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In the framework of the European Communities and later 
the European Union a number of policies were devised for 
the European regions to facilitate their balanced 
economic development. An attempt to co-ordinate these 
policies can be linked to the fact that European regions 
are increasingly interdependent and European Union 
policies increasingly more relevant to this 
interdependence. Socio-economic and regional planning 
information between the Community regions is vital in 
this interdependent environment. The importance placed 
by the academic literature and by the European Commission 
on regional planners and their actions has to an extent 
obscured the importance of regional elites in this 
process. This thesis attempts to redress the balance, 
and does so by means of a series of interviews with 
business and political elites on the effects and 
prospects of further economic integration as well as 
administrative and political autonomy. I am comparing 
Western Scotland and the west of Crete focusing on the 
wider regional political and business elites within these 
regions. My assumption that the interaction of regional 
elites with each other can be, at least partly, 
responsible for competitiveness differentials between 
regions underlies most of this analysis. I attempt a 
comparison of elite attitudes within regions and between 
regions, giving particular attention to the effect 
aspirations to autonomy may have on elite perspectives.
I have been able to discern and identify a relationship 
between regional elite attitudes on devolution and their 
perceptions of business prospects in a region. I have 
also identified a relationship between the attitudinal 
concordance among a region's elite groups and regional 
growth prospects. Furthermore, I have identified certain 
value groups for which attitudinal concordance appears 
significant to elite co-operation. Ensuing conclusions 
do not necessarily have predictive value but, by 
identifying attittudinal patterns among regional elites, 
can provide an insight into the transforming effect of 
European integration and modernity on European regional 
civil societies.
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Chapter 1
Some Questions Arising from the Literature
A. Introduction: European Integration and Regional 
Actors' Behaviour^
My interest in regional development within the context of 
European integration is linked to the possibility that an 
integrated European market can lead to economic 
agglomeration at core regions that would further hamper 
the competitiveness of the weakest peripheral regions; at 
the same time the seer size of anticipated market 
transformations, could mean that any market changes will 
be very difficult to counteract once in place.^ Regional 
inequality goes in tandem with the bleak possibility of
1. 'Regional behaviour' is taken here to refer to the behaviour of 
elite actors, at a regional level. In this paper I will proceed to 
gauge attitudes that are relevant to such pressumably distinct 
behaviour.
2. For a concise case on the necessity of European regional policy 
see Tsoukalis (1991, ch.2 & ch.8) .
13
great economic disparities that breed hardship and offend 
our perceptions of social equity, while it is 
characterised by a chronic under-utilisation of 
resources. It is not therefore surprising that the EU 
and the consisting national governments are so 
preoccupied with regional development and welfare.^ The 
understanding that Member States are, most of the times, 
too small or ill equipped for a comprehensive evaluation 
of regional problems and adoption of appropriate 
assisting measures, is one of the reasons behind the 
prominent position of European regional economics in 
current academic literature.*
 ^ . I am not suggesting that concern with regional development is on 
the ascendant in all member states. Regional development efforts 
in the UK have not been consistent since the beginning of the 
fourth Kondratieff cycle after W.W. II (Prestwich and Taylor,
1990), while since 1979 there has been an extensive drive to 
redefine the welfare state in Great Britain (Pierson, 1991), as the 
"Conservatives have stressed decreased intervention by central 
govrnment and placed much more emphasis upon national economic 
growth" (Prestwich and Taylor, 1990, p.160).
*. A seminal work on European Economics is by El-Agraa (1990) based 
on his work on International Economic Integration (El-Agraa, 1982). 
Specific problems of the European regional economy are covered by 
Despicht (1980), Pinder (1983), Molle and Cappelin (1988), Hardy at 
al (1995) and Vanhove and Klaasen (1987) .
14
Furthermore, the increase of trade and the integration of 
world financial markets has made mutual interdependence a 
feature of policy planning. The abolition of state 
subsidies and the limitation of financial instruments 
available to member states is one more reason that 
regional policy has to emanate (or at least be co­
ordinated) at the the European Union level. The trend 
towards globalisation of world production and 
distribution patterns, further affects inter-regional 
disparities in Europe.^ A final consideration is of 
European regions' integration into the European economic 
system, which means that (relevant to their degree of 
integration) any slumps in their performance become 
crucial for the rest of the EU.
The potential impact regional actors' behaviour can have, 
as a distinct factor of regional development and 
competitiveness, explains my preoccupation with attitudes 
of regional elites. Ideally, I would need to identify 
regional behaviour and attitudes as separate from those
. Economic Globalization has to be understood in a relative 
context. Krugman (1991 and 1995) has pointed to the limited extent 
of truly global trends of what Hutton (1996) has called 
'globaloney'.
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of other national or supranational elites, this although 
significant, would however require resources of a much 
grander project than the present one.
Comparing two distinct regional elites in the periphery 
of Europe (i.e. Strathclyde and Crete) appears adequate 
in order to detect the existence of an influence on 
regional performance by regional elite attitudes and 
elite interaction. I have, furthermore, given particular 
attention to the similarity or divergence of elite 
attitudes within regions. I have effectively 
hypothesised that the degree of 'concordance' between the 
business and political elite sub-groups could be directly 
correlated with past performance of a region. It is 
possible that a more exhaustive study could determine the 
degree to which regional elite concordance can be 
correlated with a measure of anticipated regional 
performance.
The role of regional elites as distinct and identifiable 
actors in European regions has not received particular 
attention in Social Science literature (recent exceptions 
include Leonardi and Garmise, 1992; Putnam, 1993; 
Dupoirier, 1994), although it is the case that certain
16
regional elites perceive their goals as distinctly 
different from those of national elites (Council of 
Europe, 1990; Morata, 1992; Newman, 1994). This could be 
viewed in tandem with the creation of a 'third level of 
governance' within European regions (Harvie, 1994), the 
emergence of a 'variable geometry state order' (Keating, 
1992, p.60) or of 'multi-level governance' (Marks, 1993; 
Keating and Jones, 1995). The relevance and implications 
of these developments to a transformation of elite 
interaction in the regional level I will examine in the 
concluding chapter of this thesis.
I have surveyed three main topics in order to establish a 
theoretical background for my survey investigation and 
determine valid assumptions in the field. The first 
deals with the relationship between business and 
political behaviour with economic development in the 
European regions. The second deals with research on the 
relation between regional autonomy and economic 
development. And in the third I discuss basic economic 
arguments on the influence on growth by natural 
endowments and regional actors.
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B . Regional Economie Development and the Behaviour of 
Regional Actors
1. The Relevance of Regional Actors
In the First Periodic Report on the Regions of Europe 
(Commission, 1981) the only section with any projections 
about the future is related to the labour market, 
signifying the importance given to the human factor by 
the researchers in the European Commission. In the 
Second Periodic Report as well (which is by itself a more 
"mature" approach to regional problems) again the main 
parameters investigated had to do with labour supply and 
demand while a reference is made to labour force 
qualifications (Commission, 1984) .^ There is no apparent 
connection of business or political behaviour in the 
regions with regional development however. Admittedly
6. Subsequent periodic reports as is the Fourth (Commission, 1991b) 
take a different angle from the first two, shifting the emphasis to 
specific regional problems rather than giving a general viewpoint 
of the regional situation. For that reason it can not be 
reasonably expected that they will dwell on such issues as the 
importance of regional elites.
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the Reports try to cover the 'social and economic 
situation of the regions of the Community' by giving an 
account of the major employment, productivity and 
regional product disparities. They are incomplete though 
-to the extent that they try to make policy suggestions- 
without considering the effects of entrepreneurial 
disposition. As I explain in part C of this chapter, 
infrastructure is not necessarily a sufficient 
precondition to guarantee private investment and 
consequent development. Of course, from the perspective 
of a civil servant, the periodic reports may be 
instrumental in identifying the problems, without however 
addressing the issue of regional actors importance.
Entrepreneurial ability and its significance is more 
openly discussed and given a centre stage by authors like 
Molle and Cappelin (Molle, 1988) ^. Although their views 
are considered controversial they indicate an interest in
7. Molle & Cappelin (Molle, 1988) also argue that long term economic 
cycle is 'responsible' for total production and unemployment; at 
this result they come using the FLEUR model (which explains changes 
in time, of the share of each region of EC in the total European 
employment by sector) in an effort to interpret differentials in 
unemployment levels.
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this particular field of research,® Molle and Cappelin in 
particular expand on the impact of Community policies in 
Europe centred on the distribution and movement of 
Labour. As Economic Geographers their particular 
interest is with the distribution of employment effects 
across space. Their contention that long term economic 
cycles are responsible for total production levels leads 
them to the conclusion that the long term cycle is 
responsible for unemployment as well.® This runs counter 
to the mainline economic principles of business cycles 
and employment levels. So, they believe that their focus 
on the long-term cycle and long-term trends of employment 
allows them not to abide by the restricted concept of 
short-term economic cycles. The authors particular 
perspective does not allow them to investigate
. An interesting point of view is expressed by French political 
economist Guy Sorman (1988), who suggests that Low Income Countries 
(LICs) experience adjustment problems to capitalist production 
because they try to duplicate Western models of developoment. 
Alhthough he sees a direct connection of development with business 
and political ethics he does not codify his contentions nor does he 
identify a regional pattern.
. The long term Schumpeterian economic cycle as a process by which 
innovation breeds innovation (Schumpeter, 1939) is considered 
relevant not only to entrepreneurship (Jensen-Butler, 1996) but is 
also a force that facilitates greater interaction between the 
private and public sector (Dunford and Bencko, 1995) .
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interaction patterns within the work force or the 
influence of particular agents on unemployment levels.
Economists like Robson, Christiansen, El-Agraa and 
Pelkman touch upon the subject of relations between
business with economic development and more rarely with
the issue of politics and economic development, but they 
seem to avoid tackling the two issues together. At the 
same time they avoid expanding on the relevant analysis 
of agent influences that will take account of the 
behavioural perspective. Since they do not touch upon 
the subject at a national level I cannot expect them to 
cover it on a regional basis either. It should not be 
forgotten however that economists categorise business 
behaviour as a basically microeconomic issue and regional 
development as a macroeconomic one. Consequently most 
economists due to 'scientific conditioning' would avoid 
mixing both perspectives.
Robson, for instance, covers the impact and importance of 
Transnational Enterprises only from the perspective of 
resource allocation and equity considerations. His 
analysis on a regional level does not refer to the
importance of a positive business climate for the
21
Transnationals to function efficiently (Robson, 1984, 
p.165-68).
Christiansen, on the other hand, makes a good study of 
location decisions on a regional level with business 
behaviour in perspective. His findings support the 
proposition that a major part of location decisions are 
made in the same way by regional actors in different 
countries. Although his study is limited in perspective 
he comes up with three rules on locational decisions :
a. decisions are made on the highest level possible,
b. small firms react more efficiently to changes in their 
locational environment and
c. only very large firms use "rational" model-oriented
procedures for selecting sites (Christiansen, 1981, 
p.224-25) .
I believe these estimates by Christiansen to support my 
contention that there is a relationship between behaviour 
of regional actors and development. In particular it 
seems that locational decisions are determined by the 
perception the manager\ entrepreneur has of the economic 
space surrounding him or her. The ability of small firms 
to react better to changes in the locational environment
22
(see b. above) could be interpreted to mean that smaller 
firms have the advantage of a more agile decision making 
process; while the fact that large firms use 'rational' 
procedures (see c. above) must be associated with the 
ability of multinationals (or aspiring multinationals) to 
have a global perspective possessing relatively unbiased 
maps of opportunity. In other words, big corporations 
are mainly influenced by 'rational' return on investment 
rules, while entrepreneurs are bound by their maps of 
business opportunities and therefore biased. Effectively 
this bias could be a major competitive advantage of the 
regions, facilitating the development of small 
enterprises, and being an 'inexhaustible' source of 
entrepreneurial capital in the regions. Entrepreneurs 
unlike multinationals are more likely to have a permanent 
commitment to a region.
Disequilibrium theory assumes rational decisions by 
businessmen, investors and migrant workers who calculate 
opportunities and act accordingly. As David Pinder 
argues "businessmen and investors possess "mental maps" 
of spatial opportunity that deviate markedly from 
reality"(Pinder, 1983 p.30). Pinder draws on theories 
developed by Hirschman, Myrdal and Friedmann in
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explaining that entrepreneurs do not evaluate objectively 
growth regions, are biased towards advanced regions and 
overestimate the benefits in some growth regions. All 
these lead to a distortion of their views on available 
opportunities elsewhere. The media or proximity of 
entrepreneurial capital to development regions, or 
business associates are likely to bias the opinion of 
entrepreneurs.
It has also been argued that much depends on the ability 
of decision makers to filter biased information and 
analyse it effectively (Gold, 1980; Gould and White,
1986). Thus indicating that balanced growth is directly 
relevant to attitudes of important actors toward 
particular regions. Finder also contents that 
"strategies designed to improve international balance 
will be incomplete if they focus on economic 
considerations alone. Attention must also be given to
10. Finder further suggests that "repeated exposure [to] particular 
features of the objective environment will however, increase 
the probability of their inclusion in the behavioural 
environment... [particularly] since people are most frequently 
exposed to those parts of the objective environment that are in 
the immediate vicinity" (Finder, 1983,p.).
In other words entrepreneurs are influenced by what is closer to 
home than what is further away.
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overcoming the psychological barriers to development in 
lagging areas" (Finder, 1983 p.32).
I now turn to the effect those 'biased' regional actors 
can have on regional economies within Europe.
2. Actors in the European Regions
Nevin comes to recognise the importance of political 
actors in efforts of regional development by pointing to 
the need of politicians to alleviate regional problems in 
the short term. He does not however distinguish the 
effect of regional politicians nor does he see the 
possible importance of a positive business climate 
created by regional government. Furthermore, he sees as 
a reason of regional imbalance entrepreneurs who 
'displace, the flexible prices and free markets of 
earlier stages of development, by administered prices', 
leading therefore to the market distortions responsible 
for regional inequality (Nevin, 1990, p.329). Although 
this is an admittedly negative view of entrepreneurial 
role it shows the preoccupation of the author with the 
role actors can play on the regional level. Furthermore,
25
this view can only be sustained for entrepreneurs that 
are able to monopolise a market, a development that can 
only seem possible if an entrepreneur has a big market 
share or acts in collusion with his competitors. In a 
world of small-medium sized enterprises and multiregional 
competition it is difficult to imagine such a 
development.
It is possible that economic analysts fail to take 
account of those characteristics that separate one region 
from another and which can be perceived to have an impact 
on the productive environment within a region. The 
perennial discussion of identity by political scientists 
could be what economists miss-out when they examine 
regional growth. For instance, in his analysis Nevin 
equates national problems in a customs union with 
regional problems within a nation (Nevin, 1990, p.335- 
41). This has the detrimental effect of altering the 
perspective of his exposition. He takes as given that 
national units (his new regions) will -or can- represent 
the interests of their own regions in the European 
Community. He, in other words, presupposes that 
analysing the behaviour of national Governments and 
industries at the community level is assimilable to an
26
analysis of regional behaviour. He does make one 
interesting remark in that context: "generalisations
concerning the regional impact on existing enterprises 
are on shaky ground ...[because] the range of productive 
performance within any given country...is at least as 
great as that between countries" (Nevin, 1990 p.329). 
Effectively he recognises the limitations of economic 
analysis on a national level, to account fully account 
for their economic problems and provide solutions. He 
warns, that once a common market exists it is difficult 
to separate industry on a regional or national basis with 
no reference to basic distributional statistics for the 
industries best and worst performers. Generalisations 
will be meaningful (i.e. identifying an industry as 
labour or capital intensive) only on a very wide basis 
(i.e. European Union level). The importance of this 
realisation lies basically in interpretations of regional 
data and policies in aid of regions, A region 
demonstrating low productivity in one industry may have a 
thriving public and ailing private sectors. This being 
an unusuall event it may not be immediately identified by 
a simple review of the data. This fact acts as a further 
impediment to meaningful analysis of regional integration 
by conventional economic analysis.
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Pelkmans addresses the issue of regional policy conducted 
'from above' which would have a negative influence on the 
'supply of entrepreneurs'. He poses the question: "is
the supply of entrepreneurs exogenously given, 
independent of the business climate?", to answer " a 
favourable business climate with sufficient freedom for 
new initiatives and new entry is likely to exert a strong 
positive effect on the supply of entrepreneurs"
(Pelkmans, 1984, p.274). He goes on to attack over­
involvement of the government for among other reasons 
that "political commitments may create an atmosphere 
where cost increases go unpunished", he believes that 
"neither Governments nor firms can 'pick winners' 
individually" therefore advocating a balanced involvement 
by both(Pelkmans, 1984, p.274). Pelkmans further 
suggests that regional policy is conducted on political 
arguments and for electoral reasons; they end-up 
distorting the market by compensating for locational 
disadvantage helping to maintain 'key' and 'essential' 
industries which would not have survived in free 
competition (Pelkmans, 1984, pp44-54 and 271-275).
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There seems to exist a dichotomy of interest between 
political and economic goals of regional policy. This, I 
believe, is evident from the fact that it can be to the 
advantage of national politicians -who frequently have a 
short term perspective- to distort market operations to 
ameliorate regional problems, instead of promoting 
economic solutions that benefit the regions in the long 
term. In short, national politicians seem to favour the 
solutions with the least political cost. That is a good 
reason to investigate behaviour of regional politicians 
to whom -hopefully- regional welfare extends beyond the 
next elections. I believe regional politicians 
commitment 'evident' by the fact that it is a small 
percentage of them that will be able to pursue a 
political career on a national or supranational level. 
Therefore their 'bond' with local government should 
identify them more with their region. Furthermore, in 
regions with autonomous aspirations, politicians 
associated with that goal, will correlate a political 
career in the national arena with stronger representation 
of regional interests.
In the report on "The Economics of 1992" (Emerson, 1988), 
representing the semi-official view of the European
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Commission on the direction of the European Common 
Market, the issue of business climate or managerial 
capacity is not tackled on a regional level. Naturally, 
an issue emerging as having paramount importance for 
further integration was the training of European 
managers. It is evident that managerial capacity and 
business initiative is considered essential but regional 
differences are omitted as one of the sources of regional 
variation. Furthermore, the entrepreneurial milieu and 
the relationship between business and political actors 
are not given adequate consideration.^^ So, although 
regional economic variations are considered one of the 
major policy arenas, posing a significant challenge to 
the competence of the EU, causes of regional 
disequilibrium are not fully gauged if the main reference 
to business actors in the regions relates to their 
training.
. The concept of the 'entrepreneurial milieu' is comprehensively 
discussed by Jesper Rasmussen (1992) as it relates to entrepreneurs 
and their social networks in a locality. Camagni (1995) and Coffey 
and Bailly (1996) explore the concept of 'innovative milieu', while 
the relationship between entrepreneurship and regional development 
is examined by Sweeney (1987) and Bradley and Taylor (1995).
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One of the latest research projects funded by the 
European Commission, tries to address the issues involved 
in regional competitiveness by surveying business elites 
in a European Community wide level (Nam, 1991a and Nam, 
1991b). This research effort, although of invaluable 
assistance as an indicator of prevailing business 
attitudes in Europe does not attempt to present the point 
that regional business elites are in themselves important 
for regional competitiveness, nor does it attempt to 
identify regional elite's interaction as one of the 
reasons behind regional competitiveness. The focus of 
this survey, on industrial production firms, which are 
typically medium or large, further bias results towards 
large national or multinational operators.
3. Some Explanations of Regional Actor Involvement 
in Regional Development
Political scientists come to interesting conclusions when 
they try to tackle the issue of regional policy. It is 
more 'natural' for a political scientist to associate 
economic considerations with political motives. So Nigel 
Despicht asserts that "government policies toward regions
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have been inspired by national problems" and "European 
regional policy is acceptable if European-scale action 
helps to solve national problems better" (Despicht, 1980 
p.40). His perspective seems like a typical 'integration 
from above' exercise where significant regional actors 
are only those having 'aspirations for autonomy' such as 
the Basques or the Scots (Despicht, 1980) .
It is possible that the visibility of other regional 
groups is less prominent but I contest the view that 
regional actors with less radical views than , say, the 
Basque separatists are less significant for their 
regions' economic development. On Despicht's defence 
regions or their integration where not very high on the 
political agenda of the 1970's and it was hard to foresee 
the importance they would assume in EC planning by the 
1990's .
Another political scientist ,Barry Jones, demonstrates 
the importance of regional political actors focusing his 
discussion on regional groups of interest and their power 
to lobby effectively. He warns that:
"The regions are parts of highly developed, 
integrated political systems. Regional interest
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group attitudes and the procedures which they have 
evolved are conditioned by the fact that they 
operate within the constitutional framework of their 
respective states, according to the rules and 
conventions of their parliaments and the 
organisational structures of their national 
political parties and pressure groups" (Jones, 1985, 
p.243) .
In other words, regional actors do not function 
autonomously of national political influence. In this 
work Jones does not determine the extent to which they 
divert from national, to support regional interests 
however.
Forecasting a possible future for the European Regions, 
Jones, believes that "the more the regional and other 
interests organise to lobby the Commission in Brussels" 
the more centralised the EC will become which will result 
in "regional and peripheral interests [to]... be 
subordinate to the needs of the Community as a whole" 
(Jones, 1985, p.245). So, Jones sees two forces namely 
the "proprietorial interest expressed by the national 
Governments" and the "consolidation of power in the
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Commission" (Jones, 1985, p.245) as seriously threatening 
the chances of European regions to autonomous decision 
making. His contentions seem consistent and point to 
subsequent developments in the European political scene 
that have taken a slightly different turn than what Jones 
predicted however. One of the possible scenarios for the 
development of Community institutions presupposes that 
regional autonomy and decision making will be enhanced, 
by the process of Community integration, so that this 
'new third level' of government at the regional level 
will counteract centralised legislative and executive 
powers of the Community. Under this scenario the 
national units will be the only ones to suffer loss of 
sovereign power.^
12. Whether the shift of power to the regions is feasible or even 
desirable, is a theoretical question. It has been suggested for 
instance that "...relations between the central government and 
autonomous communities remains a central issue facing Spain, 
although one with potentially beneficial implications."
(Heywood,1991,p .64). On the run-up to the ratification of the 
Treaty of the European Union certain governments were reported to 
be hostile to the institutionalisation of the Committee of the 
Regions, which they perceived as potentially enhancing regional 
autonomy (The Economist, 1992).
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The view has also been expressed that regional units 
become increasingly players on their own right, while 
regional politics and lobbying attain a different focus. 
According to Boisot "what we are witnessing in this 
evolution is a shift in the nature of regional strategy 
from one which could be described as a game against 
nature to one that is more appropriately labelled a game 
against adversaries" (1990,p.394). According to this 
perspective, regional authorities lobby Brussels 
directly, competing with other local authorities for ERDF 
or other funds and preferential treatment on regulations 
or allocation of resources. This would signify the 
emergence in Europe of regional players in their own 
right. Such a development would be more significant for 
regional authorities like Strathclyde that financed a 
representative office in Brussels, while it can be argued 
that by its mere existence such an office created a 
higher awareness about European issues among the 
Strathclyde local political elite.“
. Christopoulos and Herbert (1996) and Herbert (1997, forthcoming) 
examine the importance of awareness among the regional elite of Eu 
policy initiatives.
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It can be of course counter-argued that the emergence of 
regional actors as players in the European arena is a 
chimera. The European Union budget is just over one 
percent of the GDP of the member states. Recent academic 
work detects only incremental effects of regions in EU 
policy making (Bomberg, 1994/ Van der Knaap,1994; Jeffery 
1995). The concept of 'Europe of the Regions' has been 
derided while an alternative concept of 'Europe with the 
Regions'(Borras-Allomar et al, 1994; Hooghe, 1996) has 
been offered lately as a more accurate assessment of 
future relations of European institutions with regional 
government . It is also evident that lobbying in favour 
of a region is more effective with the intervention and 
collaboration of a 'home' nation state (Mazey and 
Richardson, 1993). Furthermore, it has been suggested 
that it is not the allocation of resources that drive 
regions to a European representation but the need for 
information and of a re-assertion of their regional 
identity (Marks et al, 1996).^^
. In this work it is suggested by Gary Marks at al (1996), that 
"an office in Brussels is a form of insurance against the hazards 
of a notoriously unpredictable policy environment" (p.58), 
furthermore irrespective of whether regions harbour a "sense of 
distinctiveness [that] is party-political or cultural... regional 
governments are driven to Brussels to secure independent
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The degree to which regions will proceed from being 
integral parts of nation-states to outright inter­
regional competition with one another, is the subject of 
an ongoing academic debate (Hardy et ai, 1995; Ohmae, 
1995) which is still at its early stages/^
Finally, to produce a complete account of forces 
affecting European régionalisation it is important to 
mention those that support the 'emancipation' of regional 
units within national and European institutions as a 
political conviction. Most prominent is the Federalist 
Intergroup in the European Parliament. According to the 
Federalists, consolidation of political power in the EU 
cannot but get balanced with more autonomous decision 
making from the European Union regions. The question
representation" (p.60). It is finally concluded that "the only 
resource we find evidence for is that of associational culture, 
which presumably is linked to the entrepeneurialism of subnational 
decision-makers in pursuing opportunities for political 
communication and influence beyond their own region" (p.63).
. For a discussion of the competition between European urban 
centres see Lever (1993) .
16. In an article on the institutional reforms of the EC in The 
Federalist, Antonio Padoa-Schioppa, expresses these federalist 
ambitions for Europe when he calls for the endorsement of a 
statement, in the then pending Maastricht Treaty, of "...the
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then arises whether regional actors are able to benefit 
their region more effectively than actors at the national 
level.^
Obviously speaking about regions it has to be clarified, 
that it is very difficult to make a distinct separation 
of decision making on the regional level that is not 
directly related to the national or supranational level. 
Hence my interest on regional autonomy and its relation 
to business and political behaviour.
C. Regional Autonomy and Economic Development: A Link?
There would be a limited scope in discussing the 
relationship of autonomy to regional development if all
constitutional principles of subsidiarity, popular sovereignty and 
the balancing of powers..." (Padoa-Schioppa, 1991, p.72).
17. There have been suggestions that the policy of national 
governments, like the British one, have been consistent and that 
the control of European policy through the elimination of 
federalist overtones in European Treaties is a positive development 
(George, 1990).
18. It has been argued (Hadjimichalis, 1983) that there is a 
political and cultural subordination of the periphery within the 
countries of Southern Europe, that creates a core and periphery 
relationship similar to the North-South one. It is further argued 
that the developed agglomerations in the South derive their 
strength from the existence of such a periphery.
operations and decisions on growth and development were 
taken at a national or supranational level. On a cursory 
overview this would appear to be the case for both 
Scotland and Crete. It is my contention, however that 
regional elites are able to influence decisions at a 
national and supranational level, while policies devised 
at the national and supranational level are privy to 
lobbying from those regions with the strongest and most 
determined regional elites.
On the other hand in a free trade area, with 
transportation costs becoming marginal for most 
products^, the concept of economic autonomy has an
. See Marks at al (1996) for an account of the effectiveness of 
'the mobilization of regions in the European Union'. It is further 
suggested that "the association between regional political autonomy 
and representation in Brussels is clear for several countries"
(1996, p.59).
In "The Region Is Dead! Long Live The Region" Neil Smith (1988) 
argues convincingly that the : a. internalisation of production, b. 
firm structure reorganisation, c. new labour practices that have 
increased productivity and d. transport costs that have become of 
minimal concern, are leading effectively to a 'space of flows' to 
substitute a 'space of places'. Additionally, the tertiary sector, 
the fastest growing sector in the capitalist economies, has very 
limited transportation costs and low locational disadvantages 
(Illeris, 1989). Furthermore, as regional economics contends 
(Burns, 1987 p.18), bearing an acute crisis on the downturn of the
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inherently restricted meaning. Within the globalisation 
of production and consumption patterns, the EU regulatory 
framework becomes quintessential for regional 
competitiveness. I will argue further-on that one of the 
most important assets of a region's productive 
environment is the attitudinal concordance of elite 
actors.
I will also argue that, although the major fiscal and 
monetary decisions are taken in the centre -be it 
Europe or Nation State- there exists an ability for 
manoeuvre of regional and local government. This power 
is often more than just an ability to bend rules and 
decisions taken at the centre. It is one of my 
hypotheses that regional government can create a
business cycle, transportation costs are relatively declining 
through time.
. For a (philososphical) definition of autonomy in its relation to 
politics see Castoriadis (1991).
. The traditional core -periphery arguments on their economic side 
will be developed in part D. Regional Scientists however (Agnew, 
1988) argue that there is no political core and periphery today. It 
is also argued that regions no longer have "life-cycles" with 
rising and declining economies of scale and uneven development is 
not a pattern but a process. Effectively "Regions are not actors 
with common experiences" (Agnew, 1988 p.131).
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conducive business environment,^^ and therefore be 
instrumental in creating the 'attitudes' that can be 
beneficial to the people of their locality.
It will, furthermore be interesting to examine whether 
the politicians of a region accommodate the businessmen 
of a region, within the process of 'policy networks' or 
the existence of neo-corporatist arrangements among local 
elites (Schmitter, 1979, 1982/ Cawson, 1985, 1986;
O'Sullivan 1988) . In the context of examining European 
regional prospects, it has also been suggested that the 
emergence of public-private partnerships in European
In a very important document (Commission, 1981b) in which the 
Commission gives the new dimensions of Regional Policy, 
exploitation of indigenous development potential is directed among 
others to: "dormant business capacity (especially in small and 
medium-sized enterprises, crafts and rural tourism), which need 
support services in terms of information, research, technical 
assistance, market analysis etc.".
. Going back to the economic background of such an issue a quote 
from Verhoven & Klaassen I believe is enlightening to the trade­
offs involved:
"The question can be raised whether South Wales has been better 
off with the combination of relatively high income for those 
employed, relatively heavy unemployment, and external aid, than 
it would have been if it could have devalued its 'currency' 
dispensing with aid, reducing the real earnings of those in 
work, but also reducing unemployment and probably accelerating 
growth"(1987,p.241).
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cities and lagging regions can be associated with the 
'generation of dynamic development strategies' in the 
1980's which, however, cannot by themselves be a 
sufficient condition for development (ERECO, 1993, p.45- 
46) .
At this point it is good to remember that it is still an 
open question whether businessman or politicians are in a 
better position to assess the economic predicament of a 
region better. "Policy-makers have presented themselves 
as possessing spatially unbiased views which give rise to 
an appreciation of the sub-optimal resource use 
characteristic of regional systems in disequilibrium"/ 
in other words politicians in designing regional policy 
claim they can correct "the inaccurate mental maps 
possessed by industrial decision makers" (Finder, 1983 
p.66). In assesing the role of politicians it should be 
born in mind that policy making for the regions cannot be 
considered separate from the seasonality of the political 
'game' and the party political scene.
I assume that regional politicians (in contrast to 
national ones) could create the necessary equilibrium for 
two main reasons. First, they must feel more accountable
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to their region, if only because of a smaller size of the 
electorate. Secondly, they must be more receptive and 
better aware of the needs of their region possessing a 
more accurate 'mental map' of their area.
The development of services in European regions can be a 
case in point. Sven Illeris (Illeris, 1989) argues that 
the service industry cannot operate without the existence 
of infrastructure but at the same time the existence of 
infrastructure alone is by no way a guarantee of the 
development of services. The two must go hand in hand. 
Obviously for the most promising sector of growth for the 
Community regions (Commission, 1984) the question does 
not become one of just providing the infrastructure funds 
but creating those attitudes that will make possible 
tapping into the latent human resourcefulness in every 
area.
The creation of new service firms depends decisively on 
the presence of entrepreneurs (Illeris, 1989, p.103).
What is characterised as the "entrepreneurial type of 
human resources" (Illeris, 1989,p.104) is considered 
essential for innovation and firm creation. The 
frequency of creation and degree of success of new firms
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depends to a great extent on the social and cultural 
background of the entrepreneurs. Local and regional 
authorities can therefore be instrumental in creating 
those conditions that will cultivate and encourage 
innovative skill and assist in the marketing of new 
products.
To go back into examining politicians and policy makers 
relevance to the development of a region it is relevant 
to examine possible effects of regional planning on a 
region. It has been suggested that the "competitive 
advantages of a region or firm are less determined by 
what happens to be their 'natural endowment' and are to a
large extent the result of deliberate strategies
reflected in investment in productivity ,people and R &
D" (Emerson, 1988 p.180-1). European Commission
. As argued on the report The Tourism Sector in the Community 
(Commission, 1985) it is the approach peoples of different regions 
have towards tourism that make for the differences in growth of the 
sector. Italian tourism experienced a 'tired maturity' while 
Greek and British (and later Spanish) were experiencing a constant 
growth (Commission, 1985). This report accounts for the situation 
in late 70's and early 80's. Obviously there is no account of the 
Greek 'maturity' of the late '80's that followed or the blooming of 
the Spanish and later Turkish tourist markets in the Mediterranean 
basin.
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researchers, in other words, believe that planning can be 
a sufficient counter balance for lack of endowments. 
Although 'investment in people' is a vague enough concept 
to include the creation of a positive innovation climate,
I believe there exists a failure of elevating this 
concept to the importance it deserves.
Researchers in the Commission, in the same report on the 
effects of market integration believe as well that 
eventually there will be an even pattern of development 
"between dynamic centres and lethargic peripheral areas" 
(Emerson, 1988,p.181), seeing the latter as lagging in 
basic technological infrastructure and vocational 
training. Recent analysis suggests that globalisation of 
production will eventually lead to convergence of real 
incomes while core-periphery disparities will be 
eliminated in the long term (Krugman and Venables, 1994) . 
This analysis is limited however, by an assumption of 
constantly diminishing transport costs.
On the other hand, it is generally accepted that 
distributive effects from infrastructure improvements are 
small, when they take place on all regions at the same 
speed (Rietveld, 1989); that as "US experience has shown
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... public work projects, chiefly because of their long 
delays in implementation fare badly as economic 
stabilisation instruments" (Burns 1987,p.240); and that 
international capital investment is directed towards 
locations with already existing qualified labour. From 
these premises I conclude that it has to be indigenous 
investment efforts that can trigger an adequate process 
of development. As indigenous investors I also consider 
the institutional ones since "the structure of the 
region's 'production environment' may....be more decisive 
than the abilities of the entrepreneur" (Lambooy,1986, 
p.160) or as W. Stohr claims, a prerequisite for 
innovation in the regions is the interaction of among 
others "risk financing... and locally rooted decision 
making functions" (as quoted in Vanhove,1987,p .171). A 
need for decisive actions on the region can probably be 
better facilitated the more autonomous the decision 
making is. So, it can be concluded that international 
planners and politicians are an important but not 
sufficient element to regional development, while they 
appear inherently restricted in their ability to 
influence regional development.
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I next turn to attitudes of business elites themselves. 
Characteristic of the perspective managers and 
Multinational Enterprises (MNLs) take towards an 
integrated market is the prevailing conviction that 
'unifying the internal European market is a good idea' 
(Geroski, 1989). How good and how firms should respond 
to it is a matter open to debate. Quelch and Buzzell 
forecast homogeneity of consumer behaviour and call for 
single product campaigns and a pan-European 
strategy(Quelch, 1989). Gogel and Larreche however warn 
that 'it is important having a strategic perspective in 
order to avoid either immobilisation or overreaction' 
further suggesting that markets can be fragmented even 
after the mythical 1992(Gogel, 1989). On the other 
extreme from Quelch and Buzzell is Geroski who predicts 
"an increase in the diversity of goods and services 
offered to consumers" further arguing that "the challenge 
comes from those willing to sacrifice diversity in 
pursuit of efficiency gains that are likely to prove 
modest in scale" (Geroski, 1989,p.75).
To make the issue slightly more intriguing all three 
above mentioned business articles are basing their 
predictions on the same report of the European Commission
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on the 'Economics of 1992'. The perspective of big 
corporations and managers suggests that they consider an 
internal market with uniform laws and similar consumer 
tastes as a prerequisite for the development of a Common 
Market. The importance of such a view is that they seem 
'naturally' opposed to delegating power to regional 
authorities. If this is a correct assumption autonomy 
inspired regions will have to depend more on the small- 
medium sized companies and the new entrepreneurs for 
support on their aspirations to autonomy.
Multinationals could be seen as lobbying for more 
legislative power of central authorities as expressed by 
Quelch and Buzzell (1989), who suggest a move of 
multinational enterprises head offices to the centre of 
Europe and increased lobbying in Brussels.
It appears so, that regional politicians can claim that 
they are better equipped to devise a regional development 
strategy, while big corporations and multinationals are 
averse to any moves towards regional autonomy in decision
. This is evident in the warnings by the CBI to Scottish devolution 
or the latter day 'dealignment' of larger Québécois industries from 
the nationalist camp (Keating, 1996).
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making, that could create aberrations to an integrated 
market. Support for regional autonomy is more likely to 
lie with SMEs whose proprietors/managers are more likely 
to identify with a locality. To conclude this initial 
investigation I next examine whether local entrepreneurs 
could be considered as an asset of a region, in the same 
way that one can examine natural endowments.
D. Regional Growth and Regional Actors
On a qualitative evaluation of factors of growth one is 
tempted to consider that natural endowments play an 
increasingly diminishing role in the prosperity of a 
region. A commonplace example is the success of 
economies (in the course of the fourth Kondratieff cycle) 
with very limited indigenous resources other than the 
human resources (Japan, Hong-Kong, Taiwan etc).
Peter Robson (Robson, 1984) argues that disparities 
between regions cannot be explained in terms of 
differences in initial natural resource endowments. On 
an analysis of regional disequilibria it is apparent that
49
unequal development is connected with industrial 
activity. Disadvantaged regions can be further 
identified as having lower productivity growth rates for 
a series of business cycles.
Kenichi Ohmae (1995b) suggests that globalisation leads 
to the 'rise of regional economies'. His arguments 
although stemming from a correct premise and topical to 
this discussion are rather weak however. His vision of 
regional agglomerations (Ohmae, 1995a) that transcend 
national frontiers conveniently forgets all political 
institutions that will be pegged against any such moves. 
His prediction of the 'end of the nation state' seems at 
best premature. It is conceivable that the nation state 
will be challenged by stateless nations in Europe 
(Keating, 1996a) or that in the post-Westphalian state 
there will be "a new balance between subnational and 
other identities" (Linklater, 1996, p.98). It is hard to 
conceive the dissolution of the nation state however, 
based on economic expediency alone.
. On similar grounds is a frequently quoted statement by H. Girsch: 
"The creation of a monetary union transforms balance of payment 
problems into regional problems" (1949, pp. 87-97).
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To examine the basic tenets of regional economics it 
would be beneficial to start with Gunar Myrdal and his 
classic book Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions 
(1957) in which he stresses that labour and capital will 
move to regions already developed so that in the next 
economic cycle the deprived regions are likely to be in 
an even worse position. In Myrdal's 'Cumulative 
Causation Theory' lies the beginning of much research and 
analyses like those of Hirchman, Kaldor, Klaassen and 
others (Molle, 1988) .
On the other hand it has been amply demonstrated 
(Commission, 1984) that peripherality can be a factor of 
regional development.^® In effect location can be 
considered a natural endowment as "it should also be 
mentioned that certain peripheral regions possess natural 
resources and advantages for the development of trade" 
(Commission, 1984 p.140). In other words, under certain
. Relevant to this debate is also the notion that the productive 
environment is determined by 'actions or behaviour' of economic 
actors in a locality. Baumol (1990) for instance argues that a 
legislative framework that promotes entrepreneurial incentives to 
innovate promotes 'productive entrepreneurship'. Lever (1992) 
gives an account of a succesful local authority response in the 
West of Scotland, when the region met with the challenge of 
industrial decline.
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conditions being in the periphery could be an 
advantageous position.^® It does not seem however that 
research, so far, can convincingly identify the reasons 
of regional economic marginalisation. Peripherality is a 
measurement of a static condition which evaluates the 
effect past policies or rounds of capitalist accumulation 
have had on the development of a region. I do not 
believe it can be an effective tool in evaluating 
potential.
Eventually the question of the importance of regional 
actors has to be addressed. Beyond the questions of 
autonomy raised above, regional actors are obviously not 
going to divert significantly from what actors may do on 
a national or international level. The difference I see 
in the importance of regional actors has very much to do
. An exhaustive analysis of European regional prospects was 
recently completed by the European Economic Research and Advisory 
Consortium citing "the strengthening of regional identities within 
Europe [as] one identifiable pan-European movement which is likely 
to have consequences for regional economic change" (ERECO, 1993, 
p. 3) .
The discussion on Regional Dynamics which follows is relevant to 
the questions of peripherality since it can be claimed that a 
regions' peripherality is temporal and that on the next business 
cycle it will be naturally led out of depression, a typical neo­
classical economics argument.
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with what Hirschman calls 'a special kind of boldness' 
(Finder, 1983). Both entrepreneurs and politicians need 
such a boldness to succeed in what continuously will be a 
'competition between communities' for capital (Smith,
1988) and while regional boundaries become less 
significant (Smith, 1988; Agnew, 1988) . The local/ 
regional context has become more significant as the 
emergence of an identifiably regional behaviour takes 
place. This can be the consequence of the reimagining of 
regional identity (Rosamond, 1995) and of the emergence 
of a 'multi-perspectival' polity (Ruggie, 1993) or of the 
'invention of regions' (Keating, 1996a).
To turn back into regional economics it is relevant to 
note that with the phenomenon of fast and slow motions in 
urban and regional dynamics not fully chartered 
(Dendrinos, 1984) it is impossible to give relative 
weights to the importance of endowments vis a vis actors, 
it is obvious that both factors have to be present for 
economic developoment to occur. It is not possible, 
however, to predict the combination mix that can generate 
regionial development. There is also difference of 
opinion on the development of regional dynamics. Some 
researchers believe that regional economic dynamics
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follow a cyclical pattern while others believe that a 
linear process is more typical of regional development. 
Prominent in the first group is Leo Klaassen who divides 
regions into four different categories according to their 
level of prosperity. He finds there is a pattern of 
prosperity-recession-depression-recovery, with 
approximately five-year periods for each position shift. 
In an application of his research design, regions either 
remain in the same position or move to the next with no 
region moving to a previous position (Klaassen, 1987). 
Similar views are expressed by Berg, Burns and Klaassen 
who claim regions follow the cycles of industries 
comprising their economy where "vestiges of functional 
independence of regions appear to be rapidly disappearing 
as the world 'shrinks' and spatial units become more and 
more integrated" (Berg et al, 1 9 8 7 ) A recent analysis 
that assumes linear regional development is the one by 
Krugman and Venables (1994) in which they theorise that 
globalisation of production unequivocally alters the 
economic relations between core and periphery.
. An interesting evolution to this principle might be the idea that 
as an effect of "shrinkage" and economic interdependence regions 
experiencing a cyclical development process are much more liable to 
affect the delicately balanced world economy today than they once 
were.
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So, can it be suggested that regional growth is 
influenced by the behaviour of regional actors more than 
the existence of natural endowments? The survey of the 
literature suggests that this question has to be 
considered more closely. At this stage a tenuous link 
can be made on the importance of regional actor behaviour 
as one of the endowments of a region.
Finally, note should be made of apparent limitations to 
the present investigation. Important actors on a 
regional level may have very little to do with a region's 
prosperity to the extent that regional policy is directed 
from the centre. I must therefore point to the fact that 
national actors can be considered presently more relevant 
than regional ones to a regions' level of development. 
This is particularly the case for the regions examined 
here. I have chosen in this research design to focus on 
an analysis of local businessman and politicians that I 
hypothesise are the most significant actors at the 
regional level not making the assumption that they are 
the most powerful or influential ones overall.
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E. Issues Raised: A Critical Appraisal
An effort has been made in this chapter to investigate 
the literature published by the European Commission in 
conjunction with opinions held by academics on the 
importance placed on the behaviour of regional actors and 
the relevance it may have to regional economic 
development.
It is obvious that in most sources discussed there is a 
connection between a positive business climate with 
economic development, yet a great number of authors fail 
to identify the importance of regional political and 
business actors. Most also shy away from connectinig the 
local businessman/woman with the local politician as a 
factor of development of a region. This I believe is 
understandable since regions in the EU were not 
considered to possess significant political clout 
(compared with nation states), which appears to be the
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case even in relatively autonomous and distinctly 
independent regions such as Bavaria or Cataluha.®^
From the US, the EU is perceived as having the 
characteristics of a regional federal state (Sandholtz,
1989) but this perspective 'demotes' national units which 
acquire the characteristics of these 'new regions' of the 
EU. So, political actor importance will be assumed to 
exist only in national parliaments or European 
institutions. This view fails to identify existing 
diversity, even among comparatively homogeneous nations 
such as Greece.” My belief in the importance of, 
hitherto comparatively marginalised actors, comes from my 
judgement that further consolidation of power to the EU 
centre, will inevitably free autonomous aspirations in 
the regions. A natural balance, to an empowered European
. Evidence for a 'Europe of the Regions' is at best weak. 
Academics have rarely found any real evidence for a shift in power
in European institutional structures in favour of the regions
(Jones, 1995). A number of times as a result of regional tensions 
within member states a shift of power to the regions is evident. 
This at times gets blown out of proportion by journalists who 
declare the emergence of the 'age of the regions' (Klau, 1996).
. There are many ways in which regional diversity in Greece can be
demonstrated but I need only refer to the completely different 
social, political and economic background, between regions like 
Thrace in the North and Crete in the South of the country.
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centre, could be created by segmenting the competencies 
of national units along the principles of subsidiarity.”
In this chapter I have also attempted to identify whether 
regional actors may be considered instrumental in 
creating the most appropriate conditions for economic 
development. It appears that academic literature has not 
sufficiently explored the issue yet.” Restrictions 
arising from the 'realtive political weight' and 
'credibility' of regional political actors can be 
considered relevant to the attention to local actors. A 
synergistic relationship between business and policy 
planners can be perceived as one of the most promising 
development prospects for European regions.
Overall, in the academic discourse it has not been 
conclusively established whether regional autonomy 
favours regional development or hinders it, although thre 
are indications that there exists a relationship between 
the two. Neo-classic economic theory would suggest that
. Taking account of the vagueness of the meaning of subsidiarity
as suggested by Peterson (1994).
. While it appeared to only be ; 
present project commenced in 1989.
scratching the surface when the
market segmentation leads to an increase in costs but 
local autonomy in regional development planning can 
conceivably lead to efficiency gains as well.
On the penultimate part of this analysis the question of 
endowments was considered in brief since the basic 
economic arguments about the relative importance of 
endowments is not a contested issue among the academic 
community. A discussion on how a region becomes 
peripheral and the possible hypotheses of whether 
regional actors can be a force in that process ties in 
with the rest of the theoretical considerations expressed 
here.
Finally, a discussion on regional dynamics and patterns 
of regional development has intended to show the 
importance of national (or regional) state intervention 
to ameliorate the effects of growth cycles.
Consequently, the relevance of operating state 
intervention mechanisms from the regional level (whether 
on a déconcentration, decentralisation or devolution 
principle) should be apparent.
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I will proceed in this thesis with the formulation of a 
number of hypotheses pertaining to the issues already 
explored and the development of a relevant research 
design. The first step will include determining whether 
business and political elites are different and whether 
that difference relates to their regional identity. Then 
attitudes on regional devolution will be correlated to 
perceived business prospects for a region, while 
attitudinal concordance will be correlated with the 
economic performance of the regions examined.
I focus this investigation on elite attitudes, assuming 
elite behaviour to be congruent with those attitudes, 
while using both quantitative and qualitative techniques 
in the survey employed. It has to be stressed that 
although the main research design is based on hypothesis 
testing it is extensively supplemented from literature 
and observations that are predominantly centred on an ex 
post facto analysis.
In the concluding chapter of this work I return to those 
questions explored in this primary literature survey with 
issues that I have taken-up in my hypotheses. Findings 
from examining the hypotheses are compared with
60
propositions in the literature to provide an ultimate 
measure of construct validity on the points I argue. It 
is conceivable therefore to perceive the concluding 






It becomes apparent from the examination of the literature 
that certain questions of elite interaction, on which the 
growth pattern of regions depend, are not satisfactorily 
covered in present academic discourse. Investigating some 
of these by conducting research on elite attitudes in 
European regions is a valid way for examining the impact on 
regions of elite interaction and how this interaction is (or 
could be) affected by European integration.
Issues investigated and analysed in the following chapters 
lend themselves to a cross-regional attitudinal study, as 
they are selected for their communality of significance 
across Europe (i.e. attitudes to the European Common 
Market). Choice of particular regions and elite groups is 
discussed in chapters three and four. In broad terms one 
industrially declining and one agricultural-industrialising 
region of the European Community are investigated, while the
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local political and business elites are targeted for the 
survey.
Attitudinal data referring to the interaction patterns 
between the elite groups of each region as well as 
variations in replies between elite groups are employed to 
investigate the hypotheses constructed. It was anticipated 
that some of the hypotheses I set out to test would be 
dismissed in the course of this research . A brief 
description of those initially eliminated hypotheses is 
given in section E of the present chapter. These are mainly 
investigative hypotheses some of which had to be eliminated
38as non-testable with the means at my disposal.
Referring to limiting factors of this investigation I must 
point to the small size of the targeted population which 
restricted my options in selecting the interviewee sample.
A limit to resources further limited the time I could spend 
on the field collecting information and conducting 
interviews. As will be analysed in chapter four, the 
varying response rate and degree of co-operation among the 
different elite groups, -when requesting interviews-, 
restricted testable propositions further. A more thorough
38 . The most important hindrance to collecting data were limitations 
pertaining to field research that are briefly covered in appendix I .
. The terms 'interviewee' and 'respondent' are used interchangeably. 
The terms 'informant' and 'form filler' as used by Bateson (1984) 
where thought insufficient descriptives for the participants of this 
survey.
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analysis of limiting conditions to this research is given at 
the end of this chapter in part F.
A major part of this survey consists of a qualitative
element which is used in both the interpretation of results 
and the qualification of tests conducted. As with most 
elite, personal interview surveys, a great wealth of 
information becomes available to the interviewer. This 
information consists of interviewee qualifications in 
digressions from their replies, which was encouraged and 
recorded beyond their replies to the structured part of the 
questionnaire. It was felt that by recording these replies 
the questions they gave to the quantitative part of the 
questionnaire could be clarified. It was also felt that 
issues to which they reacted, could give an indication to
issues to which they held strong opinions. It has been my
goal thus to use respondents' qualifications as extensively 
as is feasible. To this end I employ a 'linked data 
analysis' technique which focuses on the qualitative content 
of elite surveys by using a quantitative basis as the 
structure from which all qualitative data are analysed.
40 . The benefits of an integrated collection of both quantitative and 
qualitative data in a 'linked data' format is covered by Miles and 
Huberman (1994, pp.40-48). This technique can be considered as a 
form of data triangualation since data of two different types are 
analysed concurrently. The fact that this data originates in the 
same source and has been collected by the same medium in part limits 
the validity of the technique. For an excellent assesment of the 
triangulation of qualitative data see King, Keohane and Verba (1994).
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Reference to comparable sources of research is not normally- 
attempted concurrently with the analysis of data, but will 
supplement inferences made at the concluding chapter of this 
thesis.
B. A Methodological Framework for Surveying Regional Elites
An attempt is made to research attitudinal characteristics 
of two key elite groups in each region investigated. 
Attitudes from elite groups in this survey are juxtaposed in 
an effort to reveal inter and intra region (within and 
between) variances of elite perceptions. The use of 
regional elite groups, comparatively, in a cross-national 
survey is not tantamount to assuming that regional elite 
groups vary from national ones. A more extensive survey 
should include the national elites as a control for a 
presumed regional distinctiveness of regional elites, a feat 
which is not attempted here.
. This survey -from which the data stream emanates- investigates 
attitudinal responses. Behavioural patterns are not investigated as 
this survey does not attempt to construct complete belief systems for 
each interviewee. An analysis of the importance of 'belief systems' 
for political leaders is given in ch.7 of Kavanagh (1983) .
. The distinctiveness of the political culture is a presumption based 
on the difference in the cultural heritage of the Scots and Cretans 
from their respective national cultures (Kellas, 1989; Midwinter at 
al, 1991; Allbauch, 1953; Herzfeld, 1985). Recent survey data 
analysis however, suggests that there are insignificant variations in 
the value systems (and by extension political culture) within the 
regions of Great Britain (Miller at al, 1996).
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The number of factors that can influence attitudinal 
responses and the number of measurements relevant is vast.
I have attempted a measurement of direction and intensity of 
attitudes in a thorough manner. I have also tried to take 
account of issue salience, inconsistency of responses and 
degree of inclusiveness without however making them a
44central element in my analysis. Certain important 
conditions that affect response patterns are taken into 
consideration although I have attempted to steer away from 
an extensive analysis based on behavioural psychology 
focusing instead on political behaviour.
The survey I conducted has a number of limitations relating 
to the size and the selected subsets of the particular elite 
populations, these could, in many respects, characterise 
this as a comparative rather than a pure survey analysis.
. For a comprehensive analysis of attitudinal measures see chapters 
seven and eight of Political Behaviour : Choices and Perspectives by 
Dean Jaros and Lawrence Grant(1974).
. Salience is taken to be the measurement of relative importance at a 
given time, inclusiveness to be the degree of complexity of an 
attitude and inconsistency to be the tendency to reply randomly. See 
Jaros and Grant (1974) p.248.
. Certain important premises of social psychology had to be taken into 
account as are issues relating to the 'false consensus effect' raised 
by Ross, Greene and House (1977); while the analysis of problems in 
survey questions made by George Bishop (1987,1990) and William Belson 
(1981) created important considerations for my research briefly 
referred to in appendix I .
. In the words of William Miller "As the number in the survey 
decreases there comes a point where the researcher is using a 
Comparative Method rather than a Survey Method" (Miller, 1983,p.5) 
which points inevitably to the limited scope of using quantitative 
methods of analysis when the sample size is small.
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In selecting and defining type of questions that can be 
asked and elite groups that can be successfully approached I 
understood that "...the procedures still involve a 
considerable amount of ad hoc choice in order to cope with 
the complexities of the real world.." (Moyser,1987,p .15) 
which in turn make the use of elite interviewing techniques 
imperative in order to "...reveal information about 
underlying attitudes, interactions and 
intentions."(Moyser,1987,p.18).
I had intially aimed to attain a nomothetic explanation with 
this research, it became apparent early-on however that a 
number of restrictions, arising from sampling bias and the 
idiosyncrasies of the particular regions investigated
48limited the scope of generalisations and theorising.
This becomes apparent from the frequent inclusion of 
validity considerations, in the analysis and testing of most 
hypotheses. A more general and inclusive discussion of
. A vast amount of research has been conducted on elite interviewing 
of which Leaders and Elites by William Welsh (1979) covers the 
methodological problems of survey research on elites. A number of 
surveys also tackle the different methodological issues that arise.
In Business and Economic elite surveys interesting are the ones by 
Samuel Brittan (1973,1990), R.E. Pahl and J.T. Winkler (1974), John
Winkler (1987) and Martin Rickets and Edward Shoesmith (1990). In
political elite surveys methodological points are covered by Geoffrey 
Pridham (1987), Neil Nevitte and Roger Gibbins (1990), and J.H. 
Taggart (1993). Methodology on other European elites are covered by 
Helge Hveem (1972) and Ch.W. Nam, G.Nerb, and H.Russ (1990). This is 
by no means an exhaustive list, but one that refers to research
relevant to my own.
. See, de Vaus (1991) ch2 and ch3 for an analysis of limits to 
research design and scope.
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validity considerations comprises part E of this chapter, 
while internal and external validation are covered in the
49concluding chapter.
Evidently this work cannot attempt a dynamic interpretation 
of possible relationships revealed. The aim instead is to 
give, to the degree possible, a snap-shot picture of the 
regional elites investigated. Relationships revealed are 
used to test hypotheses. Tests attempted provide some 
evidence of trends in certain attitudes of regional elite 
groups. In the final stage of this research the proposition 
of whether elite interaction influences regional prospects 
is considered. However, the temporality of the data 
stream and limitations in the sample size, do not allow a 
genuinely predictive interpretation, but limit this work to 
an exploratory and predominantly inductive investigation.
49 . Questions of validity in survey research are thoroughly covered by 
gg William Belson (1986) .
. Since the data collected have a temporal character they do not lend 
themselves for any kind of dynamic interpretations. See Tufte (1974) 
for a more thorough account of data analysis and research design. 
Mannheim and Rich(1991) also develop the limitations of using 
temporal data.
. A number of analytic strategies are covered by Miller(1983, pp42- 
46). Case analysis is used here although certain assumptions on the 
causal structure of the data is more extensively covered in part C, 
of this chapter.
. In the concluding chapter I am attempting an interpretative analysis
of the data utilising a number of insights that could not be part of
a causal analysis. Limitations apply however as analysed in ch2 and 
ch4 of Mannheim and Rich (1991) and ch 3 of de Vaus (1991). I have 
elsewhere atempted an investigation of the link between attitudes and
regional prospects (Christopoulos, 1996b).
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It must always be borne in mind that this is a cross- 
sectional survey of the particular regional samples. 
Attitudinal responses aid in elaborating an analysis of 
regional actors' attitudes, which with the aid of 
qualitative data can be used to partially determine their 
influence in the political and economic affairs of their 
region. It can be deduced that the attitude measures I 
construct indicate elite value systems or what Van Deth and 
Scarbrough call 'underlying value orientations' when they 
suggest that we can "infer values from data about attitudes" 
(1995, p. 37) . Although I am naturally interested in the 
value systems and orientations of the elite groups I 
investigate, particularly as these relate to their cultural 
background, I have not attempted here the construction of a 
'values profile' further than the one that can be infered 
from their attitudinal profile in chapter five (section F ) . 
However, by presuming that regional elites will be 
influenced by their different institutional and cultural 
backgrounds (their separate value systems), I expect to find 
variations in the attitude of individuals that are resonant
53 . Survey research methodology is analysed in the "Handbook of Survey 
Research" (Rossi, 1983),"Surveys in Social Research" (de Vaus,1991) 
and in "Empirical political Analysis: Research Methods in Political 
Science" (Mannheim, 1991) .
. A comprehensive study of the contemporary interrelationship between 
values and culture can be found in Inglehart who attempts an analysis 
of the "linkages that culture has with both politics and economics" 
(1990, p.15).
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with their background when I compare samples from the two
55regions.
The use of a structured survey was employed to aid in the 
codification of a comparatively large number of elite 
interviews. I felt that failure to codify from the 
beginning would have resulted in a big loss of data or 
producing data particularly susceptible to interviewer and 
analysis bias. Codification itself however entails some 
loss of data particularly in the cases where data series 
have to be collapsed in order to create meaningful 
statistics. An ultimate test of the hypotheses is given 
by juxtaposing standardised data with respondents' 
qualifications or explanations on issues raised by the 
questionnaire.^ This alludes to what I have earlier called 
a 'linked data analysis' between quantitative and 
qualitative data. This technique can enable mutual 
confirmation or corroboration in my analysis of data, assist
55 William Miller also gives two other possible multi-national 
attitudinal survey goals further than the one used here. The first 
is"...to measure the influence of individual attitudes and behaviour 
upon political institutions. . ." and the second is "... to establish a 
degree of generality of a finding by showing how little it was 
gg affected by the social and political setting..." (1983, pp.163).
. For a thorough analysis of data codification and analysis see 
Mannheim and Rich (1991) ch 15 and de Vaus (1991) chs 14-19.
. It has been suggested that responses of open and close ended 
question systems should not be combined as this can lead to problems 
of validity of the response distributions (Belson,1986). In this 
thesis statistical analysis is limited to closed ended questions.
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in elaborating the relevant themes and draw attention to 
paradoxes in the data.^
In the analysis of the quantitative data I have used SPSS-PC 
and SPSS for Windows software, while in the analysis of 
qualitative data I have used comprehensive transcript briefs 
of each question to the questionnaire. In dealing with 
approximately one hundred interviews (seventy-six are part 
of the attitudinal analysis) I can bear witness to the 
limitations of qualitative research analysis. I anticipated 
using the QSR.NUD*IST software but it has eventually proven 
unecessary. I proceed next with an exposition of the 
hypotheses I am testing in chapters six and seven. I refer 
to dependent, independent and possible antecedent or 
intervening variables as well as the survey questions 
employed in testing each hypothesis and the relevant 
methodological considerations.
58 For a comprehensive exposition of reasons for linking quantitative 
gg with qualitative data see Miles and Huberman (1994) .
. A number of sources proved helpful in dealing with qualitative 
data. I have found Taylor (1983), Altheide and Johnson (1994) and 
Denzin and Lincoln (1994) particularly relevant. Qualitative data 
management and the use of specialist software such as QSR.NUD*IST are 
elucidated by Richards and Richards (1994)and Huberman and Miles 
(1994) .
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c. Hypotheses, Working Hypotheses and Intervening Variables
There is a progression from the specific to the general in 
the present research design. At the same time simpler 
hypotheses are tested first, while those more intricate are 
handled in the later stages of this thesis.
I begin by investigating the difference between the business 
and political elites in the two regions. This exercise is 
necessary in order to establish a degree of confidence in 
considering the political and business elites in each region 
as distinct and separate (non-interlocking). I test 
whether :
H I. Business and political elites' attitudes differ 
depending on their region of origin.
In this hypothesis the independent variable is businessmen 
and politicians' regional identity while the dependent 
variable is their attitude towards Europe.
Attitudes towards Europe are selected as a sufficiently universal 
and at the same time topical a subject, which has attracted attention 
at all European regions. Regional elites are expected to have a keen 
interest on the subject. See special pages and editorials on Europe 
in the "Glasgow Herald" and "The Scotsman" newspapers from January to 
December 1991. Special supplements on European regional policy in 
"To Vima tis Kyriakis" among national Greek newspapers. "Chaniotiki 
Eleftherotypia", "Chaniotika Nea" and "Kyrikas Chanion" local 
newspapers in Chania all carried extensive editorials on the impact 
of 1992 between January and September 1991.
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I will not test for background variables such as party 
affiliation or level of representation for politicians 
(i.e.if local or regional Councillor, MP or MEP) as this 
will fragment relatively small sample sizes. Level of 
education was not part of the questionnaire because it was 
discovered in the exploratory interviews that elite 
respondents were getting defensive in replying to questions 
they perceived could comprise a measure of their ability.
It was further feared that such questions could create the
impression that the questionnaire was an aptitude test for
61which there were right and wrong answers. The background 
variable of age is believed relevant to investigations of 
the strength of regional identity through its possible 
influence of regional attitudes. Age cohorts have been 
employed widely in explaining variation in attitudes. I
felt however, that introducing age to the testing and 
analysis of the hypotheses would side-track the 
investigation of the attitudes of the elites in this work 
and I have therefore excluded it as a factor of the final 
analysis. Issues of possible gender variance could not be 
addressed because of the very small number of women in the 
relevant elites and consequently the sample.
. The issues of 'correct' answers are covered in Belson (1981 p.370- 
387) where the possibility of distorting replies if a respondent 
gg feels it puts him into a 'poor light' are given consideration.
For a recent example of the use of age cohorts see the treatment 
of 'Materialist-Postmaterialist Value Orientations' by Scarbrough 
« (1995).. The small number of women in political elites is covered in the 
document published by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (1992) on "Women
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I will consider the possible intervening variable of 
regional grievances towards the central government, which 
may have an effect on respondents' attitudes towards Europe. 
It will also be relevant at this level to consider the 
possibility that aspirations of the local elite to an 
autonomous rule for their region is influencing the pattern 
of their replies.
The tests for this hypothesis are explained in parts B and C 
of chapter six by testing for the following two working 
hypotheses.
First I test whether,
W H l ; Businessmen have a different perception of the 
challenges of Europe than politicians.
In effect a test between response patterns of the political 
and business samples is attempted, for each region.
Recorded differences in attitude between the two elite 
groups form the basis for further investigations, 
Consequently, the similarity or divergence of attitudinal 
patterns in the two regions will give an indication of the 
degree of difference between each region's local political 
and business elites.
and Political Power". Data on sampling and responses of female 
interviewees are available in chapters four and five.
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Patterns of homogeneity of political and business elites are 
further tested by inquiring whether:
W H 2 : The occupational position of elites influences their 
perspective.
To test this working hypothesis answers from sections B 
(specific to business interviewees) and sections C (specific 
to political interviewees) of the questionnaire are used. 
Effectively the business and political elites from each 
region are tested with the equivalent elites of the other 
region. The attitudes of the Cretan compared with that of 
the Scottish elites will demonstrate whether the within- 
region difference in attitudes of elite groups is more 
significant than the between-region difference of the four 
elite groups.
In the second hypothesis I attempt to test for the 
intervening variable of 'development level' that was 
associated with HI. I test whether:
H II. The degree of accord between sub-national elite 
attitudes is related to a regions' development level.
Effectively a test with the independent variable of region 
of origin and dependent variable of elite attitudes being 
the same as in H I. The control is the intervening variable
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of the different development level of the two regions in 
question. The group of questions used in WHl will also be 
used to test WH3 and W H 4 . Hypothesis H II is developing the
same theme that was investigated in H I. My analysis of
dependent, independent, intervening and background variables 
remains the same here.
The identification of similarities and differences between 
the Cretan and Scottish business and political elites, is 
undertaken in parts D and E of chapter six with the 
following two working hypotheses. In an attempt to define 
and separate the attitudes of elite actors in each region, 
in relation to each regions level of economic development, I 
proceed to investigate whether,
WH3: Attitudes of regional elites can be identified as 
being different between a more and a less developed region.
The elementary assumption in the next working hypothesis is
that economic development can be related to elite
interaction. In particular, I test whether,
WH4: The more developed the regional economy the stronger 
the concordance of attitudes between elite groups in a 
region.
In both preceding working hypotheses there exists a high 
probability of multiple causation between the variables 
investigated. The degree of development of the respondents
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region, which has been identified as H I's intervening 
variable, is tested here as an independent variable for the 
working hypotheses, while the dependent variable is 
interviewees' attitudes towards issues of regional 
importance. Regional grievance towards the central 
government and perceived differences from the rest of the 
nation is examined as intervening variables in this
64hypothesis.
In working hypothesis WH3 the tests attempt to show a 
difference of attitudes between regions, among elite groups 
investigated, while in working hypothesis WH4 the 'goodness 
of fit' between each regions' two elite groups is 
anticipated to be better in the more developed rather than 
in the less developed economy.
One of the basic assumptions in the two preceding working 
hypotheses is that elites exhibit different attitudes in 
different European regions. Drawn to its logical conclusion 
this would imply that elite behaviour on a regional level is 
a regional endowment. This argument I explore further in 
chapter eight.
Perceived difference from other people in their region, their 
national unit and Europe will be used as a composite measure of 
perceived differences from people in their region(Measure D in 
chapter 5.F.).
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In chapter seven initially the attitudes of elites towards 
growth are investigated with the scope of identifying 
certain distinct characteristics between Scotland and Crete.
Hypothesis III inquires whether:
H III. Attitudes of regional political elites vary in accord 
with an elites' region of origin.
This hypothesis is in many respects similar to Hypothesis H 
I, the qualitative difference however is that the scope has 
been narrowed and the questions used are specific to either 
the political or the business elites. The independent 
variable here is elites' region of origin while the 
dependent variable is their attitude towards political 
elites. A background variable that could influence 
attitudes in this hypothesis is the respondents' political 
affiliation but, for the same reasons that I could not 
examine this potential influence in the preceding 
hypothesis, I am not going to consider it here either.
There are further, two possible intervening variables that 
can be related to the hypothesis. First is the level of 
development of the relevant regions and the consequent 
difference in the development experiences of the regional 
elites in question. Second is the possible aspirations to 
regional autonomy for the relevant elites investigated.
Both those factors could influence the attitudes expressed
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by the elite groups and will be considered when testing the 
hypothesis. Working hypotheses five and six are employed 
to provide a test of hypothesis H III.
The relationship of the regional political elites to growth 
is investigated, when testing whether
W H 5 : Businessmen perceive the regional political elites 
to be more receptive to them than the national political 
elites.
The independent variable in this working hypothesis is the 
level of representation of the political elites, i.e. 
whether they are elected at the regional or national level. 
The dependent variable is receptiveness to local business 
elites. Effectively I investigate possible differences in 
the perceived accessibility to local and national political 
elites.
The possibility of a high degree of interlockingness between 
the political and business sectors of regional elites is 
examined as a possible intervening variable in this working 
hypothesis. Another factor that could have an effect on the 
results of this investigation is the possibility of stronger 
clientelistic links between the regional business and 
regional political elites than links between regional 
business and national political elites.
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The assumption that regional politicians possess a more 
accurate mental map of their locality than national ones 
stems from the supposition that the smaller the constituency 
the more accurate the mental map of the individual political 
representative(Gold,1980 ; Gould and White, 1985) . However, 
receptiveness of a local politician is not necessarily as 
obvious, Nevin (1985) argues that politicians have a very 
short term perspective. I suggest that politicians feel 
more accountable the lower the level of representation they 
are elected to. As Finder (1983) claims, policy-makers 
believe they possess spatially unbiased views and can thus 
correct businessmen by designing corrective policy. It 
seems reasonable therefore, to make the conjecture that 
receptiveness of local politicians to local businessmen is 
related to the strength of their identitification with their 
region.
Behaviour of politicians in the regions is also connected to 
economic policy,
WH6; Regional politicians will be perceived to favour 
long term economic policies in the region more than national 
politicians.
The independent variable in this working hypothesis is the 
level of representation/office held by political elites 
while the dependent variable is their perceived commitment 
to the long term welfare of their region.
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A background variable that could influence the responses of 
interviewees in this and the next working hypothesis is 
their education level. Education could affect their 
understanding of particular questions asked in the 
questionnaire, to the extent that these can be considered 
technical. As with previous working hypotheses I choose not 
to control for this variable but note here what I believe 
will be a marginal bias in my results.
It is possible that an antecedent variable in the 
examination of this hypothesis is the perception that 
regional political elites are not relevant to long term or 
macro-economic planning as this is a sector preserved for 
the national or European political elites. The level of 
devolution of each regional authority is expected to have a 
role in such perceptions, as a more devolved regional 
government may be perceived to have more competence.
Arguments against my conceptualisation of this hypothesis 
are given by Pelkmans (1984, pp.25-39) who claims that 
political commitments let cost increases go unpunished, in 
effect suggesting a political clientele relationship which 
is more likely than not to be stronger the more devolved the 
political level of representation. On the other hand the 
same author suggests that regional policy is conducted on 
political arguments and for electoral reasons, inferring
that a national regional policy does not necessarily address 
regional needs. It seems thus reasonable to assume that 
regional politicians will have a longer term perspective.
I expect that regional politicians for a variety of reasons 
to have the interest of the region more at heart. My 
inquiry of course focuses on whether they are perceived to 
have the regional interests more at heart, which could 
arguably be an entirely different matter.
I continue my investigation by inquiring whether,
H IV. Elite attitudes on devolution affect the 
perceptions of business prospects in a region.
In this hypothesis elite attitudes on devolution is the 
independent variable, while their perception of business 
prospects for their region is the dependent variable.
The use of working hypotheses seven eight and nine are 
employed in exploring aspects of the relationship between 
business and political elites.
. Devolution does not necessarily has the exact same meaning in Crete 
and Scotland. It does not necessarily mean the same thing in Scotland 
at different historic periods either. I refer more extensively to 
problems arising from political semantic differences in part Fiv of the 
present chapter.
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Attitudes on the prospects of Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) are used in the next two working hypotheses to 
examine whether the level and aspirations of devolution 
affect perceptions of business prospects in a region. 
Attitudes on SMEs are used exclusively, because it is felt
that they represent a common experience for both regions, as
6 6 ,there are very few larger enterprises in Crete, It is 
also the case that SMEs tend to be locally owned while 
ownership of bigger enterprises could more easily be 
perceived to lie outside a region. If such a perception was 
accurate it could act as a bias that I could not control for 
in my testing. I inquire thus whether,
WH 7 : The level of devolution in a region influences 
perceptions of SMEs importance among regional elite groups.
The independent variable in this working hypothesis is the 
level of devolution, while the dependent variable is the 
importance of SMEs to the regional economy.
The degree of regional autonomy is a difficult principle to 
define and it is beyond the scope of this work to create a 
criterion of devolution for measuring levels of autonomy of 
local government. From the analysis of regional government 
competencies in chapter three, it becomes obvious that in
66 . An analysis of the company size outlook is given in chapter three 
which makes obvious the lack of large corporations in the Cretan 
economy. Robert Howard (1990) makes a very strong case for the 
support of SMEs as a growth vehicle in a local economy.
one of the regions investigated, local government has much 
greater resources and competence to intervene in the 
economic planning and aid of the regional business/ So, 
when the level of devolution is a relevant parameter, 
testing will be based on a comparative definition of 
devolution in which the one regional authority is more and 
the other less devolved from their respective national 
governments at the time of the survey. I naturally 
recognise that attitudes on devolution are biased by the 
perceived 'desirability' of autonomy by interviewees and in 
that respect perceptions of autonomy can be linked to the 
regional political debate. I accept this limitation as an 
unavoidable generalisation that can be associated with all 
comparative research.
I proceed with the next logical step of whether 
devolutionary aspirations are correlated with elite 
perceptions of SMEs importance by testing whether,
W H 8 : Those regional elites that aspire to more autonomous 
rule will be more positive on SMEs prospects in their 
region.
This study is based on a cross-sectional design which is centred 
around perceptions prevalent in 1991 and does not take account of 
later institutional changes of local government in both regions 
investigated. A brief account of the current institutional 
developments is given in chapter eight concurrent with the 
conclusions of this research.
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In this working hypothesis the independent variable is the 
regional elites' devolutionary aspirations, while the 
dependent variable is the prospects they foresee for local 
SMEs. This is conceived as a measure of perceived SMEs 
importance among regional elites.
A highly contested issue, which largely depends on
theoretical perspective, is the importance and relevance of
68SMEs to growth. The hypothesis attempts to investigate 
the relationship between local elites perception of the role 
of SMEs in achieving regional autonomy, if indeed such a 
relationship exists. One of the suppositions behind the 
last two working hypotheses is that elites aspiring to more 
autonomy will tend to trust local entrepreneurs more than 
international conglomerates.
Concluding the examination of the relationship of regional 
autonomy and its relationship with the development and 
growth potential of regions I test whether,
W H9; Positive attitudes towards devolution in a region 
are related to a positive perception of business prospects 
for the region.
68 . Benefits from the development of SMEs are covered extensively in a 
g report by the European Commission (Commission of the EC, 1989c).
. There is evidence from survey research that there exists some 
opposition, albeit weak, to investment from abroad in Scotland 
(Taggart, 1993); while this resentment is stronger within the 
Scottish National Party.
In this working hypothesis the independent variable will be 
the attitude of interviewees towards devolution, while the 
dependent variable will be their perceptions of SMEs 
importance. This relationship I assume to be valid across 
regions and irrespective of the origin of the elite groups. 
I anticipate that those respondents expressing a positive 
opinion on devolution will have a positive opinion of 
business potential as well.
Results from this final test I will compare with tests from 
working hypotheses WH7 and WH8 in order to test hypothesis 
HIV. There are two assumptions that led me to the 
formulation of hypothesis H IV that could be relevant to the 
investigation of intervening variables or spurious 
relationships in the working hypotheses as well. First I 
assume that aspirations of higher devolution are related to 
expectations of higher prosperity. Second is my 
assumption that centralised control of the regional economy 
is linked with charges of inefficiency and grievances 
towards misalocation of funds by the central government.
In the later part of chapter seven the tentative 
relationship between elite attitudes and regional growth is
. Kellas (1989) often refers to arguments put forward by the SNP 
according to which there is a relationship between Scottish economic 
development and devolution.
. Relevant charges of misappropriation of funds and bad management can 
be found in all local newspapers in Chania in both the editorial and 
main story news items between September 1990 and September 1991.
86
investigated. In the knowledge that this relationship 
cannot be proven with the means employed this is an 
exploratory analysis.
I proceed to investigate the proposition that,
H V. The greater the similarity of attitudes among the 
political and business elite in a region the better the 
regional growth prospects.
In this hypothesis the independent variable is the 
similarity of attitudes between business and political 
elites. The dependent variable is the regional growth 
performance of a region. In regions in which the regional 
elites hold similar opinions, (and where I consequently 
expect them to have a singular sense of purpose along neo- 
corporatist interaction patterns), the local economy is 
performing better than in regions where the local elites 
seem to have disparate attitudes. There obviously exist a 
great number of antecedent and background variables that 
could affect the regional performance of regions as diverse 
as Strathclyde and Crete. It is also the case that the 
similarity of opinion between regional elites could be due 
to elite interlockingness or the adherence to publicly 
acceptable views in their replies. It is also impossible to 
discount the possibility of spuriousness in the relationship
. Regional statistics from Eurostat (ch7 D.) are used as an indication 
of recent regional performance.
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I investigate, as homogeneity in elite responses cannot be 
proof of harmony between them.
Overall, I assume that the regions with better growth 
potential are those in which the business and political 
communities hold similar views on development requirements 
for their region. This constitutes the basic assumption of 
my investigation in hypothesis V.
In this hypothesis typical ex post facto theorising is 
employed as I only aim at formulating possible explanations 
for conditions identified. Or as de Vaus claims "the ex 
post facto explanation is conditional upon finding further 
key evidence. It is only a step in arriving at an 
explanation" (1991,p.303). In this vein I hope that my 
analysis could lead to the creation of new hypotheses and 
stimulate further research.
D. Eliminated Hypotheses
Hypotheses that I eliminated before the testing stage, were 
mainly those for which testing measures could not be devised 
with the available data. Their listing here separately is 
deemed expedient for three reasons. First, is the obvious 
need to maintain a complete account of the research process,
including its failings. Secondly, although irrelevant to 
the final tests, these hypotheses are indicative of the 
direction this investigation had initially. Finally, these 
eliminated hypotheses were constructed in order to address 
certain aspects of issues explored at the literature survey
There is a number of hypotheses relating to business elites 
that could not be tested because of sample restrictions.
The first three eliminated hypotheses belong to this 
category.
1. Multinational enterprises will be perceived to be more 
opposed to extended regional autonomy than they actually 
are.
To test this hypothesis I would need a larger sample of 
multinational companies' executives. Also, it is the case 
that while this hypothesis might be relevant to Scottish 
perceptions (Taggart,1993), lack of a frame of reference 
does not make it necessarily relevant in the Cretan context 
A cross-reference of results between the two regions would 
have been tenuous.
2. Bias of regional entrepreneurs due to distorted mental 
maps is a main advantage of regional business.
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It became apparent from the initial stages of the design of 
the questionnaire that, I would need to devote a great 
number of questions to devise measures, to define 
successfully a distortion of the mental map of elite 
individuals. Succesful proof for this hypothesis is not 
instrumental to tests of the rest of my research questions.
3. Entrepreneurs of a region demonstrate a bias in
favour of their region compared to multinational executives.
This working hypothesis was an integral part of testing 
Hypothesis IV. This appears to be the case since one of the 
distinguishing features of regional entrepreneurs from 
multinational executives, is the presumed existence of a 
distorted/biased mental map of opportunity. The assumption 
made here is that individuals have more distorted mental 
maps from multinational corporations and not that 
corporations have impeccable maps of opportunity. Corporate 
decision making is based on information processed by 
committees that are expected to show detachment.
Corporations also have the means to access information 
(because of size and quality of personnel) that the 
individual entrepreneur cannot. It is also possible that 
for reasons of sentimental attachment or cultural pride a 
regional entrepreneur may be biased in favour of his own 
region.
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It has proven impossible to test this working hypothesis, 
however, since the actual number of executives surveyed in 
Chania is very small. There has also been a bias in the 
respondents' selection of belonging in the entrepreneur or 
executive category which is explained in the next section of 
the validity considerations. To test this hypothesis would 
require a different research design.
4. Politicians must be more receptive on a regional level 
possessing a more accurate mental map of their area.
For the same considerations as for the business elites the 
local political elites can be assumed to have a more 
accurate mental map of their region than the national 
political elites. It has been the case, however, that the 
sample of political interviewees did not contain an adequate 
number of national representatives to provide an adequate 
test for this working hypothesis.
5. National actors are more accountable than regional ones 
for a region's level of development.
As for the previous working hypothesis, lack of a large 
enough national political sample and national business 
sample makes a sound testing of this hypothesis impossible.
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This research question was constructed based on the 
assumption that since a national government and business in 
the two regions investigated has more competencies than the 
local ones' the national business and political elites may 
be seen as more relevant to a regions' development. It has 
been the case however, that distinction of national and 
regional was not so straightforward in the case of 
Strathclyde, where a lot of respondents would have 
considered Scotland and not Britain to be their national 
background. On the other hand, in the case of Chania, a 
nation of Cretans has no reference in the public 
consciousness.
6 . The region is considered less favoured than the nation 
the more regional elites think their nation is unprepared 
for Europe.
Again the lack of a national sample for this survey leads to 
the elimination of this hypothesis. As previously the 
perception of regional elites as marginalised, was 
anticipated to be accenuated by perceiving the national 
elite as incompetent.
7. The deeper the alienation of regional elites from the 
nation state ethnic identity, the higher their propensity to 
view Europe as an opportunity rather than a menace.
92
As a measure of alienation from the nation state unit I 
considered the support for nationalist movements. Since 
there is no such movement in Crete such a test could not be 
comparative. The small size of the sample made also the 
sub-group of those who where supportive of nationalism in 
Scotland too small a grouping for creating a sound test.
8 . Regional attitudes by affecting confidence in regional 
business affect a region's growth prospects.
I hypothesised that attitudes on regional growth, being the 
independent variable, affect confidence in regional 
business, which would be the dependent variable. 
Consequently a region's growth prospects may be affected by 
a positive or negative business climate. But at the same 
time the variable 'growth prospects' is not part of the 
causal model in this hypothesis as it is not the actual but 
the perceived prospects of a region I aimed to inquire 
about.
This hypothesis could not be tested as the degree of 
influence of an attitudinal predisposition on economic 
performance is a rather difficult relationship to measure. 
One of the assumptions behind this hypothesis was that 
regional actors' confidence in their own region affects a 
region's performance. I assumed that previous growth
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pattern influence growth expectations. A main limitation 
in such an investigation is the variety of variables that 
can be controlled by a limited scale elite survey. 
Furthermore, this survey effectively lacks a 'null 
hypothesis region', one that will be unquestionably stagnant 
and whose elite's behaviour can be compared with faster 
growing regions such as Strathclyde and Crete.
9. Indigenous investment efforts are perceived as more 
likely to trigger regional development.
The interaction of the political with the business elites 
was expected to influence investment. The independent 
variable in this eliminated hypothesis is the source of 
investment capital, while the dependent variable is elites 
perception of development potential. In the examination of 
this working hypothesis I was going to consider the 
possibility that grievances towards their national 
government and the attitude of the regional elites towards 
European integration could affect elite perspective in 
respect to the importance of local investment. It could 
also be true that respondents perceptions of a restricted
73 . For a discussion of the causes of business cycles a standard text is 
by Samuelson (1980) , who does not discount the possibility of 
psychological reasons behind the cyclical fluctuations in a market 
economy. Business confidence in the economy is routinely measured in 
all industrialised societies as an indication of an economies' growth 
prospects (see Eurostat), while there is extensive research that 
assumes this relationship to be true (see Nam, 1990a and 1990b).
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mobility for indigenous entrepreneurs, or the significance 
of exogenous investment as a vehicle for technology
74transfers could also bias their replies. As Christiansen 
(1981) affirms, small firms typically exhibit a more agile 
decision making procedure than multinationals, this is done 
however at the expense of optimal resource allocation. It 
can be assumed that, for lack of alternative information, 
local entrepreneurs would exhibit particular commitment to 
their own region.
Infrastructural investment projects are expected to be 
closer to political personalities experience at the national 
or European level. This made me anticipate a negative 
approach from regional political elites. Businessmen were 
expected to identify what Lambooy (1986,p.156) calls a 
region's 'production environment' as more significant for 
them and possibly therefore have a more positive attitude 
towards indigenous investment. As with previous cases, 
limits in available measures made testing of this hypothesis 
impossible.
74 . Among others Lamboy (1986) explores the decision making of regional 
entrepreneurs while Sweeney asserts that "In regions dominated by 
large firms there is a lower level of entrepreneurial 
vitality..."(Sweeney 1987,p21). An interesting exposition of the 
role of multinational enterprises in regional economic development is 
given by Young, Hood and Peters(1993) while work by Yannopoulos and 




Issues of validity are often mentioned throughout this work. 
There is a variety of reasons why this is the case. The 
need to maintain a high degree of credibility makes the 
frequent reference to validity considerations inevitable.
As mentioned earlier a small sample coupled with a 
restricted population size are main limiting factors. A 
number of factors that could compromise the universality of 
the results are identified and listed below. For reasons of 
expediency the limiting factors have been grouped into six 
general categories.
i. Differing Business Conditions between the two regions 
surveyed is a factor limiting this research. Their 
divergent state of development was one of the criteria for 
selecting the two particular regions, but it also creates 
problems in the analyses and interpretation of data,
a. The possibility (indeed probability), that companies 
active in the locality are not registered there. This could 
be particularly relevant for the Scottish sample. The 
sampling process in Scotland, of approaching locally 
registered companies, might limit the representativeness of 
the elite sample, if a significant part of the local elite 
operates in non-locally registered premises. From empirical 
evidence -in the data collection stage-, I consider this
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factor not to significantly distort the sampling as it is 
expected that most companies whose executives are active in 
the region have a registered office there as well,
b. The average respondent in the Strathclyde business sample 
could be identified as a comparatively successful operator, 
while unsuccessful or companies under liquidation were not 
likely to be part of the sample, as indeed none responded. 
This bias on successful companies and their executives was 
to some extent the case in Chania as well, since the two 
lists that were used to approach interviewees are of 
exporting companies and the commercial association's members 
list, which is safe to assume include relatively successful 
enterprises.^^ It could be argued that the unsuccessful or 
temporarily set-back members of the economic elite will be 
more disgruntled and negative towards their national 
government or other institutions they blame for theirs' or 
the markets' failings. There is no concrete indication 
however that this is the case and that the less successful 
members of the economic elite significantly diverge in 
attitude from their more successful counterparts, not to 
mention the obvious that a previous member of the economic 
elite that has lately been unsucessful may not qualify to be 
considered a member of the local business elite.
75 . It is a standard accusation of business surveys that their sample is 
biased by successful operators (Pahl,1974). Some of the media has 
also made similar claims, with the Financial Times stating that CBI 
surveys are unreliable because they focus on successful operators (FT 
JUL 6-8, 1992).
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c. Cretan businessmen perceive a dependence on resources to 
the mainland which may bias their answers to the effect that 
it would be inconceivable for them to express support for 
autonomy if it meant being cut-off from mainland resources. 
This I consider to be a psychological barrier to their 
thinking and it will be given attention in the analysis.
d. The most important limiting factor for comparing 
businessmen's attitudes is the diverging degree of 
development of the two regional economies. The maturity of 
the Strathclyde economy compared with the agriculture based 
Cretan economy is affecting the outlook of the respective
76elites. Questions on local versus outside investment for 
example, are directly relevant to the perceived nature of 
those investments which relate to the degree of development 
of the local economy. This divergence, is however, part of 
the reason these questions are significant for a comparative 
study. In interpreting results this divergence has to be 
appreciated for the limits it imposes.
ii. Differing Political Conditions in the respective regions 
can have an effect as interviewees may have a different 
frame of reference and the analysis can be influenced if 
consideration is not taken of relevant deviations. Many of
76 . The local economy outlook is analysed in chapter three, it is 
sufficient here to note that in 1983 Cretan Gross Regional Product 
(GRP) was standing at 43.5% of the European Union average, while 
Scottish GRP was standing at 100.3% of the EU average.
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the limitations pertinent to the political interviewees are 
also relevant for the business ones and vice versa.
a. The Regional Council of Strathclyde was a local authority 
with an impressive track record, while its range of services 
to the local community is wide and varied. By comparison 
the Regional authority of Nomos Chanion in Crete was for all 
practical purposes an office of a government appointed 
prefect {nomarhis) with a mandate to oversee government 
policy. Local government comparisons had to be made between 
the Strathclyde Regional Council with Nomos Chanion and 
Glasgow City Council and the City Council of Chania. This 
reduces comparability of replies of the two elites. The 
Scottish one having the experience of interaction with a 
local authority which is very active on the regional level, 
the Greek one having considered the prefect (nomarhis) as an 
appendix to the government and the local politicians closely 
tied with the national political system.
b. With different competencies of the two countries local 
authorities, opinions on the fervour and effectiveness of 
the two groups are less compatible. This affects questions 
QBll and QB12 which ask business elite respondents to rate 
the effectiveness and fervour of Councillors vis-a-vis
78MPs .
. The system of local government analysed here is the one relevant 
during 1991. Changes in the local government structures are covered 
in chapter eight.
. An analysis of the questions comprising the survey can be found in 
appendix Ic and Id, while the questionnaire is displayed in appendix 
II.
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c. The different structure of local authorities in the two 
regions could also be 'responsible' for certain attitudes, 
for instance, institutional structures could be affecting 
approachability of local Councillors (QB9-QB13). This 
consideration may be relevant to Greece, where party 
politics and clientelism further erode direct approach to 
elected members.
d . Differences in the electoral systems of the two countries 
reduce the validity of certain comparisons. Particularly in 
the case of MEPs who are elected on regional constituencies 
in the UK, while they are elected on a nation wide party 
list in Greece. Question QB8 thus, is not directly 
applicable to the Greek sample, since MEPs do not have a 
regional electoral basis. The question is asked in the 
Greek business sample however, since a number of elected 
MEPs have their political roots in Crete.
e. To the degree that the state has an all-pervasive 
superstructure in Greece certain answers can be considered 
biased since any research, particularly from more senior 
elite members, may be linked consciously or sub-consciously 
with the maintenance of 'personal files' by the state.
f. The perceived dependence on-out-of region resources may 
bias results to questions relating to autonomy. This may be
particularly the case for Crete where qualifications to the
79 . The monitoring of political beliefs by the creation of 'files' was 
endemic in Greece during the Metaxas dictatorship, on the aftermath of 
the Civil War and at the time of the Colonels dictatorship.
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quantitative part of the questionnaire suggest a strong
80perceived but limited real dependence on the mainland.
g . The difference in size of the relevant economies could 
support the argument that on the smaller Cretan economy a 
greater interlockingness of elite positions should be 
expected, as indeed is the case. This point should be taken 
into consideration when examining differences in the 
political culture of the two regions.
h. As with the business elite's bias of successful companies 
responding to this survey, in the case of the political 
elites there might exist a bias of getting responses from 
elected representatives of parties with a clear political 
agenda on European issues. It seems to be the case in 
Strathclyde, where pro-European Liberal Democrats, had a 75% 
response rate, far surpassing any other political group.
iii. Sample size related factors are given a more thorough 
exposition here. Statistical significance cannot be 
attained for most samples, although the population sizes are 
comparatively small. In the Strathclyde political sample 
the MEP population sub-group consists of three cases, this 
survey includes two of those which would have made it 
sufficiently significant, it is however the case for most
80. The Cretan Economy is comparatively self sufficient in that it is a 
net exporter of goods and services. Comprehensive data are analysed 
in chapter three.
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other sub-groups that a 50% level of the population size is 
not attained.
a. Institute specific hypotheses (i.e. SRC, Glasgow City 
etc.) can not be tested since it would have meant further 
dividing already small sample sizes. Such questions can 
only be investigated in an exploratory fashion as part of 
the qualitative element of this research.
b. Party specific hypotheses can not be tested for the same 
reason as above. Again, those hypotheses that are 
instrumental in the research design will be investigated as 
part of the qualitative element.
c. Female, ethnic or other special elite group variations 
cannot be tested for sample size limitations.
d. In both regions business samples, executives with ethnic 
roots outside the region constituted too small a sub-group 
to effectively test relating hypotheses. Their small 
overall number provides some evidence in support of some of 
the hypotheses relating to elite origin, but their small 
numbers also mean they cannot be used as a control group for 
the ethnic (i.e. Cretan or Scottish) participants, A 
similar case holds true for the Strathclyde political 
sample, where the non-Scottish interviewees are too few. In 
the Cretan political sample none of the respondents has out- 
of-region ethnic roots.
. It is obvious from the previous section that party political 
hypotheses have been eliminated from the analysis.
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iv. Attitudinal or Etymological variations between the Greek 
and English version of the questionnaire are dependent on 
cultural differences between the two countries and semantic 
differences between the two languages. The extent of these 
is difficult to assess and every effort has been made to 
limit relevant bias.
a. Entrepreneurship has proved more controversial than 
initially anticipated. Admittance to being an entrepreneur 
seem to denote a special status which some respondents in 
the Strathclyde sample seemed to shun. In the Greek 
language the equivalent word 'epihirimatias' is close in 
meaning to the word for businessman but also carries a 
connotation of small operator. Larger company entrepreneurs 
would prefer been called executives, since this denotes a 
higher social status. The question asked: 'whether they 
consider themselves as entrepreneurs or executives' (QBIOF) 
may have been too simplistic if one wanted to investigate 
the true nature of their perceived role. More than one 
questions would have been necessary to achieve that, which I 
feel lies beyond the scope of this research.
b. Remnants of an authoritarian state machine create 
problems in the relationship of the interviewer and 
interviewee in Greek surveys. One of these is the treatment 
of the survey as a test for which they try to give correct
82 . Among others Belson (1981) discusses the issues that arise out of 
the semantic interpretations of language in survey questions while 
Koutsiaras (1993) identifies some problems in the use of the Greek 
language in social science.
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answers, which to some extent is true about Scottish 
interviewees as well.
c. When expressing an opinion about local Councillors or 
MPs, some of the evidence from cross-referencing replies 
suggests that respondents may refer to the institutions 
rather than the individuals.
d. Opinions on individual Councillors or MPs may also be 
affected by their grievance with the existing institutional 
structures (i.e. their belief in the need for greater 
autonomy might affect their perception or response to the 
existing local authority) and have nothing to do with the 
individual representatives.
e. A difference in the functions of the local political 
authorities means that the reference to the local political 
institutions have a differing significance for Strathclyde 
and Chania. These last three factors are partly an expected 
by-product of a cross-national survey, consideration should 
be given, nevertheless, of their ramifications when 
interpreting information comparing the two groups.
V. Interpretation of Results can be a limiting factor in the 
validity of the testing, particularly since this research is
83 . Miller (1983) and Sheatsley (1983) analyse the dangers from 
misconceptions in the implementation of surveys, while McCrossan 
(1991) refers to the approaches the interviewer must take when 
initiating an interview. In this series of interviews, in order to 
limit any such bias, respondents where introduced to the interview by 
the assertion that there are no correct replies and their names would 
be protected in the publication of results.
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based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
responses.
a. Standardisation of results is limiting the explanatory 
value of many of the hypotheses,
b. The mainly ordinal character of data from the 
quantitative part of the questionnaire limits both the 
applicability and the spread of possible testing.
c. The process of including qualitative replies to the 
explanation of the hypotheses testing is selective. The 
judgmental character of the process makes the possibility of 
error higher. Certain replies will have to be qualified by 
this factor.
v i . Questionnaire Construction and Survey Implementation
has affected the validity or applicability of certain of the 
hypotheses tested. An initial round of fact-finding 
exploratory interviews (thirteen) was conducted in 1989 in 
Scotland among officials in regional agencies which was not 
based on the questionnaire used in 1991 (seventy-six 
administered and analysed gestionnaires). Resource and time 
considerations precluded the use of a pilot survey 
questionnaire. However, preceding as well as shortly after 
the main series of elite interviews I conducted a number of 
interviews with senior local governmet administrators, 
academics, national government bureaucrats and party 
activists in both Greece/Crete (sixteen interviews) and 
Scotland/Glasgow (eleven interviews). These were
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unstructured 'informed subject' interviews that helped me 
identify issues pertinent to my investigation. In that 
respect they assisted me to orient the survey questions and 
direct my analysis. Validity considerations remain in that:
a. It has become apparent in certain occasions that the 
investigative tools are inadequate for a complete and 
thorough investigation of the hypotheses. For instance, 
there are no adequate measures to establish or refute a link 
of nationalism with xenophobia. Although this was of 
secondary importance to the survey, investigating such a 
link for this particular sample would have aided with the 
testing of other relevant hypotheses.
b. The order of the questions, although designed to produce 
a certain impact, may influence replies to certain questions 
in such a way that subsequent tests will be affected 
adversely.
c. Certain questions are not applicable to both countries, 
as the regions have differing socioeconomic conditions and 
institutional traditions. For instance question QDll, 
inquiring whether respondents in Chania believe there are 
great differences between people in their region and people 
in the rest of Europe, was only employed in the Greek 
sample.
d. Scottish business and political elite interviewees 
replied to a letter requesting an interview, which as
84 . An account of the procedural issues and problems that arise out of 
the questionnaire formation are covered in appendix I .
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mentioned above has the drawback of successful businessmen 
or favourably minded politicians taking part. In the Greek 
sample, lists from appropriate collective bodies were 
supplied (primary bias) and all those successfully contacted 
participated. This difference in the implementation of the 
questionnaire, creates problems with the applicability of 
certain hypotheses which assume the sample to be 
homogeneously (if not randomly) sampled,
e. Certain of the questions have to be practically 
eliminated from the testing of the hypotheses due to an 
unexpected 'optimism' in replies to certain questions. This 
is the case for question QD12, in which all members of the 
Greek business sample replied that they thought Europe 
represented a challenge for their region. This condition 
weakens the quantitative tests of some of the hypotheses.
F . Research Outline
Chapters three and four describe the regions and elites 
investigated, while in chapter five I have included a 
primary analysis of each sub-samples' profile. This could 
be considered as an attitudinal and socioeconomic profile of 
each elite, although, attitudinal measures constructed in 
chapter five section F, can be also considered relevant to 
respective elites' value systems.
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Hypotheses H I and H II are tested in chapter six while H 
III and H IV are tested in chapter seven. An exploratory 
analysis of data in connection to hypotheses H V is 
attempted in section D of chapter seven. Conclusions from 
this research and inferences for further research are 
covered in chapter eight.
In chapter five, basic statistical tools are used, including 
cross-tabulations and percentage distributions. In chapters 
six and seven, tests employed include correlations and 
computations of the mean, although relevant techniques are 
necessarily limited by sample limitations. There is an 
extensive use of respondents' qualifications (the 
qualitative element) in order to interpret -or even 
question- statistical analysis. These qualifications, at 





A. Overview; Systems of Local Government.
Initially, this research intended to cover the European 
regions®^ of Scotland, Catalonia, Sicily and Peloponnese. 
For lack of resources the Italian region was excluded as 
the least significant for a comparative study and the 
Spanish region had to be subsequently eliminated due to 
insufficient resources and time constraints.
Scotland was selected as a region/nation containing a 
number of declining industrial regions, it was 
subsequently thought more feasible to cover the Region of 
Strathclyde and focus in particular on the prominent city 
within that region, Glasgow.^" Peloponnese was
. The definition of region accepted here is that of a territorialy 
defined area used for purposes of statistical analysis. An 
account of the problems of definition for regions is given by 
Kimble (1951) who questions how meaningful it is to accept the 
regional concept and Gilbert (1960) who suggests integrating the 
physical and economic notions of the regional concept.
Furthermore, in the case of Scotland it can be argued that the 
geographically defined region has the characteristics of a nation 
(Kellas, 1989). In the analysis that follows, unless otherwise 
defined, I refer to nation-states as nations and all their sub­
divisions as regions.
. In this work I accept the definition of a declining industrial 
region given by Padoa-Schioppa (1987, p.162-64), Scotland in this 
sense is considered a region, although it has been effectively 
argued that it has a distinct national identity (Kellas, 1989; 
Midwinter et al, 1991) .
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subsequently relinquished for the region of Crete (Kriti) 
which appears to have a more appropriate cultural and 
historic background for the research questions that I 
want to explore. A further, narrowing-down, to the 
prefecture of Chania was deemed necessary to facilitate a 
more in-depth study, while I focused on the city of 
Chania, which is the most prominent urban centre within 
the prefecture. Crete is considered a least -favoured 
region by European Community standards (Padoa- 
Schioppa, 1987) . I have thus focused on two urban centres 
and their surrounding region. If there were no regional 
historical and particularly regional administrative 
boundaries, I could have defined my area of investigation 
as pertaining to Western Scotland and Western Crete.
This investigation has focused on one 'industrially 
declining' and one 'underdeveloped' region of the 
European Union. Both regions lie on the periphery. 
Scottish territory lies between the 30% and 20% 
peripherality contours (Commission of EC, 1984, p.136). 
This indicates a degree of peripherality similar to that 
of south-western France and the Iberian peninsula, a 
position markedly more central from that of Greece and 
particularly of Crete which lies outwith the 10% 
peripherality contour (see map 3.1).
The particular study cited here estimates accessibility 
in 1979, while a big effort has been made since, in
improving infrastructure and communications to ameliorate 
the situation.
Map 3.1 Peripherality Contours as a percentage of Highest 
Regional Accessibility in 197 9
1
Source: Commission of the EC. The Regions of the EC: Second Periodic 
Report, Luxembourg : 1984.
Both regions have very unique political cultures, aspects 
of which are considered in part E of this chapter. In an 
effort to attain a higher degree of understanding of the 
interaction between the political and business elites of
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the two regions, I tried to narrow the targeted 
population in geographic terms. This narrowing down from 
Scotland to Strathclyde to Glasgow City and Crete to 
Chania to Chania City entails many limitations, more 
extensively covered in part F.
At this stage I should refer to the structure of regional 
government in the regions investigated at the time of 
this survey. In the UK system, under legislation in 
force in 1991, local government had two tiers in 
S c o t l a n d . I m m e d i a t e l y  under the decentralised arm of 
the national bureaucracy (Scottish Office) were the 
Regional Councils, which contained a number of District 
Councils. There were 9 Regional and 53 District 
Councils. Strathclyde Regional Council was by far the 
largest regional council in Scotland with 2.3 million 
people in its territory, while Glasgow City Council was 
the biggest District Council in Strathclyde with 715 
thousand people within the City boundaries.
Councillors in both chambers were elected by majority 
vote in single member wards and served for four years. 
Local Government in Scotland was financed by a Community 
Charge Tax, first introduced in 1989, which however was 
abandoned, as announced in March 1991, and replaced by a
For the change of local authorities legislation and the political 
debate on the enactment of a single tier local authority system 
see the relevant documents by the Scottish Office (1991,1992) and 
the Strathclyde Regional Council (1993). For the relevant debate 
on the introduction of a single tier local government in Scotland 
see Padison (1995) and MacAteer (1996).
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capital value property system introduced in 1993. 
Additionally, there was the Uniform Business Rate through 
which local business contributed to local government, 
while an amount of less than 40% of local government 
expenditure was met directly by central government. The 
funding structure has drastically changed under the new 
single tier authorities (MacAteer, 1996).
There have been numerous calls for reform of the local 
government system in Scotland and the UK. Overall, 
academic essays centred around the perceived failings of 
the existing system to provide efficient services 
(Gaster,1991) or the fact that many local services are 
provided by non-elected bodies (Preston,1992)
Strathclyde has been considered by some as a successful 
authority, in spite of its large size (Midwinter,1985) or 
maybe because of it. The fear also has been expressed 
that such a large authority could not "...co-exist 
peacefully with the proposed Scottish Assembly..." 
(Midwinter,1985,p.44). The City of Glasgow, however, 
which is the largest district within Strathclyde, has 
integrated well with the Region (Gordon,1985) and does 
not consider the region to be an impediment in the 
services it provides.
. A comprehensive account of the theoretical debates in 
contemporary British local democracy is presented in a recent 
edited volume by King and Stoker (1996) .
. Both the Leaders of the City Council and the Regional Council 
when interviewed, supported the idea that relationships between 
the two Councils are at a very good level and not at all 
competitive. Keating however, has argued that "it would not be 
true to say that the relationship between the tiers [of City and 
Region] are characterised by harmony and collaboration" (Keating,
Relations with central government have been cited as one 
of the reasons that local authorities have been hindered 
in providing a high level of services. "During the 1980s 
the relationships existing between central and local 
government in the UK have been characterised by much 
tension and at times open conflict."(Preston,1992,p .120). 
This tension is easily identified on most articles on 
local government in the national press throughout the 
1980s. Some consider it as part of a policy by the 
British government, during the 1980s, to centralise 
governmental functions, while it has been suggested that 
in the question of subsidiarity for European funding, 
government ministers 'would vehemently agree for it to be 
applied to Brussels, but emphatically disagree for it to 
be applied to Westminster'{The Economist,1992). In order 
to understand the relationship between local government 
in Strathclyde and central government it would also be 
useful to draw a distinction between relations with the 
Scottish Office (which are comparatively amicable) and 
attitudes towards Whitehall (characterised by mutual 
suspicion). It should also be noted that a degree of 
'administrative devolution', by increasing the remit of 
the Scottish Office (Scottish Office, 1993) has not 
necessarily meant a decrease in the control of Whitehall 
on Scottish affairs. 'Administrative devolution' may be
1988, p.73). Tensions, among other sectors, are reported on the 
development of the highway network. Distrust and internecine 
conflict between Strathclyde and the district councils is reported 
in the Stodart Report (1981).
a missnomer as what has really happened is 
'administrative decentralisation'. Whitehall is, to some 
extent, still determining Scottish policy priorities 
based on UK criteria. As a result local government 
relations with the Scottish Office, although vital, can 
not be considered as a direct substitute to relations 
with Whitehall.
Both Strathclyde Regional Council and Glasgow City 
Council were Labour dominated in 1991. The Chairman and 
the Lord Provost were the figureheads, for the region and 
the city respectively, while the Leader of the Council 
and the Leader of the Majority were on top of the 
respective political party hierarchies and therefore 
responsible for decisions taken and policy made.
The Greek system of local government had only one level, 
whose autonomy is embedded in the constitution. There 
have been attempts to create a second tier, notably law 
1622/86 of 1986 which introduces a second tier of local 
government with regionally elected councils to undertake 
some of the responsibilities currently vested on 
prefects. Prefectures {Nome) are the administrative
. A major role in the development of the regions and districts is 
played by the respective local government bureaucracy the head of 
which is the Chief Executive, a non- political post. The 
importance they have in both implementing, but also advising on 
policy, gives them particular political significance.
. An account of the recent history of decentralisation and relevant 
legislation in Greece is provided by Verney and Papageorgiou 
(Verney,1992) and Theodorou (1995). Laws 1622/86, 2218/94,
2240/94 and 2307/95 have introduced elected prefecture Councils, 
Regional Councils and Regional Development Funds for each Region. 
The changes where brought about by the requirement of the European
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arms of government locally and there are 51 prefectures 
of approximately similar size. There are thirteen 
regions (currently, since the size and number of Greek 
administrative regions has varied with the periodic 
introduction of new statistical methods by the European 
Commission and Eurostat) of predominantly statistical 
significance at the time of this survey.
At the time of the survey government-appointed prefects 
were taking part in Regional Councils with consultative 
regional planning functions. These Regional Councils 
included some appointed political and business 
personalities of the region. The law on elected regional 
councils (1622/86) has been slow to enact for a number of 
reasons. One of these was a resistance from political 
parties to come to terms with the loss of power entailed 
in decentralisation (Verney, 1992).
The first (and only functioning at the time of the 
survey) tier of local government in Greece comprised of 
City and Local Councils {Deme ke Kinotites) . There are 
303 municipalities and 5,697 communes, while 83% of the 
latter have less than 1,000 inhabitants. City councils 
{Deme) are those who have over ten thousand inhabitants 
or had city status historically or are the seat of a 
prefecture. All other smaller communities have the
Union for local management of financing, together with the 
perceived need for decentralisation of the Greek state. The first 
prefecture/regional elections took place on the 16th of October 
1994 .
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status of a Local Council (kinotita). They are funded 
through taxes on property and land, a beer tax and local 
charges. Central government collects these taxes for the 
smallest of these communities. Additionally they receive 
a percentage of inheritance tax, vehicle taxation and the 
duty on real property transfers. The government funded 
the local authorities through the prefecture as well, 
which in turn will oversee the legality of the actions of 
the local authority. Elections for local government are 
held every four years under the alternative vote system, 
which means that a ticket to be elected has to command an 
absolute majority. This one party-ticket will have the 
majority of seats in the council but there is usually 
greater room for opposition councillors to be elected 
than in a single ward first past the post system. Most 
city councils in Crete are Socialist or Socialist/Left 
coalition dominated. This was the case for the City of 
Chania as well in 1991.
The mayor, in the bigger city councils {Deme), is 
assisted by an executive committee of between 3 and 6 
members. A mayors' role is executive, since the city 
council is responsible for making policy, fixing local 
taxes etc.
The role of local government, being rather marginal to 
regional development, is further diminished by the party 
political platform which usually characterises local 
elections. Holding the mayor's office in the three
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biggest cities in Greece, (and to a lesser extent in the 
next ten biggest), is a political appointment, with 
national political appeal, which enhances influence 
within party structures and can lead to a seat in the 
national legislature.^^ This relates to the political 
elites' perception that real political power exists only 
at the national parliament. The aspirations of 
influential local politicians are therefore directed 
towards the national parliament which is one of the 
reasons why they failed to lobby effectively for the 
creation of a second tier of regional government.
To establish the degree of comparability of the two 
different systems of regional government a useful aid 
will be the comparison of the competencies of local 
government under the two systems. In table 3.1 a list of 
functions is matched to the degree possible. There are a 
number of differences in the mandate of local authorities 
in the two countries that make direct comparisons at 
times tenuous. It is also the case that some of the 
alleged local authority functions are misleading. When
. Holding an elected position in National and local government is 
incompatible under Greek law. The impossibility of a 'cumule de 
mandats' probably diminishes the influence of local government in 
the national legislature but could also be considered to increase 
local government independence.
. Attempts at decentralisation in the contemporary Greek state 
culminated with law 3200/55 of 1955 which introduced advisory 
prefecture councils but was thwarted by the centralisation imposed 
by the 1967-74 dictatorship. An attempt at reform was introduced 
by law 1235/82 shortly after accession to the EEC and with the 
Socialist government of the day having a decentralisation platform 
which extended the role of prefecture councils but maintained 
their non-elected advisory capacity. Previously mentioned laws 
1622/86 and 2218/94 were the first to introduce regional elected 
councils, whilethe first elections were held in October 1994.
'economic development' responsibilities are 'transferred 
to a Greek local authority, their remit does not by any 
stretch of the imagination encroach upon the national 
ministries' work and would at best indicate a marginal 
role in regional or urban economic regeneration. 
Comparison of functions in table 3.1 suggests a good 
degree of correspondence in competence between local 
authorities in the two regions. It must be stressed 
however, that Greek local authorities exhibit much less 
autonomy in decision-making than what their 'formal 
competence' might indicate.
Table 3.1: Local Authorities Functions and Responsibilities
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Source: European Municipal Directory, 1991.
The Greek system of prefectures having been modelled 
after the French centralised system of government, 
appears comparatively monolithic in its centralisation.
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The main consideration however, when this system was 
introduced, was to keep a very divergent country under a 
central authority and most importantly to cultivate 
allegiance to that centre. The population of Greece was 
too small, it was feared, for allowing for the existence 
of autonomous entities that might eventually create 
centrifugal forces to the country's unity. Furthermore 
Greece's centralisation drive has been re-enforced by the 
country's nation building experience which involved a 
consolidation towards an outside threat (the Ottomans) 
and a subjugation of the many regional (and perceived 
parochial) to the one national (modernising) identity.
It has been the almost unanimous view of all officials I 
interviewed, both in the survey and in the interviews 
that helped me plan the survey, that the time is ripe and 
the need urgent for the introduction of greater autonomy 
at least in the design and implementation of policy 
making. The question naturally arises for the political 
scientist whether that is a call for decentralisation or 
devolution and whether this can be linked with a re­
enforcement (or re-awakening) of regional identity.
. Diamandouros notes that after Greek independence "an ethos of 
pronounced localism and parochialism...[impeded] national 
integration by placing a premium on primordial sentiments, and by 
producing fierce and lasting local and regional attachments" 
(Diamandouros, 1983, p.46).
. The former Greek MEP Phillipos Pierros has remarked that 'the 
basic problem lies in the fact that different authorities have the 
implementation competence and different one's the supervision. To 
face the problem there must be a conjunction of the two 
competencies ...[and] ... a transfer of competencies to the 
periphery...'. (liberal translation from the Greek prototype) 
(Pierros, 15 August 1991, p.55). This criticism refers 
particularly to problems in the implementation of Regional 
Development and Integrated Mediterranean Programs.
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B, Crete and Scotland in a comparative context.
Selection of the particular regions must be attributed, 
up to a point, to the availability of regional 
statistics. The European Commission has developed a 
system called NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
Statistics) which effectively determines the way 
statistical information is gathered and processed. 
Scotland is a level I region (NUTS I) with Crete included 
in Eastern and Southern islands NUTS I (Anatolika ke 
Notia Nisia) . Obviously to move to level II so that I 
could work with Crete I have to compare it with an equal 
level region in Scotland, in this case Dumfries-Galloway, 
Strathclyde. To further narrow the scope to NUTS III I 
am, when possible, supplementing this analysis with data 
on Nomos Chanion and the Strathclyde Region. From the 
official publications of the EC available in Glasgow 
University's European Documentation Centre, there is very 
little comparable evidence available prior to 1983 for 
level II regions. Even on Statistics for 1992 (latest 
available in June 1996) there are many gaps on the 
breakdown of regional data (for example fragmented data 
on Gross Value Added).
Scotland and Crete have an independent/autonomous past 
and are located on the periphery of Europe in 
geographical terms. This similarity is one of the 
reasons they constitute a valid pair for a comparative
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study. Their divergent industrialisation and development 
experience, together with their different level of 
development is not just a limitation on validity. I 
consider their difference to enhance the comparative 
character of this work and allow me to assume a greater 
degree of universality from my conclusions.
As expected, Crete is found on the bottom of the ladder 
regarding Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with 34% of 
Community average in ECU's in 1981. The picture looks 
slightly better if converted to Purchasing Power Standard 
units, where Crete attains 45% for the same year. What 
is remarkable, is that by 1984 Crete has moved to 43% of 
ECU's and 54% PPS's. An increase of more than 1/4 in 
ECU's and 1/5 in PPS's in just three years. Although 
between 1983 and 1984 there is almost no growth from 1985 
onwards GDP was expected to increase as a result of the 
implementation of the Mediterranean Integrated Program 
for the region.
Another very interesting feature is that between 1983 and 
1984 Crete has altered its Gross value Added (GVA) 
composition by moving away from Industry and Services and 
into Agriculture. This has been an effect of out of 
season covered and greenhouse crops that were 
particularly favoured with accession to the Common Market 
(Commission,1983). So between 1983 and 1984 agriculture 
increased from contributing 32.1% to 39.1% of regional
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value added, industry declined from 19.8% to 18.1% while 
services fell from 48.4% to 42.8%.
Statistics for Strathclyde (including Dumfries-Galloway) 
are rather fragmented. There is no specific data for 
Strathclyde on GVA in the European Community publications 
and I therefore use statistical figures provided for 
Scotland, while on GDP data exist only after 1983.^^ 
Between 1983 and 1984 GDP in ECU's fell from 94% to 88% 
of Community average while in PPS from 95% to 91%. In 
the Scottish economy as a whole there is a move from 
industry to services. In 1981 industry accounted for 
40.5% while services for 56.6% of GVA while in 1984 for 
37% and 60.2% respectively.
Between 1986 and 1987 Crete had a fall in unemployment 
from 4% to 2.7%,^^ while Strathclyde a minor increase from 
16.7% to 17% . From non-comprehensive latest data 
Strathclyde unemployment is currently down to 9.3% 
(Strathclyde Trends, No48, 1995) . These figures indicate 
a major improvement in the rather bleak picture of the 
beginning of the 1980s.
. There are extensive regional statistics provided by the Bureau 
of Statistics in the UK and the Strathclyde Regional Council. For 
reasons of comparability I try to arrive to most comparisons from 
Eurostat statistics supplementing with national ones only if 
necessary.97 . In a report prepared by the prefecture of Chania it transpires 
that during the winter months Nomos Chanion and Crete as a whole 
suffer from chronic winter labour shortages (Protopapadakis, 1987, 
p.69), while the active population unemployment figure they 
estimate at 3.3%
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So, as the relevant statistics indicate I have used two 
distinctly different regions, in terms of composition of 
output, employment level and market orientation towards 
the future. Their common elements are their below EC 
average GDP (particularly as compared to their national 
average) and, as already mentioned, their peripherality 
and particular sense of regional identity (a theme upon 
which I will expound further on).
The fact that there is a regional identity that separates 
these regions from their respective national (i.e. 
nation-state) entities I trust that makes their study 
easier and at the same time more complicated. I am not 
able to use results from this research to generalise 
about national entities, I am however able to use my 
conclusions in relation to other regional units.
Scotland and to a lesser extent Crete see themselves as 
the inheritors of a distinct ethnic identity.
This research could be relevant to the examination of 
actions of regional units; assuming they will develop 
independent patterns of behaviour consistent with sub­
national actors in a supra-national arena. The choice of 
regions here targets assumed differences in 'mentality' 
(and therefore possibly value systems and attitudes)
98 . This trend however, as Juliet Lodge asserts, should be seen in 
the perspective of an emerging new 'European Order' where an 
increasing "Europeanisation of domestic issues" is the natural 
course of events (Lodge, 1989), this trend may be applied to 
regional actions as well but its universality remains to be 
proven.
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between the two regions, Scotland has an industrial past 
and Scottish see themselves as northern Europeans with a 
Celtic and Nordic inheritance, distinctly different from 
the rest of the British. Cretans perceive themselves as 
a gifted ethnic group, different from the rest of Greece 
and in the process of transformation from a backward 
agricultural region, to a model developing region. Their 
centuries-old pride in their ethnic identity is 
reinforced by this success.
In this context a further difficulty has to do with the 
artificial division of territorial units into regions by 
government bodies for political reasons, which is why I 
have focused this study on the West of Scotland and West 
of Crete. I have thus tried to take account of 
boundaries of identity (a sense of belonging to a region) 
rather than administrative boundaries. That has not 
meant that I have been willing to transcend the 
administrative boundaries when seeking interviews, but 
rather acknowledging that these administrative boundaries 
do not necessarily contain all those identified with the 
respective regions.
99 . The social situation in Crete after WW II is analysed in socio­
economic research by Allbaugh (1953) , while a more contemporary 
anecdotal account is given by Hopkins (1977) and an 
anthropological account by Herzfeld (1985).
. In the case of Scottish regional boundaries, the accusation has 
often been made, that regional or district borders are re-defined 
with a view to gerrymandering from the national government. A 
factor that has been coming to the fore in latter years, is the
extent to which regional borders permit different localities to
qualify for different types of regional aid, as in objective 5b
(rural areas) or 2 (industrial decline) regions.
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Finally, in order to proceed with an examination of the 
economic conditions in the two regions it has to be noted 
that, to the extent that this is a study of integration 
of regional units, "any analysis of the integration of 
regions risks being tautological for in a sense a region 
is defined by the extend of its integration" (Bernstein, 
1970) .
C. The Strathclyde economy: Focusing on Glasgow City.
In the next two sections I attempt both an analysis of 
the economic geography of the two regions and an account 
of the development prospects and expectations in 
Strathclyde and Crete at the time of my survey.
Scotland extends to an area of 77,080 sq. km, of which 
73% is utilised for agriculture. There were 4.957 
million people living in Scotland in 1991 according to 
that year's census. In 1991 5.1 million people were 
recorded resident (note the difference between being 
resident and being recorded in the census) in Scotland of 
which 2.25 million were resident in Strathclyde. In the 
same year 1,973 thousand people were employed in Scotland 
of which 3 0 thousand were employed in the primary, 591 
thousand were employed in the secondary and 1,353 
thousand in the tertiary sector, while there were 281 
cars per thousand people (Central Statistical Office, 
1992) .
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Table 3.2: Household economic situation in Strathclyde and
Strathclyde Glasgow
No of Households 903,339 289,855
% Privately Owned 47 .1% 37 . 2%
% Central Heating 76 .4% 62 . 7%
% Without Car 49 . 2% 65 . 5%Source: General Register Office for Scotland, HMSO, 1993.
Unemployment as a percentage of the work-force was at
9.9% (1990) in Strathclyde while it reached a figure of 
7.8% for the whole of Scotland. Overall, there seems to 
be a consistent 1-2% gap in the unemployment rate between 
Great Britain, Scotland and Strathclyde from 1977 to 
1991, as Strathclyde maintains a persistently higher 
unemployment rate.
Scottish Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current prices 
was £5.756 per capita in 1987 which represented 94% of 
the UK average. Gross Regional Product (GRP) for 
Strathclyde stood at £5,419 per capita at current prices 
up from 3,281 in 1981.^°^
In 1990 there were 59,054 companies registered in
Scotland up from 32,978 in 1978. In 1979 domestic 
consumption of energy accounted for 1,389 million therms 
while industrial, transport and other consumers for 4,314 
therms. By 1989 consumption of energy had dropped to
1 0 1 . This is readily apparent in Statistical and Graphic analysis of 
unemployment trends for Strathclyde, in Strathclyde Economic 
Trends (No32, October 1991, p.18).
. Contemporary economic statistics for Strathclyde and Scotland 
can be found in the Scottish Economic Bulletin published by HMSO. 
Issue no 43, of June 1991, pp 59-72 is referred to here.
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1,326 from households and to 4,011 million therms from 
industrial, transport and other users. Energy 
consumption has maintained a 1/3 ratio between domestic 
and productive uses through this period.
Table 3.3: Population and employment by sector accordingto the 1991 Census for Strathclyde and GILasgow City.
IN THOUSANDS Strathclyde GlasgowResident Population 2,249 663
Total Employed 862 222
Aqric./Fishing 11 1.3% 0.3 0.1%Mining 19 2.2% 2.3 1.0%
Manufacture 155 18.0% 35 16.0%Construction 73 8.5% 19 8.5%
Source: General Register Office for Scot^Land, HMSO, 1993.
One interesting indicator for understanding the degree of 
entrepreneurial vitality in Scotland is the percentage of 
self employed in the work-force. Data for 1990 reveal 
this figure to be little over 10% for Scotland compared 
with the UK average which was 12.5%.^°'^
To understand the prevalent elite attitudes on Scottish 
business prospects I proceed with some data on the 
performance of the Scottish versus the UK economy.
The Scottish economy outperformed the UK economy 
achieving a 2% growth in 1990 compared with the UK 
average of 0.7%. The figures for the previous year are
103
104 . Ibid. Scottish Economic Bulletin, pp76-80.. Ibid. Scottish Economic Bulletin p.52. Entrepreneurial vitality 
can be also related to growth of the number of SMEs or rate of 
business failures or by evaluating the 'entrepreneurial milieu' in 
a region.
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even more impressive where Scotland achieved a 3.5% 
growth compared to 1.9% in UK. Similarly, unemployment 
change which is another indicator of the force of the 
recession across regions, showed a less marked increase 
in Scotland of 11% while in UK the change was 42% and in 
the South East unemployment grew by 80% . These figures 
agree with a number of surveys conducted during 1991, of 
which the one conducted by CBI indicates that the 
Scottish recession "has been both shorter and shallower 
than in the UK as a whole..." {Scottish Economic 
Bulletin, no43, p.9-10).
A forecast by Cambridge Econometrics was predicting a 
fall of 5.7% in manufacturing output in 1991 to be 
followed by 0.8% fall in 1992, which would induce a fall 
of employment in the sector. An export-led recovery was 
predicted to follow in the latter part of 1992. The 
Service industry was expected to fare better with output 
growth of 0.9% and 1.8% in 1991 and 1992 respectively. 
Tourism and leisure were expected to lead this revival 
although employment was expected to decline overall.
The most important factors that were likely to affect 
growth in the short term, according to the Scottish 
Office, was the lag in international trade growth, to be 
further aggravated by problems in the Uruguay Round of 
the GATT negotiations, as well as the US budget deficit 
and German costs of unification. Prospects for Scotland
Ibid., Scottish Economic Bulletin, p.11.
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were considered uncertain in the medium term particularly 
because of higher inflation and unit costs of labour than
its international and particularly its EC/EU
^  106 competitors.
The overall performance of the Scottish Economy was 
naturally linked to the performance of the British 
economy as a whole. Furthermore, the relevant position 
of the UK economy within the European integrated market 
was considered of paramount importance. Problems that 
might evolve from a 'traditional' British reticence to 
further integration could hit the regions hardest. Some 
analysts believed that Britain has overall received a 
negative economic impact from accession to the Community 
(Bulmer,1992). Others believed that Britain has failed 
to make the best of opportunities, particularly in the 
regional development level, where the British Government 
refuses to accept the additionality principle in regional 
aid.^^
D. The Cretan Economy: Focusing on the Prefecture of 
Chania
The region of Crete is one of 13 regions into which the 
National Statistical office sub-divides Greece. The
. Ibid. Scottish Economic Bulletin, pp 11-12.
. A good analysis of the impact -or the lack of it- of European 
Regional Policy in British regions is given by Richard Harrington, 
who describes ERDF transfers as a "disguised rebate to the UK 
government" (Harrington, 1992, p.64).
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number of inhabitants according to the 1981 census were 
502 thousand; 188,560 declared being employed while 
4,614 unemployed. The unemployment figure reached 10,942 
by 1988, The disposable per-capita income was 163,296 
drachmae in 1981.
Agricultural land was slightly reduced from 3,223 
thousand strernmata to 3,177 thousand; in the rest of 
Greece this decline is more pronounced. The average 
agricultural property is 30 strernmata in size (30 
thousand m^) and segregated in 8 lots. The average 
yearly temperature is 18.3 degrees Celsius and the 
average rainfall is 800 mm per year.^°®
Industry and handicraft operations represent roughly 5% 
of the national total at 7,349 operating units (1984); 
use of units of electricity where the national ratio is 
2/3 between domestic to industrial, is reversed in Crete 
to 7/2 ; obviously indicating small industrial units with 
limited use of industrial machinery (1988) .
Other basic economic indicators (1988-1989) show two 
phones for every five people, one doctor for every 48 
people , one teacher for every 12 pupils in high school, 
while the public finance indicators show declared income 
which is 75% of the national average per-capita. All of
A good geographical analysis of the prefecture can be found in 
the 'Report to the School of National Defence' by the then prefect 
S .Tsirkas (197 5).
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the above figures are below the national average figures 
from between 10 to 35%.
Tourism is very important for the island with 71,634 beds 
and 7,929,097 overnight stays from foreigners in 1989. 
This represents almost a quarter of the national average. 
There are an estimated further 45,000 seasonal tourist 
beds available in the black economy for which there can 
only be assumptions on the overnight stays they provide. 
It is also estimated that approximately 30 thousand 
people or 19% of the work-force are employed in tourism.
The high peripherality of the island, as it is placed on 
the eastern Mediterranean and the southernmost tip of 
Europe, creates problems of accessibility that are 
aggravated by poor communication links. This is made 
worse by limited and at times poorly maintained 
infrastructure on the island itself. There is no road, 
as yet, traversing the east to west axis on the southern 
part of the island. A very limited length of existing 
roads qualify for the term carriageways and the plans for 
extending or upgrading the network are not conforming to 
a comprehensive feasibility; subsequently public works 
projects have a difficulty qualifying for EC grants.
The prefecture of Chania comprises the western-most part
109 . In interviews with Chania prefecture economic specialists it was 
noted that although in individual infrastructural projects there 
is a requirement for a feasibility study there is no overall 
development plan linking smaller projects and assessing their 
collective impact (Chania, July 1990 and September 1991) .
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of Crete and it is one of four administrative sub-regions 
the island is divided into, having an area of 2,379,000 
stemmata.
Table 3.4: Cretan land morphology
Chania Crete Greece
plains 18 . 7% 23.4% 30.3%
semi-mountainous 19 .1% 26.7% 27 .1%
mountainous 62.2% 49. 9% 42 . 6%
Source: Protopapadakis (1987).
Crete has a density of 53 inhabitants per sq. km compared 
with the national average being 75 and the EC average 
being 164 (Eurostat, statistical office of the European 
Communities, 1987). Employment figures show Agriculture 
to have the largest share with 42.82%, but only supplying 
2 8.5% of the income (see table 3.5 below), employment in 
the primary sector show a drastic decline from the 1971 
figure of 70.9% but it should be noted that people 
employed in the secondary and tertiary sectors are 
occasionally employed in the primary. Also unemployment 
levels are negligible but there is a serious problem of 
under-employment (Protopapadakis, 198 7) .
Table 3.5: Employment by sector in Chania, Greece and the 
EEC




primary 42 . 8% 28 . 5% 28.9% 8 .6%
secondary 19 . 1% 22. 0 % 27.4% 33 . 8%
tertiary 38 . 1% 49 . 5% 43 . 7% 57 . 6%
Source: Eurostat for Greece and EEC ,Protopapadakis 
(1987) for Chania.
There was one industrial-park in existence but had proven 
quite inadequate, there were three more parks under 
construction and one at the planning stage. To the 
degree that these parks conform to national trends their 
operation does not necessarily indicate industrialisation 
as most enterprises would be small and geared towards 
handicraft. In total 51.7% of sold lots in industrial 
parks in Greece were for lots of between 2-5 thousand m^ 
which indicates a strong orientation towards small-medium 
sized units; 88% of the sales were for lots of 15 
thousand m^ or less .
Almost all established industries were related to 
agricultural production, which imposes restrictions on 
the possibility of alterations in existing production 
patterns.
Table 3.6: Existing Industries in Crete in 1987
a. olive oil products
b. wine and spirits
c. raisins
d. concentrated juices
e. processing of sugarcane
f. milk, cheese, ice-cream
g. processing of leather
h. canning of agricultural products
i. silk weaving 
j . textiles
Source: Protopapadakis 1987.
Statistics on industrial plant size are found in Epilogi, August 
1991, pp.44-46.
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The prefecture had set out a list of proposed industries 
with the scope of inducing industrial development in 
Crete.
Table 3.7; Proposed Industries in Crete
a. petrochemicals
b. cement and building materials
c. gypsum production
d. shipyards
e. construction of earth moving equipment




j . tourist and silverware artefacts 
k. irrigation and greenhouse equipment
Source: Protopapadakis 1987.
As is evident, proposed industries could create an 
inducement to industrialisation of the island, while they 
would increase the region's autonomy from outside 
suppliers. The limited planning and environmental impact 
feasibilities, however, create concerns on the 
introduction of such industries on the local economy. 
Furthermore, although there seems to be a market for each 
of these products within Crete, proposed industries did 
not seem to be export oriented (Mavromatis, 1989).
All major urban centres are on the North side of the 
island where most of the cultivated lands exist as well. 
There are three major ports on the North side while there 
are no substantial port facilities on the south side.
This uneven orientation is reflected in the development
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of the island as an appendix of the Greek production 
system.
Future economic trends point to the need of 'autonomous' 
regional development and re-orientation of the island's 
economy to take advantage of its geographical position 
and production strengths. This realisation was manifest 
in local authority plans to establish a regional airline 
company to transfer tourists and agricultural produce 
directly to the European markets. Furthermore, the three 
major companies conducting the sea transportation from 
and to the island were about to merge, to become the 
biggest such carrier in Europe, with plans to expand 
their network to other direct destinations in Europe and 
eventually the Middle East.
Cretan businessmen seemed to aspire to the development 
achieved since the mid 1970's by Cyprus, an island of 
similar size, population and location. They understood 
that they could not depend on industry for their 
development, and seemed to concentrate their efforts on 
agriculture and services. Notably they had managed to 
increase both the quality of agricultural products and 
the productivity of land with covered or greenhouse 
cultivation, while between 1981 and 1990 they had almost 
doubled their capacity in tourist beds. Cretans believed
. An extensive analysis on the state of the tourist economy in 
Crete is given in a special section on 'Crete and Tourism' of 
Tourismos ke Oikonomia [Tourism and Economy Monthly], issue no 
151, June 1991, pp.94-146.
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in achieving self-sufficiency, as 'Crete makes an 
integrated economic unit, probably the most integrated in 
the country' a phrase coined by Manolikakis (1963) which 
was frequently quoted in academic research on Crete.
Crete had something to show for the attention it received 
recently in planning departments of the Greek ministries. 
Between 1970 and 1981 GNP for Greece rose in fixed 1970 
prices from 100 to 161, Cretan GRP by comparison rose to 
178 (Voloudakis, 1984).
The prefecture enjoyed many benefits from Greek accession 
to the EEC, that also created a number of problems 
relating to its peripheral nature and the problems of 
Greek economic integration to the Community. Regional 
development grants, aimed at agriculture and 
infrastructure and the Integrated Mediterranean Programs, 
had a positive effect on the income, productivity and 
standards of living particularly of the agricultural 
community (Protopapadakis, 1987). Negative effects 
included primarily those of the integration itself, which 
brought stagnation and high inflation to the Greek 
economy, while agricultural production had to face steep 
competition from similar products from the rest of 
Southern Europe. Additionally, the lack of a developed 
administrative mechanism to support agricultural 
production and the lack of complete information for 
taking advantage of Community programs, added to the
137
disadvantages the region experienced towards certain 
other regions.
It should be noted finally, that the economic condition 
and development of Crete is closely linked with that of 
mainland Greece. The main concern during the early 
1980's was that the Greek economy could not undergo the 
structural adjustments necessary to successfully 
integrate in Europe.
The position of the Greek economy in the European 
integrated market is very relevant to the ability of the 
Greek regions (particularly the more remote ones) to 
attain sufficiently high levels of growth so that they 
can achieve convergence with the rest of Europe. This 
is increasingly the case since evidence from recent 
research suggests that Greece has remained in the 
periphery of European growth during the 1980's and is 
under danger of being marginalised economically within 
the European Community (Commission, 1991).
. A number of studies have been published on the impact of the 
Greek accession to the EC. Most of the early ones foresee 
difficulties but point to balance of payment benefits (Drakos, 
1986), (Kefalas, 1986), (Manassakis, 1986), or see relatively 
limited effects(Tzoannos, 1986), (Van Frausum, 1986). More recent 
studies call for structural changes in the Greek economy or even 
suggest there is a need for "...the modernisation of political and 
institutional structures as a pre-condition for their successful 
participation in a new, more competitive 
environment..." (Tsoukalis,1991, p.302).
E. A distinctive political culture?^^^
I assume there are a number of differences in the 
political culture of the two regions I have investigated 
both from their respective national units and between 
each other, Their respective civil societies differ 
not only due to the different culture and political 
experiences of the two regions, but also due to diverse 
civic cultures. This divergence manifests itself in the 
encouragement or discouragement of political 
participation, as well as citizens trust or distrust of 
political authority in the two regions.
In the case of Crete there is a general distrust of 
authority, bred through centuries of opposition and 
resistance to foreign rule, which influences all aspects 
of social life, including citizens perceived 
responsibilities and entitlements (Clogg,1983a).
. To discuss political culture it was deemed expedient to refer to 
Scottish and Cretan political cultures as encompassing the local 
political cultures of City of Glasgow/Strathclyde and the City of 
Chania/Nomos Chanion. It is naturally recognised that the West of 
Scotland (Strathclyde) has a distinctive political culture that 
can be detected in the centrality of religion or the corporatist 
role of Labour 'bosses' in the area. Similarly in the West of 
Crete (Chania) there is a strong local identity that accentuates 
the 'non-conformist' and 'democratic' character of the West of 
Crete, as opposed to a perceived Athens-oriented and 'subservient' 
eastern part of the island. It is felt however that Scottish and 
Cretan identity, respectively, encompasses these more local 
distinct identities within the space of their concentric regional 
identities (Smith, 1996).
. I note here that "the danger of relying on political culture or 
national character to explain particular forms of behaviour is 
that they are self-referential and therefore static conceptions" 
(Heywood, 1994, p.5).
. For recent empirical quantitative research on clientelism see 
Kouvertaris and Dobratz (1984) and Sotiropoulos (1994) .
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The all-pervasive clientelistic political relationships 
are not just typical of Mediterranean political life but 
also a by-product of Ottoman rule, which by allowing 
three different (often conflicting) legal systems to run 
in parallel, cultivated distrust, as well as an evasive 
and suspicious attitude towards authority (Diamandouros, 
1983; Hopkins, 1977). Nepotism, as well, has affected 
social relations, as it has been considered a legitimate 
facet of power in pre-modern Greece. This was due to the 
importance family relations had in the latter years of 
the declining Ottoman rule (Cambell, 1983b; Ward, 1963). 
The extended family "spread horizontally and vertically 
to fill up critical social space, [and] became the 
central mechanism of social integration and of 
organisation" (Diamandouros, 1983, p.45). The arbitrary 
character of power has led to a "profound distrust of all 
concentration of power outside one's own hands, and ... 
the simultaneous pursuit of power at all costs" 
(Diamandouros, 1983, p.46), while political socialisation 
was marked by a directive approach towards the 'lower 
classes' (Mouzelis, 1987).
Furthermore, the absence of voluntary associations that 
could act as agents of "secondary political socialisation 
is directly related to the weakness of civil society" 
(Diamandouros, 1983, p.58). This condition can also be 
associated with the imposition of institutions at the 
genesis of the modern Greek state that are the product of
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capitalist social formations; these institutions applied 
to a pre-capitalist society eventually produced "a deeply 
alienative political culture" (Diamandouros, 1983, p.
48) . This is exhibited in the failure to incorporate 
lower class representation, in the formative years of the 
modern Greek state, and which resulted in "alternating 
bourgeois regimes" (Giner, 1986, p.13). Alienating 
progressive elements in society led to oppression or a 
"fascistisant" (Giner, 1986, p.24) state more blatantly 
evident in the Metaxas (1936-1940) and Papadopoulos/ 
loannides (1967-1974) dictatorships.
Contemporary Cretans' disregard of authority is most 
vividly reported in anthropological accounts of their 
dealings with the state by Herzfeld (1985). An earlier 
study by Allbaugh (1953) gave an account of how all 
administrative and political elites on the island were 
appointed and paid for by Athens, presumably accentuating 
the alienation of the local population and elites with 
the modern Greek state and national e l i t e s . T h i s
Cretan civic culture was further alienated from national 
political culture as a result of the repression of the 1967-74 
military dictatorship. The strict imposition of central control 
on local bureaucracies (Scwhab, 1973) coupled with the need for 
rapid modernisation after the collapse of the dictatorship 
(Featherstone, 1987) could be seen to re-enforce divisions between 
centre and periphery in the Greek civil society.
. It has been further suggested that in Southern Europe there has 
been an "institutionalisation of the negotiated resolution of 
conflicts" (Giner, 1986, p. 43) related to neo-corporatism. For 
the relevance of corporatism to the post-1974 Greece see Schmitter 
(1986).
. In a recenlty presented paper I concluded suggesting there is 
little evidence of corruption in Western Crete (Christopoulos, 
1996b). Heywood (1994) and Della Porta give authoritative 
comparative accounts of corruption in Southern Europe.
141
condition could be assumed to induce a distrust of any 
representatives of the state apparatus by the local
119community.
To the degree that centre-periphery clientelism and 
patronage are retained in contemporary Mediterranean 
societies, it can be argued that they will propagate the 
alienation of local societies from their respective 
national centre by keeping them subservient. This 
could also accentuate differences in regional civic and 
political c u l t u r e . T h i s  condition could be reversed by 
the process of further integration of Greece in the 
European market (possibly by inducing industrialisation 
and economic development) if they facilitate 
modernisation of the political culture.
Campbell argues that the development of capitalist 
production patterns "may lead to some attenuation of
. The party political affiliations in Crete are considered liberal 
since the incorporation of the island to the modern Greek state 
(1913). Eleftherios Venizelos, the most influential politician of 
modern Greece, came from Chania. He is mentioned as an important 
influence in the modern political context. In the 1989 European 
Parliament elections 42.5% of voters in Chania voted for the 
Socialists(PASOK), 31% for the Conservatives (ND), 13.5% for the 
Communist-Left coalition and 7.2% for the Liberal Party. The 
Liberal Party is the original party constituted by Venizelos at 
the beginning of the century and still receiving substantial 
support in Crete alone.120 . Clientelism can also be seen as a guarantor of political order 
in the periphery "where the central state was weak, ... [and] 
regional brokers -caciques in Spain, mafiosi in Italy, comatarhis 
in Greece- mediated between centre and periphery on the basis of 
patronage networks which served as an important mechanism of 
social order" (Heywood, 1994, p.9).
. It should be noted that some attitudinal evidence reveals a 
negligible variation among regions in Greece (Errson and Janda, 
1985), pointing to the possibility of a limited variance in the 
value systems accross Greek regions.
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patronage relationships" (Campbell, 1983, p.204).
Gellner as well refers to the importance of economics in 
civic socialisation, further proposing that "it is 
plausible to suspect that patronage is only avoidable 
when relations are anonymous and specific, in a mass 
society; and that in an inevitably more intimate elite, 
where relations cannot be anonymous nor criteria 
universalistic, patronage must be endemic" (Gellner,
1977, p.6).
Overall, Cretan political culture assumes a high moral 
ground, in attitudes pertaining to civic responsibilities 
and the preservation of local, regional and national 
ideals while by contrast having a total disregard for 
authority and discipline (Herzfeld, 1985, pp.1-8). The 
remoteness of state authorities from the average citizen 
in the region discourages participation in the political 
process, while it enhances the sense of separate identity 
among the citizens of the region. Their idiosyncratic 
civic culture can be further witnessed in Cretans' strong 
sense of community and the all-pervasive role of the 
family in societal interactions.
Scottish political culture is characterised by a 
distinctly strong sense of a separate identity from the 
English political culture. The existence of Scottish 
sections of all major political parties (in preparation 
to voice Scottish interests in the proposed Scottish 
Parliament) can be interpreted as a recognition within
14:
the British political establishment of a separate 
Scottish political identity.
This particular debate has characterised most of modern 
politics and has marked the political culture of the 
Scottish. Kellas (1989) has convincingly argued of the 
existence of a separate political system in Scotland 
which has a distinct legal, religious, bureaucratic, 
local government and educational tradition from the rest 
of Britain. Midwinter, Keating and Mitchell have argued 
that although they can not identify a separate political 
system Scotland "has never been fully assimilated [in the 
UK]. Distinctive civil institutions, issues, [and] 
political demands ...have been strengthened [through 
time]" (Midwinter, 1991, p.203).
The most obvious expression of this separate Scottish 
political identity is the existence of the Scottish 
National P a r t y . T h e  SNP is a persistent presence in 
Scottish political life, that has forced the political 
establishment in Scotland and Westminster to deal with 
the call for Scottish self-determination. Consequently, 
party political campaigns in Scotland have been, to a 
great extent, determined by the varying degree of 
devolution from the rest of the UK envisaged by different 
political parties. All major parties are obliged, by the
An excellent account of the Strategies for Self-Government: The 
Campaigns for a Scottish Parliament since 1885 is provided in 
Mitchell (1996), who also examines in detail the historical 
foundation and development of the political movement that led to 
the creation of the National Party (Mitchell, 1996, pp.172-254).
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centrality of the issue, to have a policy on Scottish 
devolution. The importance of the SNP in local 
political consciousness is apparent from the frequent 
opinion polls that show a consistently high rate of 
preference for devolution and the high electoral support 
for SNP among the Scottish population.
A note should be made of the (contentious among Scots) 
argument that Scotland historically never had a 
nationality inspired nationalism, as it was effectively 
integrated in the English empire before the age of 
nationalism (Anderson, 1991 pp.89-90). On a similar vein 
Smith argues that the Scottish movement for greater 
autonomy was led by a 'secular intelligentsia' which 
limited ethnic agitation "by the historic presence of a 
wider political identity [i.e. British] and by the 
possibility for democratic accommodation of ethnic 
grievances" (1995, pp.74-76). These accounts do not 
however provide a satisfactory explanation for the rise 
of Scottish nationalism. To claim that Hugh McDiarmid, 
as part of an 'organic' (i.e. authoritarian, mystical but 
also democratic, liberal and moderate) type of
. An excellent account of the history and role of the SNP is given 
by Kellas (1989), Midwinter at al.(1991) and Mitchell (1996). The 
views of the SNP are portrayed in their campaign documents on the 
European and national elections (SNP, 1984 and 1992).
. The Scottish National Party's fortunes were on the ascendant 
following their September conference in 1995 as reported in a 
System Three poll according to which they held 3 0% of the 
electorate's favour (The Herald, 2 October 1995, p.1,3). It should 
also be noted here, that SNP electoral support can be related to 
support for independence and not necessarily with support for 
devolution as the latter is part of the political agenda of both 
the Liberal Democrats and Labour.
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intellectual leader was the deciding element in the 
formation of Scottish 'neo-nationalism' (Smith, 1995, 
p.77, p.151) appears simplistic. For the purpose of this 
exposition it is sufficient to observe that both Anderson 
and Smith acknowledge the existence of Scottish 
nationalism, even if they do not directly identify its 
roots with Scottish identity. McCrone, on the other 
hand, has argued that "Scotland, like other societies, 
may be entering a post-nationalist age. The vehicle of 
that journey, ironically, seems to be nationalism itself" 
(1992, p.196). Whether, modernity can be perceived to 
lead to a post-nationalist political environment still 
remains to be seen as there is ample evidence to the 
resurgence of nationalism not only in former Eastern 
Europe but also often in the nationalist rhetoric of 
contemporary European and World leaders.
As a footnote to this discussion it will be interesting 
to examine the historic relationship between business and 
political elites in Scotland. It has been suggested that 
local political and business elites can only be 
considered as separate from one another in Scotland the 
last few decades. According to this argument, Scottish 
business leaders of the mid-19th to the mid-20th century 
held the strings to local political power, "local 
government was largely in the hands of these men"
(Slaven, 1994, p.167) . If this legacy continued into
. It is also the case that a number of other professional elites, 
that were protected under the Treaty of Union of 1707 were also
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the latter part of this century, Scottish business elites 
would be expected to control or interlock with political 
elites. The high degree of Labour domination in both the 
regional as well as the Scottish level, should be an 
adequate indication of the improbability of such a 
scenario today. This past relationship can be considered 
significant, if it indicates a previous trend between the 
local political and business elites; in this sense it is 
relevant to present-day interactions between the two 
elite groups if it affects the respective political 
consciousness of elite interactions through such a 
historically generated bias (i.e. the political elite 
perceived as subservient or interlocking with the 
business elite). It can be juxtaposed that local 
political elites in 19th century Scotland did not mainly 
originate from within local government, as other elite 
groups held significant political power (i.e. powers of 
the Lord Advocate).
To examine and fully understand the political culture of 
the Scots it is important to have an understanding of the 
role of the British government in the administrative and 
political machine that rules Scotland. It has been 
argued that administration by the Scottish Office leads 
to a rather alienative political culture, since "the 
system of administrative devolution with no political 
devolution to accompany it does cut Scottish urban
relevant to the local political interaction including Legal, 
Judicial, Education and Finance elite groups.
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politics off from England while producing within Scotland 
a curiously depoliticised society" (Keating, 1988, 
p.197). Kellas points to the workings of the Scottish 
Office (Kellas, 1989, pp.27-61) with its 'mini-cabinet' 
and comparative administrative autonomy. This is 
coupled, while the Conservatives have been in power 
(since 1979), with the elected government at Westminster 
consistently registering a minority of preference on 
national elections from the Scottish electorate. This 
difference between the local political institutions and 
the national, -come regional- bureaucracy is indicative 
of the alienative civil culture in the region and the 
depoliticisation of which Keating refers to.
Scottish civil society is thus characterised by a 
relative distrust of political authority, to the extent 
that it originates south of the Scottish Borders. 
Political participation is encouraged particularly among 
the middle classes in Scotland, although the existence of 
a large 'underclass' of chronically unemployed citizens 
with minimal access to political power or institutions 
marred that picture at the time of my survey.
Finally, an important element of the Scottish civic 
culture is the expectation of an 'orderly' interaction in 
the political and social arena, which is characterised by 
comparatively rigid moral values and stern rules of
. The campaign of civil disobedience for 'No Poll Tax' during 
1989-1991 was based partly on a perceived remoteness of the 
Westminster government from the needs of the Scottish people.
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political conduct that can be associated with the 
Protestant work ethic^^^ or with the 'post-materialist' 
values of a 'post-industrial' society (McCrone, 1992) . 
This creates in Scotland and Strathclyde, (as integral 
parts of the British political tradition), a political 
culture remarkably different from the one held by the 
local elites in Crete and Greece. At the same time both 
regions' peripherality and comparative alienation from 
their respective national centre is a shared experience 
that could possibly reflect on a similarity of aspects of 
their respective civil society and political culture.
It should be also noted that in any discussion of 
political culture a distinction has to be made between 
that of the general public and that of the elites. 
Concerned with the first type is the classic work by 
Almond and Verba (1963) on Civic Culture , while latest 
examples of a comparison between elite and public 
attitudes can be seen in Miller, Timpson and Lessnoff 
(1996) .
A discussion of political culture in Scotland has to take 
account of the possibility that it is not remarkably 
different from that of Great Britain or indeed from that 
of the rest of Europe. The distinctiveness of Scottish 
culture based on what McCrone (1992) calls the
. The protestant ethic in the West of Scotland with its strong 
catholic tradition is examined in The Social History of Religion 
in Scotland Since 1730 by Brown (1987). Relevant issues are also 
considered in Walker and Gallagher (1990) and Brown (1993), while 
the political dimension is examined by Kellas(1980).
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'egalitarian myth' which determines a special 'social 
ethos' is not necessarily self evident. Miller et al 
give evidence that "there is not a huge difference in 
political culture between those who live in Scotland and 
those who live in England and Wales" (1996, p.373). They 
find furthermore that Scottish values "reflected a 
commitment to common Western values whose egalitarian 
aspects were more consistent with European or 
Scandinavian constitutions" (1996, p.373). It can be 
counter-argued, however that perceived difference in 
political culture for Scotland may be more important for 
the decision making options of a local political elite 
than actual difference in value orientations.
In conclusion it appears that the Scottish political 
culture can be identified as distinctly different from 
the rest of Britain for it bears a number of historical 
traditions and ethics that are unique. This I accept 
regardless of evidence that Scottish value systems do not 
remarkably differ from the rest of Britain. Similarly in 
Crete the political traditions are distinct, the 
existence of a local ethnic identity re-enforces that 
separateness although evidence from attitude surveys do 
not indicate significant variation among Greek regions. 
The pre-eminence of clientelism in political interaction 
is endemic in all of Greek society and could be 
considered one of the primary reasons that Cretan and 
Scottish political culture are distinctly different. The 
Weberian 'protestant ethic' of Scotland can be considered
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one other factor of dissimilarity although the 
peripherality and 'subjugation' of both Scotland and 
Crete to their respective national centres would count as 
a common experience.
F. Limitations in Using the Particular Regions
The limitations posed with the particular regions are 
mainly twofold. By narrowing down the area investigated 
I am possibly reducing the applicability of findings to 
wider political or business elites. At the same time, 
local political elites are very closely associated (it 
could be argued that they are dependent) on national and 
supra-national elites. The local business elites, on the 
other hand, can be considered to be affected by wider 
inter-regional, international or even global business 
expediency and their attitudes and behaviour should be 
accordingly determined. So, in effect, limitations in 
the explanatory value of the regions I selected are 
important.
Further than these considerations, account must be taken 
of the peripherality of the respective regions, which by 
itself limits results as meaningful to regions of 
similarly peripheral character. On this subject however, 
I note that in indicators of peripherality, mentioned 
earlier in this chapter (Map 3.1), consideration is given
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to the accessibility of particular regions to the rest of 
the European Communities. This approach presumes regions 
in the European Community to be more integrated than they 
probably are. Furthermore, it fails to take account of 
the fact that from the local point of view, often, a 
national or political centre is defined by one's position 
vis a vis that centre, while the focus of perceived 
interests does not take account of relations between the 
centre and the periphery (Gould, 1974) . Particularly 
since this thesis is based on attitudinal data, this 
consideration should be taken into account when 
interpreting results.
Note should be taken as well of the difference in the 
political systems and respective governmental structures 
between the two regions. The particular institutional 
traditions are remarkably different. The British system 
is based on Common Law, with the Monarchy, the House of 
Lords and the House of Commons as the guarantors of 
stability and continuity in democratic institutions. The 
parallel existence of a separate Scottish legal and 
administrative system can be considered as a way the 
system has accommodated internal strains within it, which 
were expressed as calls for institutional reform and 
administrative devolution to Scotland.
By comparison, the Greek political system is relatively 
young, while under the latest Constitution (1975) the 
President of the Republic and the Parliament are the
152
ultimate guarantors of stability and continuity. The 
state is unitary with all powers of regional (prefecture) 
authorities emanating from the national government.
Crete may also be peculiar, in that regional economists 
differ on whether it should be considered an 
agriculturally dominated economy in the traditional sense 
or a semi-industrialised, agriculturally intensive 
economy. It is maybe convenient to categorise Crete as 
agricultural but the underlying dynamism of its economy 
could be rending it unrepresentative of European backward 
agricultural regions.
There is further, a fallacy entailed in comparing 
Purchasing Power Units devised on national criteria to 
measure standard of living in regions, since household 
needs and subsequent demand in remote agricultural areas 
follow much different patterns than in urban areas, while 
the size of the 'black economy' is reputably and 
notoriously high in Crete (some journalistic accounts 
make it as high as 3 0% of the GRP).
Some statistical problems in using Crete for comparative 
purposes centre around the unavailability or 
unreliability of data, particularly for the early 1980's; 
and on the fact that small business constitute a much
. with the exception of some limited rights of self determination 
for local communities (laws 1622/1986 and 2218/1994).
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higher percentage of total business than in other regions 
of the Greece and the EU.
Both selected regions maintain an identity difference 
vis-a-vis their respective national entities. Although 
this was one of the main reasons for selecting the 
particular regions, the fact itself limits -to a degree- 
use of results to areas exhibiting similar socio-economic 
characteristics. Note as well should be made that at the 
time of interviewing, Cretan 'nationalism' in 
manifestations of the local ethnic identity, did not 
appear to be pronounced and politically significant, 
which was the case for Scottish nationalism.






In this thesis I attempt to make inferences upon regional 
elite behaviour by focusing on regional elite 
attitudes. ^ 0 As regional prospects can be assumed to be 
linked to elite actions and (by inference) to elite 
interaction, the behavioural pattern of regional elites 
become all the more important. My presumption of a 
'sound' theoretical basis for interpreting elite 
relationships was an inducement for attempting an 
investigation of elite interaction. Theory, however, is 
far from settled on issues of elite interaction while it 
is apparent that investigating within-elite interaction 
(i.e. interaction between elite sub-groups in a region) 
is not tantamount to an investigation of power 
relationships. To complicate things further, attitudinal 
convergence or divergence (concordance or discordance)
13 0. In the 'ecological fallacy theorem' and the 'individualistic 
fallacy theorem', Alker (1965, pp.102-5) points to possible 
misrepresentations that can arise out of an attempt to infer a 
relationship among individuals to hold for collectivities and vice 
versa. I have qualified all inferences made of attitudes in 
respective regions with validity limitations and have not 
attempted to infer a relationship between institutions from a 
presumed relationship among the individuals I examine.
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cannot be equated, without caution, with a sharing of 
values, while a sharing of values between two elite 
groups does not necessarily imply that there will be 
higher interaction, Higher frequency of interaction, 
on the other hand, cannot be equated with more efficient 
or productive interaction, which leads to the problem of 
the 'quality' of interaction between elite groups. To 
avoid circular reasoning it is adequate for the purposes 
of this work to say that the 'quality' of elite 
interaction is tangential to my hypotheses and is 
mentioned here only so that my approach is further 
elucidated.
I begin with an exposition of certain aspects of the 
debate relating to the study of elites. I am 
particularly interested in definitions of elite functions 
and inter-elite interaction. Questions of whether elites 
exist as coherent groups, elite transformation as well as 
the mechanisms by which elites disseminate (distribute or 
share) power are some of the initial questions 
considered. Finally, theoretical issues of investigating
3^1 . Current empirical work on inter-elite interaction within the 
framework of policy networks by John and Cole (1996) points to a 
weak but significant correlation between a sharing of values among 
actors and frequency of network relations (networkability).
3-32 . 'Quality' of elite interaction is discussed here as a factor 
that can be distinguished from the frequency or effectiveness of 
that interaction. No theoretical definition of 'quality' can be 
offered here other than it is perceived to be relevant to elites 
sharing of values that presumably leads to a sharing of 
objectives, such as regional development. A discussion of the 
importance of 'core values' within a policy network framework by 
Wright (1991) points to their importance in determining agenda 
setting and network membership.
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elites are also related to some methodological issues of 
elite surveys.
The latest work on European, and in particular, regional 
elites is related to the significance of some of the 
hypotheses I have set out to test. Some limitations, 
stemming from the evolving character of European civil 
society are also given consideration.
I then proceed with a discussion of difficulties in 
identification of the business and political elites in 
Strathclyde and Chania, the reason for selecting the 
particular elite sub-groups within each region, the 
particular method employed in contacting them and some 
problems in approaching them.
I finally give an appraisal of the response rate of each 
particular group and an estimate of the
representativeness, and population size for each sample.
B. Defining Elites.
In order to establish a theoretical framework for this 
analysis, I had to take into consideration several 
problems related to regional elite identification in 
determining a sample. In particular: a. the comparative 
character of the research questions, b. that surveying
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had to be intensive and cross-sectional rather than 
extensive and longitudinal and c. the ability to identify 
exclusively and interview successfully an elite sample.
I proceed here with a rudimentary definition of regional 
elites that acted as a basis for identifying a sample.
A number of the references in the literature, analysed 
below, make it clear that it is almost impossible to have 
a watertight definition of who belongs to a regional 
political or business elite. A definition, to a degree 
arbitrary, had to be employed so that political and 
business elites could be selected. I use as a starting 
point theories by Pareto, Mosca and Lasswell.^33 pareto's 
notion of a 'governing class' which shares the spoils of 
power with those who defend and sustain it (Finer, 1966, 
pp.77-81), ties in with the ideas of Mosca who attests 
that "in every political organism the existence and 
functioning of a ruling class is necessary" (Mosca, 1972, 
p. 249) . According to Mosca "in all societies. . .-two 
classes of people appear- a class that rules and a class 
that is ruled"^34 (Mosca, 1939, p. 50) or in Meisel's 
analysis of Mosca "the history of all societies has been, 
is, and will be, the history of dominant minorities"
(1962, p.v). So, in both Pareto's notion of 
clientelistic power sharing and Mosca's notion of
133. An excellent comparative analysis of Pareto's and Mosca's work 
is edited by Meisel (1965).
134 . However, more sophisticated notions of the relationship between 
the ruler and the ruled have to be considered, as the demarcation 
line between the rulers and the ruled are not always clear and 
influence from one to the other can be considered interactive.
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'dominant minorities' I can trace ideas that can be 
useful to the contextual setting of regional elites.
C. Wright Mills in his notion of 'power elites' 
incorporates 'local elites' as those "who possess more 
than do others of whatever there is locally to possess; 
[while] they hold the keys to local decision" (Mills,
1956, p.30). He sees their role as subservient to the 
power elite of the larger urban centres,
Lasswell, on the other hand, defines elites as the 
influential. "The influential are those who get the most 
of what there is to get...those who get the most are 
elite" (Lasswell, 1950,p.3). He further identified power 
elite participants to possess among other things, a sense 
of a territorial community (Lasswell, 1965) . Territorial 
identity among regional elites is by definition exclusive 
and presumably acts as a cohesive force for regional 
elites distinguishing them 'against' all others, while it 
aligns their interests with those of their region of 
identification. This notion can be instrumental in 
understanding territorially identified and land-locked 
elites, such as the regional elites, Lasswell's notion
135. Beyond being dated, Mills study (1956) focuses on American
elites, with subsequent limitations on references that can be made 
in the contemporary European context.
136 . Certain regional elites' strife for administrative autonomy can 
be linked to what Harvie (1994) and Keating (1996b) term 
'bourgeois regionalism', under which economically advanced regions 
propelled by a regional bourgeoisie, seek to create political and 
administrative structures that would favour economic development.
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of 'influential' actors is employed here in the selection 
of regional elites.
I proceed to examine the power context within which 
regional elites operate as it is essential in 
understanding the limits of their actions and scope for 
interaction. From the multiplicity of local elite groups 
my interest has been with those most relevant to regional 
growth. I encountered a number of problems in 
identifying them not the least of which were theoretical. 
I had to take account of Ivor Crewe's opinion that 
approaches to elites "...suffer from trying to make 
reliable statements about elites without first 
formulating a satisfactory theory of power..." (Crewe, 
1974, p.14). The exercise and dissemination of power by 
elites is a theoretical consideration with relevance to 
this research, as a frequent referral to clientelistic 
and patronage networks reveals. Articles by Clapham 
(1982) and Gellner (1977) cover the issues relating to 
the dissemination of power, particularly relevant to 
Mediterranean clientelism. I will in a number of 
occasions use clientelistic interpretations of elite 
interaction to explain findings that apply particularly 
to the Cretan elite groups. An interesting distinction 
between the elite groups in the two regions could be 
based in the existence of clientelistic networks in the 
case of Crete and patronage networks in the case of 
Strathclyde.
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To further understand the notion of elite interaction it 
is interesting to examine notions of leadership developed 
by Wiatr and Fiedler which point to the change in the 
structure of modern society.^^ 7 wiatr (1973) refers to 
informal leadership which can be functional, 
differentiating it from the formal leadership of elites. 
He further argues, that political elites exist only when 
a minority has much greater power than the rest of the 
community and there is a barrier of entry to the 
political field by non-elite members. Fiedler (1971) 
refers to the effect that followers have on leaders, 
arguing that to a great extent situations form leaders, 
so that they are not independent of the will of their 
followers.
European elite interaction has received particular 
attention in the context of policy networks analysis and 
the existence of a multi-level governance (Rhodes and 
Marsh, 1992; Marks, 1993; Rosenau, 1992). The impressive 
volume of the relevant literature points to an expanding 
interest in the role of sub-national actors. This 
discussion has direct relevance to my approach as a 
result of the policy network context of an emerging 
'variable geometry' in the European polity together with 
the increased significance of non-state actors, a result 
of a 'hollowing-out' of the state (Jessop, 1996). The 
limitations in applying a policy-network approach here
3-37. An other important contribution to the understanding of 
leadership is the one by Riker (1986) .
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stem from the generality in the conception of policy 
networks that diminishes their explanatory v a l u e ,  it
can be argued that if you will look for policy networks 
you will find them. 3-39 So, although I will not use a 
'policy network' approach in identifying the elites 
surveyed, a number of the interpretations that will be 
offered will derive directly from 'policy network' 
explanations.
My interpretation of elite interaction also takes account 
of the neo-corporatist perspective according to which 
"elites collude and collaborate rather than compete" 
(Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987, p.143). It has been further 
argued that "state and economic elites are so 
interpenetrated by each others' concerns that no sensible 
boundary line or balance of influence can be drawn" 
(Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987, p.185), while "political and 
economic elites ... have shared interests in managing 
their complex environments, which facilitates co­
operative elite bargaining" (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987, 
p.197). Within this framework I also consider two very 
distinct possibilities. In the first instance "in 
Britain [and Greece] the unitary structure of the state
3-33 . An effective proponent of policy network interpretations is
Peterson (1995). The approach can be very helpful in examining EU 
policy-making and the interaction between a number of different 
policy arenas. It can also be effectively employed in the 
interpretation of decision-making patterns among elite actors, as 
demonstrated by John and Cole (1996) .
3-39 . And indeed has been suggested by Kassim (1994) , Michael Keating 
and Charlie Jeffery in the context of the 1996 ESRC 'Policy Networks' 
workshop in Oslo that the concept can be used most effectively as a 
methodological tool rather than a theoretical paradigm.
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and the extent to which local government functions have 
to be centrally handed down by statute... severely 
constrains the possibility of a viable local corporatism" 
(Cawson, 1985, p.146). Secondly, it has been argued that 
"countries locked into state corporatism at an earlier 
stage of development are likely to find it much more 
difficult to evolve toward ...a consensual solution" 
(Schmitter, 1979, p.41) which points to the possibility 
that in Crete state corporatism further inhibits the 
development of local corporatism. As is the case with 
the policy networks perspective some of the 
interpretations offered with the analysis of data in 
chapters six and seven are associated with the neo- 
corporat ist paradigm.
There are various alternative elite definitions to the 
ones I have used, whose assumptions and simplifications 
do not lend themselves to my work but can however enhance 
our conceptual understanding of elite interaction. 
Contemporary Marxist analysis of 'class fractions' I 
found both inadequate and without the explanatory value 
sought in a theoretical framework that is primarily 
concerned with elite attitudes and elite i n t e r a c t i o n .
14 0. Poulantzas being one of the most prominent contemporary Marxists 
has provided an interpretation of Marx's writings dismissing 
aspects of the analysis by Mosca, Weber, Mills, Michels and 
Pareto. He argues that "certain distinct classes,..., often 
appear in the social formation dissolved and fused with other 
classes, as groups (autonomous or not) of other classes" 
(Poulantzas, 1973, p.77), these he calls 'fractions'. A 
systematic critique of Poulantzas arguments on 'class fractions' 
is given by Crewe (Crewe,1974).
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An alternative theory that diverges from the basic 'elite 
theory framework', is that of 'technostructures' by J.K. 
Galbraith (1967). I find the arguments portrayed in this 
and later work by Galbraith relevant to contemporary 
elite structure, but lacking, again in explanatory power. 
It is indeed relevant to my hypotheses whether a 
technostructure has forced the entrepreneur to disappear, 
the business to be indifferent to which party is in 
office and whether ideological considerations -between 
Left and Right- have been made i r r e l e v a n t ,
The extent to which there is a difference between 
industrialising economies and post-industrial economies 
and if indeed the technostructure influences the 
formulation of policy while at the same time remaining 
distant from political decisions and choice, are issues 
relevant but not instrumental to this analysis. However 
close to the theoretical framework of this work, 
Galbraith's approach cannot serve as a basis for this 
investigation, particularly since it can have a limited 
explanatory value in comparative studies of societies 
that are in different stages of d e v e l o p m e n t . 3-42
3-41 . The role of the Scottish Office, in the case of Strathclyde, 
may be a mediating factor on the effect of 'technostructures' in 
the region. Galbraith's model has more explanatory power in 
interpreting the role of entrepreneurial than of local government 
elites.
142 . A similar argument is put forward by Lasch (1995) in the Revolt 
of the Elites under which the managerial elites disengage from 
their societal obligations which leads to an intensification of 
social divisions. The prominence of multinational corporations 
and the internationalisation of world production patterns are to 
blame, while democratic institutions are weakened in the process. 
This is a view of disengaged and socially disinterested elites
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And finally, an interesting element of the theoretical 
debate considers whether unitary elites actually exist in 
Western democracies. Focusing in particular on the 
process for change within elites. Burton and Higley 
(1987) attempt an investigation beyond the basic 
parameters of elite group identityi^s basing their 
arguments on Weber's concept of political actors. They 
also argue that present scholarly debates are 
characterised by a "'conceptual swamp' in which the elite 
concept has no agreed-upon meaning and no clearly 
perceived theoretical utility" (Burton, 1987, pp.237- 
238). This is an ongoing debate often based on issues of 
semantics, without a necessarily clear direction. A 
consideration of the process of elite change, that stems 
out of it, is relevant to attitudes I am investigating. 
But I also believe that such change, could only be gauged 
by a longitudinal analysis, which is clearly beyond the 
scope of this paper.
Overall, I am inclined to accept Lasswell's (1950) 
definition of elites as 'the influential' refined to 
include the influential within a region. It is apparent, 
however that there can be no concise definition of elites 
that can safely delineate who is and who is not 
influential, who holds and who does not hold functional
that does not apply to my assumption of regional elites as those 
caring most for their region.
3-4 3. These basic parameters are the so called three C's and include 
elite group consciousness, cohesion and conspiracy.
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eliteness. Primarily, it has not been possible to 
determine a characteristic of elite influence that could 
act as a uniform criterion for all elite groups I 
investigate. It is also the case that accessing a large 
enough sample of the positional elite in each group to 
create a representative sample is beyond the resources of 
this work. These are the main reasons why I have 
declared my approach to be primarily qualitative.
C. Elite Interaction : The European Context.
The most exciting recent development in the examination 
of European elites is an interest on regional elites.
Work by Dupoirier (1994), Leonardi and Garmise (1992), 
Keating (1991,1995), Harvie (1994) and Putnam et al 
(1993) all point to the emergence of regional or sub­
national elites in the framework of the European 
Communities and Union. In the long term, according to 
Keating, we will see the emergence of a "differentiated 
state order" as a result of a breakdown in the "tidy 
hierarchical order of continental, national, regional and 
local authorities"(Keating, 1992, p.60). The end result 
could be envisaged as a 'variable geometry state order'. 
Keating believes that civil society becomes important as 
"national governments have been weakened, so the powers 
they can lend subnational governments are less 
potent"(1992, p.56). It has also been argued that there
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is a shift in identities from the national to the local 
and global. 144 "The post-Westphalian state creates a new 
balance between subnational and other identities within 
the state, traditional nation-state loyalties and the 
wider sphere of international obligations" (Linklater, 
1996, p.98).145 The transfer and re-orientation in 
identities from the nation state is examined by Keating 
(1996a) in his discussion of the 'invention of regions' 
and Smith (1996) in his discussion of the re-imagining of 
regional identities, that in his view, have to be 
considered as concentric. Christopoulos and Herbert 
(1996), drawing from Gould and White (1986) offer the 
idea that identity in contemporary European regions can 
be visualised as 'concentric and fluid', with 
identification at the local, regional, national or supra­
national level overlapping and in constant flux.i4® The 
timing of this series of interviews, before the 
completion of the single Market and the Treaty of the 
European Union, partially alleviates the need to consider 
the influences of modernity on European regional identity 
(as covered by Rosamond, 1995).
144 . A more comprehensive account of the interplay between the local 
and the global can be found in Sassen (1991), Swyngedow (1992) and 
Amin (1994).
145 . I am considering the influences of modernity (post or 
radicalised) in my concluding chapter. According to Giddens 
modernity "would not be a world that 'collapses outward' into 
decentralised organisations but would no doubt interlace the local 
and global in a complex fashion" (1991,p.178).
146 . This theme is more fully explored in the concluding chapter of 
this thesis, ch8.
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In this framework, the hypothesis could be considered 
whether elite behaviour, normally influenced by an 
overlapping but hierarchical allegiance to different 
levels of the European civil society (local, regional, 
state and European), under the influence of modernity, 
will in the future disregard traditional territorial 
allegiances. Assuming that this is a valid hypothesis 
there would be a direct impact on elite 'consciousness' 
in Europe. In such a scenario regional elite behaviour 
should be re-evaluated. A case in point is if, for 
instance, local elites' allegiance does not follow a 
hierarchical pattern but, for instance, 'skips' a level 
This would be exhibited if a Scottish nationalist 
identifies more with Europe than the UK. 3-47 it is also 
possible to consider elite identity 'separated' (not to 
use the term alienated) from their local community, as 
they may be active on a regional, national or 
international level without exhibiting allegiance or 
identifying with any level of polity. 3-48
D. Elites Selected.
Selecting the business and political elites as most 
appropriate for this attitude survey, is concurrent with
3-47 . Which points to the inherent problems with campaigns for 
'independence in Europe' as the one attempted by the SNP (1992) .
3-48. The constant reference to 'eurocrats' in popular media points to 
an assumed allegiance of Commission bureaucrats to 'Europe' or to 
their own 'caste', in defiance of their national or ethnic 
background.
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my preoccupation with regional growth. It was also 
important to investigate two elite groups in constant 
interaction and possible interdependence . 3-49 i further 
attempted to identify those groups most responsible for 
the successful implementation and dissemination of 
national and European regional policies. While having 
further assumed that the regional political elite will be 
aware -if it is not indeed the vehicle for- the 
aspirations of the regional p o p u l a t i o n . T h i s  is 
relevant to issues of autonomy and nationalism that 
comprise a substantial part of my survey questions. I
also assume that the regional business elite will be -by 
their occupational position- more able to assess the 
prospectsisi their region has, particularly in relation to 
European integration and the Single M a r k e t . 3-52
I have aimed at a survey of the wider business elite, 
without attempting to target the most powerful or those 
among them that would be considered 'business leaders' or
3-49. The distribution of economic and political power as the sources 
of 'social order' and 'economic order' are analysed by Weber 
(Gerth, 1991).
3-60. I assume higher 'representativeness' of local than national 
elites without however testing that particular hypothesis, 
although I refer extensively on the impact of regional identity on 
my concluding chapter.
3-63- Assessing business prospects is not considered tantamount to 
economic prospects in a region. Politicians could argue that 
having a wider (macro) perspective they are best able to judge 
economic prospects.
3-62 . There has been extensive work on the ' local entrepreneurial 
milieu' (Rasmussen, 1992), the 'innovative milieu' (Campagni, 
1995), the 'local context' (Johanisson and Spilling, 1983) . All 
this work explicitly or implicitly cite the significance of 
regional elite actor collaboration and identification with their 
region for regional development.
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opinion formers. 3-53 As mentioned earlier I am interested 
in the functional/powerful/influential actors within an 
elite group but I have not attempted to identify them 
before requesting interviews as any such criterion of 
power or influence would introduce one more validity 
limitation to my analysis. The assumption is therefore 
intially made that elite and leadership relationships 
apply to the whole elite sample with similar 
effectiveness and as concisely as with business elites 
involved in the higher echelons of decision making. 3-54 in 
the case of the political elites I attempted to identify 
in the data analysis those among them with a 
'reputational' or functional eliteness although 
positional eliteness was the deciding factor in selecting 
to interview them. So, the political samples contain 
both functional and positional elite members, since I 
applied no measure to exclude those that by their 
interview or reputation I could determine were not 
powerful.
3-63 . The debate between the plausibility of using any senior 
businessman/woman, depending on the size of the business they 
control or assessing business attitudes by interviewing 'business 
leaders' or 'business representatives' is long. I do not believe 
that businesspeople elected in Chambers of Commerce represent the 
attitudes and business preoccupations of their electoral college 
more than any elected office holder or politician represents the 
attitudes of their electorate. For an alternative approach see 
work by Garmise (1996) .
3-64. Samuel Brittan identifies reasons for difference in replies on 
an attitudinal survey of economists and politicians in that, 
"practical politicians find it more difficult to think in terms of 
assumptions and hypotheses" (Brittan, 1973, p.30). This 
consideration together with reservations expressed in later survey 
work (Brittan, 1990), (Rickets, 1990) has to be taken into account 
since they provide evidence that variance of attitudes among 
elites may be due to differences in perspective among elite 
groups.
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To place my work within the European context, it is 
interesting to note that most expositions on the 
institutional workings of the European Community and 
Union, take account of elite attitudes as a determinant 
of their behaviour. I first take account of Holland's 
reservations with the functionalist school which "by 
stressing elite roles in the control of capital they 
neglect the extent to which 'elite perceptions' on 
political issues such as European integration can be 
contradicted by the class role which the same elites need 
to pursue" (Holland ,1980, p.98). It is indeed probable 
that this 'class role' of elites can be instrumental in 
understanding their attitude and behavioural patterns. A 
possible 'contradiction' between elite actions (as their 
class interest) and elite attitudes (as their beliefs) 
towards Europe comprises a limitation of any attitudinal 
approach to the understanding of European integration.
Issues of 'personnel circulation' and 'social 
circulation' could pertain to the selection of political 
elites surveyed but relevant data for the particular 
regions were unavailable, The issue of
3-5 5. I use definitions by Welsh (1979, pp. 24-27) who defines
'personnel circulation' as the turnover rate in elite membership; 
'social circulation' as the degree to which an elite's social 
background changes, 'representativeness' as the degree to which 
the elite represents attitudes of the general population and 
'interlockingness' as the overlapping membership in high ranking 
bodies of the political and other societal organisations.
Lasswell gives an explanation of interlockingness between elite 
groups according to which "forms of power and influence are
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'representativeness' is only relevant to the sampling of 
the business elites further discussed at the 
methodological appendix. It is relevant to mention at 
this stage that issues arising out of the 
representativeness of samples are partly addressed by 
using a comparative approach.
A framework of analysis, based on methodological 
considerations of researching elites, is provided by 
Moyser and Wagstaffe (1987) who note that ad-hoc choices 
have to be made in choosing procedures, while a 
comprehensive approach to the study of elites is in the 
volume edited by Hertz and Imber (1995). Issues of 
'elite autonomy' and the contrast between class and elite 
theory is covered by Etzioni-Halevy (1993). Theoretical 
considerations with empirical analyses of elite studies 
can also be found in Goldstone (1975) and Pahl and 
Winkler (1974), while a very interesting quantitative 
approach is taken by Ziegenhagen and Koutsoukis (1992).
More recently interest has been centred on viewing 
business and political elite relations within policy 
network analysis. In particular, the volume edited by 
Marsh and Rhodes (1992) on policy networks has been 
seminal, while important contributions on the analysis of 
social/political networks include Knoke (1990), Scott
agglutinative: those with some forms tend to acquire other forms 
also" (1952, p.97) .
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(1991) and Wasserman and Galaskiewicz (1994). A most 
interesting addition to this literature includes 
sociometrics in decision making network analysis(John and 
Cole, 1996). Policy network analysis will not be used in 
the testing of my hypotheses however, due to limitations 
imposed by the character of the survey, but as mentioned 
earlier will mainly supplement interpretations in the 
concluding chapter,
All these different methodological approaches to the 
study of elites I have considered in the analysis of 
results in chapters six and seven. The diversity of 
definitions and the difficulty in identifying and 
interviewing regional elites, suggest the necessity of 
using both quantitative and qualitative techniques in
this investigation. 3-57
E. Approaching Political and Business Elites in 
Strathclyde and Chania.
Having the distinct task of identifying the business and 
political elite groups within their respective civil
3-66 . A particular limitation of the policy network approach is that 
'if you will look for it you will find it' in most elite 
interactions. This limits the interpretative value the approach 
has, by reducing it to a tool of investigation rather than a 
comprehensive theoretical instrument that can provide 
explanations.
3-67 . To account for the need to integrate quantitative and
qualitative approaches I have employed a questionnaire design that 
facilitate a 'linked data' technique to data gathering as 
explained earlier.
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society, I had to deal with a number of considerations of 
research validity.
As mentioned already I share one of Welsh's concerns on 
political elites that could apply to business elites as 
well, "it seems dubious to assume that any individual who 
holds membership in a prominent decision-making body 
actually exercises influence on political outcomes. His 
colleagues may be influential, but it does not 
necessarily follow that he is..." (Welsh, 1979 p.166). I 
initially had to deal with the problem of an individual 
holding positional but not functional 'eliteness'. While 
the possibility exists as well, that "elites may occupy 
formal positions for non-functional reasons" (Welsh,
1979, p. 166) . 158
Beyond procedures and measures, analysed in the following 
section, a bias arises from the fact that personal 
judgement on who does or does not hold functional or 
reputational eliteness, partly influenced who I chose to 
approach for an interview in Crete although their 
positional eliteness was the decisive factor in 
attempting to interview. This is particularly relevant 
for most of the Cretan survey, where approaching 
interviewees was less structured and based more on a
. Functional eliteness can be also linked to 'issue 
determination' or 'agenda setting' individuals within elite 
structures (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970).
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'snow-balling' technique, which is fraught with 
reputational bias. iss
Equally, I recognise the possibility that a particular 
elite member is an extremist, a maverick who has no 
influence among his peers, society or over decision 
making structures. In this thesis admittedly, I could 
not resolve issues dealing with a 'reputational 
definition of eliteness', but I felt inclined to consider 
problems of identification of individuals in the 'elite 
proper' category.
In the business samples surveyed I attempted to "...limit 
our definition of economic elites to those exercising 
allocative control..." (Whitley ,1974, p.115). My effort 
to that end was of interviewing managing directors or 
owners-entrepreneurs in the companies approached.
Failing to secure an appointment with the managing 
director I tried to interview one of the executive 
directors, never interviewing non-executive (or 
ceremonial) directors. The sampling method for the 
business sample identified suitable companies first (based 
on a number of criteria on size by number of employees 
and turnover) and their managing directors second. In 
the case of Strathclyde I used a register of companies 
out of which by random selection a letter was sent asking 
the company managing director for a forty minute
. A very informative account on the 'ethnography of local 
community elites' is presented by Hunter (1995), while snowballing in 
the context of qualitative research is discussed by Devine (1995).
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interview stating the cause of this research. In the 
case of Chania I used a register of trading companies 
supplied by the local Chamber of Commerce together with a 
list of all registered companies from which a random 
sample of address and telephones was used to contact 
prospective interviewees.
The mailing in Chania produced no replies and so each 
company was approached individually by telephone. The 
character of the contact thus was much more impromptu and 
it could be argued that the Greek sample is biased by the 
personal response interaction to the interviewer. There 
seems no way I could eliminate that bias if it exists, 
impromptu surveying being the standard practice in 
Greece. ^"2 After a series of phone calls an interview 
time and date was agreed which in many cases did not 
necessarily mean the individual in question would adhere 
to appointments in 'submitting' to an interview.
Overall, I typically eliminated companies with fewer than 
five employees in Greece and ten employees in UK from the
iGo. Sample letters of approach to elite groups can be found in 
Appendix II. A register of companies used included a Regional 
Company Survey that provided comparative size and profitability 
data for companies in Western Scotland (ICC, 1989). 
iGi. This does not constitute classic 'snow-balling' as most of the 
businessmen interviewed were selected from lists provided by the 
local chamber of commerce. The main bias exists in the 
reputational approval -or possibly disapproval- of my research 
that helped in securing interviews or could have been the cause of 
denials.
A recent example of an excellent elite survey that uses 'snow­
balling', is the one by Sotiropoulos (1994) on the Greek 
bureaucracy.
A brief reference to problems of research in Chania is attempted 
in appendix I .
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sampling. Proprietors of such small companies usually 
falling within the self-employed category and with 
typically a very small chance of belonging to the local 
business elite.
For the political samples I targeted individuals in the 
local and national executives of elected officials in 
both countries. As mentioned above however, I could not 
secure any interviews from the Greek national executive. 
This fact is limiting the scope of this research and the 
consequent hypotheses that can be effectively tested. 
Furthermore, as is apparent in the profile of elites 
interviewed (developed in chapter five) in Crete most of 
the interviewees were entrepreneurs, while in Strathclyde 
most were executives.
In Strathclyde, political elite interviewees came from 
the following bodies: 
a the City Council of Glasgow,
b. Strathclyde Regional Council,
c. the UK Parliament (elected in Glasgow),
d. the European Parliament (elected in Glasgow)
e. political candidates or activists in above bodies.
. I take the point made by a number of academics (see Garmise, 
1996) that local business elites have to be part of 'policy 
networks' or be involved in 'governance'. It is however my 
conviction that business elite attitudes can be correctly gauged 
if one concentrates on the attitudes of the wider business elite 
(of those holding substantial portions of allocative power) 
instead of investigating a nexus of power of regional businessmen, 
or identifying those with most frequent interactions to the 
political elite or considering those in business representative 
organisations as most significant.
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In the prefecture of Chania political elite interviewees 
came from:
a. local Community Councils (Presidents),
b. small Town Councils (Mayors),
c. Chania City Council (Mayor and Councillors) and
d. political parties (influential activists in Chania).
My approach on the political sample was very similar to 
the one used on the business one. I used a mailing for 
arranging an interview in the case of the Scottish 
sample, while I came in touch with the local community 
liaison officer in the Chania City Hall who introduced me 
to a meeting of the local mayors. Additionally a list of 
elected officials provided from the office of the 
prefecture served as reference for approaching local 
community mayors. In this respect there are both 
elements of 'snow-balling' and random selection in the 
Cretan sample. Unsuccessful attempts to interview the 
Cretan Members of the Greek Parliament were made both by 
a mailing and by personal contact in the House of 
Parliament {Vouli ton Ellinon) in Athens.
In both samples interviewing activists and individuals 
with political importance were pursued after referrals to 
the particular individuals by some of the office bearing 
interviewees. In this sense their selection is not 
random and their replies have to be considered in this 
light.
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Another issue that arose was that of interlockingness.
In some cases I found interviewees to belong to both 
elite groups simultaneously. This likelihood was closely 
scrutinised. The inclusion of a question inquiring on 
politician's business links (QC14) is meant to explore 
precisely that possibility. To determine whether 
business respondents had an elite position in the 
political world I specifically asked whether they held an 
elected position to a public body.
In two cases in the Greek sample and in one in the 
Scottish sample I found political personalities that also 
had an influential function in the business world. In 
those cases they were asked to answer the whole of the 
survey (including both Business and Political sections).
I hoped to be able to make particular inferences from 
their responses but opted instead for eliminating one 
from the business and the other from the political 
analysis in the Greek case (reasoning explained in 
chapter five) and keeping the Strathclyde respondent 
within the political sample. I further avoided in the 
business sample the inclusion of heads of governmental 
agencies or organisations, academics or consultants, as I 
believed this could spoil the 'purity' of the sample by 
introducing attitudes that were not of the actual 
decision m a k e r s . % made a point of interviewing a
In the Scottish political sample a senior bureaucrat was 
included as he has a very instrumental position in policy 
implementation. Two Regional councillors in Strathclyde are also
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number of them (as a pilot and not as part of the survey) 
in both regions and found they provided me with a very 
good understanding of local culture and civil society. 
These groups obviously belong to the wider elite 
structure, but I have attempted here to narrow the sample 
to the absolutely necessary groups in order to increase 
the significance of my conclusions.
F. Response rate in approaching elites.
The diversity of cultures between Scotland and Crete also 
determined the approach I could employ to interview the 
respective elites. It became apparent very early on that 
the Greek samples had to be approached differently than 
what could be considered standard code of practice in 
Britain.
In the case of the Scottish political elite, all Glasgow 
MPs and MEPs were approached, together with a number of 
the local regional and City Councillors. Two MEPs (out 
of three) responded and were subsequently interviewed, 
while three out of eleven MPs responded and were
academics, they were expected however to express views under their 
political function.
In a sample questionnaire on similar hypotheses with the present 
one which I constructed and implemented between April and October 
198 9 aiming particularly at consultants, heads of governmental 
agencies and union officials, results did not appear particularly 
conclusive and one of the reasons was obviously the heterogeneity 
of the elite groups surveyed.
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subsequently interviewed. The Councillors contacted were 
selected randomly from the list of Councillors of the two 
bodies (City, Region). There are 66 elected Councillors 
in Glasgow City, while there were 103 Councillors in the 
Strathclyde Regional C o u n c i l . R e g i o n a l  representatives 
with a constituency outwith Glasgow I considered part of 
the local elite, since their decisions are bound to 
influence local affairs, and have not been therefore 
excluded from the sampling.
A rough estimate of the membership of the local political 
elite will include all those presently in office, 
together with those that could most seriously challenge 
them in the next election(the elite-in-waiting). It 
will also include their most trusted advisors, and the 
senior bureaucracy of the Councils, the local arm of the 
national bureaucracy (i.e. the Scottish Office or the 
office of the Prefecture) and the Regional Development 
agencies. Assuming a strong local political culture, I 
could also consider as members of the local political 
elite, editors of local political papers, senior
. The number of SRC Councillors was nominally 104 (before the 
abolition of Strathclyde).
. Although in the case of the SRC and Glasgow City, these 
'challengers' would be expected to come not from other parties but 
from within the Labour Party.
I consider senior bureaucrats (of which one is interviewed) of 
the local authorities and the national executive to be members of 
the local political elite. Furthermore, all those that can 
influence decision making, could be considered as part of the 
political elite. These according to Lasswell (1965, p.16), 
include those 'adherents of a counter ideology that are 
influential with the established order', those that held office 
and still are influential, highly influential people such as 
advisers and close family members of elected officials.
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political activists within party hierarchies and 
prominent intellectuals that influence or challenge 
political thought and concepts in the region. Resource 
limitations did not permit the thorough investigation of 
all the parts of the local political elite. In my 
Strathclyde political sample I have interviewed 14 
elected representatives out of the 182 holding office in 
the relevant political bodies (a 8% sample) and three 
from the non-elected regional elite, which my arbitrary 
estimate brings to 500 individuals.
There were a series of mailings to attain interviews for 
the Scottish business elite based on a catalogue of 
business based in Strathclyde and Glasgow (ICC, 1989), 
from which companies with the desired characteristics of 
number of employees (over 9) and turnover (over £100 
thousand) were randomly selected. This means that 
business in both industry and services were selected.
The mailing of letters requesting interviews was 
conducted in waves, while all positive responses were 
followed-up.^'z There was a total of six batches with the 
first one in March and the last one in May of 1991. In 
total 139 letters were sent-out that led to 24
1^ °. A number of individuals belonging to what I could call
'tangential elite groups' (such as academics), can be considered 
relevant to regional political interaction, by affecting political 
consciousness on what is desirable, and what is politically 
feasible.
No enterprises exclusively occupied with agriculture were part 
of the random sample, although a number of industrial companies 
were engaged with processing of agricultural products.
Sample letters of approach can be found in appendix II.
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interviews. That represents a response rate of 17.3% of 
those approached. '^3
In the case of the Cretan political elite I have used a 
list of the local Mayors (7 cases), provided by the 
office of the prefecture, and presidents of local 
Communities which included 152 cases. Since MEPs are 
elected on a national, rather than a regional 
constituency, their relevance to regional political life 
can only be limited; so, I do not consider MEPs a part of 
the regional elite. There are 21 councillors elected in 
the Chania City Council, which is the largest and most 
influential local authority. There are further, four MPs 
elected to the national parliament from Nomos Chanion. 
This brings the local elected elite to 184 cases of which 
I have interviewed 12, or 7%. I have also interviewed 
two individuals belonging to the non-elected local 
political elite, which similar to all the regional elite 
categories described for the Strathclyde political 
elites, I speculate it consists of 300 i n d i v i d u a l s .
173. According to European Commission (1990) statistics 9.91% of 
enterprises in the UK are SMEs or Large ones according to 
employment figures. There were approximately 2000 business in 
that category registered for VAT purposes and filing accounts 
(according to ICC, 1989), which suggests interviews here represent 
a 1.2% sample. A more recent publication puts the total number of 
VAT registered business in Glasgow at 12000 a 10.3% share of 
Scottish business (Glasgow Development Agency, 1995).
174. My estimate of the local non-elected political elite in Chania 
is higher than that of Strathclyde, if the population of the 
respective regions is taken into account, but reflects my 
understanding of the high involvement with politics of the local 
elites (bearing a relevance to clientelism as well). I also 
believe that there is a 'minimum figure' in the constitution of a 
local political elite, i.e. there is a minimum number of 
individuals, even in the smallest regions, that comprise an active 
local body politic.
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To identify the Greek business elite I used a list of 
members to the Chania Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
{Emporiko Ke Viomihaniko Epimelitirio Chanion) as well as 
from a list of members of the Crafts and local Trade 
Associations. I also used a list of 72 exporting 
companies from the region, targeting the managing 
D i r e ctors.175 My sample of 21 cases represents 20% of 
that population. There were 2,551 registered enterprises 
in the prefecture, which could only be an indication of 
entrepreneurship however, since Labour Statistics are 
notoriously unreliable in the Greek state. I consider 
the lists used to offer a close approximation to the size 
of the local business elite.
So, overall I have interviewed 8% of the Glasgow elected 
local elite and 7% of the one elected in Nomos Chanion.
A token sample of the non-elected political elites was 
included for both regions. From business elites I have
175. My initial attempt to use the register of companies resident in 
Nomos Chanion proved unsuccessful because, at the time of my 
research, this information was not part of a data bank, was not 
updated and contained no vital information on the registered 
companies. Consequently, a great number of companies were 
inactive while most were personal craft or trading enterprises. 
Similarly unsuccessful was my attempt to use a register of Limited 
Companies, Corporations and Co-operatives, provided by the local 
Labour Ministry Department {Epitheorisi Ergasias) .
176. Data existing for Greece (Commission, 1990) puts Micro 
enterprises (1-9 employees) at 92.8% of the total. Assuming that 
there are 2,500 active enterprises in the region (and not taking 
account of the probability that the average size of enterprises in 
Chania is bound to be smaller than that of the rest of Greece) I 
would expect to find 29 enterprises with over 10 employees in 
Chania. This is an indication that my estimate of 105 individuals 
comprising the local business elite must be close to the true 
figure.
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interviewed an estimated 1.2% sample of directors and 
managers of Small, Medium and Large enterprises in 
Strathclyde and a 2 0% sample in Nomos Chanion. These 
samples, being relatively low, affect the inferential 
value of most statistics employed but by being closely 
focused on the elite groups identified earlier in this 
thesis present a fair picture of elite attitudes.
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Chapter 5
Profile of the Participating Elite Samples
A. Introduction
The type of hypotheses investigated in this thesis make the 
use of a comparative approach essential. Before I proceed 
with a test of the hypotheses I present here an analysis of 
the aggregated data from the survey. Simple statistical 
tools and graphics will be used to give an attitudinal 
profile of interviewees on the four sub-samples that 
comprise the entire sample, namely: a. Strathclyde 
politicians, b. Strathclyde businessmen, c. Cretan 
politicians and d. Cretan businessmen. Evidence 
underpinning a number of assumptions employed in the testing 
of hypotheses are initially examined here.
To process the data of the forty-one strong Scottish sample 
and thirty-five strong Greek one, 1 used a standard 
statistical package. Coding of results was employed for
177 . The main software used, for statistical operations and manipulation of 
data files is SPSS/PC+ and SPSS for Windows.
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transforming raw data into computer programmable ones.^^^ A 
code-book was constructed and was used in coding respondents 
r e p l i e s . S i n c e  the goal of this chapter is to provide an 
elementary profile of elite groups, cross-tabulations and 
other elementary analytical statistics are deemed
j ^ 180adequate.
Analysis of the relevant attitudinal profiles of the elites 
sampled includes characteristics like: age, function within 
elite hierarchy, certain preferences (i.e. support for 
nationalism) and confidence in their region (as expressed in 
confidence in preparation for 1992). Relationships explored 
in this chapter will be mainly those where there is a strong 
indication of association between the variables 
investigated. Questions referred to will be noted by their 
abbreviated form (as used in the codebook in appendix II).
In part F of the present chapter I have constructed a number 
of measures using group statistics. These, in turn, will be 
used when testing the hypotheses in chapters six and seven.
One digit codes proved sufficient to cover most possible answers. In 
very few cases, two digit codes were used. See appendix II.
. Manheim (1991) and de Vaus (1991) provide an excellent account of 
^g^tatistical techniques as they are employed in statistical methodology.
. Although statistical tools are used extensively in the next two 
chapters statistical results should be considered as a support of the 
qualitative element in this survey.
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Interviews for this sample, were conducted in Strathclyde 
region, between March and November 1991 and Nomos Chanion 
between September and October 1991.
B. The Strathclyde political elite
Three of the respondents were City Councillors, six were 
Regional Councillors, three were Members of Parliament at 
Westminster and two were Members of the European Parliament. 
Three of the respondents were not elected members of 
political bodies, of which, one was a senior administrator, 
in charge of economic policy for one of the Councils. He 
was (although in his bureaucratic capacity apolitical) 
considered to be directly related, if not responsible for 
many of the Council's policy initiatives and naturally 
directly involved in the Council's budget; one of the 
respondents was a candidate at the forthcoming parliamentary 
elections and one was a candidate in the last Regional 
Council elections. Both candidates were considered very 
close to the top of their respective party structures, were 
in their mid-thirties and although, not directly involved in 
policy decisions, one as Parliamentary assistant and both as
A number of exploratory interviews preceded the survey ones' in both 
regions, from June 1989 to October 1991.
activists were very influential and rather close to the 
decision-making elite.
In this section of the sample I encountered the only two 
females of the Scottish section of this survey. One was an 
MP and the other an MEP. Their uniqueness within the sample 
makes it impossible to treat them as a sub-group with any 
significance in statistical tests. I therefore, incorporate 
the female cases in the samples treatment of the male cases.
Table 5.1: Respondents' age distribution.
YEARS OF AGE
3 5 OR LESS 36-45 46-55 56 OR MORE
Strathclyde 5 7 5
Politicians 29.4% 41.2% 29.4%
Strathclyde 2 7 10 5
Businessmen 8 .3% 29.2% 41. 7% 20 . 8%
Cretan 1 5 5 3
Politicians 7 . 1% 35 . 7% 35 . 7% 21.4%
Cretan 5 6 7 3
Businessmen 23 .8% 28.6% 33 .3% 14 .3%
The respondents age group structure is a normally 
distributed bell shaped curve, centred around the 46 to 55 
years age group (Table 5.1). Respondents were predominantly 
Labour (thirteen out of seventeen), Liberal Democrats 
(three out of seventeen) and Scottish National Party (One
89
out of Seventeen). There were no Conservative or minority
party representatives. As is explained on chapter three on
the choice of the elite groups, the strong dominance of
Labour is normal, since sampling was centred in the Glasgow 
182area.
Table 5.2. Respondents' identification with their region.
ROOTS IN REGION ROOTS OUTSIDE REGION
Scottish politicians 12 5
70 . 6% 29.4%
Scottish businessmen 21 3
87 . 5% 12 . 5%
Cretan politicians 14
100%
Cretan businessmen 17 3
85% 15%
Note: Question Q 4 : 'Are
Scotland/Crete?'
your family/ethnic roots in
Of the political respondents, 70% have their ethnic roots in 
Scotland (Q4), a figure noticeably lower than the business 
average for Scotland of 87.5% (Table 5.2). Much more 
unanimous than their business counterparts, 82.4% of the 
political sample believes that nationalist movements are 
'definitely' not constructive in regional politics (Q3).
182 . Labour history and effective dominance in Glasgow is covered by 
Keating (1988, ch.2-3), while political life in Scotland is covered in 
Midwinter et. al. (1991, ch.1-3).
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This result was expected, since the confrontation between 
the Scottish Nationalists and the Labour party has been most 
severe as they both vie for voters in the same section of 
the political spectrum. While Scottish businessmen favoured 
an economy controlled at the National centre, politicians 
favoured more regional rather than national control. The 
Regional Council was favoured by 47%, while 40% favoured the 
national institutions in macro-economic decision making 
(01) .
I proceed by presenting an overview of interviewees' 
attitudes towards local entrepreneurs and politicians, local 
and multinational business as well as the state of the 
regional economy.
The perceived importance of the local political elite is put 
into serious question, since nine out of the seventeen 
politicians believed that MPs receive most of the lobbying 
for regional issues (QCl), 56% of which in turn, were in 
favour of macro-economics being controlled at the regional 
level (Ql).
Replies to questions comparing trust in local entrepreneurs. 
(QC4) and respondents ethnic origin (Q4) are particularly
. A Spearman correlation coefficient between Ql and QCl of .296 (sig. 
.266) indicates a moderately high association between their views on 
macro-economic control and lobbying of MPs.
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interesting since 80% of those not born in Scotland believed 
that prosperity depended on local entrepreneurs and 
conversely, 60% of those with their roots in Scotland 
perceived multinationals to be more important.
A majority of two out of three of those that expressed a 
preference believed business would perceive autonomy 
positively (QDl), which points to a serious difference in 
attitude from Scottish businessmen, since 61% of those 
expressing an opinion answered negatively to the same 
question.
A crosstabulation between their perception of business being 
positive to autonomy (QDl) with politician's trust of local 
entrepreneurs or multinationals (QC4), reveals 35% of 
respondents to believe in local entrepreneurs and at the 
same time find that business see autonomy positively.
Politicians expect that 82% of small-medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) will maintain operations in the region 
inspite of a recession (QC5), while 59% expect 
multinationals would shift operations to another region 
(QC7) Fifty-eight percent of those expressing an
184 . A Spearman correlation coefficient for QDl and QC4 of .402 (sig. .109) 
points a high degree of association between the two variables.
The Spearman correlation coefficient between QC5 and QC7 is .571 (sig. 
.021) which points to a high level of association between the two
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opinion said the economic future of the region depends on 
out of region capital investment, (QD2), while 29% of this
sample had no view on whether the region will depend on
indigenous or exogenous investment.
The image of MEPs appears very positive, 41% of respondents 
finding they have the longest term perspective among elected 
representatives (QC12). Councillors came second in 
preference with, 24% of the sample believing them to be 
economically far-sighted, while only one respondent 
supported the premise for MPs.
The large majority of respondents (71%) believe that MPs are
not held accountable for decisions taken by regional 
authorities (QC2), at the same time the majority (53%) 
believed that MPs are accountable for regional development 
(QC3)
A possible inconsistency exists between answers to questions 
of whether future economic growth depends on local 
entrepreneurs (QD3), and whether the regions prosperity 
depends on local entrepreneurs (QC4) . Only 54% of those
variables. If respondents thought SMEs will maintain operations were 
very likely to think MNLs will maintain operations and vice versa.
A Spearman correlation coefficient of -.085 (sig. .746) points to no 
association in respondents replies between the two questions.
A Spearman correlation coefficient of .336 (sig. .163) points to a 
relatively high degree of association between the two variables however
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that believed in local entrepreneurs (QD3) answered 
similarly on whether their prosperity depended on local 
entrepreneurs (QC4). The difference may be explained by the 
time reference in each question. The first one (QD3) is 
inquiring about the future, so replies can be more 
'optimistic', while the second one (QC4) is asking 
respondents about the present situation.
On the issue of whether MPs are receiving most of the 
lobbying for issues of mainly regional importance, the 
predominant attitude was that this was the case (QCl). A 
similar majority said that they have been on the receiving 
end of lobbying efforts ( Q C 1 3 ) A  total of 56% of 
respondents that declare to have been lobbied themselves 
also believe MPs are lobbied for issues of regional 
importance. As apparent from the correlation coefficients 
however, these attitudes cannot be associated.
In correlating whether respondents support the proposition 
that Strathclyde Regional Council is either Dynamic, Active 
or an Anachronism (QD4) and identifying Councillors as 
possessing a more accurate mental map than MPs (QC9) I find 
a pattern showing a correlation of replies to the two
Respondents exhibit no consistency in their replies however, as a 
Spearman correlation between QCl and QC13 of .054 (sig. .838) signifies.
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q u e s t i o n s . Those that found Councillors possessing a 
more accurate mental map tended to find the Council more 
Dynamic compared to those that did not think Councillors had 
a more accurate mental map. Most of those who had a 
negative view on Councillors mental map tended to view the 
Regional Council as simply active.
Overall, in the whole Scottish political sample only 17.6% 
had a negative view of the Regional Council (QD4). The 
existing correlation points to a positive view of the 
Regional Council being linked with a positive view of 
Councillors. Correlating answers on whether Councillors' 
perceived accuracy of their own 'mental map' (QC9) with 
their perceived receptiveness to businessmen (QCIO) exhibits 
indications of a relationship. From those that find 
Councillors possessing a more accurate mental map 60% also 
find Councillors more receptive than MPs. From those that 
do not find Councillors having a more accurate mental map 
than MPs 67% do not believe that they are more receptive 
than MPs. There exists a consistency which point to the 
existence of two groups. One which strongly believes in 
Councillors ability and fervour and one which does not. 
Overall results on question QCIO on Councillors
189 . The overall Spearman coefficient is modest however, at .159 (sig.
.588).
190 . There is a considerable correlation in respondents replies to the two 
questions with a Spearman coefficient of .463 (sig. .071) .
195
receptiveness are rather negative with 47.1% of the sample 
taking a negative view.
In replies to questions on whether the British (QD5) and 
Scottish (QD6) economy are ready for 1992, I find a 
remarkable consistency in replies which tended to coincide 
between their answers for Scotland and Britain with very 
small variations. So, if respondents found the British 
economy ready for European competition, they thought the 
same for the Scottish economy and vice-versa. This 
signifies an identification of the region with the economic 
fortunes of the nation can be considered relevant to the 
position this sub-group takes towards nationalism and 
devolution.
When however they are asked whether Scotland is in a worse 
position than the rest of UK or not (QD7) the distribution 
of their replies is balanced between those that find 
Scotland slightly worse off with those that find it slightly 
better off than the rest of the UK. This suggests a 
diversity of opinion that only becomes apparent when this 
particular issue of the region vs. the nation becomes 
explicit (QD7). In replying to questions on the 
preparedness towards 1992 (QD5,QD6) they were not requested 
to draw a comparison between their region and the rest of
191 . A very high correlation coefficient of .817 (sig. .000) signifies a 
very strong association between QD5 and QD6.
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Britain. When this is done in QD7, I assume that their 
replies become influenced by their political beliefs and 
ethnic background in showing a divergence from their initial 
replies in QD5 and QD6.
In an effort to further identify bias, if and when it 
exists, I cross-reference questions of those that find there 
is a difference between the people in their region and the 
rest of Scotland (QD9) or between their region and Britain 
(QDIO), with the question that asks whether they believe the 
region's prosperity depends more on local entrepreneurs or 
multinationals (QC4). I find that 67% of those who believe 
there are great differences between people from Strathclyde 
and the rest of Britain also believed their region's 
prosperity to depend on local entrepreneurs. The only 
respondents who did not believe there are great differences 
between people from Strathclyde and other British, where 
found in the group that had answered in favour of 
multinationals on the regional prosperity question(QC4). So 
those that believe local entrepreneurs to be closely 
associated with the region's future also find the Scots to 
be different from the British, while a great number of the 
sample of Strathclyde politicians who find multinationals to 
hold more promise for the region's future also find the 
Scots and the British to be alike. There emerges a pattern, 
according to which those that think there is no difference 
among the Scottish and British tend to believe in the
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importance of multinational enterprises, while those finding 
a difference among the Scottish and British tend to believe 
in the importance of local entrepreneurs for regional 
development.
I finally investigate the distribution of replies among 
those that believed autonomy will be perceived positively by 
business (QDl), 60% of which believed future prosperity lies 
with local entrepreneurs (QC4). Similarly 60% of those 
that gave an answer believing autonomy will be perceived 
negatively by business (QDl) also found that the future of 
the region lies with multinationals (QC4). The two 
groupings seem consistent with the assumption that 
supporters of local entrepreneurs will support autonomy as 
well, while supporters of multinationals will view autonomy 
negatively.
Overall, Strathclyde politicians believe that business would 
perceive autonomy positively, MEPs have the longest term 
perspective and the Regional Council is a dynamic 
institution. There is also a link between a perception of 
difference of the Scottish people from other British, a 
positive view of entrepreneurs and a positive view of 
autonomy.
192 . The high Spearman correlation value of .402 (sig. .109) points to a 
strong association between the two questions.
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C. The Scottish business elite
Most of the interviewees (21 out of 24) were Managing
Directors, Chairmen or Board Directors of their respective
companies. The three junior Managers I interviewed were : a
company accountant, a sales manager and a personnel manager.
Their junior status within their respective companies does
not disqualify them from being considered as part of the
elite group, since to a great extent they all had direct
access to their companies' Managing Directors, while their
position within the hierarchy was more relevant to their 
193young age.
Their respective company profiles reveals most companies to 
be in the medium to large category with 46% having more than 
£2 0 million annual turnover and 71% having more than one 
hundred employees (Graph 5.3). This apparent bias towards 
larger companies is considered more extensively in the 
discussion of response rates in chapter four.
Concurrently with issues of representativeness of the 
sample, consideration has to be given to the level of 
interaction between business and political elites. This 
must be influenced by the size of the local economy and
193 . All three were in their mid-thirties, one put himself in the less than 
3 5 years old group and the other two in the 35 to 45 years old group.
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respective average company size, I assume that where the 
average enterprise is larger, business elites will usually 
come from these larger enterprises. In this respect I trust 
that, Strathclyde (as well as Cretan) businessmen in this 
sample are close to being a representative sample of their 
respective elite.
Table 5.3: Size of Scottish business surveyed by annual 

















TOTAL 16. 7% 37.5% 45.8%
On an intuitive analyses I can point to the fact that small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the United Kingdom account 
for 46.8% of employment while large companies account for 
30% and that comparatively "...more employment is provided 
by SMEs and large firms in the UK than in the Community" 
(Commission of the EC, 19909, p.6.8). Previous research on 
economic elites has employed similar methods for identifying 
company directors from companies with a large turnover.
194 Reference here is made to research conducted by R.E. Pahl and J.T. 
Winkler (Pahl,1974). The researchers studied companies whose turnover 
was £250,000 or greater. Indexing between 1974 and 1991 will produce a 
minimum turnover value close to the one I applied. Considerations of 
systematic bias were made in that survey as well, particularly to the 
degree that successful companies were more prone to participating. My 
discussion on validity in chapter two entails these considerations.
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A noteworthy aspect of this sample is that 21% declared that 
they consider themselves entrepreneurs, while the rest said 
they consider themselves to be executives (QBIOF). On 
occasion a chairman or managing director seemed hesitant 
deciding between entrepreneur and executive status. A good 
number were holders of a large part of equity in their 
respective companies and had been personally responsible for 
their company's growth. Without fail all those who were 
indecisive ended-up opting for the executive status answer.
A number of possible explanations can be offered for this 
attitude. One could be that entrepreneurship is associated 
with creativity and in that sense it would be like bestowing 
themselves with a compliment; alternatively, for some an 
entrepreneur may not command a very high status in society. 
Since this survey had to be limited to particular political 
hypotheses, this rather etymological and conceptual fine- 
point is beyond this paper.
Another note-worthy distinction between entrepreneurs and 
executives seems to be the former's support for a federal 
Europe and international control of macro-economic aspects
195 . Respondents conceptual perception of entrepreneurship may effect their 
relevant responses to the questionnaire. This limitation, could be 
particularly relevant for comparisons between the two different national 
groups. A context of different understandings of entrepreneurship is 
often encountered in the book edited by Goffee and Scase (1987) on 
'Entrepreneurship in Europe'.
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of the economy (Q1,Q2). Executives seem to overwhelmingly 
support national macro-economic control while at the same 
time supporting a federal structure for Europe. This marks 
an oddity which if not relevant to sample restrictions, must 
point to entrepreneurs having a more internationalist 
attitude than executives. Sixty percent of entrepreneurs, 
but none of the executives, expressed support for 
international macro-economic control in their region (Q2).
Another unexpected result relates to the apparent 
contradiction between Federalist (Q2) and Nationalist (Q3) 
views of the executive s a m p l e . S i x t y  percent of 
respondents that think a federal Europe is viable do not 
believe that nationalist movements are good, while of those 
that believe nationalist movements are good 55% believe a 
Federal Europe not to be viable. I have to assume that 
nationalism and federalism are incompatible values for this 
sample.
A high percentage of the companies in this survey were 
private, with their shareholders primarily Scottish (Table 
5.4). This category accounted for 67% of the sample.
Another 25% were public companies, primarily of UK origin 
outside Scotland while 8% were companies with an 
international parent. Again note should be made of the bias
. Spearman correlation coefficients for both groups are negative. More 
so for the executives with a value of -.368 (sig. .121) than for the 
entrepreneurs with a value of -.167 (sig. .789).
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which exists by approaching companies registered in Glasgow, 
since some -particularly large UK companies- might be 
operating in the area without necessarily being registered 
there. I expect this bias to be limited however, as 
executives from non-Glasgow registered companies I assume 
not to be very senior within their company and therefore 
unlikely to be part of the local business elite. It is also 
the case that defining the elite as the influential in the 
local setting I am not interested in those that cannot be 
seen as directly relevant to the locality.








Scottish 16 1 5 2
Companies 66 . 7% 4.2% 20 . 8% 8 . 3%
Cretan 16 1 3 1
Companies 76.2% 4 .8% 14.3% 4 . 8%
Note: Region here refers to Scotland and Crete respectively, while 
nation refers to UK and Greece.
Half of this sample consists of companies exporting to more 
than two countries, reinforcing the probability that there 
is a bias of representation of the more successful companies 
(Table 5.5). Thirty three percent operated on a local- 
regional basis only, while 17% operated on a national basis 
exclusively.
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Table 5.5: Area of operations of interviewees firm.
LOCAL ONLY REGION NATIONAL EXPORTS IN 





Strathclyde 1 7 4 12
Business 4.2% 29.2% 16 . 7% 50%
Cretan 8 5 5 2 1
Business 38 .1% 23 . 8% 23 . 8% 9 . 5% 4 .8%
From the business interviewees, 88% considered their ethnic 
origin to be Scottish which is slightly higher a percentage 
than the total sample average.
I will proceed by presenting an overview of interviewees 
attitudes towards nationalism and devolution, local 
government and local entrepreneurs as well as European 
integration.
Asked whether they think Strathclyde will benefit from an 
increase in the powers of the Strathclyde Regional Council 
(SRC) 54% answered negatively while 42% answered positively 
(QBl).^^^ Subsequently, when asked if business would 
perceive regional autonomy favourably (QDl) 58% answer 
negatively. Interestingly, from those that viewed an 
increase in regional powers positively 3 0% view autonomy 
negatively. A relation seems to exist between a favourable
197 . Discrepancies in percentage totals stem either from rounding or from 
respondents declining to express an opinion or expressing an individual 
opinion outside the options given. When answers diverged from the set 
options in significant numbers these new categories were also tabulated.
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opinion for Strathclyde's increase in regional power (QBl) 
and a perception of constructive role for nationalist 
movements like the SNP (Q3). This was expressed as a 
majority of those favourable to nationalist movements 
supporting an increase in SRC powers (55%) and conversely 
those not supporting nationalist movements not supporting an 
increase in SRC powers (69%). This correlation becomes more 
pronounced when the question becomes one of their own 
business benefiting from an increase in the powers of the 
SRC (QB2).^^®
There exists a strong link between those who responded 
positively on whether the region will benefit from an 
increase in the powers of the SRC (QBl) and those who 
believe their business would benefit from such a shift as 
well (QB2)
The number of those having ethnic Scottish roots (Q4) that 
did not think an increase in the powers to the SRC will be 
good for the region (QBl) was twelve, against nine who 
viewed such a development favourably^°°. This is in accord 
with the predominantly negative attitude towards an increase 
in SRC power but offers no support to one of my assumptions
198 . Spearman correlation coefficients between Q3 and QBl were .296 (sig. 
^g^l60) while for Q3 with QB2 took a value of .497 (sig .014).
. The Spearman correlation coefficient for QBl with QB2 is .461 (sig 
20^024) pointing to the strong relationship of the two variables.
. The Spearman correlation coefficient between Q4 and QBl is -.062 
(sig. .773) which points to the limited association of the two variables.
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'strong ethnic identification with the region will relate 
positively with a positive view of increasing regional 
powers'.
For those of the respondents who find there are great 
differences between people in Strathclyde and the rest of 
Scotland (QD9), 40% are negative about the benefits to the 
region from an increase in the powers of the regional 
authority (QBl) and at the same time negative about 
nationalist movements in regional politics (Q3). So, those 
who find differences among their region and the rest of 
Scotland do not support nationalism and believe an increase 
in the powers of the SRC will be detrimental to their 
business.
For those who do not distinguish between people in their 
region and the rest of Scotland (QD9) there is a clear 
distinction towards either being positive on nationalist 
movements (Q3) and at the same time being positive towards 
SRC powers (QBl and QB2) or being negative towards both.
I could simplisticly identify three major attitudinal 
patterns in regard to this sample;
a. The Scots are different, nationalism is bad, an 
increase in SRC powers is bad,
b. The Scots are similar, nationalism is good, an increase 
in the powers of the SRC is good.
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c. The Scots are similar, nationalism is bad, an increase 
in the powers of the SRC is bad.
Together these three categories account for 57% of cases.
They point to a trend since for those who see nationalism as
bad (a. and c.) so is an increase to SRC powers, while for
those in the first group (a.) Scots are different from other
Britons and those in the third group (c.) Scots are similar
to other Britons. For those who see nationalism as good, so
is an increase in the powers of the SRC while Scots are all
similar (b.), This may point to a relationship between
201support for local government and nationalism.
Comparing the replies of those who consider their region to 
be in a worse or better position than the nation (QD7) with 
replies on whether Europe represents more opportunities or 
risks (QD13) I can identify two concentrations of replies.
There is a high degree of confidence in Strathclyde and its 
European future, particularly the latter, since the 
concentration around more opportunities (QD13) is the 
strongest. A number of respondents (13%) see more risks in 
Europe, while at the same time they believe their region to 
be worse off than the nation. The size of the sample does
201 . As mentioned earlier, this survey was conducted long before the 
Scottish Constitutional Convention had presented any concrete plans for 
devolution from Westminster. Questions on nationalism and Scottish 
nationalism can be associated with sympathy for the SNP.
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not permit investigating the hypothesis of whether Scottish 
'euro-sceptics' at the same time feel their region to be 
underprivileged within the UK.
A possible discussion on 'euroscepticism' should not fail to 
take account of the replies to question QD12 which were 
overwhelmingly p o s i t i v e . I n  this particular sample all 
respondents were positive, that Europe does represent a 
challenge for their region. In this light, even those who 
view their region's future in Europe negatively (QD13) claim 
that Europe represents a challenge (QD12).
Most respondents seemed pessimistic about the economy's 
preparedness, which was anticipated, given that interviews 
were conducted in the middle of a British and world 
recession. Sixteen of the respondents answered that the 
economy was not prepared at all or plainly unprepared, seven 
thought it was just prepared and only one took the view it 
was well prepared(QD5).
Little inference can be drawn from the primary analysis of 
the group of questions pertaining to how well businessmen 
know their political representatives. The two largest 
groups of six cases - twenty five percent of the sample -
2 02 . Such was the unanimity of opinion on this question that it could act 
as a control to identifying possible "exceptional" respondents, (those 
who could give random replies or be negative by reaction to the 
interview).
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are those who either know all of their local political 
representatives, Councillors, MPs and MEPs or none (QB6, 
QB7, QB8).^°^
In order of 'obscurity' fifteen did not know their City or 
Regional Councillor, thirteen did not know their MEP and 
nine did not know their MP. Eight out of nine businessmen 
that did not know their MP did not know their Councillor, 
while six did not know their MEP either. This points to a 
possible polarisation at the one end of which we have 
'politically informed' and at the other 'politically 
uninformed' businessmen, which could be taken one step 
further in stating an obvious condition. Only some elite 
businessmen are politically active while some are 
politically indifferent or inactive.
Cross-tabulating data referring to questions on whether 
local representatives are better at promoting the economic 
interests of the region and more receptive to businessmen 
compared with MPs (QBll, QB12, QB13), with degree of 
acquaintance with office bearers (QB6, QB7), I find great 
similarities in the distribution of replies to these 
questions. Answers to QBll and QB12 show that twelve and
2 03 . Spearman correlation coefficients for QB6 and QB7 is .422 (sig .040) 
point to a strong correlation between businessmen knowing their 
Councillor and MP. The coefficient for questions QB6 and QB8 has a value 
of .497 (sig .014) which points to a strong correlation between
businessmen knowing their Councillor and MEP. The only weak correlation
was between questions QB7 and QB8 at .194 ( sig .363) pointing to a low
association between businessmen's knowledge of their MP and MEP.
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thirteen cases respectively support the statement that 
Councillors are much more or slightly more fervent and much 
more or slightly more effective than MPs. This is in spite 
of the fact that most do not know their local or regional 
Councillors. To illustrate, five out of seven businessmen 
who said Councillors are much more fervent than MPs did not 
know their local Councillor while, of the same group, five 
knew their local M P . I can make the assumption that they 
are plainly dissatisfied with the performance of their local 
MPs rather than happy with the effectiveness or fervour of 
their local Councillors.
Cross-tabulating questions on how fervent (QBll) with how 
effective (QB12) this sample finds Councillors compared to 
MPs I see the emergence of two distinct g r o u p s . T h e  
first is of those who find Councillors much less fervent and 
much less effective and the second is of those that find 
Councillors much more fervent and effective.
Another noteworthy observation is that for all three 
questions (QBll, QB12, QB13) those that had chosen the 
options of equally fervent, effective or receptive, -for 
Councillors' and MPs' performance- belong to either of the 
two groups of respondents who either know both or neither of 
their respective MPs and Councillors. Also in the case of
204 . A Spearman correlation coefficient between QBll and QB12 of .666 (sig 
.001) points to the very strong correlation between the two concepts.
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the question on receptiveness (QB13), -which is based on the 
assumption that councillors are more accessible and 
therefore, businessmen probably feel them to be more 
receptive than MPs- I found a fairly balanced response with 
five of the respondents believing Councillors much less or 
slightly less receptive, ten finding them equally receptive, 
and seven finding them slightly more or much more receptive. 
Overall response patterns to this group of questions are 
rather unexpected and against some of my initial assumptions 
of businessmen's perception of Councillors and MPs.
There are two possible interpretations for this discrepancy. 
The first interpretation is that respondents are not giving 
an evaluation of the respective Councillors and MPs 
individually but of the institutions they represent. So, 
fervour and effectiveness were related to the Glasgow City 
Council and the Strathclyde Regional Council respectively. 
This view is supported by the qualifications to responses I 
received which express a wide support, of the Regional 
Council particularly, among the business community. The 
second possible reason for this response could be the 
disaffection of the Scottish business elite with existing 
institutional structures. This view, although not expressed 
as strong support for nationalism, can never the less be 
perceived as strong support for federalism (Q2).
211
In respondents' expressed locational mobility, consideration 
must be given to the fact that the majority are executives 
(QBIOF) and that only five are over 56 years of age. Of 
those who said they were prepared to do the same job in 
another region of UK (QB14), 57% said they were prepared to 
do the same job in another region of the European 
Communities as well (QB15). Ten in total were not prepared 
to move at all (QB14,QB15)^°^ . These results seem 
consistent with expected relocational patterns of 
executives, since those that are prepared to move are maybe 
not prepared to move to Europe but those that are not 
prepared to move to another UK region are more unlikely to 
want to move to another European region. There seems to be 
no pattern in the distribution of replies pertaining to the 
willingness to work elsewhere in Great Britain (QB14) and 
their perception of difference between Scottish and British 
people (QD9)
Respondents were unanimous in their confidence that local 
entrepreneurs could function in a different UK region than 
their own (QB16), while they were close to unanimity that 
they could function in a different European region outside
There is a very strong correlation between respondents replies to 
questions QB14 and QB15 as a Spearman correlation coefficient of .598 
^^^(sig. .002) reveals.
. The Spearman correlation coefficient for QB14 and QD9 is .070 (sig 
.747) pointing to no association between the two variables. This runs 
contrary to the assumption that if respondents believed there were great 
differences among the Scottish (QD9: positive) they would not be prepared 
to work elsewhere in the UK (QB14: negative). I assumed that this could 
be an indication of prejudice towards the English.
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UK (QB17). There was some dissent, however, on whether 
multinationals are detrimental to the performance of local 
entrepreneurs, with six claiming they would perform worse 
and sixteen that they would perform better in the presence 
of multinationals (QB18).^°^
Whether respondents see themselves as entrepreneurs or 
executives seems to mildly affect their views on SMEs 
growth. All of those declaring themselves to be 
entrepreneurs (QBIOF) also believe there will be a growth in 
small-medium enterprises (QB3). Of those who see themselves 
as executives (QBIOF) most but not all believe that there 
will be a growth in SMEs.
In conclusion, in the attitudes of Scottish businessmen in 
this sample I find an association between an increase in the 
powers of the Strathclyde Regional Council and support for 
nationalist movements, while there is a negative correlation 
of nationalism with European federalism. They are 
pessimistic about the regional economy's prospects and are 
more likely to know their local MP than their local 
Councillor.
207 . The weak association is also apparent from the relevant Spearman 
correlation coefficient for QB17 and QB18 of .049 (sig .825) .
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D. The Cretan political elite
Fourteen interviews are included in the analysis 
representing a number of political b o d i e s . M o s t  
interviewees were aligned with or directly elected with the 
'left' of the political spectrum representing either the 
Socialist (six cases) the Communists (one case) or a 
Socialist-Left coalition (one case). Three of the 
respondents declared belonging to the Centre of the 
political spectrum although two were elected with the 
Socialists and one with the Conservatives. Another two 
respondents were right-wing conservatives. Remarkable is 
the case of the respondent who declared allegiance to a 
political party which, for all practical purposes, was at 
the time defunct (Enosis Kentrou) . It is possible that the 
party dealignment evident in the willingness of respondents 
to give and receive support from the two major political 
parties in contemporary Greek politics (Nea Democratia and 
PASOK) has to do with the character of politics in Greece. 
The clientelistic and leader-centred political culture makes 
ideology almost irrelevant to political alignment and 
support of a party. Hence, the often opportunistic 
realignments and coalitions based on shifting patronage 
relationships.
A distribution of respondents according to the elected position they 
hold is displayed in Table 7.2.
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Table 5.6: Declared political affiliation of Cretan 
political interviewees.
PARTY AFFILIATION CASES AND 
PERCENTAGE
Communist-Left (Synaspismos-Aristera) 1 7%
Socialist-Left (Left-PASOK) 1 7%
Socialists (PASOK) 6 42%
Centre -Socialists (Centre-PASOK) 2 14%
Centre (Enosis Kentrou) 1 7%
Conservative (Centre) 1 7%
Conservatives (Nea Demokratia) 2 14%
The predominance of Socialist representatives in this sample 
is a fair reflection of the political map of local 
government in Chania. A strong sense of a democratic 
tradition, which people in Chania feel links them to the 
days of Eleftherios Venizelos, is probably indicative of the 
prevailing feeling in the political community at large.
This attitude is important for the analysis, since it points 
to a tendency for consensus politics that may be 
uncharacteristic of other regions in Greece.
Of the non-elected interviewees one was a senior influential 
figure in the local political scene, a labour leader or
209 Cretan political customs are investigated by Hertzfeld (1985), while 
an insight into modern Greek political history is provided by Woodhouse 
(1968) and Clogg (1986).
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'ergatopateras' (literally: 'father of workers'), he was
also the editor of one of the local union publications and a 
person directly involved with the party political machine 
being very influential in the local political party scene. 
The other one was the publisher and editor of one of the 
most important local papers. He was affiliated with the 
Socialist party and was directly involved in the political 
power struggles of local politics. In both cases their 
involvement in the local political scene is deep and I 
believe qualifies them as members of the local political 
elite. One of the interviewees was a female, in this case 
similar to the Scottish sample, the size of the sub-sample 
does not allow any further testing relating to her gender.
The age group structure reveals a comparatively youthful 
sample with only 21% of the respondents on the 'over 56 
years of age' category (Table 5.1). Forty three percent of 
the Cretan compared with 29% of the Scottish politicians 
were younger than 4 5 years of age.
Representation of certain political institutions -like the 
Greek Parliament or the European Parliament- could not be 
achieved as the political elites in those bodies refused to 
participate. I feel however that the loss of the respective 
institutions from the sample only limits the investigative 
search in as much as it eliminates certain hypotheses that
216
can be relevant to the respective political institutions and 
does not reduce the value of the results in any other way.
All of the respondents declared their roots to be Cretan 
which makes a contrast with all other sub-groups of this 
survey (Table 5.2). I believe this to be the case for all 
local MPs in the National Parliament as well. This fact if 
indicative of a larger national or regional trend in Greece 
could be relevant to the possible direction regional 
politics might take in the future. Since relevant 
statistics are unavailable for other regions in Greece 
however I cannot dwell on this topic further.
Respondents in this part of the sample found that macro- 
economic policies should be controlled at the regional level 
by 58% compared with the Scottish political sample where 47% 
of respondents held the same view (Ql). A big majority of 
71% also believed that a federal structure for Europe can be 
viable (Q2). It did not come as a surprise that 85% of 
respondents found nationalist movements not to be 
constructive in regional politics (Q3). As explained 
concurrently with the testing of the hypotheses (chapters 
six and seven) Cretans are particularly wary of any talk of 
secession from the mainland. The threat of Turkey is
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considered very real while for many Cretan respondents 
nationalism has an inherently negative meaning.
I find however a noteworthy comparison between their 
responses to the first group of questions in the 
questionnaire. By a great margin they seem to think macro­
economics should be controlled at the region, while 
federalism is viable at a European level. Furthermore, they 
do not find nationalist movements constructive. It could be 
that existing nationalist movements or parties do not have 
the confidence of the elite. It is the case as well, that 
the semantic meaning of the equivalent Greek word for 
nationalism, ' ethnikismos', can have negative connotations.
It is possible, however, that if this is indeed a 
contradiction not related to the measures employed, that 
Cretans could make the 'logical leap' of supporting a 
federal structure for their r e g i o n , N a t u r a l l y ,  I am not 
suggesting that nationalism is positively related to 
federalism. Interestingly in interviews with officials 
from the planning agency of the prefecture and the local
210 . A characteristic remark was 'the lone sheep is eaten by the wolf'. 
There are no recent claims on Crete from Turkey, but for the sample 
interviewed the danger appeared very real. It could be explained in part 
from the long fight of the Cretans to free themselves from Turkish rule, 
which was only achieved in the latter part of the 19th century.
. Independence from Greece has never been a goal presented by any major 
political party in the regional or national level. It has been voiced 
2i^owever as a fringe movement of autonomy at various times.
. Indeed many federalists, Altiero Spinneli (1972a) among others, argue 
exactly the opposite.
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chamber of commerce (not constituting part of the 
questionnaire), it was relayed that the local administrative 
elite was frustrated with the existing decision making 
structures and would hope and lobby for a regionally 
autonomous administration.
I proceed by analysing Cretan politicians' attitudes on 
nationalist movements, local entrepreneurs and 
multinationals, the regional economy and national 
parliamentarians, as well as the European Community.
A common opinion expressed, was that the Cretan economy is 
able to outperform the rest of Greece and would be probably 
better off without the burden of central Greek 
administration and taxes.
Significantly, all those who found nationalist movements 
constructive (Q3) claimed also that national policies for 
the region have failed (QD8) T h o s e  that found 
nationalist movements not to be constructive were almost 
evenly split between those that thought nationalist policies
213 . Note should be made that bureaucrats perspective could be closer to 
calls for déconcentration rather than decentralisation or devolution.
. Details of estimates of net expenditure by the Greek state are given 
in chapter three analysing the economic conditions in Crete. The most 
important result of that analysis is that Crete is a net contributor to 
the state, although its Regional Per Capita Income is below the Greek 
average.
215 . A weak Spearman correlation coefficient of .150 (sig. .609) points to 
the 'problematic' association between the two questions.
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have failed and those that did not think that to be the 
case.
Eighty six percent of interviewees said MPs receive most of 
the lobbying (QCl), while 58% of them said that macro­
economics should be controlled at the regional level 
(Ql) In a country where political patronage is a facet
of the state machine, it is considered natural to lobby at 
the state legislature, which is the highest decision making 
body. The dependence of local authorities on the central 
administration further explains this pattern. Of those who 
believed macro-economics should be controlled at the 
national level came the only two respondents to support the 
proposition that MPs do not receive most of the lobbying for 
issues with regional impact . If they represented a more 
significant part of this sample, I could deduce that such a 
group sees the national administration as the most competent 
agent for dealing with the regional economy and at the same 
time feel there exists a balance by lobbying for regional 
issues at the competent authorities for the region; such a 
group would obviously favour the status quo of affairs for 
the region.
In terms of trust of the local entrepreneurial skills, 64% 
of respondents believe their region's prosperity depends on
A comparatively strong Spearman correlation coefficient of .365 (sig. 
.243) points to the strong association between the two variables.
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local entrepreneurs (QC4), while 71% believe future economic 
growth will depend mainly on local entrepreneurial skill 
(QD3) . A group of respondents representing 29% of the
sample believed the economic future of the region lies in 
out of region capital (QD2) while at the same time the 
regions prosperity depends on companies with headquarters 
outside the region (QC4); this same group also believes 
future growth will depend on out of region entrepreneurial 
skill or have no opinion on the issue(QD3) .  On the 
question of whether the capital resources for future growth 
will come from within or outside the region a total of 43% 
of the sample expect capital to come from outside the region 
(QD2) .
The strong trust in local entrepreneurial skill is mirrored 
in replies of the business part of the Cretan sample. I 
find it indicative of the natural pride in their own ethnic 
identity. The big proportion of those that expect capital 
resources for their region's growth to come from outside the 
region shows, to some extent, the degree of their perceived 
dependence on such sources for growth.
217 . The very high Spearman correlation of .837 (sig. .000) points to the 
very high association between the two facets of this issue for Cretan 
interviewees.
Question QD2 shows a higher Spearman correlation coefficient with QD3 
at .519 (sig. .057), than with QC4 which is at .351 (sig. .218). This 
points to a higher correlation between sources of capital and skill than 
sources of capital and a companies base of operations.
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A concentration of replies exists between those that 
perceive the future of the region to depend on local capital 
(QD2) and at the same time expecting SMEs to stay in the 
region ( Q C 5 ) O v e r a l l  93% of respondents expected SMEs 
to stay in the region in the case of a recession, while only 
50% of respondents expected multinationals to stay in the 
region in a similar case (QC7).
In their views about multinationals' commitment to the 
region, compared with their views on local or international 
resources for their growth, I find two significant 
concentrations of replies. One was of those who believed the 
future of the region lies in out-of-region capital (QD2),
67% of which believed multinationals will stay in the case 
of a recession (QC7)/ while the second one was of those who 
believed the future depends on local capital resources, 57% 
of which believed multinationals would go in the case of a 
r e c e s s i o n . T h e s e  views show a degree of consistency in 
the opinions of this sample which, furthermore, seems 
divided between those who believe the region is dependent on 
foreign capital and multinationals for its future and those
219 . The Spearman correlation coefficient between QD2 and QC5 being rather 
moderate at .230 (sig. .427) I have to assume that there is no overall 
association between the two variables..
2 2 0 . There is a strong negative association for QD2 and QC7, the relevant 
Spearman correlation coefficient takes a value of -.382 (sig. .178) 
supporting the assumption that multinationals are linked with support of 
out of region capital.
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that do not trust multinationals and believe the future to 
lie with local resources and entrepreneurs.
It is noteworthy, as well, that although Crete is below the
Greek average per-capita income, the political elite finds
Crete to be better off than the rest of Greece. In replies
to a question asking whether their region is in a worse
position than the nation (QD7) 75% of those who replied to
this question found Crete to be in a slightly better
position, while 17% believed Crete to be in a much better
position than the rest of Greece. At the same time 50%
believed MPs to have a longer term perspective (QC12) while
42% believed MEPs to have a longer term perspective. All of
those who believed their region to be much better off than
the nation (QD7) believed that MPs have a longer term 
221perspective.
It could be argued that Cretans perceive themselves in a 
better position than the nation, because of renewed interest 
in the region as the first one in Europe to have an 
Integrated Mediterranean Programme implemented.
Furthermore, the fast growth and increased prosperity due to
2 21 . A Spearman correlation coefficient of -.405 (sig. .192) points to a 
strong association between preference for MPs and a belief that the 
region is better off than the nation.
222 . The implementation problems of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes 
in Greece are covered by Papageorgiou and Verney (Papageorgiou, 19 92), 
while a general critique is given by Bianchi, (1992).
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the increase of agricultural incomes and tourist revenue in 
the 1980's must be partly responsible for the optimistic 
outlook of the regional elites.
The connection between their belief in their prefecture 
being better off than the nation and their trust of national 
MPs economic foresight, indicates confidence in the region's 
growth at the same time regional politician's dependence on 
the centre. And although all respondents in this sub-sample 
belong to local political bodies, it is impressive that they 
demonstrate no trust to their own economic foresight. In 
that respect it would be interesting to examine whether 
calls for decentralisation and autonomy are led by a 
business elite that is driven by economic expediency and 
resisted by a political elite deeply embedded in the 
national clientelistic web.
So I examine how respondents see the relation of MPs with 
local authorities. Replying to a question on whether they 
think MPs are considered accountable for decisions taken by 
local authorities, 86% of respondents thought this not to be 
the case (QC2). On answering whether MPs are held more 
accountable for regional development than local Councillors, 
57% declare this not to be the case, while 21.5% say this is 
the case and a similar proportion do not know (QC3). There
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were no respondents who were positive on both questions 
while 50% of.this sample was negative on both.
It seems, thus, that MPs are held in high esteem (QC12), 
they are not considered accountable for decisions taken by 
regional authorities (QC2), and they are less accountable 
for regional development than Councillors (QC3).
On their replies to the question of whether Councillors are 
more receptive than MPs to pressure from businessmen (QCIO) 
in their area 50% replied positively and 41.7% negatively.
Sixty seven percent of those that found Councillors more 
attentive than MPs (QCIO) believed their regions' prosperity 
to depend on local entrepreneurs (QC4), while 60% of those 
that found Councillors less attentive than MPs believed the 
future of their area to lie with companies from outside the 
r e g i o n . I n  this light appreciation of local government 
can be related with appreciation of local entrepreneurs 
while disaffection with local government could be linked 
with trust of an 'out of region entrepreneurial effort'.
223 . A Spearman correlation coefficient of -.028 (sig. .923) points to no 
association in the way respondents replied between the two questions.
224 . There is a mild statistical association between the two variables as a 
Spearman correlation coefficient takes a value of .245 (sig. .442).
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Inquiring whether they have been lobbied for the change of 
legislation and cross-tabulating to assess whether they 
believe MPs are receiving most of the lobbying, 65% of 
respondents to both questions said they have not been 
lobbied (QC13) and MPs indeed receive most of the lobbying 
for regional issues (QCl).
I next examine the relationship between their perception of 
the most prominent local authority and the relevance they 
think local Councillors have with regional problems. A 
total of 57% find Councillors possessing the most accurate 
mental map (QC9) while 75% of those find the local Council 
to be Dynamic (QD4). In total 71% find the local Council 
dynamic which indicates the City Council is considered to be 
a significant political force by the local political elite. 
The strong concentration of positive replies for the Council 
and Councillors could be explained by the occupation of the 
respondents, being themselves Councillors or presiding over 
local Council bodies. I cannot thus determine whether their 
esteem for Councillors is dependent on their impression of 
Councillors possessing a more accurate mental map.
A high correlation between their replies on the state of the 
Greek and Cretan economies shows replies to correspond
225 . This relationship attains a Spearman correlation coefficient value of 
-.258 (sig. .418) which points to an association between on the one hand 
having been lobbied themselves and MPs receiving most of the lobbying.
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between respondents' views of the economic conditions 
between the two economies (QD5,QD6)
I proceed to investigate their views towards national 
policy. Seventy percent of those who thought the region to 
be better off than the nation (QD7) also thought that 
national policies have failed. So a large proportion of 
those who believed the national authorities to have failed 
believed the region to be better off regardless. It seems 
they do not connect the well-being and progress of the 
region to national policies. At the same time they have a 
very positive image for local MPs. One is inclined to think
that such a position is either relating to a political
apathy with state institutions and policies or in a belief 
that the system cannot be changed and the local MPs are 
utilising it to the best of its capabilities.
I next try to identify to what extent the elite from the 
prefecture differentiates itself from the region and the 
nation. The first indication of divergence is between those
that support the premise that there are no differences
between the people of the prefecture and the rest of the 
region (QD9) and there are no differences between people of 
the region and the rest of Greece (QDIO), who represent 36%
. A very high Spearman correlation coefficient of .751 (sig. .002) 
signifies the strong link between their perceptions of the regional and 
national economies, which are considered highly intertwined.
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of the sample, and a group of equal size (36%) who support 
the premise that there are differences both within the 
region and between the people of the region compared with 
the rest of the country. Twenty eight percent of the sample 
support the premise that there are no differences within the 
region but there are differences between the region and the 
nation. The whole sample can be thus divided to those that: 
a. find there are no differences whatsoever between all 
Greeks (36%), b. find people from Chania to differ from the 
rest of the region and Greece (36%), c. believe people from 
Chania differ only from the rest of the Greeks (28%).
The second (b.) and third (c.) groups comprise 64% of the 
whole sample. So I deduce that these groups represent those 
who see cultural or other differences between their region 
and Greece. The first group (a) is intransigent in its 
belief that Greeks have all the same characteristics 
cultural or otherwise.
Further attempting to qualify respondents position towards 
Europe, I see that in the question asking whether 
respondents believe there are more opportunities or risks in 
a united Europe (QD13), 71% reply that they believe there 
are slightly more or more opportunities, while another 21% 
reply that there are the same level of risks and 
opportunities, while 7% reply there are many more risks.
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Trying to identify trust for multinational enterprises as it 
compares with their trust for local entrepreneurs I trace a 
weak relationship since a majority (71%) of respondents who 
believe multinationals will stay in the case of a recession 
(QC7) also believe the region depends on local entrepreneurs 
(QC4). Concurrently, the proportion of those who believe 
multinationals will go, seem not to trust local 
entrepreneurs(60%) . The size of the sample does not
allow a generalisation of this relationship. So, although 
there are indications for the existence of this 
relationship, trust in local entrepreneurs cannot be linked 
with trust in the presence of multinationals in the region.
To conclude, Cretan politicians trust local entrepreneurs 
and multinationals but show little appreciation for local 
political effectiveness. Furthermore they are optimistic 
towards the regions' prospects in Europe.
E. The Cretan business elite
The age structure of respondents in this sub-sample shows 
52% to be 45 years old or younger, while only 14% of them 
were older than 56 years (Table 5.1). The character and
227 . The Spearman correlation coefficient denotes a low statistical 
association between replies to QC4 and QC7 at a value of .162 (sig. 
.579).
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average size of business in Crete precluded the possibility 
of many members of the business elite to be executives.
This is not only due to the comparatively small size of 
incorporated companies, but also due to the predominance of 
family controlled business, which still comprise the 
backbone of Greek business. This picture was confirmed in 
their responses in the survey as 64% of them declared being 
entrepreneurs and only 32% declared being executives.
Furthermore as mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
interlockingness between the local political and business 
elite is assumed to be related to the size of the local 
economy. The small size, in this case, of the Cretan 
economy makes the holding of a position in both elite groups 
a more frequent occurrence than witnessed in the Strathclyde 
sample. Two cases interviewed had an important role in both 
elite groups. One of them a managing director of the 
biggest company in the prefecture was eliminated from the 
political sample and was only included in the business one. 
Similarly an editor of one of the local papers was 
eliminated from the business sample and was only part of the 
political one.
Some basic aspects of their attitudinal profile are revealed 
in answers to the question inquiring whether respondents 
believe a federal structure for Europe is viable (Q2), where 
an overwhelming majority of 86% said they believed this to
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be the case. Half of those also argued that macro economics 
should be controlled at the international level (Ql). It is 
noteworthy that only 19% of the sample supported the 
proposition that macro-economics should be controlled at the 
regional level, while another 19% supported the proposition 
that it should be controlled at the national level.
So Cretan businessmen show themselves to be much more 
internationalist than their Scottish counterparts (75% of 
whom supported national control of macro-economic policies). 
An apparent explanation of this, as of many other questions, 
is that businessmen from the prefecture find the national 
administration inefficient and trust the European Commission 
as a comparatively uncorrupted bureaucracy. The efficiency 
and higher level of development of European business also 
make them a model which Cretan businessmen would like their 
economy to follow. By comparison Scottish businessmen may 
perceive Brussels as a bureaucratic organisation which 
competes with their national government for imposition of 
taxes and the establishment of a Social Charter. The 
European Commission may be perceived thus as an impediment 
to business by Scottish businessmen in this sample.
A total of 76% of the sample perceive nationalist movements 
negatively (Q3) which is a similar figure with the Cretan 
political elite response, but is far higher than the
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Strathclyde business figure of 54% of respondents being 
negative on nationalist movements.
Another interesting distinction between entrepreneurs and 
executives' replies is that 31% of entrepreneurs could not 
decide whether nationalism was bad (Q3), while at the same 
time all executives had a clearly positive or negative 
position. There is no divergence in their views on 
nationalism that can be ascribed to their professed ethnic 
roots either(Q4).
Most respondents replied that their roots are Cretan, a 19% 
minority in this sample consider their roots to be outside 
Crete (Table 5.2). This fact in itself is significant, to 
the degree that it points to the business elite not being as 
homogeneous in its background as the respective political 
elite.
Trying to determine whether there are variations in the 
approach to nationalism and international economic control 
which depend on the status of respondents, I divide 
respondent replies on whether they perceive themselves as 
entrepreneurs or executives. A noteworthy concentration of 
replies consist of those who identified the region or the 
nation (Ql) as most appropriate to exercise macro-economic 
control. Only 13% of executives support the nation as most
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appropriate level of management of the macro-economic 
policies of the region.
I proceed by giving an account of interviewees' attitudes 
towards devolution, local business, local politicians and 
European integration.
Remarkably, an overwhelming majority of 95% of respondents 
believed that the region will benefit by an increase in the 
powers of the prefecture (QBl), while 90% believed their 
business will benefit from such an increase in regional 
powers as well (QB2) A negative perception of
nationalism (Q3) does not preclude an almost unanimous 
support of an increase in the powers of the regional 
administration. This strong support for devolution from a 
rather demoralised and centrally dependent regional 
bureaucracy, points to the distress that the workings of the 
existing structures bring to businessmen in the region.
Although 95% of respondents believe their prefecture will 
benefit from devolution (QBl), only 29% find that business 
will see autonomy positively (QDl) while a majority of 62%
. The relevant Spearman correlation coefficient confirms this strong 
22 association exhibiting a value of .689 (sig. .001) .
. The need for decentralisation and the perceived 'gross inefficiency' 
of the Greek state to address the problems of the locality was a 
prevalent theme of almost all interviews with prefecture and development 
agency representatives in the region. (Interviews in the summer of 1990 
and 19 91)
233
think that although the prefecture will benefit from 
devolution, business will not like autonomy. This reply is 
particularly intriguing if one considers that this group of 
respondents are businessmen. From relevant qualifications, 
respondents gave to their replies, the most apparent 
interpretation to this 'contradiction' is that, Cretan 
businessmen can see the benefits of devolution in the 
administration but would view with unease the possibility 
of severing their ties with the Greek business community.
It seems also to be less the case of resource dependency of 
the Cretan economy to the mainland than dependence on the 
Greek market as an outlay for their products and services.
A high correlation exists on whether they foresee more SMEs 
(QB3) and whether this is beneficial to their own firm (QB4! 
with whether they have declared themselves to be 
entrepreneurs or executives. This association is 
directly relevant to the perceived role of respondents in 
the business community. I can assume that entrepreneurs 
view SMEs as competition, while executives view them as a 
wider market for their products.
23 0 . A high association between the two variables with a Spearman 
correlation coefficient value of .447 (sig. .374) for executives and a 
value of -.408 (sig. .188) for entrepreneurs. Apparently executives 
relate more SMEs with a positive development for their firm, while 
entrepreneurs with a negative development.
234
From those who responded that more SMEs will create a more 
devolved economy (QB5), 77% have also found business holding 
a negative view of the possibility of autonomy (QDl).
Those that answered that the economy would become more 
dependent, were equally split, 50% of them believed business 
to be positive and 50% to be negative to autonomy. An 
overall majority of those who perceive SMEs to create a more 
devolved regional economy perceive business to be negative 
to autonomy.
Those who believe people from Chania to be different from 
other people in the region or the nation represent 48% of 
the sample (QD9,QD10); those who believe neither people from 
the region nor people from the nation to be different from 
people in Chania represent 24%; finally, those who find 
there are great differences between people in Chania and the 
rest of Greece, but no differences between people from 
Chania and the rest of the region represent 19% of 
respondents. So, as with the Cretan political personalities 
I can distinguish three major groups of respondents.
A relationship between their ethnic roots and a perception 
of difference of the regional people can be demonstrated by 
the fact that 59% of those who declared their ethnic roots
231 . The Spearman correlation coefficient has a value of -.305 (sig. .191), 
which points to a moderately high association between an attitude that 
SMEs are related to a devolved economy and that business hold a negative 
view on autonomy.
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to be Cretan (Q4) believed there are great differences 
between people in their prefecture and the rest of Crete 
(QD9) The inverse is true for those who do not have
their roots in Crete, 75% of which believe there are no 
great differences among the prefecture and the rest of 
Crete.
Of those that would be prepared to work elsewhere in Greece 
(QB14), 63% perceived no great differences of people within 
Crete (QD9) . Of those that would not be prepared to work 
elsewhere in Greece, 67% found there are great differences 
between the people in their prefecture and those in the rest 
of Crete. This attitude is consistent with assuming that 
those who find great differences within their region are not 
prepared to emigrate and vice versa. Further evidence from 
their qualitative replies identifies this group as the 
potential 'hard-line' nationalists in the region.
Replies to QB14 and QB15 show an interesting inversion from 
replies in the Scottish sample. When asked if they would be 
prepared to do the same job they perform here in another 
part of Greece 57% replied they were not prepared to move 
(QB14), this reply was partly anticipated since this sample 
consists mostly of entrepreneurs with comparatively small
This association is not as pronounced in the relevant statistics since 
the value of the Spearman correlation coefficient is only .182 (sig.
.431).
236
operations, while as they have claimed that they believe 
their region to be better off than the nation (QD7). When 
replying if they would be prepared to do the same job in 
Europe, 52% reply in the affirmative (QB15). The inference 
from the Scottish investigation of replies, was that if 
someone was not prepared to work outside Scotland in the 
United Kingdom he was less likely to be prepared to do so in 
Europe. Many assumptions can be made why Cretan businessmen 
would be more willing to work in Europe than they would be 
to work in Greece. Most apparent is the existence of a 
better organised state infrastructure and better returns for 
their efforts in most of western Europe. I must not fail to 
identify their entrepreneurship and keen sense of adventure, 
and the long history of emigration and immigration 
(particularly acute in the 1950s' and 1960s') from the 
region and Greece as a whole.
Respondents knowledge of their elected representatives is 
very high. All respondents knew who their elected 
representative was, in both the city or town Council (QB6) 
and the National legislature (QB7). A total of 57% also 
knew a Cretan MEP (QB8) . The presumably high degree of
interlockingness of the two elite groups, the comparative
233 . The electoral system for the European elections allows for one 
national list of representatives from each party. In that sense there 
are no MEPs that stand in Crete alone. There are a number of MEPs 
however who have their political roots on the island. Because of the 
difference in the electoral systems and the wording of the Greek 
translation to this question, there are limits in our ability to cross- 
reference this question with answers from the Scottish sample.
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small size of the prefecture and above all the importance of 
political patronage in the economic life of Greece make the 
main reasons for a high level of interaction between the two 
elite groups. This fact poses certain problems in dividing 
the two groups and identifying which is the dominant 
function of individual cases in the Cretan sample. It is 
partly because of the nature of Greek political reality in 
the regions but also because of an implicit 'forced 
participation' in political life that there exists such a 
high awareness and involvement with politics.
In assessing effectiveness, receptiveness and fervour of 
their local Councillors compared with their local MPs, the 
distribution of replies follows a pattern remarkably 
different from the Scottish one. An equal percentage (44%) 
of those respondents who expressed an opinion found their 
local Councillors less or much less fervent from local MPs 
with those that found them more or much more fervent (QBll). 
A majority of 63% of those who expressed an opinion believed 
that local Councillors are less or much less effective, 
compared with 25% who found them more or much more effective 
(QB12). On the question of receptiveness/accessibility 48% 
found local Councillors more or much more receptive.
234 . Participation in political life is here given the characterisation 
'forced' exactly because of the totality in which the state is geared to 
serve the political machine. Clientelism is a facet of citizens everyday 
interaction with the state machine, particularly so in remote provinces 
like Crete. See Mouzelis (1987) and Lyrintzis (1984) .
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compared with 24% who found them less receptive (QB13)
In cross-tabulating the three questions there was negligible 
correlation between replies to questions, while their 
distributions showed no direct patterns and replies to one 
did not seem to preclude replies to the other, save for an 
association between receptiveness and fervour. Most 
importantly their appreciation of the local political 
elite's effectiveness is small (QB12)and its correlation 
with their fervour (QBll) and receptiveness (QB13) not 
extremely impressive. This leads me to assume that although 
the relation of the local business elite with the local 
political one is direct, (as it has been demonstrated in 
their replies to questions QB6, QB7, QB8 and QB9), their 
appreciation of the local Councillors' and Mayors' ability 
to be instrumental, in the promotion of the region's or 
their individual interests, is obviously limited.
Perceived receptiveness of Councillors seems also linked to 
respondents' position towards the respective local 
authority. A majority of 57% of those that found their 
local authority to be 'dynamic' (QD4), also found the local
2 3 5 . The only strong association between the three attitudes exists between 
questions QBll and QB13. The Spearman correlation coefficient has a 
value of .545 (sig. .019), suggesting that those respondents that found 
Councillors more fervent also found them to be more receptive and vice 
versa.
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Councillors to be more r e c e p t i v e ( Q B 1 3 S i m i l a r l y ,  from 
those that found their local authority to be 'active' or of 
'minor importance', 80% believed their local Councillors to 
be equally or less receptive than MPs. It seems thus that a 
positive impression of Councillors receptiveness and 
accessibility is linked with a dynamic image of the local 
authority and vice versa.
As anticipated all of those that believe their region's 
economy is prepared for European integration (QD6) belong to 
the group of those that believe their prefecture to be in a 
better position than the nation (QD7).^^^ Replies to the 
question on the competitiveness of the Greek economy (QD5), 
showed no correlation with those that found the prefecture 
in the same or worse position than the nation. Since their 
replies on the position of the prefecture towards the nation 
does not seem to correlate to their replies on the state of 
the national economy (while a mild relationship exists 
between QD7 and QD6), I assume this sub-group does not make 
that attitudinal connection.
In conclusion, Cretan businessmen supported administrative 
devolution, were mostly apprehensive of the prospect of more
. The Spearman correlation coefficient for this relationship has a value 
of -.226 (sig. .324) which gives a mild association between a dynamic 
view of the Council and receptiveness of local Councillors.
2 3 7 . A high Spearman correlation coefficient of .630 (sig. .002) points to 
the high association between answers in the two questions.
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SMEs and were prepared to work elsewhere in Europe. They 
tended to know all their elected representatives and 
believed Crete and Greece to be unprepared for the Single 
Market.
F . Attitudinal Measures^^^
In the last section of this chapter I will include a number 
of group indicators that will be used as control variables 
in the testing of a number of the hypotheses. I have 
devised measures that give an ordinal ranking for these 
indicators for the four regional elites. The ordinal scale 
has been coded to denote the highest value for the highest 
ranking parameter. So, 4 ranks the elite group with the 
strongest or most positive recorded attitude and 1 the one 
with the weakest or most negative recorded attitude.
I have initially intended this section to include factor 
analysis for groups of variables. As explained in chapter 
two there are a number of reasons that limit the scope of 
using advanced statistical techniques. These are mainly due
. In this section I have to specifically acknowledge extensive advice 
from Professor William L. Miller. It is naturally my interpretation of 
that advice that entails any weakness in the indexes that follow.
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to the samples' elite character and comparatively small
size
In the case of the present measures care was taken for 
variables not to be causally related. The data available 
however was not always of interval character.
Significantly, all but one of the measures constructed are 
based on dichotomous variables. So, in order to group 
variables together an empirical assessment had to be made 
instead of a statistical factor analysis. I trust the 
measures eventually devised to closely represent the 
attitudes they attempt to gauge and to be indicative of 
attitudes of the wider elites outwith my sample.
1.Regional Elite's Grievances Towards their National 
Government.
From an analysis of replies by the four elite groups to 
questions QD7, that the region is in a much better position 
than the nation in regard to 1992 and QD8, that the national 
policies have failed to create opportunities in the region, 
certain patterns emerge. Both Strathclyde elite groups 
believe their region is in the same or worse position than 
the nation by a wide margin since 69% of the political and 
77% of the business elite appear to believe so. In contrast
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the Cretan elites appear strongly optimistic, most of them 
stating their region is in a better or much better position 
than the rest of the nation, with 86% of the political and 
81% of the business elite taking that position.
These replies compare interestingly with their replies on 
whether national policies have failed to create 
opportunities in their region comparable to those created in 
other regions of the nation (QD8). A wide margin of 88% of 
Strathclyde politicians believe national policies have 
failed to do this. The reverse was true for Strathclyde 
businessmen, 57% of whom believed that national policies 
have not failed in the region. Both Cretan elites believed 
national policies to have failed, 57% of the political and 
65% of the business respondents taking that view.
I assigned a value of 100 to those that both said that
national policies had failed (QD8) and that their region was
in a much worse position than the nation (QD7). The value
of -100 was given to those replies both identifying the
region to be doing much better than the nation and national
policies not to have failed in the region. For those that
did not give an answer or stated they did not know the
23 9answer, a value of zero was assigned. This scale thus
23 9 . In none of the questions employed here 'neutral' scaling (do not 
know-refuse to answer) represents more than 14% of the respective sub­
samples .
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can take values of between -100 and +100, where replies 
closer to zero identify a neutral view point. In table 5.7, 
I have calculated the mean score of all respondents to both 
questions for all four elite groups.
The measure (table 5.7) shows Strathclyde politicians to 
have the highest level of grievance and the Cretan 
politicians to have the lowest. Cretan businessmen seem 
neutral while Strathclyde businessmen, although negative, 
are not nearly as negative as Cretan politicians.








Strathclyde Politicians 39.1 (39.8) 4
Strathclyde Businessmen -11.4 (57.1) 2
Cretan Politicians -17.9 (56.7) 1
Cretan Businessmen -3.6 (49.6) 3
Note: a. Question QD7: Do you find that your region is in a worse 
position than the nation in regard to 1992? Question QD8: Do you 
believe that national policies have failed to create the opportunities 
in your region that have been created in other regions of Britain?
The initial analysis of the frequency distributions for the 
two questions showed a high degree of regional grievance 
towards national policies for all elite groups except the 
Strathclyde businessmen. These latter seem to think that 
their region is worse off than the nation and at the same
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time reject the premise that national policies have failed 
in the region. It seems thus that overall, Strathclyde 
businessmen are those with the fewest grievances towards the 
national government, a result partly confirmed by the 
measure constructed.
2. Regional Elites' Support of Regional Devolution.
To create a measure for this attitude I initially compare 
elite group replies to question Q2 inquiring whether 
respondents believe federalism is viable in Europe and 
question QDl inquiring whether respondents think business 
elites would perceive autonomy positively. I have also 
included a second measure by including replies to question 
Ql inquiring whether respondents believed macro-economics 
should be controlled at the regional, national or 
international level.
To establish a measure I decided to use a technique of 
scaling respondents replies for the questions and then 
establishing a common numerical factor that if compared for 
each elite group could give an indication of how favourable 
or unfavourable they were towards regional devolution. The 
scale ascribed a value of -100 to replies that were negative 
on regional autonomy, 0 to those that refused to answer or 
claimed they did not know and +100 to replies positive on 
regional autonomy. The group means for the two groups of
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questions and all four elite groups are compared in the 
following table.
In this table (5.8) the highest mean score represents the 
highest sympathy level for regional devolution by the 
respective elite. Consequently, Strathclyde politicians and 
Cretan businessmen high score indicates a strong positive 
attitude for the questions examined. A lower score 
indicates a comparatively neutral attitude, which may 
indicate that there are equal numbers amongst a sub-group of 
the sample that support and refute a proposition or that 
most respondents chose a neutral answer.
Table 5.8: Ordinal Ranking of Variables Indicating
Regional Elites Positive Attitudes Towards Regional 
Devolution








Strathclyde Politicians 35.3 (60.6) 35.4 (43.0) 4
Strathclyde Businessmen -6.8 (69.5) -19.7 (62.3) 1
Cretan Politicians -17.9 (54.1) 8.3 (51.5) 2
Cretan Businessmen 16.7 (48.3) 28.6 (45 . 1) 3
Note; Question Q l : Do you believe that macro-economic policies should be 
controlled at the regional, national or international level? Question 
Q 2 : Do you believe a federal structure for Europe can be viable?
240 . A low value in the standard deviation would support the 
proposition of a concentration of replies close to the mean value, while 
a large standard deviation would allude to a wide spread in responses. 
Such an interpretation of the standard deviation assumes normal or bell 
shaped distributions of replies which are not necessarily feasible in 
small samples.
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Question QDl: Do you believe that if your region were to become more 
autonomous, business would perceive this as a generally positive 
development ?
The inclusion of question Ql alters responses for three of 
the sub-groups. This variable, because it is primarily 
indicating anti-state sentiments is conceptually similar but 
not the same as those of variable Q2 and QDl. Strathclyde 
businessmen become more negative towards 
devolution/autonomy, while Cretan politicians and 
businessmen become more positive.
An explanation could lie in the trust of the national state 
by Strathclyde businessmen, which supports the assumption 
that they are primarily against further autonomy.
Remarkably, Strathclyde politicians are unaffected by the 
measure, remaining the most positive sub-group on regional 
autonomy.
Both Cretan elites become distinctly more positive on 
autonomy by the introduction of the QDl variable. This 
could be related to my assumption of the Cretan regional 
elites overall distrust of the national government and a 
possible underlying sentiment that may become apparent in 
future demands of regional autonomy. Such an attitude if 
true could be relevant to future political developments in 
the region.
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Finally it should be noted that this measure is intended as 
a gauge of positive attitudes towards regional autonomy and 
I do not believe it can be taken to indicate a positive 
relationship to any political party's agenda.
3. Regional Elites' Perceived Difference from the Rest of 
the Nation.
To create this measure I examine elite replies from question 
QD9 inquiring whether respondents perceive differences 
between people in their locality and those in the rest of 
Scotland/Crete and question QDIO in which they are asked 
whether they perceive a difference in people from their 
region and those in the rest of Britain/Greece. This 
measure is also relevant in establishing whether regional 
elites perceive people in their region and by inference 
themselves to be different from people in the rest of their 
nation.
There was relatively small variation in the replies between 
the four elite groups. The Strathclyde political elite 
agreed with the two premises more strongly than any other
241 . It is apparent that political interviewees may be rehearsing 
political standpoints instead of personal attitudes (as mentioned in 
chapter two). The use of three questions with a partly indirect way of 
inquiring on this topic is meant to alleviate that possibility.
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group 56% attesting that they are different from people in 
the rest of Scotland (QD9) and 81% saying that the Scottish 
are different from the rest of the UK. The Strathclyde 
Business elite was also strong in its identification of 
difference from the rest of the nation with 83% of 
respondents answering in the affirmative to question QDIO 
but only 43% of respondents believing the same difference to 
hold between their region and the rest of Scotland (QD9).
Table 5.9: Regional elites' perceived differences between 
people in their region and people in the rest 
of their nation.






Strathclyde Politicians 35.3 (70.2) 4
Strathclyde Businessmen 27.1 (73.7) 3
Cretan Businessmen 0.0 (87.7) 1
Cretan Politicians 26.2 (83.1) 2
Note: Question QD9: Overall do you find there are great differences 
between people in your region and those in the rest of Scotland/Crete? 
Question QDIO: Overall do you find there are great differences between 
people in your region and those in the rest of Britain/Greece?
The Cretan elite samples also strongly identified their 
regional peoples' as separate. The Chania business elite 
had the stronger indication of this attitude since 71% show 
people in their locality as different from the rest of the 
Greeks (QDIO) and 55% believed the local people to be 
different from the rest of Crete. The Cretan political
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elite was the one who perceived the least differences 
between the peoples in their locality and those in the rest 
of Greece 64% attesting to that effect, while only 36% of 
them perceived differences between themselves and the rest 
of Crete.
I will not attempt a comprehensive explanation of the 
possible reasons for the divergence in attitudes here. This 
will accompany the analysis of results in the following 
chapters.
Strathclyde politicians showed the highest score in this
measure attesting to their perception of a high degree of
separateness between people in their region and people in
the rest of Scotland and UK. Strathclyde businessmen and
Cretan politicians follow closely behind, while Cretan
businessmen show a neutral overall position. This
difference of Cretan politicians I assume to be partly due
to associating separateness of people with calls for 
242autonomy.
4. Elites' Perception of Preparedness Towards 1992.
242 . As analysed in chapters six and seven moves to autonomy are extremely 
emotive issues for Cretan political elites who at least openly consider 
any such issues as separative and motivated by foreign propaganda. Many 
examples of this are apparent in the editorials of local newspapers 
(Newspaper Kyrikas Chanion, August-September 1991).
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To establish this measure I use elite responses to questions 
QD5 and Q D 6 . These inquire whether the national and 
regional economy is prepared for the run-up to 1992.
Responding to the question of whether their national economy 
was prepared for 1992 (QD5) 81% of the Strathclyde
politicians, 67% of the Strathclyde businessmen, 79% of the 
Cretan politicians and 100% of the Cretan businessmen 
replied their nation was slightly or not at all prepared.
Responding to the question of whether their regional economy 
is prepared for 1992 (QD6) 86% of the Strathclyde
politicians and 67% of the businessmen believed their region 
to be slightly or not at all prepared. Similarly, 57% of 
the Cretan politicians and 71% of the businessmen believed 
their region to be slightly or not at all prepared.
In both these questions a Likert scale was used which for 
the purposes of this measure is converted to a scale of 
-100 for the most negative attitude to the proposition up to 
100 for the most positive attitude for the proposition. The 
middle value in the Likert scale is given a value of zero, 
while intermediate values 4 and 2 are given values of -50 
and 50 respectively.
Apparently all elite groups believe their regional and 
national economies not to be prepared for 1992 (table 5.10).
25:
The elite group with the lowest perception of preparedness 
towards 1992 is the Cretan business elite. Interestingly 
the Cretan political elite is the one with the most 
favourable opinion of regional preparedness.
The opposite pattern is apparent in the Strathclyde elite 
groups. Politicians think their region and nation is not as 
prepared for 1992 as businessmen whose opinion is not as 
pessimistic on regional preparedness.
Table 5.10: Preparedness of the regional and national units 
towards 1992 as perceived by regional elites.






Strathclyde Politicians -48.4 (30 . 9) 2
Strathclyde Businessmen -39.6 (38.2) 3
Cretan Politicians -35.7 (36.3) 4
Cretan Businessmen -61.9 (29.2) 1
Note: Question QD5: Do you believe that the British/Greek economy is 
ready for the competition that the 1992 integration will bring? 
Question QD6: Do you believe that the Scottish/Cretan economy is ready 
for the 1992 competition challenge?
To the degree that these results could be generalised for 
the broader elite groups investigated I could infer that on 
this particular issue, elite groups in the two regions seem 
to have diverging attitude patterns or even value systems. 
Politicians in Strathclyde are more pessimistic than 
businessmen, while businessmen in Crete were more 
pessimistic than politicians. As previously I will not
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attempt an interpretation of results at this stage of the 
analysis.
5. Elite Attitudes Towards European Integration
In this measure I use questions Q2 and QD13. The first 
inquires about elite perceptions of the viability of 
federalism in Europe while the second inquires whether 
elites believe there will be more opportunities or risks in 
a united Europe.
Replying on whether they find federalism in Europe 
viable(02) 86% of the Cretan business elite, 76% of the
Strathclyde political elite, 71% of the Cretan political 
elite and 63% of the Strathclyde Business elite answer 
affirmatively.
Answering whether more risks or opportunities exist in a 
united Europe (QD13), 76% of the Cretan politicians, 71% of 
the Cretan businessmen, 65% of the Strathclyde politicians 
and 63% of the Strathclyde businessmen replied they believed 
there will be more or many more opportunities in a united 
Europe.
The introduction of the recoding and computation of the new 
measure follows the same rules as above with -100 signifying 
an extremely negative attitude to the proposition, 0
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signifying a neutral attitude to the proposition and 100 
signifying an extremely positive attitude to the 
proposition.
The strongest positive attitude towards European integration 
is expressed by the Cretan businessmen (table 5.11). Cretan 
politicians and Strathclyde politicians also show strong but 
slightly milder support for European integration.
Strathclyde businessmen are those with the smallest support 
indicator for European integration.
Table 5.11: Regional elite attitudes towards European 
integration






Strathclyde Politicians 44.1 (62 .2) 2
Strathclyde Businessmen 27.1 (54.1) 1
Cretan Politicians 48.2 (57.6) 3
Cretan Businessmen 69.0 (48.7) 4
Note; Question Q 2 : Do you believe a federal structure for Europe can be 
viable? Question QD13:Do you believe there are more opportunities or 
risks in a united Europe?
6 . Attitudinal Profiles
I will proceed by identifying certain trends in the replies 
of the four elite groups on all five constructed
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measurements which summarise the findings. It may be 
significant to note at this stage that average standard 
deviations (empirically estimated at a value close to 50) 
are observed in most mean values of measures employed. High 
standard deviation values are only observed in the case of 
Measure C (difference between people in their region and the 
rest of the nation) signifying relative disagreement among 
members of an elite group, while in Measure D (preparedness 
towards 1992) a high concentration in their replies produces 
small standard deviation values.
The Strathclyde political elite shows a great sense of 
grievance towards their national government (Measure A ) , 
believes the people of the region to be very different from 
the people in the rest of the nation (Measure C), has a 
positive view of regional devolution and European 
integration (Measures B and E) and believes the region not 
to be prepared in the run-up to 1992 (Measure D ) .
The Strathclyde business elite has a positive opinion of the 
national government (Measure A) and believes their region to 
be unprepared for 1992 but by a smaller margin than any 
other elite (Measure D ) . They also find the regional people 
significantly different from people in the rest of the 
nation (Measure C) and have a comparatively negative view of 
regional devolution and lower support for European 
integration than any other group (Measure B and E ) .
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The Cretan political elite shows the most support for their 
national government (Measure A ) , have the strongest negative 
view on regional devolution (Measure B) and at the same time 
seem keen on European integration (Measure E ) , They 
believe their region is rather unprepared for 1992 (Measure 
D) and are equivocal about whether there are differences 
between the people in their region and those in the rest of 
the nation (Measure C) .
The Cretan business elite do not show signs of grievance 
towards the national government (Measure A ) , are 
comparatively positive on regional devolution (Measure B) 
and very supportive of European integration (Measure E ) .
They believe people in their region are rather different 
from people in the rest of their nation (Measure C) and have 
very strong doubts as to whether their region is prepared 
for the Single European Market (Measure D ) .
Interpretations for the divergence among elites in these 
attitude measures will be attempted as part of the testing 
of hypotheses (in the chapters immediately following) where 
the purely quantitative elements used here will be 
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Chapter 6
Differences Between Political and Business Elites
A. Introduction to the Analysis
In this chapter I compare patterns of reply by using two and 
three dimensional cross-tabulations in parts B and D of this 
chapter. Respondents qualifications to their replies (the 
qualitative element) are analysed in parts C and E. This 
approach should provide a degree of data triangulation as it 
satisfies the need to have multiple methods of measurement 
and to create multiple measures of concepts. Questions used 
on the quantitative element are those designed to 
investigate the particular hypotheses in question, while the 
qualifications and elaborations on the replies to these same 
questions provide the qualitative element.
The measures used in this chapter inquire whether business 
and political elites have different attitudes and also 
whether differences in those attitudes can be considered
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relevant to their region of origin. It is also the case 
that the tests conducted do not aim at universal 
explanations as inferences made in this chapter apply 
primarily to the samples examined.
B. Difference in Attitudes between Elites:
Analysis of Patterns in Relevant Questions
In an effort to reveal potential 'covert' interlockingness 
among elite groups and in order to be able to clearly 
distinguish each sub-group, I initially examine whether:
H I. Business and political elites' attitudes differ 
depending on their region of origin.
The independent variable is the elites' region of origin 
whose influence on elite attitudes (the dependent variable), 
I am attempting to measure with this hypothesis. I have 
chosen to focus on elite attitudes on Europe in the 
examination of this hypothesis as it is a theme of high 
significance for both regions and elite groups.
An examination of elite grievances towards their national 
government (Measure A) and aspirations to autonomy (Measure 
B ) , as computed in chapter five, will be employed to examine 
whether the pattern of elite replies on European issues is
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reflected in their replies on these indexes as well. It is 
presumed that from available attitudinal measures these 
indexes can act as intervening variables on the attitudes of 
elites regarding Europe. Determining the possible effect of 
these two attitudinal measures on the relationship I attempt 
to investigate will improve causality. I employ working 
hypothesis one and two (WHl, WH2) to test this hypothesis.
To investigate the degree of divergence between business and 
political elite attitudes, I compare the pattern of their 
replies, testing whether:
WHl: Businessmen have a different perception of the 
challenges of Europe than politicians.
Issues specific to European and regional integration, that 
are investigated by the questionnaire, have been 
crosstabulated and the variance analysis of elite replies 
compared. The replies of the business and political elites 
within each region are analysed to examine variations in 
their attitudes.
In all questions constructed to investigate this working 
hypothesis there was supporting evidence for its validity.
I will proceed with an analysis of those questions most 
characteristic of the general attitude patterns as they 
relate to their perspectives towards Europe.
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Support for the premise is offered in question QD5 (is the 
British/Greek economy ready for the competition of 1992).
In this question the two political and the two business 
elites answer in a similar manner, suggesting a similarity 
between elites of the same occupational position that 
transcends regional disparities. In particular, both 
political elites show a symmetrical distribution of replies 
centred on the 'slightly not prepared' option. The 
business elites were more pessimistic, with 48% of the Greek 
sample believing their economy is 'not prepared at all'.^^^
Graph no 6.1: Distribution of replies of business elite 
respondents to question QD6.
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243 , In certain of the questions investigated it is natural to find 
divergence of replies between the two regional elites, as the regional 
circumstances are not the same. I expected thus to find greater 
divergence in their replies stemming from this cause than what I 
eventually witnessed.
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On their respective regional economy's prospects towards 
1992 (QD6) the apparent similarity is between the two 
business elites, that interestingly, have an even 
distribution of their replies around the 'slightly not 
prepared' option (Graph 6.1). Political elites differ, with 
the Cretans being rather more optimistic: 43% believed their 
region is 'prepared' or 'well prepared', compared with
equivalent figures in Scotland of only 13% (Graph 6.2 244











Note: Question QD6: Do you believe that the Scottish/Cretan economy is 
ready for the 1992 competition challenge?
244 . The Spearman Correlation Co-efficient for questions QD5 and QD6 was 
high for all elite groups investigated. It displayed a value of 0.817 
(sig. .000) for the Strathclyde politicians, a value of 0.907 (sig.
.000) for the Strathclyde businessmen, a value of 0.752(sig. .002) for 
the Cretan politicians and a value of 0.631(sig. .002) for the Cretan 
businessmen. As is apparent, the Strathclyde elite groups have a higher
correlation co-efficient than the Cretan elite groups. This is not,
necessarily, a show of higher concordance among the Strathclyde elites.
It is rather a show of higher consistency in their replies to questions
relating their respective regional with the national economy.
262
In regard to perceptions over whether there are more 
opportunities or risks in a united Europe (QD13), political 
elites took a generally positive view with a rather even 
distribution in their replies. The business elites, 
however, differed not only from their political counterparts 
but also between the two countries. The Cretan business 
elite is much more optimistic than any other group, 62% of 
them believing there would be 'many more opportunities in a 
united Europe'. The Strathclyde business elite on the other 
hand was more cautious with 46% believing that there would 
only be 'slightly more opportunities'.
Growth patterns in the two regions may contribute to the 
reasons for these differences. Cretan businessmen, although 
believing their economy to be disadvantaged and peripheral 
within the European Community, anticipate growth both as a 
factor of Community support and as a long-term expectation
245 . Spearman correlation coefficients between question QD13 and questions 
QD5 and QD6 show comparatively low levels of correlation and no 
significance. Remarkable is the value of 0.330 (sig. .211) for the 
correlation of QD13 with QD6 of the Strathclyde politicians; the value 
of 0.257 (sig. .375) between questions QD13 and QD5 for Cretan 
politicians; and the value of 0.236 (sig. .304) between questions QD13 
and QD5 for Cretan businessmen. Apparently there are limited inferences 
that can be made from the existence of these correlation values, further 
than suggest that Cretan elites exhibit a degree of correlation between 
their view towards opportunities in Europe and their view of their 
national economy, while Strathclyde politicians exhibit a limited degree 
of correlation between their view of opportunities in Europe with their 
view on their regional economy. Strathclyde businessmen show no 
correlation between their view on opportunities in Europe and the 
regional or national economy.
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of convergence with Community standards of living.
Strathclyde businessmen on the other hand do not necessarily
have similarly high expectations of growth and at times
seemed quite uneasy about the duration and effects of the
247current recession.
All three questions analysed above show a distinct 
difference in the pattern of replies between business and 
political elite groups, while there is some similarity 
between elite groups of the same occupational category in 
the two regions examined. There would thus appear to be 
support for the premise that for the elite samples surveyed, 
businessmen have a different perception of the challenges of 
Europe than politicians in both regions.
The question then arises whether elite groups of the same 
occupational position have similar perspectives. I inquire 
on the validity of the working hypothesis that:
W H 2 : The occupational position of elites influences 
their perspective.
. For a thorough analysis of the economic conditions in Strathclyde and 
Crete refer to chapter three. The regional economy of Crete is analysed 
in Mavromatis (1989) and the problems of Greek regional development in 
the fourth periodic report of the European Commission on the Regions of 
the Community (1991b).
. Business confidence of Strathclyde and Scottish Businessmen is 
regularly surveyed by Eurobarometer.
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I test for this hypothesis by examining elite replies to 
questions that were asked to the business and political 
elites on their views on SMEs and MNLs.
In a question particular to the business elites, inquiring 
whether respondents foresee the development of more SMEs 
(QB3), there is evidence of a great similarity between the 
replies of the two groups. It is 6 0% of the Greek sample 
and 79% of the Strathclyde one who foresee more SMEs in 
their region. Replying to whether they believe such a 
development will be positive for each respondents' firm 
(QB4), both groups see this as a probable development.^^*
There are two questions designed to test the attitudes of 
political elites in comparison with their business elite 
counterparts. The first question is on respondents' 
confidence in SMEs (QC5),. in which the two national groups 
had an almost identical pattern of replies.
The question on confidence in multinational enterprises 
[QC7] shows great divergence in replies (Graph 6.3), since 
half of Cretan politicians believed multinationals would 
stay in their region in the case of a recession, while 63%
248 . Spearman correlation coefficients between questions QB3 and QB4 for 
the Cretan businessmen is -0.152 (sig. .546), while for the Strathclyde 
Businessmen it is 0.429 (sig. .098). Strathclyde businessmen correlate 
the creation of more SMEs with a positive business climate. Cretan 
businessmen perceive more SMEs as a direct competition to themselves. 
This divergence is analysed in part C of chapter seven.
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of Scottish politicians believed multinationals would g o . 
This similarity of opinion on SMEs and divergence of opinion 
on multinationals presumably stems from different 
experiences of development in the two regions. The Scottish 
have seen major conglomerates come and go, while the Cretan 
peoples' experience with multinationals is comparatively 
recent and limited to small or medium scale projects. This 
divergence of opinion on the particular issue I believe to 
be relevant to their respective experience of 
industrialisation and does not necessarily disprove the 
hypothesis.
GRAPH 6.3: Patterns of reply by political elites to question 
QC7 .
%
maintain operations shift to another region
■ Scottish Politicians on 
Multinationals
□ Greek Politicians on 
Multinationals
Note: Question QC7: In the case of a recession do you believe 
multinational business are more likely to maintain operations in your 
region or shift to another region?
249 . Spearman correlation coefficients between questions QC5 and QC7 have 
values of 0.571 (sig. .021) for the Strathclyde politicians and 0.453 
(sig. .104) for the Cretan politicians. Both elite groups high 
correlations and diverging distribution patterns signify a similarity in 
perspective towards SMEs and MNLs within each group but obviously not 
between groups.
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Overall, evidence presented in the previous working 
hypothesis testing (WHl) and those analysed here lead me to 
conditionally accept the premise of WH2. Elite groups seem 
to hold different positions on issues this questionnaire 
raises, while these differences can to a degree be 
attributed to membership of their respective elite group.
Conclusive proof for this working hypothesis can only be 
provided by the examination of the qualitative element in 
respondents replies, which follows in part C.
The evidence so far, support the premise that business and 
political elites attitudes differ depending on elites region 
of origin (H I). As with the validity of working 
hypotheses, however, ultimate proof will lie with the 
qualitative analysis.
C. Differences in Attitudes between Elites 
Inferences from Qualitative Replies
To correctly interpret the attitudes of interviewees, 
qualifications they gave to replies in the questionnaire are 
deemed essential. As is explained in appendix I,
250 . Quotations of respondents replies are used without the application of 
omission points before the quotation marks. Respondents replies are 
used both from their verbatim answers to the structured part of the 
questionnaire as well as from their discussion of issues raised.
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respondents were encouraged to elaborate on their replies to 
the structured part of the questionnaire. These replies are 
juxtaposed while the most characteristic, in defining a 
prevailing attitude, are given verbatim.
From analysing the quantifiable replies I have thus far 
accepted the premise that, businessmen have a different 
perception of the challenges of Europe than politicians 
(WHl). From a thorough analysis of qualitative replies I 
can also detect a difference between the preoccupations of 
the business and political elites that relates to their 
perception of opportunities and risks in a united Europe.
Businessmen were primarily preoccupied with foreign 
competition and government support levels or government 
interference. Politicians, on the other hand, believed 
their constituents not to be interested in European affairs, 
while Scottish politicians did not think the European Market 
to be particularly beneficial for the British economy.
I proceed with an assessment of the qualitative replies of 
interviewees to questions QD5, QD6 and QD13. My inclusion 
or exclusion of responses is in accord with the prevailing
251 The questionnaire in this respect operated both as a structured and 
as an open-ended instrument of investigation. For a thorough analysis 
of the theoretical consideration involved one should look at the 
methodological analysis of Moyser and Wagstaffe (1987) or Miles and 
Huberman (1994) .
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mood in each elite group, while an effort has been made to 
include replies responding to the most characteristic 
attitudes.
In Strathclyde, businessmen expressed fear on the "role of 
Germany" , while also expressing concern that the "French 
might come a c r o s s , or that the national economy is "not 
as well prepared as the French and G e r m a n . Another 
major concern was the role of the political establishment. 
Some businessmen believed there are great opportunities in a 
united Europe "as long as the politicians will let things 
happen"^^^, while they see their shortcomings in that "links 
[of business] with government are not as strong in this 
country as is on the mainland (i.e. E u r o p e ) .
The divergence in the preoccupations and therefore 
perspective of the two groups becomes apparent from the most 
vociferous replies that range from the most negative "I have 
never thought the Common Market was any good for the British 
economy" , to more specific remarks on the economy as 
being "particularly poorly prepared in the training and 








Case 18. Company director. Date of interview:9/11/1991 
Case 31. Company director. Date of interview : 30/5/1991 
Case 26. Company chairman. Date of Interview:5/6/1991 
Case 23. General manager. Date of Interview:14/6/1991 
Case 19. Company director. Date of Interview : 25/6/1991 
Case 14. MEP. Date of Interview:17/10/1991 
Case 9. Activist. Date of Interview : 15/10/1991
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the politicians surveyed believe at best that the local 
economy is ready "only in those areas where we are 
traditionally strong"^^^.
As for their perspective on the influence of European 
affairs on their constituents, some believe that "they don't 
pay any attention to E u r o p e w h i l e  others believe that 
people are optimistic on Europe because they "don't realise 
what the impact [of European integration] will be"^^^. A 
revealing comment that, to some extent, clarifies the 
perspective of some politicians is that "some of the 
pressures for change are not related to the area, they are 
generated at an international l e v e l S c o t t i s h  
politicians seem to perceive a pressure of integration that 
comes from international business expediency, while overall 
being rather hesitant about the benefits of a united Europe.
Evidence from the qualifications of replies for Strathclyde 
elites, analysed here, is thus in support of the conclusion 
reached in the primary analysis, accepting the working 
hypothesis that businessmen have a different perception of 
the challenges of Europe than politicians (WHl).
259 Case 12. City Councillor. Date of Interview : 8/11/1991
Case 13. M P . Date of Interview:12/7/1991
262' iO- Regional Councillor. Date of Interview:28/10/1991
. Case 8. MEP. Date of Interview :14/10/1991
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In the case of the Cretan elites, the two elite groups seem 
again to have diverging perspectives, with the political 
elites mainly concerned about cultural influences of greater 
integration, while businessmen were mainly preoccupied with 
the inefficiency of the political elites and the level of 
'education' of other businessmen.
The most frequently recurring theme in politicians fears 
about European integration was the "risk in the alterations 
to our social structures and c h a r a c t e r " , which was at 
times defined as an "alteration to our national identity" 
or into claiming that "our cultural traditions are in 
d a n g e r . In another recurring theme, they seemed to 
identify political benefits with European integration. They 
saw "opportunities in the national l e v e l r e f e r r i n g  to 
the Greek-Turkish disputes
The Business elites in Crete believe in the strengths of the 
regional and national economy if "we can find someone to 
organise us"^^®, while European union will bring an
Case 70. President of local community. Date of Interview:20/9/1991 
Case 65. President of local community. Date of Interview:26/9/1991265
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Case 72. City councillor. Date of Interview : 19/9/1991 
Case 66. President of local community. Date of Interview:25/9/1991 
Turkish aggression is perceived as the major foreign threat to Greece. 
Particularly in islands like Crete with comparatively recent 
independence (18 97) from Turkey and a long string of revolts these 
issues are exceptionally relevant. For a balanced historical account of 
the Greek and Turkish dispute see Clogg (1983).
. Case 47. Business manager. Date of Interview:23/9/1991
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"improvement on democratic institutions" .  Their main 
call was for "an organised [business] e n v i r o n m e n t , while 
they believed that "the Greek economy is undisciplined" , 
partly because "economic development on the way it is 
implemented is bad for us . The uneasiness with the work 
of politicians was mainly directed at national political 
elites and not regional ones as can be infered from their 
calls for increased local decision making powers.
A theme recurring in both elite groups was their trust in 
Greek human resources. Businessmen declared that "based on 
Greeks' ability" they are optimistic, or that "a last 
minute miracle [can be] expected from G r e e k s . In the 
words of one political interviewee "I trust Greeks, the 
dangers[from integration] will be surpassed" . I 
speculate that their belief goes beyond a deus ex machina 
trust in destiny, and it should be taken here to signify a 
homogeneity of attitudes in the Greek elites on what are 
considered issues of paramount importance.
269 Case 43, Managing director. Date of interview : 25/9/1991
Case 48. Managing director. Date of interview:20/9/l991
2^2 " Case 55, Business manager. Date of interview:18/9/1991 
2 ^2 ' Case 45, General manager. Date of interview:24/9/91 
2^^, Case 48, Managing director. Date of interview : 20/9/1991
2 ^2 ’ Case 52, Managing director. Date of interview:17/9/1991
Case 67. City councillor. Date of interview:26/9/1991 
, Another recurring theme related to their support of European 
integration is based on 'internationalist' considerations. As an ageing 
mayor of a village burned to the ground by the Nazis during W.W.II said 
"I believe in a united Europe, The only road to peace, development and 
democracy is the co-operation of peoples with their own will"(case 69, 
date of interview:20/9/1991), Or in the words of a businessman "we must 
have political union, an economic union is not enough"(case 43, date of
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Evidence presented here suggests that support for the 
working hypothesis WHl (differences in perceptions of the 
challenges of Europe between business and political elites) 
is present for the Cretan elites as well. Therefore the 
conclusions reached from the first level of analysis can be 
upheld. It is also the case, however, that there seems to 
be a greater preoccupation over issues of 'national 
importance' or 'ideological' considerations for the Cretan 
elites (where we can observe a convergence of attitudes), 
this not being apparent in the evidence from the Strathclyde 
elite samples.
In all elite groups there seem to be some common themes 
recurring in the replies from both regions. Both political 
elites seemed mainly preoccupied with threats from 
integration, while both business elites were concerned with 
the performance of the political elites.
Next I examine the qualitative responses relating to the 
next working hypothesis of whether the occupational position 
of an elite influences the perspective of its members (WH2).
As previously, this entails an analysis of respondents' 
qualifications, starting with the business elite and their
interview: 25/9/1991). It is interesting that support for European 
integration seems to be based on 'ideological' considerations.
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replies to questions inquiring whether they foresee the 
development of more SMEs (QB3) and whether this will be 
positive for the respondents' firm (QB4).
The qualifications to these questions reverse to a great 
extent the 'spirit' of the replies as they where recorded in 
the quantitative part of the questionnaire and analysed in 
section B of this chapter. An impressive 79% of Scottish 
respondents foresee more SMEs while at the same time they 
qualify this by saying "a lot don't s u r v i v e o r  that they 
have "d o u b t s w h e t h e r  this development will materialise 
"at the m o m e n t . Similarly Greek respondents believe 
there will be more SMEs and at the same time find that 
"contraction of SMEs [leads them] to extinction"^®^ or that 
"the market is saturated [of SMEs] and "it will be
better if they don't [develop] " . It has been the case
that the Greek business sample has the plight of the SMEs 
more at heart as most of them work for or own SMEs. More 
SMEs could thus be seen as a scenario that will have more 
adverse effects for the Greek business elite as it will mean 
more competition, while Scottish businessmen see it as a
2 7 7 Case 23. General manager. Date of interview : 14/6/1991 
Case 36. Managing director. Date of interview;22/5/1991 
2QQ. Case 37. Senior manager. Date of interview:22/5/1991
2 Q2_' Case 43. Managing director. Date of interview:25/9/1991
2 g2 ‘ Case 50. Business proprietor. Date of interview:19/9/1991
. Case 51. Business proprietor. Date of interview:16/9/1991
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possible improvement in services or increase in their client 
base (as most represent larger concerns)
Importantly for the purpose of testing the working 
hypothesis, it is the case that although business elites 
seem to negate their quantitative replies they do so in 
unison. The reply pattern in their qualitative replies is 
thus in support of the basic premise of this working 
hypothesis as the two business elites maintain a similar 
perspective on SMEs' development.
I do not believe that this divergence in their response 
pattern, between their qualitative and quantitative replies, 
reveals any great contradiction in their attitudes. A 
deficiency of the interview wording is possibly responsible. 
Although I find more likely the possibility that their 
evaluation of what will happen, sometimes contrasts to what 
they would wish would happen. It is possible that for some 
more SMEs will be detrimental to their perceived business 
interests although they could see more developing.
It is the case that 99.4% of Greek establishments/enterprises 
belonged to the Micro/Small category in 1984, while 98.74% of UK 
enterprises belonged in the same category in 1986 (Commission 1990).
The bias in favour of SMEs related respondents in the Greek sample and 
Medium/Large enterprises for the Scottish sample is comprehensively 
explained in chapter four where data on the profile of the companies of 
participating elites are considered.
275
Replies to question QB4 can partly explain the contradiction 
that seems to exist between the quantitative and qualitative 
replies of the responses in Q B 3 . This is particularly so, 
if one considers that Scottish businessmen represent mainly 
medium to large corporations, while Greek businessmen small 
and medium ones .
It seems thus, that the development of more SMEs will be
beneficial for the Scots (QB4) although with certain
qualifications. "There will be on balance more competition
for e m p l o y e e s c l a i m e d  one, while another believed it
would "increase the potential customer base" of his firm^^^.
The Cretan businessmen had a similar positive view claiming
that more SMEs "will support production [at a higher
l e v e l ] w h i l e  it would also assist their firm by
facilitating "the creation of entrepreneurial co- 
288operatives"
Qualitative replies in QB3 and QB4 make a re-evaluation of 
primary conclusions imperative. This is particularly the
284 . For an analysis of the size of business elite groups represented in 
this sample refer to chapter four.
2gg. Case 29. Company director. Date of interview:4/6/1991
Case 31. Company director. Date of interview : 30/5/1991
2gg. Case 48. Managing director. Date of interview:20/9/1991 
. Case 50. Business proprietor. Date of interview : 19/9/1991
Entrepreneurial co-operatives were instigated in Chania, bringing
together capital from mainly small-business owners to fund large scale 
projects such as an aquatic theme park, a private hospital etc. Further 
details can be found in the Greek business press of which the journal 
Agora run a series of articles on the Chania entrepreneurial co­
operative in 1991.
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case for Cretan businessmen who have answered that they 
anticipate more SMEs in their region (QB3) but in their 
qualifications were pessimistic of the future of SMEs.
Next I examine the replies of the political elites to the 
questions relating to the future of SMEs and multinational 
enterprises in their region (QC5, QC7).
The qualitative replies of both elite groups on both 
questions investigated are similar, although certain 
deviations are apparent. Considerations of the elite groups 
are corresponding to the same preoccupations. Small and 
medium enterprises are seen as having a limited mobility and 
restricted scope of action, while multinational enterprises 
are seen as mobile and self serving.
Cretan politicians expressed support for SMEs since "they 
satisfy local needs"^®^ while at the same time having 
limited mobility since "they can not transcend Crete"^^°. 
Strathclyde politicians replied in a similar vein stating 
that "it is in the nature of small business [to be tied to 
the r e g i o n ] w h i l e  further suggesting SMEs "depend on 
[the] people who live h e r e .
2 8 9
2 gQ- Case 58. City Councillor. Date of interview: 9/10/1991. 
2 g2_' Case 74. Mayor. Date of interview: 21/9/1991.
2 ^2 ' Case 8. MEP. Date of interview: 14/10/1991.
. Case 5. Regional Councillor. Date of interview: 1/7/1991.
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Regarding their views on MNL mobility (QC7), Cretan
politicians stated that MNLs will go "wherever their
interests take them"^^^ but also that "they have the ability
2 94to increase [local] productivity" . Strathclyde 
politicians stated that MNLs will "close down in the 
periphery [and] go to cheap labour-cost r e g i o n s w h i l e
expressing concern in that there are "no constraints in them
j • ..296doing so"
This pattern of replies contrasts with their quantitative 
replies which showed the two groups significantly diverging 
in their answers on multinationals (QC7). The evidence here 
suggests that both elite groups, in spite of different 
experiences of industrialisation, distrust MNLs operating in 
their region.
The working hypothesis that 'the occupational position of 
elites influences their perspective' is upheld in the 
qualitative analysis. Their qualitative replies, at times 
alter the perspective portrayed in the quantitative 
analysis, as both business and political elites are 
diverging from their initial reply patterns. This new 
'picture' however does not deduct support from the working 
hypothesis (WH2).
29322^. Case 75. City Councillor. Date of interview: 26/9/1991.
2 gg. Case 68. City Councillor. Date of interview: 9/10/1991.
2gg- Case 5. Regional Councillor. Date of interview: 1/7/1991.
. Case 9. Activist. Date of interview: 15/10/1991.
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It appears thus that business and political elites are 
different and that this difference stems from their 
respective elite roles and perspectives. The business 
elites in the two regions had a positive view of SMEs based 
on considerations of competition and the introduction of new 
products and services. The political elites viewed SMEs 
bound by their limited mobility and justifying their 
existence by satisfying basic local needs.
To examine the validity of hypothesis H I it would be 
desirable to consider possible antecedent and background 
variables such as party affiliation, level of representation 
for elected officials and age of respondents. As explained 
in chapter two however, the small sample size does not 
permit further fragmentation for statistical analysis. 
Consideration will be given nevertheless to the influence of 
the possible intervening variables of regional grievances 
towards their national government (Measure A) and 
aspirations of the local elite to autonomy (Measure B ) .
The difference between the political and business elites in 
Strathclyde is apparent in the values of Measures A and B 
(table 6.1). Strathclyde politicians register the highest 
grievance towards their national government (Measure A) and 
highest positive attitude towards regional autonomy (Measure 
B ) ; while Strathclyde businessmen register the second lowest
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grievance towards their national government and the only 
negative attitude towards regional autonomy.
Cretan politicians registered the lowest grievance towards 
their national government (Measure A, table 6.1), while 
Cretan businessmen the second higher. Cretan politicians 
recorded a neutral attitude towards regional autonomy 
(Measure B) , while businessmen a very positive one.
Table 6.1: Ordinal ranking of Measure A (grievance towards 
their national government) and B (positive attitude towards 
regional autonomy)
ELITE IDENTIFICATION MEASURE A MEASURE B ORDINAL RANK
MEASURE A MEASURE B
Strathclyde Politicians 39.1 35.4 4 4
Strathclyde Businessmen -11.4 -19.7 2 1
Cretan Politicians -17 . 9 8.3 1 2
Cretan Businessmen -3 . 6 28.6 3 3
Note: Measures A and B as computed in chapter five part F,
It is evident that the elite groups show distinctly 
different perspectives in these indexes for both regions 
investigated. It is very likely that, the attitudes 
recorded in these indexes (Measures A and B ) , have an effect 
on their attitudes on Europe, examined in working hypothesis 
one (WHl). It is also possible that their attitudes on SMEs 
and MNLs, examined in working hypothesis two (WH2), are 
reated to their views on autonomy (Measure B ) .
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It is not apparent however, whether it is exclusively this 
difference in the attitudes indexed (in Measures A and B) 
that causes the difference in their recorded attitudes on 
Europe, SMEs or MNLs. It is further impossible to determine 
the degree of influence of those measures on their 
perceptions with available statistics.
I can neither, of course, suggest that these are the only 
intervening or antecedent variables affecting elite 
attitudes on E u r o p e . T h e  inclusion here of Measures A ' 
and B is deemed expedient as the most relevant of the 
available measures.
In conclusion, the analysis of the first working hypothesis 
(WHl) suggests that businessmen and politicians in each 
region hold different positions on the attitudes surveyed. 
This effectively identifies the political and business elite 
groups as separate. On the second working hypothesis (WH2) 
the attitudes across regions are compared for the political 
and business elites separately. The resulting comparisons 
suggest that the occupational position of each elite group 
influences their perspectives. Put differently, the elite 
role they have, in business or politics, appears to affect 
the attitude they exhibit.
2 97 . The possible intervening variable of 'regional development level' is 
examined in hypothesis H II.
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These comparisons support the premise that the business and 
political elites attitudes in this sample differ depending
on their region of origin (H I). It becomes apparent that 
the elite groups are distinct 'within' each region^^® and 
also that there are identifiable 'between' region
differences of elites of the same occupational category.
By establishing a degree of 'within' and 'between' region 
difference the four elite groups can be considered as four 
separate sub-samples in their attitudinal characteristics.
D. Development Level and Regional Differences:
Analysis of Patterns in Relevant Questions
The variable of 'regional development level' that could be 
considered as an intervening factor in hypothesis H I, 
becomes the focus of the analysis in the following 
hypothesis :
H II. The degree of accord between sub-national elite 
attitudes is related to a regions' development level.
The elites' region of origin (as the independent variable), 
has an effect on the attitudes of the elite groups in each
298 . Effectively suggesting limited 'covert' interlockingness between the
299 elite groups.
. Remarkably, the 'within' region differences appear greater than the 
'between' regions differences.
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region investigated(as the dependent variable). The 
effective control for this hypothesis is the different 
development level of the two regions investigated.
The two working hypotheses employed (WH3 and WH4) attempt to 
investigate whether the differences in the socio-economic 
background of the two regions can be linked with their 
attitudes on certain issues. I stress again the exploratory 
character of this investigation as there exists a distinct 
possibility of multiple causation for the phenomena 
examined, while the type of relationship for these issues, 
allow mainly the use of inferential logic.
I first inquire whether:
WH3: Attitudes of regional elites can be identified as 
being different between a more and a less developed 
region.
This working hypothesis attempts to define and separate the 
attitudes of elite groups in each region, in relation to 
each regions' level of economic development. The tests for 
this working hypothesis will consist of an examination of 
the differences in key attitudinal areas between the two 
regions investigated.
Concerning attitudes towards autonomy the two groups seem to 
hold different perspectives. In particular the Scottish
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elite groups (more developed region) have considerably 
different attitudes between the political elites, 59% of 
them believing 'autonomy in their region would be perceived 
positively by business'(QDl), compared with the business 
elites, 64% of which took the view that business would 
perceive autonomy negatively. For the same question the 
Greek elite groups (less developed region) had very similar 
reply patterns 86% of the business and 67% of the political 
samples believing autonomy will be perceived negatively by 
b u s i n e s s . T h e  difference in the replies between the 
Scottish and Cretan Elites gives some support to the 
contention that there is a difference in the perspective 
elites from different regions have towards a similar 
concept.
The next two questions I contrast for the two national 
groups are those inquiring whether 'the economic future of 
their region lies in local or out of region capital and 
entrepreneurial skill' (QD2,QD3).
In these two questions the differences between the two 
regional elite groups is not so pronounced. The Scottish 
business elite seems most uncertain about the sources of
. In Measure B of chapter five F (positive attitudes towards regional 
autonomy) there is a 20.3 index points difference between the Cretan 
elites and a 55.1 index points difference between the Strathclyde 
elites. These differences are supporting the contention of higher 
concordance amongst the Cretan elites, which is examined in more detail 
in part D of chapter 7.
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capital for development with 71% not knowing if it will be 
local or out of r e g i o n . C r e t a n  elite groups, on the 
other hand, agree that on balance it will be indigenous 
resources that will provide growth. Analysing replies to 
the question on the importance of indigenous or foreign 
entrepreneurial skill, the pattern of replies is shown to be 
similar in all elite groups. This was expressed as a high 
level of confidence in local entrepreneurial skill except 
for Cretan businessmen 47% of whom showed a reluctance to 
identify local entrepreneurs as most important for future 
g r o w t h . I n  both these questions evidence exists, albeit 
weak, that attitudes amongst the elite groups in each region 
differ.
In the question inquiring whether they felt 'their region to 
be in a worse position than the nation in regard to 1992' 
(QD7) there is a consistent difference between the two 
regional groups. Scottish replies to the question are 
centred around the 'same' option, signifying they believe 
their region to be in overall the same position with the 
rest of the UK. Cretan replies to the question centre 
around the 'slightly better-off option, signifying an
^ . Spearman correlation coefficients for questions QD2 and QD3 take a 
value of 0.285 (sig. .178)for Strathclyde businessmen and 0.116 (sig. 
.669) for Strathclyde politicians. This indicates a low consistency in 
2^2 the reply upturn between the two questions.
. Spearman correlation coefficients for questions QD2 and QD3 take a 
value of 0.234 (sig. .335) for Cretan businessmen and 0.519 (sig. .057) 
for Cretan politicians. This indicates a high relevant consistency, 
between their replies to the two questions, for Cretan politicians.
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optimism among the elite groups comparing their chances with 
those of the rest of Greece. Evidently groups from the two 
regions have replied in a manner that is distinctly 
different.
Replying to the question investigating whether the two 
national elite groups perceive their respective nations' 
regional policies to have 'failed creating adequate 
opportunities in their region' (QD8) replies show distinctly 
diverging patterns. Eighty-eight percent of Scottish 
politicians agree with the premise, while 54% of Scottish 
businessmen disagree with it. Fifty-seven percent of Cretan 
politicians and 62% of Cretan businessmen agree with the 
premise. Differences among the two national groups are 
distinctly pronounced here.
In questions investigating elites perception of 'differences 
among peoples in their locality and peoples in the rest of 
their region' or 'the rest of the nation' (QD9, QDIO) I can 
discern only small differences in the pattern of replies 
among elite groups. Perceived differences between people in
Spearman correlation coefficients for questions QD7 and QD8 in order 
of their ordinal rank value for Measure A (grievance towards their 
national government) are as follows: 4. Strathclyde politicians -0.170 
(sig. .528); 3. Cretan businessmen -0.120 (sig. .605); 2. Strathclyde 
businessmen 0.321 (sig. .145); 1. Cretan politicians 0.270 (sig. .350). 
It is apparent that those elite groups with the highest grievance 
towards their national government (high ordinal rank) also demonstrated 
a negative correlation in their replies to the two questions. This 
signifies a relationship between a high grievance level (Measure A) and 
a discordance between their attitudes on QD7 and QD8.
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their locality and those in the rest of Scotland or Crete 
exist but views are evenly balanced on their significance. 
When the question becomes one of specifying whether there 
are differences between people in the region and people in 
the rest of Greece or UK, all four elite groups in both 
regions answered in a similar manner, namely stating that 
great differences do e x i s t . T h i s  points to a similarity 
of the two groups in perceptions of national identity. In 
view of this similarity the premise cannot be supported in 
reference to these two questions.
In replies to the question inquiring whether there are 'more 
opportunities or risks in a united Europe' (QD13), a 
comparatively clear distinction emerges between the two 
regional elites. Cretans appear to be more optimistic, 
since 43% of the political and 62% of the business elite 
support the 'many more opportunities' option; by comparison 
35% of the political and 17% of the business elites in 
Strathclyde were as optimistic.
304 . Spearman correlation coefficients between QD9 and QDIO are: 1. 0.493 
(sig. .023) for Cretan businessmen, 2. 0.557 (sig. .039) for Cretan 
politicians, 3. 0.405 (sig. .050) for Strathclyde businessmen and 4. 
0.228 (sig. .379) for Strathclyde politicians.
. As mentioned in chapters three and four, Cretan elites may be more 
optimistic than Strathclyde ones for reasons that are relevant to their 
culture, elite idiosyncrasy or particular economic circumstances. Even 
if that was the case and a control for these factors would have shown 
the differences in the two elites responses to be insignificant, these 
restrictions are considered irrelevant, since at this stage I only try 
to analyse attitudes at a particular moment in time. Taking account of 
these restrictions however, results should not be interpreted to infer 
universal proof for the premise.
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In their replies elite groups do not show any dominant 
patterns. It is the case, however, that for most questions 
analysed there are differences between the Cretan and the 
Strathclyde elite. The working hypothesis is accepted thus, 
that the sample of elite groups examined, from Crete and 
Strathclyde, has shown consistently different attitudes on a 
number of regional issues (WH3).
It might also be interesting to note that in general, the 
Cretan elites seemed more optimistic on their regions' 
prospects in Europe, while being negative on the possibility 
of autonomy. The Strathclyde elites seemed to be more 
exasperated with their national administration, while both 
groups took a similarly strong perspective on their regions' 
difference from their respective national units.
The question then arises whether it can be assumed that the 
Strathclyde business and political elites understand and 
share each others goals more closely than the Cretan elites. 
This question is investigated by testing for the working 
hypothesis of whether:
W H 4 : The more developed the regional economy, the 
stronger the concordance of attitudes between elite 
groups in a region.
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In this working hypothesis the degree of development 
(independent variable) is presumed to influence elite 
perceptions towards issues of regional importance (dependent 
variable). These attitudes should in turn be more 
concordant, the more developed the regional economy.
I will examine the same data that was examined in the 
previous working hypothesis (WH3). This consists of a 
number of questions that all four elite groups have 
answered. A comparison of the distribution of replies, 
between elite groups in a region, to establish the 'goodness 
of fit' in the pattern of their replies, is attempted. 
Strathclyde elites are expected, according to the working 
hypothesis, to be more consistently similar in their replies 
than Cretan elites.
Table 6.2 compares the means of the elite group replies for 
each question separately. In this table the absolute 
difference between the means of the two Scottish and the two 
Cretan groups, is calculated as a measure of comparison. 
Because, however, the distribution patterns depend on the 
standard deviation this 'mean difference' cannot be 
considered an exact measure of attitude concordance, as the 
standard deviation of a mean indicates the 'spread' of 
opinion for each question within each group.
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For the question inquiring whether 'autonomy would be 
perceived positively by business' (QDl) evidence from the 
distribution of replies suggests there is a stronger 
concordance of attitudes among the Cretan than the 
Strathclyde business and political elites. This 
distribution of replies suggests, that the working 
hypothesis as it has been stated is not valid.
In questions inquiring whether 'local or out of region 
resources and skill' (QD2,QD3) are most important for the 
region's development, the evidence is inconclusive. In the 
question of resources there is more concordance between 
replies of businessmen and politicians in Crete than in 
Strathclyde. In the question of entrepreneurial skill there 
appears to be similar concordance in the replies of both the 
Strathclyde and the Cretan elites. So, from their replies 
on the source of human and financial resources for 
development, it is not possible to draw any inferences on 
the validity of the premise (WH4).
Next I examine replies to questions inquiring whether their 
'region is in a worse position than the nation in regard to 
1992' (QD7) and whether 'national policies for the region
have failed compared with the rest of the nation'(QD8). In 
both questions the Cretan elites seem to be more in accord 
than the Strathclyde ones. This constitutes evidence 
against the hypothesis as stated above.
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Table 6.2: Absolute difference in mean values for the 
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Note: An absolute mean difference value closer to zero denotes a higher 
concordance. Attention should be given to the value of the standard 
deviation fg^^each mean figure in interpretation of the mean 
difference.
For the questions inquiring whether respondents 'perceive 
great differences between local people and people in the 
rest of their region' and 'the rest of the nation'
(QD9,QD10) both national samples have shown very similar
306 . The data analysed are either ordinal in a scale from 1 to 5 
(QD7,QD8,QD13) or dichotomous transformed to a scale from 1 to 3 
(QDl,QD2,QD3,QD9,QDIO). Ninety five percent of the cases will lie within 
two standard deviations, if the assumption is made that the distribution 
of replies is normal.
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replies and comparatively strong concordance. This appears 
to be more the case for the Strathclyde elite. This is the 
first set of questions for which there is support for the 
premise, although weak.
Replying to the question of whether they believe there are 
more opportunities or risks in a united Europe (QD13), there 
is some evidence that the Scottish elite replies are more 
discordant between politicians and businessmen than is the 
case for the Cretan sample, which comes again as evidence 
against the working hypothesis as stated.
In an overall assessment of the questions analysed to test 
this working hypothesis it becomes evident that support for 
the premise is in the best of cases weak. It can be argued 
that not only the hypothesis can not be supported but that 
the evidence suggests an alternative rival hypothesis to be 
true. It appears thus that:
AWH4: A stronger concordance of attitudes between local 
elite groups exists, the less developed a region is.
Since this analysis is exploratory it is not meaningful to 
attempt a causal explanation of the reasons the working 
hypothesis had to be rejected, similarly a test of the 
alternative rival working hypothesis seems superfluous. A 
brief description of probable explanations for the
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relationships observed, is provided in the qualitative 
element of the analysis, immediately following.
E. Development Level and Regional Differences: 
Inferences from Qualitative Replies
The two working hypotheses analysed in the previous section 
(WH3, WH4) are attempting an investigation of issues for 
which I can not provide conclusive proof. Qualitative 
replies thus become essential, to a more insightful 
exploration of these issues.
I have accepted, so far, that the two elite groups tested 
show consistently different attitudes (WH3). I have not 
been able to conclude whether this is due to the fact that 
the samples used represent a more or a less developed region 
(WH4). I proceed here to see whether qualifications in 
interviewees replies will support or refute the quantitative 
results. Both working hypotheses are examined concurrently.
The analysis begins with the question of whether respondents 
believed 'business perceive the possibility of autonomy 
positively' (QDl). A comparative analysis of qualitative 
replies shows that the sample can be sub-divided into three
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main groups. Those that are extremely negative, those that 
are comparatively neutral and those that are positive to the 
proposition.
Those that are distinctly negative about the question belong
mainly to the Cretan political elite who find the
possibility "catastrophic"^^^. Some believe autonomy should
be accepted "under no circumstances and for no reason"
while some expressed the view that "any such move is suspect
309and should be crushed"
With feelings running high among Greek politicians' on the 
potential dangers of autonomy the Greek businessmen's view 
was rather mild. Their opinion ranged from the position 
that Crete is "totally dependent on the rest of Greece"^^°
311to the view that autonomy will make "no difference" to 
business or that business will accept such an option "only 
if guarantees are given" . This signifies business 
preoccupation with the political risks involved in such an 
option but shows them to be comparatively positive to the 
idea of self rule. Their view can be better understood








Case 63. Activist. Date of interview: 20/9/1991 
Case 69. Mayor. Date of interview: 20/9/1991.
Case 72. City Councillor. Date of interview: 19/9/1991.
Case 44. Business proprietor. Date of interview: 23/9/1991. 
Case 48. Managing director. Date of interview: 20/9/1991. 
Case 62. Business proprietor. Date of interview: 16/9/1991. 
This theme is further explored in chapter seven.
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administration's inefficiency as the basic limiting factor 
to their region's development, a view not fully endorsed by 
the political elite.
A different kind of balanced approach was shown by the 
Scottish business elite which took the position that 
autonomy will be good "if it means raising local issues" 
it will be bad if it means an "increase in taxation"^^^ and 
it will be accepted "if Britain was to become regional[-y 
autonomous throughout the c o u n t r y ] . It seems thus, that 
business elites in both regions share similarly neutral 
views on autonomy in their qualitative replies.
Strathclyde political elites are the most positive elite 
group. They suggest that business "ought to be [positive 
about autonomy, but], they will not be"^^^. This they 
believe to be the case because "business favours the status 
quo"^^®. So, overall Strathclyde politicians are positive 
to the idea of autonomy, and do not share the concerns 
expressed by their Greek colleagues, while differing as well 






Case 35. Managing director. Date of interview: 23/5/1991. 
Case 32. Managing director. Date of interview: 29/5/1991. 
Case 28. Company manager. Date of interview: 4/6/1991. 
Case 2. City Councillor. Date of interview: 28/6/1991. 
Case 11. Activist. Date of interview: 10/11/1991.
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The qualitative analysis make imperative a re-evaluation of 
the quantitative interpretation on both working hypotheses. 
So, attitudes of the two regional elites can be identified 
as being different (WH3), but this is more the result of 
political elite variance in what they believe the business 
elites perceptions are, rather than a substantial difference 
among the business elites themselves.
Furthermore, taking into consideration the qualifications of 
their replies in the question investigated, I can not 
suggest with any conviction that Cretan elites have a 
stronger concordance in attitudes towards autonomy than the 
Strathclyde elites do. Both regional elites seem to have a 
within group divergence of opinion, which however, can not 
be considered as significantly larger in any of the two 
regions. Strathclyde political elites believe that 
'autonomy would be perceived positively by business' (QDl) 
while business elites are neutral to positive. Cretan 
political elites believe business perceive autonomy 
negatively, while business elites are neutral to negative.
The qualitative evidence analysed here cannot support the 
quantitative conclusions on AWH4 (assuming a stronger 
concordance among Cretan elites).
I proceed to see whether clarifications in their replies, 
regarding whether 'the economic future of their region lies
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in local or out of region capital and entrepreneurial skill 
(QD2,QD3), alters the conclusions reached in the previous 
section. In the quantitative analysis I have found some 
evidence to support the hypothesis that 'attitudes between 
regional elites are different'(WH3), while evidence on 
whether 'stronger correlation of attitudes is linked to 
regional development'(WH4) was inconclusive.
Scottish political elite replies are comparatively similar 
with the business elites' who either suggest that "growth 
depends on local entrepreneurs" or that the region "needs 
the catalyst of outside s k i l l T h i s  'wavering' attitude 
is consistent with an overall rejection of the importance of 
entrepreneurs. Scottish elites do not seem to hold a 
definite view on the importance of entrepreneurs. One 
political interviewee admits that "the value of the 
entrepreneur does not impress me" and a businessman 
suggests that " [development] will not depend on 
entrepreneurial s k i l l . There appears to be no apparent 
trend in the Scottish elite attitudes towards local or 
foreign capital.
The Cretan elite groups seem to have a similarly close 
concordance in their attitudes. Politicians believe that
31922Q. Case 22, Managing director. Date of interview: 17/6/1991.
2 2 1' Case 40. Company chairman. Date of interview: 17/5/1991.
2 2 2" Case 14. MEP. Date of interview: 18/10/1991.
. Case 18. Company director. Date of interview: 9/11/1991.
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"there are considerable local resources" and that "there 
is a lot of capital that is not u t i l i s e d " . Businessmen 
believe that "local capital is not fully utilised y e t o r  
that "local capital is not e n o u g h " a n d  that "for big 
investments [foreign] co-operation is required" . On a 
distinctly different perspective to Strathclyde elites, 
Cretans appear much more supportive towards entrepreneurs.
A businessman suggests that " [foreign entrepreneurs] will 
bring a new way of thinking and w o r k i n g " . Politicians 
are overwhelming in their praise of entrepreneurship, 
suggesting that "Greeks are ingenious" and that "foreign 
entrepreneurs have to co-operate with local operators" ,  
assuming in this way a positive attitude on the influence 
from foreign entrepreneurs.
It becomes apparent from this exposition that the validity 
of working hypothesis three (WH3) can be upheld from the 
evidence presented while there is weak support for 
alternative rival hypothesis four (AWH4).
For the next two questions investigated, namely whether 









Case 76. Mayor. Date of interview: 21/9/1991.
Case 73. Activist. Date of interview: 19/9/1991.
Case 52. Managing director. Date of interview: 17/9/1991 
Case 53. Company director. Date of interview: 17/9/1991. 
Case 42. Managing director. Date of interview: 27/9/1991 
Case 57. Company director. Date of interview: 20/9/1991. 
Case 72. City Councillor. Date of interview: 19/9/1991. 
Case 74. Mayor. Date of interview: 21/9/1991.
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and whether 'national policies have failed to create as many 
opportunities in your region as in other parts of your 
country'(QD8), qualifications of their replies make elite 
differences better understood. Differing preoccupations, 
both in regard to their region's development potential and 
its position in relation to other regions is apparent in the 
replies given.
The Cretan elites feel that their region is in a much better 
position than the rest of Greece, having "a big variety of 
products and s e r v i c e s w h i l e  "it is developing very 
fast"^^^. This development is hindered however by "lack of 
infrastructural work"^^^ or "insufficient infrastructural 
programmes" .  Both elite groups are also preoccupied with 
clientelism in the Greek administration albeit from a 
different angle. Politicians see it as a 'chronic hindrance 
to development' because they believe it tends to favour 
other regions in Greece, businessmen because "national 
policy operates under political and party c r i t e r i a " , 
which effectively shows their preoccupation with the 
modernisation of the state machine, while they believe that
^2 2 ’ Case 44. Business proprietor. Date of interview: 23/9/1991.
2 2 2" Case 63. Activist. Date of interview: 20/9/1991.
Case 57. Company director. Date of interview: 20/9/1991.
Case 65. President of local community. Date of interview: 26/9/1991.
. As explained by a political interviewee who suggested that Crete 
"belongs to a particular political area [socialist]. When the 
government was 'of our own', we could not get any favours because it was 
our own people. When they are 'alien' because they are not our own 
people" . Case 69. Date of interview: 20/9/1991.
. Case 46. Business manager. Date of interview: 24/9/1991.
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"most big projects are based on private initiative" which
shows that overall they have a very low regard for the 
effectiveness of the administration.
In the case of the Scottish elites the issue is again that 
Scotland does not "have the infrastructure to compete 
without substantial cost penalties"^^®, which "is not a 
matter of preparation, [since] we are further from the 
market"^^^.
Where the Scottish elites do not seem to have a similar 
perspective is on the failures of regional policy. The 
politicians believe that "regional policy has failed 
abysmally"^ ° , particularly "in comparison with the South 
East of E n g l a n d " w h i c h  has benefited by government 
policies much more than Scotland. Businessmen on the other 
hand believe that Scotland has been treated "just as bad"^'^^ 
or that the government is "trying to create
o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d  that "not only national policies [are] 
responsible"^^* for the failure of opportunities to be 
created in Scotland. This difference in perspective may
3 3 7 Case 44. Business proprietor. Date of interview: 23/9/1991. 






Case 6. MP. Date of interview: 5/7/1991.
Case 2. City Councillor. Date of interview: 28/6/1991. 
Case 3. Administrator. Date of interview: 4/7/1991.
Case 21. Managing director. Date of interview: 27/6/1991.
Case 37. Senior manager. Date of interview: 22/5/1991.
. Case 35. Managing director. Date of interview: 23/5/1991.
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also signify the two elite groups presumed different 
political convictions.^*^
The analysis of their qualifying replies supports the 
conclusions reached in the quantitative section. It seems 
thus that the two regional groups have differing 
perspectives and preoccupations concerning the particular 
issues of regional development (WH3), while at the same time 
Cretan elites although coming from a less developed region 
are more concordant on the issues raised, than Strathclyde 
elites are (WH4).^*^
In their qualifications to questions QD9 and QDIO 
(differences of the local people with those of the region- 
nation) there are apparent disparities from their 
quantitative results.
Strathclyde politicians held very diverse views. These 
ranged from references to "the nationalists [who] have a 
problem because Scotland is not homogeneous" (8), to
34 5 . I have made the assumption that Scottish businessmen are 
predominantly Conservative, while local politicians are predominantly 
Labour (75% of the present sample).
Reasons for this difference could stem from the regional elites 
interlockingness levels being higher in Crete than in Scotland, but also 
from the differentiation of elite functions being more highly evolved 
the more elaborate societal institutions are. If that is the case, 
differentiation of functions in an advanced society will position elites 
into particular socio-political perspectives, while in less developed 
regions, where modernisation has not yet created such divisions, 
different elite groups will only differ by the fact that they may 
represent different interests in the societal exchange.
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references to civic culture since "Glasgow folk are locked 
into a public sector culture to a much greater extent than 
other regions . Overall they appear to think that there
34 8are "great differences within Strathclyde itself"
The answers of Strathclyde businessmen range from a belief
34 9that there are "sizeable differences in attitude" among 
local and regional peoples, to one that "there used to be a 
marked difference"^^°. As evident from this exposition of 
replies there is a marked discordance both within and 
between elite groups in Strathclyde which was not 
immediately apparent in their replies of the quantitative 
part of the questionnaire.
Cretan businessmen find great differences among the peoples 
in their region and the rest of the nation which they 
identify as being relevant to "character" ,  while 
attesting that "there is a natural difference" between 
the peoples.
Cretan politicians also find that "there are differences in 








Case 1. Regional Councillor. Date of interview: 26-28/6/1991.
Case 11. Activist. Date of interview: 10/11/1991.
Case 36. Managing director. Date of interview: 22/5/1991.
Case 34. Managing director. Date of interview: 27/5/1991.
Case 47. Business manager. Date of interview: 23/9/1991.
Case 61. Company director. Date of interview: 16/9/1991.
Case 66. President of local community. Date of interview: 25/9/1991
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differences in behaviour" . Some politicians had a less 
marked view of differences asserting that "it is 
chauvinistic to assume there are differences" also 
claiming that "young people are the s a m e " t h r o u g h o u t
357Greece.
Apparently, the diversity of views between Cretan 
politicians and businessmen is not pronounced on these 
questions. The minor divergence of attitudes among the 
political elite can be considered relevant to their 
particular view-point not warranting further inquiry.
Concordance among Cretan elites and discordance among 
Strathclyde elites supports alternative working hypothesis 
four (AWH4). Furthermore, in this exposition there are 
apparent differences in the attitudes the Cretan and 
Strathclyde elite groups hold, which supports working 
hypothesis three (WH3).
In their replies to question QD13 (more opportunities or 
risks in a united Europe) the elite groups were very 
vociferous holding rather varied replies.
354 . Case 68. City Councillor. Date of interview: 9/10/1991.
. Case 69. Mayor. Date of interview: 20/9/1991.
. Case 71. President of local community. Date of interview: 11/9/1991.
. Research by Errson and Janda (1985) on regional party strength,
points to a small divergence of youth voting across Greece. This does 
not necessarily mean that youths share the same value systems but rather 
that they seem to have a similar political outlook.
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Cretan politicians perceived risks to be mainly cultural and 
focused on fears of "alterations to our national 
identity"^^^ and "our social structure and character"^^^, 
while attesting that "our cultural traditions are in 
d a n g e r . Opportunities existed in the "establishment of 
law and o r d e r " a n d  in achieving gains in international 
disputes at "the national level" .
Cretan businessmen perceived risks "if there is no 
convergence in the development level of Greece [and 
Europe] also in the possibility that "big trusts
[/multinationals] intervene [into the market] 
Opportunities existed in the anticipated "improvement in 
democratic institutions" as well as "political 
opportunities" .
The emerging picture among the Cretan elites is one of 











Case 65. President of local community. Date of interview: 26/9/1991
Case 70. President of local community. Date of interview: 20/9/1991
Case 72. City Councillor. Date of interview: 19/9/1991.
Case 65. President of local community. Date of interview: 26/9/1991
Case 66. President of local community. Date of interview: 25/9/1991
Case 56. Business manager. Date of interview: 19/9/1991.
Case 59. Business proprietor. Date of interview: 14/9/1991.
Case 43. Managing director. Date of interview: 25/9/1991.
Case 62. Business proprietor. Date of interview: 16/9/1991.
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The Strathclyde political elite perceived risks in "giving
too much power to the centre " as a result of further
integration and also in the "failure to prepare as a result
of government policy failure" .  Opportunities existed to
"develop our [own] responses to European challenges"^^^
particularly since European integration is a "sine qua non 
370of progress"
The Strathclyde business elite perceived risks in that "we
3 71lose control of our destiny as a country" and that "links 
with government [are] not as strong in this country as [they 
are] on the mainland [of Europe] " . This latter view was
contested however by those who believed there are more 
opportunities "as long as the politicians will let things 
h a p p e n " . The view was expressed as well that "Scots are 
very insular people" and that " [we are] a long way from 
Europe [to be affected]
Similarity of replies between Strathclyde elites centred 
around the position that "failing to take the opportunities 











Case 1. Regional Councillor, Date of interview: 26-28/6/1991. 
Case 9. Activist. Date of interview: 15/10/1991.
Case 1. Regional Councillor. Date of interview: 26-28/9/1991. 
Case 8. MEP. Date of interview: 14/10/1991.
Case 39. Company chairman. Date of interview: 20/5/1991.
Case 19. Senior director. Date of interview: 25/6/1991.
Case 23. General manager. Date of interview: 14/6/1991.
Case 37. Senior manager. Date of interview: 22/5/1991.
Case 28. Senior manager. Date of interview: 4/6/1991.
Case 12. City Councillor. Date of interview: 8/11/1991.
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from not being a part of European integration. While their 
overall preoccupations seemed divergent, the main connecting 
theme was the relationship with the centre, be it 
Westminster or Brussels.
From this exposition of their replies it becomes evident 
that the Strathclyde and Cretan elites have distinctly 
divergent preoccupations relating to Europe, which supports 
the premise of working hypothesis three (WH3). There is no 
conclusive evidence however, that can assist in making any 
inferences on alternative working hypothesis four (AWH4).
The qualitative analysis supports the premise of working 
hypothesis three almost uniformly. It appears thus that on 
evidence analysed, 'attitudes of regional elites can be 
identified as being different between a more and a less 
developed region' (WH3).
Evidence from question QD13 (more opportunities or risks in 
Europe) and QDl (business positive on autonomy) are 
inconclusive on alternative working hypothesis four. The 
bulk of the questions examined however provide support, weak 
at times, to the premise that 'a stronger concordance of 
attitudes between local elite groups exists the less 
developed a region is' (AWH4).
377 . Case 30. Senior director. Date of interview: 3/6/1991
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I am inclined to accept the premise that 'the degree of 
accord between sub-national elite attitudes is related to a 
regions' development level' (H II). This follows from 
accepting that regional elites examined have different 
attitudes (WH3) and these attitudes are more concordant in 
the less developed than in the more developed region (WH4).
There is a high probability of multiple causation between 
the phenomena investigated in hypothesis H II. In this 
hypothesis I have detected an influence of the degree of 
development (the independent variable) on attitudes of 
regional elites (the dependent variable). I note however 
that regional grievances towards the central government 
(examined in Measure A) and perceived differences from the 
rest of the nation (examined in Measure C) can have an 
effect as intervening variables to this hypothesis which 
however, is impossible to measure with the means at my 
disposal. A number of other antecedent variables could be 
considered relevant as well, including ideological or 
political affiliation of respondents or position within 
political party hierarchy which have not been examined as 
part of this investigation however.
In this hypothesis, I have attempted to determine whether 
elites in different European regions have substantially 
different attitudes. This can be important as it could
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identify them as separate. I have effectively attempted to 
determine a 'within' and a 'between' region variance of sub­
national elites. Within region differences also ascertain 
the degree to which elite groups are interlocking. While 
between region differences establish the separateness of 
elite groups in the two regions investigated.
There is a number of assumptions relevant to the examined 
hypotheses. One of the central assumptions used in the rest 
of my analysis as well is that different elite attitudes in 
the two regions investigated would point to different 
behavioural patterns. It is possible in this way to 
perceive attitudes as a central element of a region's 
endowment profile. The link of attitudes with a region's 
development prospects I examine in the following chapter.
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Chapter J7.
Elite Attitudes: Assessing The Broader Picture
A. Introduction
In this chapter the analysis and tests for hypotheses H III 
and H IV are similar in method to those used in the previous 
chapter. As previously, I first use quantitative data to 
test the working hypotheses to be followed by qualitative 
evidence which provide the ultimate indication of proof. In 
the case of hypothesis H V the analysis is exploratory as my 
investigation cannot provide conclusive proof.
In part B the analysis of hypothesis H III explores the 
relationship between regional elites' perceptions of 
Councillors and elites' aspirations to autonomy. Measure B 
from chapter five is used as an indicator of elites' 
aspirations to autonomy. This entails certain limitations 
as Measure B provides a nominal index of rank between the 
elite groups. So, inferences made from the inclusion of 
Measure B in the findings have to be limited by the nominal 
character of the index.
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In part C working hypotheses WH7, WH8 and WH9 are employed 
in the discussion of hypothesis H IV, which investigates the 
proposition that elite attitudes on devolution have an 
effect on the perceptions of business prospects in a region. 
Of these working hypotheses, WH9 is the one with the closest 
thematic relevance to H IV. The inclusion of WH7 and WH8 in 
the testing, by examining perceptions of importance for 
SMEs, introduces an important new variable to the analysis. 
The inclusion of this variable is considered imperative 
since SMEs have been considered essential to regional
378development and, some argue, to regional autonomy.
Measure B indexing 'Positive Attitudes Towards Regional 
Autonomy' and D indexing the 'Preparedness of the Regional 
and National Units Towards 1992' are used extensively in the 
analysis.
In part D the analysis is exploratory. Hypothesis H V 
investigates whether concordance of attitudes between
378 . References on the importance of SMEs for regional development can be 
found on a number of European Commission Documents(1989c, 1991a). Gerry 
Sweeney has argued that in regions where there are large firms "...there 
is a lower level of entrepreneurial vitality" (1987, p.21), while also 
claiming that "...autonomy in decision-making within a region 
...supports entrepreneurial activity" (1987,p.124), which suggests that 
entrepreneurial vitality is positively related with the existence of 
decision making autonomy and negatively with the existence of 
multinationals. The role of local authorities in promoting SMEs as a 
measure to promote endogenous growth is covered by a report of Nuttal 
(1986) for the Council of Europe. It is one of the basic contentions of 
the Scottish National Party (SNP, 1992) that Scottish economic 
independence can be based on local firms and the development of local 
SMEs .
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political and business elites in a region affects regional 
growth prospects. This hypothesis was an integral part of 
the exercise at the beginning of this research effort. Very 
early in the construction of the survey it became apparent 
that limitations in resources would not allow the 
satisfactory coverage of all issues relevant and that there 
will be a number of variables that could not be 
investigated. Instead of dismissing hypothesis H V however, 
I included it here in an exploratory analysis. This is done 
in order to use the great wealth of data collected that 
pertain to this hypothesis. Hopefully, this effort may be 
instructive to a course of future research.
The relevance of findings in chapters five, six and seven to 
contemporary academic discourse are then examined in the 
final chapter of this thesis.
B. Perceptions of Regional Elites; The Effect of Aspirations 
to Autonomy
In this section I will test hypothesis H III relating it to 
the intervening variable of aspirations to regional 
autonomy. Hypothesis H III inquires whether:
H  III. Attitudes towards regional political elites vary 
according to an elite’s region of origin.
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In this hypothesis the use of working hypotheses five and 
six should provide an indication of whether the region of 
origin of the two political and business elites' influence 
their perceptions of regional political elites. It is of 
course the case, introduced at length in chapter two, that 
the evidence presented here will not necessarily cover all 
possible intervening or antecedent variables. To put it 
differently, there are a number of other reasons, beyond 
their different region of origin, that could be the cause of 
any observed variance between the two regional elites 
investigated. It is the case, however, that most variables 
that could affect such a diversion in attitudes have been 
identified and accounted for. I am also confident that the 
relationships identified are real and that the logical 
sequence connecting them is causal.
Working hypothesis five attempts an investigation of 
business elites' attitudes and in particular their 
perception of political elites, in considering whether:
W H 5 : Businessmen perceive the regional political elites 
to be more receptive to them than the national 
political elites.
This is a test of whether the independent variable region of 
origin affects the dependent variable of perceived 
receptiveness of politicians to businessmen in their area.
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The assumption of the working hypothesis is that local 
politicians will be more receptive than national politicians 
to the local business elite.
The most important possible intervening variable is the 
interlockingness between the business and political elites 
in the two regions. I will give no further attention to 
such a possibility than referring to my analysis in chapter 
six hypothesis one (H I) which examines the difference 
between the business and political elites. From that 
analysis I conclude that there is limited interlockingness 
in the case of the Cretan political elites who declare some 
business interests (50% declaring they hold at least 1% 
equity in one of the local companies-QC14) and very limited 
in the case of the Scottish sample (18% of whom declare 
holding equity of 1% or more in a regional business-QC14). 
Businessmen on the other hand were vetted for their 
political activities and when found to have some function in 
the political community, were placed in the political elite
379category and asked the relevant questions. To put it 
plainly, businessmen in the sample cannot have a function 
within political parties and the only effects of 
interlockingness exist to the degree that political elites
379 . Exception to this rule was one distinguished Cretan businessman (Case 
42), who was also a member of the City Council. The decision to include 
him in the business elite sample was taken because of his prominence in 
the business community.
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have a prominent business function, which I consider 
unlikely.
It is also possible to consider the intervening effect of 
stronger clientelistic ties, in the relationship between the 
regional political and regional business elites, than 
between the national political and regional business 
e l i t e s . H a v i n g  a very small national sub-sample 
(consisting of three cases) in the Strathclyde political 
elite and no national sub-sample in the Cretan political 
elite it is impossible to comprehensively examine such a 
premise. From evidence presented in question QC13 however 
it is apparent that businessmen in Strathclyde and Crete 
seldom lobby the local political e l i t e s . F r o m  their 
questionnaire replies it emerges that 67% of the Strathclyde
380 . It is interesting to examine the relevant bibliography on Greek 
client-patron political ties which includes articles by Sotiropoulos 
(1994), Kouvertaris and Dobratz (1984) and Lyrintzis (1984). They all 
point to strong and pervasive patronage ties that they relate to 
underdevelopment or political culture. The relation of centre vs. 
periphery, within the existing political structures, gets a mention only 
relating to the 'macro' level of international politics(Kouvertaris 
1984, p.36). All commentators identify the highly centralised character 
of the Greek state, which is heavily politicised along party 
lines(Sotiropoulos 1994, p.359). These studies do not specifically 
investigate the relationship between business and political elites or 
patronage networks between regional and national political elites. It 
is assumed that patronage networks are vertical with localities at the 
'receiving' end of central political institutions patronage.
. For a detailed anthropological account of a Cretan communities' 
perceptions of clientelism and patronage see Herzfeld (1985), while a 
very interesting account of an earlier study of a Greek pastoral 
communities' perceptions of clientelism is found in Campbell (1964).
Work by Clapham (1982) and Gellner (1977) can be useful, by providing a 
typology with which to examine patron-client relationships in the 
Mediterranean context.
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and 75% of the Cretan local politicians declared that they 
have not been lobbied by businessmen. By comparison all of 
the local MBs and MEPs in Strathclyde declared they have 
been lobbied by local businessmen.
To investigate this hypothesis I proceed by examining for 
the replies to question QB13, which inquired how receptive 
businessmen found regional elected representatives compared 
with MPs. Using the respondents' respective region of 
origin as a criterion of comparison, I identify a difference 
in the pattern of replies of the Scottish and Cretan 
businessmen.
Strathclyde business personalities thought the local and 
national politicians in their region to be equally receptive 
to their views. Cretan businessmen tended to find local 
politicians receptive more often, as 55% said local 
Councillors were 'more' or 'much more' receptive; this 
compares with 32% of the Strathclyde sample who took the 
same position.
In order to understand which sub-groups of the respective 
elites support or refute the relevant hypothesis I control 
for their respective rank. This measure sub-divides the 
business elites into three categories: a. the small business 
owners, b. the business managers and c. the directors.
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Members of the a. group, who are all Greek, claimed that 
national politicians were equally or more receptive by a 
margin of 71%. Managers in both Crete and Scotland would 
strongly support the premise that regional Councillors are 
more receptive than MPs. The bias, against local 
Councillors' receptiveness, can be traced to the group of 
directors in the two regions.
Table 7.1: Distribution of responses to question QB13 




























Note: Question QB13: How receptive do you think regional Councillors are 
to your views compared with Members of Parliament?
Directors in Strathclyde were symmetrically centred around 
the equally receptive option for which 53% of their sub­
group opted. Cretan directors were more appreciative of
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regional representatives' receptiveness, 42% claiming they 
found them much more receptive.
A possible explanation for this difference could lie with 
the difference respondents gave to question QB6 in which 62% 
of the Scottish business elites declared they did not know 
their regional elected representative, compared with a 
unanimous Cretan business sample who claimed they knew their 
local elected representative. Such a discrepancy could lead 
to the assumption that in the comparatively devolved region 
of Strathclyde, regional politicians are held in lower 
esteem among the local business elites than in the 
nationally controlled prefecture of Chania, where all 
businessmen know the local politicians and consider them 
rather receptive.
The construction and tests for this working hypothesis were 
based on the assumption that regional political elites 
possess a more accurate mental map of their constituency 
than national political e l i t e s . I t  has not been possible 
to test this assumption as such but the working hypothesis 
tested should provide an indication that this may indeed be 
the case. Both business elites seemed to be in support of 
the premise if a control was applied for the replies of the
382 . A discussion on the assumptions I made regarding mental maps is given 
in chapter one, while a further analysis of behavioural geography's 
perception of mental maps can be found in Gould and White (1986) and 
Gold (1980).
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business directors sub-group. So, the evidence analysed to 
this point, supports the premise of working hypothesis W H 5 .
The analysis, so far, has concentrated on quantitative 
evidence of a receptiveness of the political elites, as 
viewed by businessmen. I proceed with an examination and 
analysis of their qualitative replies in the survey.
In the examination of replies to question QB13 there are two 
trends among the Cretan businessmen. According to the first
383prevailing view "...Councillors do not count" and 
"...local Councillors are ornamental and bear little 
w e i g h t T h i s  attitude ties in with the prevalent view 
that " ... an MP can do a lot which points to strong 
existing clientelistic relationships of local businessmen 
with MPs. The opposite view among Cretan businessmen was 
that Councillors have been receptive "...within the last 
decade" and they are more receptive than MPs "...relative 
to their [limited] contribution"
Scottish businessmen have an almost uniform appreciation of 
local Councillors' work, with some reservations however.






Case 45. Business manager. Date of Interview:24/9/1991 
Case 62. Business proprietor. Date of Interview : 16/9/1991 
Case 51. Business proprietor. Date of Interview:16/9/1991 
Case 52. Managing director. Date of Interview:17/9/1991 
Case 54. Business proprietor. Date of Interview:17/9/1991
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clout" or that "..regional Councillors being in opposition 
are more receptive"^*. Overall their view is rather
390positive as they claim that "..Councillors pay more heed" 
to them.
From this exposition the pattern of businessmen's 
perceptions suggest that Councillors in Chania have no real 
clout and are held in low esteem, while MPs are perceived to 
hold the strings of power. In Strathclyde businessmen think 
that Councillors pay more heed to them, providing 
indications of a high level of interaction with the local 
political elite, who in turn appear to play a more decisive 
role in the integration of political and business interests 
in the region.
Comparing the response patterns from the quantitative and 
the qualitative elements, it is immediately evident there is 
a dichotomy between businessmen's perceived receptiveness of 
regional political elites (high in the case of Cretan 
businessmen and low in the case of Strathclyde businessmen) 
and the esteem in which they are held. Cretan businessmen 
believe Councillors are more receptive but at the same time, 
that they have no clout. Strathclyde businessmen believe 
Councillors are not as receptive as MPs but seem to pay more
308g. Case 38. Managing director. Date of Interview:20/5/1991 
Case 26. Company chairman. Date of Interview:05/6/1991 
. Case 27. Company director. Date of Interview:05/6/1991
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heed to them. I will accept the premise of the working 
hypothesis WH5 that although businessmen perceive regional 
elites to be more receptive than national political elites, 
there is evidence that the two business elites have a 
different perspective on regional politicians' 
receptiveness.
In the next working hypothesis the premise that regional 
politicians have a longer term perspective and the economic 
interests of the region more at heart is given further 
consideration when I inquire whether:
WH 6 : Regional politicians will be perceived to favour 
long term economic policies in the region more than 
national politicians.
The dependent variable here is the perceived commitment of 
regional political elites to regional welfare. The region 
of origin of the two political elites is expected to affect 
the way they perceive the local and national political 
elites' commitment to their region.
Replies to this working hypothesis could be conceivably 
affected by elites' educational level but since this 
variable was considered 'offensive' to some elites it has 
not been included in the questionnaire and cannot be 
controlled for. My personal estimate of the literacy level 
of the two political elite samples is that Cretan
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politicians seemed less educated in regard to standard 
qualifications, but as worldly as the Strathclyde 
politicians, a good number of the latter apparently
391possessing higher academic qualifications. This 
evaluation being subjective it cannot be used as a 
quantifiable measure however, and I refer to it only as an 
indication.
Another variable that I have to consider is the possibility 
that regional political elites are not, by definition, 
considered relevant to macro-economic planning. This could 
be true particularly in the case of the Cretan sample where 
the local government had very limited powers since the
392unification of the island with mainland Greece. The 
particular question asked however (QC12) inquires whether 
local or national politicians have a longer term perspective 
when proposing policy. I believe that such an antecedent 
variable will only become relevant if there is a genuine 
bias against the local political elites, a matter which is 
to an extent investigated by the analysis following.
391 . This is an empirical assessment of their level of education as there 
292 were no questions inquiring about it on the questionnaire.
. The unification of Crete with mainland Greece took place in 1913 after 
a long series of revolts against Ottoman rule and a period of autonomy 
under the auspices of the Greek monarchy (1898-1913). Hopkins (1977) 
and Woodhouse (1968) provide concise accounts of modern Cretan and Greek 
history.
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TABLE 7.2: Analysis of replies to question QC12 controlling 
















Strathclyde Members of 
Parliament
1
Strathclyde Members of 
European Parliament
1










Notes: a. Question QC12: Which of the following do you believe have a 
longer term perspective when proposing economic policy: regional, 
national or European representatives? b. Number of respondents replying 
to QC12 is 24, missing values (comprising Do Not Know or refusals to 
reply) equal seven cases.
The basic premise of this working hypothesis holds true for 
the Scottish political elite who appear to support the 
proposition that regional politicians and MEPs have a longer 
term perspective than MPs when proposing economic policy 
(QC12). In the examination of the replies of the Cretan 
political elite I find that they diverge from the Scottish 
pattern of replies in that they believe national and
322
European elected representatives have a longer term 
perspective than regional representatives. A full analysis 
of their replies is given in table 7.2.
Differences in the opinions of the two groups could be 
related to the Greek elites' low esteem for local 
authorities. This I understand as an attitude stemming from 
the limited competence of regional political elites in
393Greece.
The breakdown by occupational category (variable RANK) of 
the elite replies reveals some trends that are interesting 
and can elucidate the analysis further. Councillors in the 
Scottish sample are almost equally split between supporting 
the view that it is either themselves or MEPs that have the 
interest of the region more at heart. In the Cretan sample 
it seems that Councillors believe it is MPs who have a 
longer term perspective, while all Mayors in Greece seem to 
think that it is MEPs who have the longer term perspective.
In the interpretation of replies of the Cretan elite I can 
only assume that the antecedent variable of perceived 
competencies of the local elites affects respondents
393 . It is also the case that in the period between the Second World War 
and the 1967 coup d'etat, local authorities in Crete had very restricted 
competencies, while during the years of the dictatorship (196 7-1974) 
local authorities where effectively appointed, further discrediting the 
institution. Relevant analysis can be found in Featherstone and 
Katsoulas (1987) and Clogg (1986).
323
replies. This view is reinforced since there is a high 
indication of regional grievance towards the national 
government. As computed in chapter five. Measure A 
identifies the Cretan political elite as the one with the 
highest grievance indicator towards their national 
government. Local politicians see the national politicians 
not as having the interest of the region more at heart but 
probably as more competent in macro-economic policy (which 
presumably is beyond their reach). It is also possible that 
the question used forms an inadequate measure for the Cretan 
sample, given their assumed lower educational level as 
compared with the Scottish sample.
Having completed the first level of analysis (for 
quantitative data) I can only conditionally accept the 
premise that 'regional politicians are perceived to favour 
long term policies' (WH6) and that only for the Strathclyde 
political elite. Qualitative data should further elucidate 
Cretan sample results.
I proceed to examine politicians' perspective on whether 
regional, national or European representatives have a longer 
term perspective (QC12) and effectively inquire which 
political elite sub-group they hold in higher esteem.
The Cretan respondents, belonging to the local elite 
themselves, appeared to have a very low esteem for the local
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elite. This is apparent in the support for the national and 
European political representatives. They exhibited a very 
high esteem for MPs' role attesting that "...MPs will be 
elected and re-elected, they do not have just a four year 
perspective"^^, while "...MPs have the growth prospects of 
the region more at heart, while MEPs cannot focus on the 
r e g i o n . Views on MEPs where consequently split between a 
mildly negative view that "...we do not know what the MEPs 
are doing"^^^ to the more positive "...MEPs living in
397Brussels have a wider perspective" . Very few took the 
view that "...the local Councillor has a stronger interest
398[in the region] than anybody else" while the attitude that
399Councillors "...have a very limited perspective" was 
prevalent.
Strathclyde politicians took a rather different approach to 
MPs' contribution to the region. They claimed that "...MPs 
are led by short-termism"^°°, while "...strategic plans are 
produced by the regional Council, MPs do not have a regional 
i m p a c t T h i s  support for the Council was not as readily 
converted into support for the regional Councillors however, 









Case 75. City Councillor. Date of Interview:26/9/1991
Case 68. City Councillor. Date of Interview : 09/9/1991
Case 64. President of local community. Date of Interview:26/9/1991
Case 76. Mayor. Date of Interview:23/9/1991
Case 66. President of local community. Date of Interview:25/9/1991
Case 65. President of local community. Date of Interview : 26/9/1991
Case 1. Regional Councillor. Date of Interview:26-28/6/1991 
Case 5. Regional Councillor. Date of Interview:01/7/1991
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402does not concern the Councillors" . MEPs received more 
uniform support, expressed as a belief that "...MEPs have a 
strategic view" and particularly since "...the economies
404of Europe are tied-up [together]"
From this evidence it becomes apparent that the two
political elites have a very different perspective. Cretan
politicians seem to hold MPs in very high esteem, while 
showing an equivocal opinion on MEPs. Strathclyde 
politicians seem to have a very negative opinion of MPs 
while holding a uniformly positive opinion of MEPs.
Regarding their perceptions of the regional elites, the 
Cretan political elite seems to hold Councillors in very low 
esteem, while the Strathclyde political elite has a rather 
good opinion of Councillors.
Analysis of their qualifications reinforces the initial 
quantitative analysis between the political elites. It
becomes apparent that on the present evidence working 
hypothesis WH6 holds true for the Cretan elite. Qualitative 
replies also elucidate the reasons behind the Cretan opinion 
to be based on the low level of competencies of regional 
elites.
402 Case 11. Activist. Date of Interview:10/11/1991 
ggq. Case 16. Regional Councillor. Date of Interview : 19/6/1991 
. Case 10. Regional Councillor. Date of Interview:28/10/1991
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On the evidence from the two working hypotheses WH5 and WH6, 
it becomes obvious that the two regional elites have 
distinctly different patterns of reply. It appears, as 
well, that their different origin has a relevance to the 
pattern of replies they have. To that effect I accept 
hypothesis H III as true for this sample. Their region of 
origin seems to be relevant to the way an elite perceives 
their respective regional political elites.
As is further evident from the analysis of the qualitative 
data, the varying level of devolution (or decentralisation) 
between the two regions can be related to their 
perceptions.^^ It can be argued that the low competence of 
Cretan political elites is the actual cause of their 
perceived low receptiveness to businessmen. Furthermore 
elite replies show a remarkable covariation with the 
intervening variable of positive attitudes towards regional 
autonomy (table 7.3).
The two elite groups with the highest positive attitude 
towards regional autonomy have the best opinion of regional 
Councillors. Strathclyde businessmen and Cretan politicians 
who hold Councillors at the lowest esteem also have the
405 . A very interesting case study analysis of devolution versus 
déconcentration in the decentralisation experience of some low income 
countries as given by Crook and Manor (1995).
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least positive attitudes towards regional autonomy. I have 
to assume on the basis of this evidence that aspirations to 
autonomy have an effect on perceptions of regional political 
elites receptiveness (QB13) and their long-term commitment 
to their region (QC12).
Table 7.3: Comparison of the way regional political elites 
are perceived (QB12, QC13) and regional elites positive 
attitudes towards regional autonomy (Measure B)






Strathclyde Politicians 35 .4 Positive
Strathclyde Businessmen -19 . 7 Negative
Cretan Politicians 8.3 Negative
Cretan Businessmen 28. 6 Positive
Consideration should be given to the unlikely possibility 
that perceptions of regional elites are the independent 
variable, having an effect on aspirations to autonomy. I am 
not able to discount that possibility totally, for lack of 
specific measures that can test the direction of this 
relationship. It is reasonable to assume, however, that in 
the belief system of regional elites issues of regional 
welfare and autonomy come before those of elites' attitudes
406on Councillors' performance as examined here. If this
. The interrelationship of individuals' feelings and expectations with 
the environment is analysed by Behavioural Geography (Gold, 1980), while 
Political Behaviour (Jaros and Grant, 1974) has interesting insights 
into belief system attributes and the hierarchies of opinions, attitudes
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hierarchy is valid then it is reasonable to assume that 
aspirations to regional autonomy must influence perceptions 
of regional elites.
C. Level of Devolution: Does it Influence Growth Prospects?
It has been repeatedly suggested in editorials of the 
Financial Times that the prospect of devolution in Scotland 
will affect business confidence, by presuming that a tax 
yielding Scottish Parliament will be likely to increase 
business tax rates. Whether this will be done to cover 
the increased costs of a devolved government or whether it 
will cover an increase in social welfare policies, the 
message has been clear. The British business press suggests 
business would be apprehensive of Scottish devolution. 
According to this view there is a link between the prospects 
of devolution in Scotland and business prospects for the 
region.
and belief systems. Under this typology I assign elites' perceptions on 
autonomy as part of their ideology and belief system, while their 
perceptions of Councillors performance belong to the 'inferior' opinion 
and attitude level (Kavanagh, 1983, pp.14-15).
. The British Prime Minister opposed the idea of devolution for Scotland 
on the grounds that it would mean higher taxes and less investment 
(Financial Times, 12 January 1991 and 14 November 1991), while the 
Scottish CEI members opposed the creation of a Scottish Parliament with 
tax raising powers (Financial Times, 26 April 1991) .
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Elite attitudes on devolution could be considered relevant, 
in turn, since they are directly linked with the indicators 
of business confidence. It could also be the case that 
elite attitudes on devolution have a direct causal influence 
on the business prospects in a region by affecting business 
confidence, which is the next hypothesis I investigate:
H  IV. Elite Attitudes on Devolution affect the Perceptions 
of Business Prospects in a Region.
Elite attitudes on devolution I consider as the independent 
variable, while business prospects in a region is the 
relevant dependent variable.
In the examination of this hypothesis I make the assumption 
that the more business and political elites attitudes are 
similar in a region, the higher the growth potential for 
that region. I am using this premise assuming it to hold 
true for the purposes of this investigation. This premise 
is more thoroughly explored in my discussion of hypothesis H 
V.
My test will consist of employing working hypotheses 7,8 and 
9 for an analysis of the quantitative data and then proceed 
with an exposition of qualitative replies in order to decide 
on the validity of the hypothesis. I first examine whether:
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W H 7 : The level of devolution in a region influences 
perceptions of SMEs importance among regional elite 
groups.
For this working hypothesis the level of devolution between 
the two regions investigated is the independent variable 
while the perceived importance of SMEs to the regional 
economy is the dependent variable. Effectively replies 
between the elites of the two regions will be compared in 
relation to their attitudes towards SMEs importance.
In this working hypothesis I have made the assumption that a 
higher level of devolution is linked with a stronger trust 
in SMEs and local entrepreneurs as compared with MNL
408enterprises.
To test this working hypothesis I compare respondents' 
replies specific to the business and political elites. 
Questions inquiring on the importance of SMEs to the 
regional economy (QB3,QB4,QB5,QC4,QC5,QC7) were 
crosstabulated controlling for the respondents region of 
origin. The comparison consisted of comparing the
408 . The relationship between local development, regional autonomy and 
small business is covered in a series of case studies by Vazquez- 
Barquero (1990); while the role of local authorities in the development 
of SMEs is examined by Nuttal (1986).
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distribution of replies between the elite groups of the more 
devolved Strathclyde and the less devolved Chania.
Table 7.4: Crosstabulation of elite replies to questions 
QB3, QB4 and QB5
Question Q B 3 : 
Do you foresee 
more SMEs
Question Q B 4 : 
Positive on 
more SMEs
Question Q B 5 : More 
SMEs lead to an 
economy more :
YES NO YES NO Devolved Dependent
Strathclyde 19 5 14 2 19 4
Businessmen 79% 21% 87% 13% 83% 17%
Cretan 12 8 15 4 13 4
Businessmen 60% 40% 79% 21% 76% 24%
Notes: a. Question QB3: Do you foresee the Development of more small- 
medium enterprises in your region? b. Question QB4: Will such a 
development create a positive environment for your firm? c. Question 
QB5: Do you think that a shift in the economy towards small-medium 
enterprises will aid in the creation of : 1. a more devolved economy? or 
2. a rather dependent economy?
Table 7.5: Spearman correlation coefficients matrix for business elites' replies to questions QB3, QB4 and QB5
Scottish Cretan Scottish CretanQB4 .429siq .098 - .152. 546QB5 .314 - .119 .423 .464siq .144 . 629 siq .116 . 052
QB3 QB4Note: As with other association statistics in this survey issues of 
validity limit the inferential value of these figures. The Negative 
category is collapsed with the Do Not Know category to facilitate 
correlations.
As becomes apparent, from the examination of tables 7.4 and 
7.6, there is no significant difference in the distribution 
of replies to the questions investigated, between the
. Competencies of the respective regional authorities at the time of the 
survey are covered in chapter three sections A and B.
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regional elites. There are some differences in the 
correlation coefficients (tables 7.5 and 7.7) which could be 
relevant to a different perception of development among the 
elite groups and possibly between the two regions.
Table 7.6: Crosstabulation of elite replies to questions 




Question Q C 5 . 
SMEs likely 
to :
Question Q C 7 . 
MNLs likely to:
LOCAL MNLs STAY GO STAY GO
Strathclyde 8 7 14 1 2 10
Politicians 53% 47% 93% 7% 17% 83%
Cretan 9 5 13 7 5
Politicians 64% 36% 100% 58% 42%
Notes: a. Question QC4: Do you believe your region's prosperity depends 
more on : a. local entrepreneurs or b. Companies with headquarters 
outside the region. b. Question QC5: In the case of a recession do you 
believe small-medium sized business that will survive the recession are 
more likely to maintain operations in your region or shift to another 
region? c. Question QC7: In the case of a recession, do you believe 
multinational business are more likely to maintain operations in your 
region, or shift to another region?
Table 7.7: Spearman correlation coefficient matrix for 
political elites' replies to questions QC4, QC5 and QC7





QC7 .075 .162 .571 .452
sig .782 . 579 sig .021 . 104
QC4 QC5
Note: The standard qualifications on validity considerations apply here 
as well. The Negative category is collapsed with the Do Not Know 
category to facilitate correlations.
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The higher value of the Cretan from the Strathclyde 
political elites correlation coefficient for questions QC4 
and QC5 (table 7.5) can be related to the Cretans' stronger 
support for local entrepreneurs, rather than MNL enterprises 
(QC4) .
The difference between the two political elites' 
distribution of replies in question QC7 is the most 
pronounced one. This I believe is relevant to the different 
experiences of industrialisation between the two regions, 
which makes the Strathclyde politicians more apprehensive of 
the role of MNLs. Because QC7 is not instrumental in the 
premise investigated by the working hypothesis, I do not 
consider that this difference merits any further attention.
The Scottish business elites' high values on correlations of 
questions QB3 and QB4, as well as QB3 and QB5 (table 7.7), 
relate to their positive attitude on the impact of SMEs on 
devolution (QB5), while they also tend to believe that more 
SMEs will be positive for their firm (QB4). An opposite 
attitude pattern is true for the Cretan businessmen, who 
relate more SMEs (QB3) with a negative competitive 
environment for their own business (QB4), and believe SMEs 
make a region more dependent on outside imports (QB5).
The pattern of elites replies, although divergent, does not 
follow the pattern assumed by the working hypothesis. The
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Scottish businessmen, by exhibiting more trust, and the 
Cretan businessmen, by being more apprehensive of SMEs, 
broadly abide by the assumption of the premise. The Cretan 
politicians, by their unconditional support, and the 
Strathclyde politicians by holding an equivocal position do 
not support the premise. With the measures employed so far, 
my assumption of trust of SMEs and distrust of MNLs in those 
regions that have a higher level of devolution cannot be 
supported.
The argument could further be put forward that existing 
elites in power will not want a change that could affect the 
status quo. If this is the case it can be also argued that 
the particular elites interviewed are not those that are 
likely to instigate such a change.
It could be true as well that, my categorisation of 
Strathclyde as more devolved than the prefecture of Chania, 
(although reasonable taking account of the respective 
regional competencies), may not be the way Strathclyde 
elites perceive their region. For this reason I have used 
indirect measures by asking questions on SMEs and not on 
autonomy, in order to have the minimum bias on their 
replies. It could still be the case, however unlikely that
410 . I do not consider elite change as it may be linked with broader 
process of economic and social change. A discussion of the link between 
micro (elite) and macro (society) interdependence in change of elites 
are discussed by Welsh (1979, ch.8).
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their perception of the degree of regional devolution in 
their region is lower from that of Cretan elites.
In conclusion it is apparent that, although SMEs and 
regional entrepreneurs will be trusted more than MNLs in 
both samples, the pattern of their replies does not follow 
the one anticipated by the working hypothesis.
Consequently, differences in attitudes between the elite 
groups in the two regions cannot be ascribed to the 
different level of devolution/decentralisation between the 
two regions. Which leads me not to accept the working 
hypothesis based on the quantitative evidence and proceed to 
examine the qualitative replies of interviewees.
In the case of business interviewees there is no apparent 
difference in their qualitative replies to questions QB3,
QB4 and QB5 that differentiates from the quantitative 
analysis of their replies. The only minor difference was in 
replies to question QB3, on whether respondents foresee the 
development of more SMEs, in which the Cretan respondents 
seemed more preoccupied with such a scenario. Typical 
responses centred around the theme of a market with a high 
level of competition where "...the market is saturated"^^ 
and "...there is no space [for further SMEs developing]"
This slight divergence of Cretan businessmen is
411 Case 50. Business proprietor. Date of Interview : 19/9/1991 
. Case 59. Business proprietor. Date of Interview : 14/9/1991
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understandable as they see the development of more SMEs as a
413direct threat to their own livelihood.
In the case of the political elite groups the only variation 
in their replies can be traced to question QC7 inquiring on 
MNL enterprises likelihood to go or stay. Beyond the fact 
that the issue investigated is marginal to the working 
hypothesis, apparent differences can be traced to the 
different experiences of industrialisation between the two 
regions. In the Cretan case the prevalent view was that 
"...[MNLs] will not go because they are currently developing 
the particular [Cretan] m a r k e t ; while in the case of 
Strathclyde elites the predominant view is that 
"...multinationals have branch plants in the region [which 
are] externally controlled I take this difference in
perspective to point to a significant difference in 
attitudes towards multinationals. It should be noted as 
well that, there is an underlying distrust in statements on
416MNLs activities from both elite groups.
So the qualitative data analysis, by not adding any 
significant insights in the similarities and disparities of
413 Cretan business are predominately small. An analysis of the size 
distribution of this sample compared with the Cretan business as a whole 
can be found in chapter three section D.
. Case 74. Mayor. Date of Interview:21/9/1991 
Case 9. Activist. Date of Interview : 15/10/1991 
. A number of researchers have consistently investigated political 
attitudes towards multinational enterprises including La Palombara and 
Blank (1976), Fayerweather (1982) and Taggart (1993).
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opinion between the elite groups, leaves the analysis 
inconclusive relating to W H 7 . The possibility that 
perceptions of the level of devolution are more important 
than a quantifiable categorisation of devolution make any 
results in this working hypothesis tentative. It is further 
the case that attitudes of two regional elites support and 
two refute the premise. This could be an indication that it 
is not the level of devolution, but the perceived level of
417devolution, that affects elite responses. This 
consequently has a relevance to the next working hypothesis 
I examine.
This as all other conclusions in this thesis bears the 
obvious limitations of the measures and regions employed.
I proceed with an examination of the premise that:
W H 8 : Those regional elites that aspire to more 
autonomous rule will be more positive on SMEs prospects 
in their region.
This working hypothesis develops the premise examined in the 
previous working hypothesis by introducing a measure for the 
regional elites devolutionary aspirations which is the 
independent variable. I examine the importance elites place 
on SMEs, as the dependent variable in my investigation.
417 . I note here that according to Anthony Smith "ethnic nationalisms do 
not generally correlate with economic trends" (1995, p.73).
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As with the previous working hypothesis I have retained the 
assumption here that aspirations of elites to regional 
autonomy are linked with a trust of local entrepreneurs and 
SMEs and a distrust of MNLs.
To proceed with a test of this working hypothesis I have to 
use a measure of devolutionary aspirations that will apply 
to the four elite sub-groups. In part F of chapter five 
certain group control parameters were constructed, one of 
which was Measure B (regional elites' positive attitudes 
towards regional autonomy). This is the measure I will use 
here.
This measure employs replies to question Ql, which inquires 
whether macro-economic policies should be controlled at the 
regional, national or international level, Q2 which inquires 
whether federalism in Europe is viable and QDl which asks 
whether respondents believe business would perceive autonomy 
positively.
In the analysis of replies to questions QC4 and QC5 (Table 
7.6), pertaining to the political sub-groups, there is some 
strong evidence that the working hypothesis is supported by 
the data. In question QC5 inquiring whether SMEs that 
survived a recession where likely to stay in their region
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93% of the Scottish and 100% of the Cretan sample that gave
418an answer replied in the affirmative.
In question QC4 inquiring whether they believe regional 
prosperity to depend more on local entrepreneurs or MNLs 
their replies show a trust for local entrepreneurs which is 
as high as 53% for the Scottish and 64% in the Cretan 
regional politicians.^* This I believe to be supportive of 
their trust of SMEs which almost by definition are local.
It would also be the case that for this particular question 
even a weak support for local entrepreneurs I would consider 
important since it would go against the popular wisdom of
420big MNLs being perceived as the driving force of growth.
The two business elite groups have replies that are 
concordant with each other on the particular issue of SMEs' 
importance and prospects, as demonstrated by their replies 
to questions QB3 and QB4 (Table 7.4). More specifically.
418 . On these questions I have attempted a measure of respondents 
acceptance of SMEs as important factors of growth in the region and I 
take respondents replies to be a testament to that effect. In appendix 
I on the Questionnaire Formation such issues are covered more 
extensively.
. When a filter is used on the national politicians of Scotland, 
excluding the views of the 3 MPs, the Scottish support of local 
entrepreneurs was up to 62%. The three MPs views can be excluded since 
the subject matter of the hypothesis permits such a treatment, while for 
reasons of compatibility of the two samples (i.e. the Cretan sample 
lacks national MP interviewees) such a filter could be considered 
2^0 desirable.
There is extensive literature referred to throughout this thesis on 
the importance of MNLs as potential engines of regional development and 
the relevant studies conducted at the international and European level 
(Yannopoulos, 1976) (Young, 1993).
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79% of the Scottish business elite foresee the development 
of more SMEs in their region, while 88% believe that such a 
development will be good for their own business. In the 
Cretan sample 60% of respondents declared they foresee the 
development of more SMEs while 79% believed this will be 
positive for their own firm.
A further test for the business elites perceptions is a 
comparison in their replies on question QB5 (Table 7.4). 
Crosstabulations show that 83% of the Scottish and 76% of 
the Cretan business elites believe that a shift in the 
economy towards SMEs will lead to a more devolved and 
autonomous economy. This control proves that businessmen 
recognise a power in SMEs to 'generate autonomy' and at the 
same time have a positive opinion about them.
This result is significant if it is combined with the 
Strathclyde elites' perceived hostility towards regional 
autonomy and is contrary to assumptions made in the working 
hypothesis.
To provide a final test for the working hypothesis I compare 
elite attitudes towards SMEs with Measure B by constructing 
table 7.8. It becomes apparent from the comparison in this 
table that for two of the elite groups the relationship 
seems to hold true and for two of them it does not. It 
could be argued that attitudes on SMEs are not related with
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regional autonomy and that is why the results are 
inconclusive. From evidence on question QB5 however, it 
becomes apparent that a great percentage of the business 
sample believe that autonomy and SMEs are related.
Table 7.8: Elite attitudes towards SMEs (QB3,QB4,QC4,QC5) 
compared with their attitudes towards regional autonomy 
indexed in Measure B and their anticipated attitudes as 
hypothesised in WH8
Measure B Recorded Expected
Direction Attitudes on Attitudes on
Sc Value SMEs SMEs (WH8)
Strathclyde POSITIVE POSITIVE POSITIVE
Politicians 35.4
Strathclyde NEGATIVE POSITIVE NEGATIVE
Businessmen -19 . 7
Cretan NEUTRAL POSITIVE NEUTRAL
Politicians 8.3
Cretan POSITIVE POSITIVE POSITIVE
Businessmen 28 . 6
Note: a. Question QB3: Do you foresee the development of more SMEs in 
your region?; b. Question QB4: Will such a development create a 
positive environment for your firm?; c. Question Q C 4 : Do you believe 
your region's prosperity depends more on local entrepreneurs or 
companies with headquarters outside the region?; d. Question QC5 In the 
case of a recession do you believe SMEs that will survive the recession 
are more likely to maintain operations in your region or shift to 
another region?.
According to the working hypothesis, elites that are more 
positive towards regional autonomy are going to be more 
positive towards SMEs' prospects. Since there are no 
questions on SMEs common to all elite groups, I can only 
compare the two political and the two business elites with
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each other. In the table 7.9 I have constructed such a 
measure.
Table 7.9: Expected and Observed Affirmative Responses to 
Questions QB3, QB4; QC4 and QC5, according to WH8
EXPECTED ACCORDING TO WH8 OBSERVED PERCENT.
QC4 SCOT.POL.> CRET. POL. 53% < 64%
QC5 SCOT.POL.> CRET. POL. 93% < 100%
QB3 CRET.BUS.> SCOT.BUS. 60% < 79%
QB4 CRET.BUS.> SCOT.BUS 79% < 88%
Notes : Spearman correlation coefficients betwen these variablees are
presented in table 7.5 and table 7.7.
In all relationships that could be investigated with the 
present data the observed relationship has an opposite 
direction from the expected one according to W H 8 . It is the 
case as well that the evidence is weaker for the political 
and stronger for the business elites.
This leads me to accept with reservations the alternative 
rival working hypothesis that:
AWH8: Those regional elites that aspire to more 
autonomous rule will be more negative on the prospects 
of SMEs in their region.
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Such an attitude can be explained as an indication that 
aspirations to autonomy are linked with a bleak outlook for
421the economic prospects of a region.
Since their support for SMEs is apparent (Table 7.9) and at 
least some of them see SMEs as leading to more autonomy 
(QB5) it is possibly, not their support towards SMEs, but 
the business prospects of SMEs, that are negatively related 
to aspirations of autonomy. There are no comprehensive 
measures to monitor elite attitudes on whether an increased 
number of SMEs will also mean that SMEs have a bright future 
in a r e g i o n . I  can only turn to elite qualitative replies 
for an indication of validity for this premise.
On a review of the qualitative replies of the business 
elites it becomes immediately apparent that most respondents 
share a great concern over SMEs future in their region.
423Cretan businessmen say that "...SMEs are closing" and 
"..they need greater state support" . While Strathclyde 
businessmen claimed that more SMEs "...increase our
421 . In relation to Scottish nationalism, it has been suggested that the 
SNP fortunes are linked with a relative poor performance of the Scottish 
economy. This perspective is summarised by Kellas (1989, p.137): "the 
SNP does well, according to this argument, when Scotland is seen to be 
doing badly relative to Britain".
. Question QB3 covers this issue only partly, because it inquires 
whether respondents foresee the development of more SMEs, it does not 
2^3 inquire on whether SMEs have a positive future.
Case 54. Business proprietor. Date of Interview:22/5/1991 
. Case 45. Business manager. Date of Interview:24/9/1991
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potential customer b a s e b u t  that their increased numbers 
"...might pose competition"* At the same time a Cretan 
executive claimed that "...a big corporation needs many SMEs 
in its environment"^^ and a Strathclyde executive claimed 
that "...there is a relation between SMEs and economic 
growth"*^*. This evidence suggests that Cretan businessmen 
are rather negative on SMEs' prospects while Strathclyde 
businessmen, by contrast are rather positive.
The political elites in Crete claimed that "...if the local 
entrepreneurs invest, we don't need outside investors at 
a l l w h i l e  also stating that the future of the region 
depended "...mainly on local businessmen who are involved in 
tourism"**°. The Strathclyde politicians claimed that 
"...the prospects are not good [since there is] no strong 
entrepreneurial spirit"**^, also claiming that "...local
432entrepreneurs [will be important] in the long term" 
Apparently the Strathclyde politicians' perception of SMEs 
prospects is more negative than that of their Cretan 
counterparts.
425 Case 31426
427 ■ Case 18Case 55428
429 ■ Case 35
430 ■ Case 66
431 ■ case 68Case 1.432 Case 7 .
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The evidence from the qualitative analysis suggests that the 
alternative rival hypothesis is supported by the replies of 
elite groups. So, overall, the Cretan politicians were 
positive, while the businessmen were negative on SMEs' 
prospects. The Strathclyde politicians were negative, while 
the businessmen were positive on SMEs' prospects for their 
region. These attitudes are discordant with their views on 
regional autonomy (Measure B, in Table 7.8). This 
contradiction reinforces the validity of the premise of 
alternative working hypothesis eight (AWH8).
I finally examine whether:
W H 9 : Positive attitudes towards devolution in a region 
are related to a positive perception of business 
prospects for the region.
Respondents' attitudes towards devolution is the independent 
variable. This working hypothesis attempts to measure the 
existence of an effect of the independent variable on elite 
perceptions of the business prospects for a region.
I have made the assumption that elites which are positive on 
devolution will be positive on the business prospects for 
their region. This assumption was based on the observation 
that 65% of those who gave a positive reply on business
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perception of autonomy (QDl) had a concordant reply on the
433preparedness of their region for 1992 (QD6).
Effectively this test attempts an investigation of whether 
regional elites' business confidence relates to their 
devolutionary aspirations.
In a crosstabulation of respondents' replies, between their 
perception of business concern over further devolution (QDl) 
and their regions' competitive position (QD6), I found no 
apparent distribution variations between the political 
elites. The two variables appear unrelated for these sub­
groups/"* I could either infer that the measures used are 
inappropriate or that this relationship does not hold true 
for the political elites.
The reasons that this relationship cannot hold true for the 
political elites can be traced in a number of causes that 
are relevant to the particular samples. In the case of the 
Cretan political sample the fact that 86% believe autonomy
433 . The figure of 65% is derived if all positive replies on QDl are 
compared with replies on QD6 and all replies of QD6 that are at or above 
the mean value of the particular elite sub-group of QD6 are recorded as 
success.
. The Spearman correlation coefficients for QD1*QD6 were .277 (sig.
.338) for the Cretan and -.150 (sig. .579) for the Scottish political 
elites. A negative view of autonomy (QDl) is correlated with a positive 
view of the regions preparedness (QD6) for the Cretan politicians, while 
a positive view of autonomy is correlated with and a negative view of 
the regions preparedness for Scottish politicians. The relatively small 
coefficients however, make any further inferences tenuous.
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would not be perceived positively by business (QDl) limits 
the potential for analysis. Similarly in the case of the 
Strathclyde political elite the fact that 88% find the 
regional economy unprepared for the challenges of 1992 (QD6)
limits the relevant inferences that can be made about the 
relationship this hypothesis attempts to investigate.
In examining the pattern of replies for the Cretan political 
elite I found a high degree of concordance in their replies 
to the two questions. They exhibit a high consistency in 
that 81% of their replies are either negative on both or 
positive on both questions investigated. This I take as an 
indication of a degree of correlation between the two 
questions, even if their frequency distributions reveal no
435apparent patterns.
Inevitably I have to conclude, however, that for the 
measures at my disposal, no inferences can be made about the 
political elites. From the analysis of data for the 
business elites, a relationship becomes evident which is 
summarised in table 7.10. The business elites in Crete 
confirmed my initial assumption that a positive view of 
higher devolution (QDl) is related to a positive view of 
regional prospects (QD6). The Scottish business elite 
however, showed a different pattern of replies, since most
435 . The reliability of correlation coefficients is low as there is a large 
number of cells that have a low expected frequency.
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of those believing that business would perceive autonomy 
positively also stated that their region is not prepared for 
1992.*^^ Overall, the evidence is stronger in the case of 
the Cretan businessmen and inconclusive in the case of the 
Scottish businessmen.
This response pattern is sustained when analysing 
respondents' views on whether macro-economic policies should 
be controlled at the regional, national or international 
level (Ql), crosstabulated with their replies on the 
preparedness of the regional economy for 19 92 (QD6). Again
a similar pattern between the two business elites emerges. 
Scottish businessmen are divided into two groups. Those 
that believe macro-economics should be controlled at the 
national level and tend to be pessimistic about the region's 
prospects in 1992. And those believing that macro-economics 
should be controlled at the international level, are also 
more likely to believe that their region is comparatively 
prepared.
The Cretan businessmen have again the opposite perspective, 
most of those that believe macro-economics should be 
controlled at the regional level (Ql) being more likely to
436 . The Spearman correlation co-efficient for Strathclyde businessmen was 
.279 (sig. .209) which links a negative view on autonomy (QDl) with a 
high score on their perception of their region's preparedness for 1992 
(QD6). The Cretan businessmen's' sample showed a correlation of -.554 
(sig. .009), which links their positive view on autonomy with a low 
score on their regions perceived preparedness for 1992.
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believe that their region is comparatively prepared (QD6), 
while most of those believing macro-economics should belong 
to the international domain also believing that their region 
is not prepared.
Table 7.10: Regional business elites' crosstabulation of
Strathclyde Businessmen Cretan Businessmen













Prepared 5 8 2 12
Region
Prepared 2 5 4 2
Region
Well Prepared 1
Notes: a. Question QDl: Do you believe that if your region were to 
become more autonomous business would perceive this as a generally 
positive development? b. Question QD6: Do you believe that the 
Strathclyde/Cretan economy is ready for the 1992 competition challenge? 
c. Refusals to reply and Do Not Know answers accounted for three cases 
in the Strathclyde and three cases in the Cretan sample.
I could thus divide the Scottish business elite sample into 
two main groups. Those that believed their region was 
prepared for 1992 (QD6) tended to have a negative view on
business perception of autonomy (QDl) and at the same time 
believed macro-economics should be controlled at the 
international level(Ql). Those that believed their region
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was not prepared for 1992 also believed business had a 
positive view of autonomy and that macro-economics should be 
controlled at the national level.
The Cretan business elite can also be divided into two main 
sub-groups. Those that had a positive view of the 
preparedness of their region towards 1992 (QD6) also tend to
believe business will view autonomy positively (QDl) and 
that macro-economics should be controlled at the regional 
level (Ql). Those that had a negative view of the region's 
preparedness towards 1992 also believing business would 
perceive devolution negatively and supporting the view that 
macro-economics should be controlled at the international 
level.
It is apparent from the analysis, that there can be no 
irrefutable proof that the relationship between the two 
variables is true for the direction assumed in the beginning 
of the analysis. It is indeed possible that it is not 
attitudes on devolution that affect elites' perception of 
economic prospects, but economic prospects affecting 
devolutionary attitudes. Since the working hypothesis 
inquires into the existence of a relationship rather than 
its direction however, any strong indications to that effect 
will be considered adequate proof.
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Furthermore, comparisons of scores from the measures 
constructed in chapter five give an indication of a strong 
link between attitudes on the issues investigated here. I 
constructed table 7.11 to compare attitudes on Measure B and 
Measure D.
Table 7.11: Comparisons of Measure B and Measure D






Strathclyde Politicians 35.4 -48.4
Strathclyde Businessmen -19 . 7 -39. 6
Cretan Politicians 8 . 3 -35. 7
Cretan Businessmen 28 . 6 -61.9
Note: As calculated in chapter 5, section F, Measure B: Regional elites 
positive attitudes towards regional autonomy; Measure D: Regional elites 
perceived preparedness of the regional and national units towards 1992.
The two elite groups with the highest absolute scores on 
Measure B and Measure D are the Strathclyde politicians and 
the Cretan businessmen. Both groups had the highest 
positive scores on Measure B and the most negative scores in 
Measure D. This could signify a relationship between a 
positive attitude for regional autonomy as linked with a 
negative attitude on economic preparedness. Strathclyde 
businessmen and Cretan politicians recorded comparatively 
modest scores for these measures.
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This evidence is against the basic hypothesis of WH9 that 
positive attitudes towards devolution are related to a 
positive perception of business prospects for a region. The 
evidence even warrants the creation of an alternative rival 
hypothesis on exactly the opposite premise that:
AWH9: Positive attitudes towards devolution in a region 
are related to a negative perception of business 
prospects for the region.
Since the analysis of the quantitative data support the 
alternative rival working hypothesis AWH9, qualitative 
replies to questions QDl and QD6 will be used in order to 
provide a final test.
From the evidence so far, there seems to be a division of 
the elites I am investigating into two groups. The first 
group consists of the Strathclyde political elite and the 
Cretan business elite and their particular characteristic is 
their extremity of views on the issues of this working 
hypothesis. I will identify them as 'radical'. The second 
group consists of the Strathclyde business and the Cretan 
political elite who are more 'moderate' on the issues 
raised.
On their qualitative replies to question QDl (would business 
perceive autonomy positively) it becomes apparent that the 
'radicals' have a stronger opinion on the issue.
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Strathclyde politicians say that business "...ought to be
437[positive on devolution but] they will not be" , while
438suggesting that "...business favours the status quo" . At 
the same time Cretan businessmen suggest that "...maybe 
autonomy would be good if political and economic guarantees 
are given [by Greece]" , while showing apprehension that
440"...there is total dependence on the rest of Greece"
The 'moderate' elite groups had, overall, more balanced 
replies on QDl, but at the same time shared similar concerns
441with their respective 'radical' counterparts. The 
Scottish business elite was rather negative on autonomy 
claiming that it will bring " ... an increase in taxation"**^ 
and concern that "... in [the rest of] UK they will have a 
different attitude [towards devolution]""^. The Cretan 
political elite was split between those that claimed there 
was a great danger in autonomy by stating they will accept
444"...autonomy under no circumstances and for no reason" and 
those that claimed that "...there exists [a high level of] 
sensitivity on the issue
437 Case 2. City Councillor. Date of Interview:28/6/1991 
Case 11. Activist. Date of Interview : 10/11/1991 
Case 62. Business proprietor. Date of Interview : 16/9/1991
Case 44. Business proprietor. Date of Interview:23/9/1991
. The semantic interpretation of the term autonomy in this instance 
could be interpreted to mean devolution in the case of the Scottish and 
independence in the case of the Cretan elites.
. Case 32. Managing director. Date of Interview : 29/5/1991
. Case 36. Managing director. Date of Interview:22/5/1991
Case 69. Mayor. Date of Interview:20/9/1991 
. Case 67. City Councillor. Date of Interview:26/9/1991
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I proceed with an investigation of elite replies on question 
QD6 (on whether the regional economy was ready for 1992) . 
From the group of 'radicals' a Scottish politician claimed 
that "... [regional elites did] not know what 1992 is" , 
while a Cretan businessman said that Crete was not prepared
447because "...the Greek economy is undisciplined"
The concerns of the 'moderates' were not much different. A 
Strathclyde businessmen claimed that "...Scotland is in a 
recession for hundreds of years" while another that
449"Strathclyde is opening-up a regional route to Brussels"
The Cretan politicians showed concern over the role of the 
national bureaucracy, one of them claiming that the regional 
economy is not ready because "...the decision making is done
450in Athens and we have no direct connection with Brussels"
As is evident, there are no apparent trends in elite 
replies, relevant to question Q D 6 . The same themes of 
distrust of the national bureaucracy for the Cretan and 
apprehension towards 1992 for the Strathclyde elites were 






Case 14. MEP. Date of Interview : 18/10/1991 
Case 55. Business manager. Date of Interview : 18/9/1991 
Case 25. Managing director. Date of Interview : 5/6/1991 
Case 33. Managing director. Date of Interview:2 7/5/1991 
Case 76. Mayor. Date of Interview : 23/9/1991
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I hypothesise that one of the reasons that two elite groups 
seem moderate and two seem radical relates to their 
respective degree of acceptance of the status quo and their 
consequent propensity to initiate change.
The two 'radical' elites have their own reasons for 
discontent. The Scottish regional politicians predominantly 
belong to the opposition parties, where they have been since 
197 9. They do not accept the UK government's interference, 
while they see its policies as disruptive and detrimental to 
their region."^ The Cretan business elite is systematically 
hindered in its activities by a centralised and unresponsive 
national bureaucracy. Both groups can foresee great 
benefits from change.
451 . On an article in the special supplement of the Financial Times on 
Scotland (FT, 13 December 1991, p.30/2) titled 'Farce and Tragedy' the 
views of all Scottish political parties, including the Conservatives, 
are reported to be in favour of some form of Scottish assembly. The 
views of local opposition parties in Strathclyde to Government proposals 
for the reform of local government, (to a single tier Council system), 
may be one of the reasons behind their hostility towards the incumbent 
Government (Glasgow City Council, 1991) (Strathclyde Regional Council, 
1993) (Scottish Office, 1992). For a critical analysis of the views of 
the main British political parties on regional government see Moore
. The extent of the Greek states' centralised structures and resistance 
to reform is attested by the attempt to decentralise the administrative 
structures legislated in 1986 (Law 1622/86), which however were not yet 
enacted as policy by 1991 (Pierros 1991, p.55). The role of the 
prefectures in the attempt to decentralise Greece is analysed by Verney 
and Papageorgiou (1992) . Regional policy incentives combined with the 
need for decentralisation were identified as a hindrance to development 
by the 'Fifth Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Condition and 
Development of the Regions of the Community' (Commission, 1994) .
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The 'moderate' elites have invested interests in the status 
quo, that are to an extent threatened by change.
Strathclyde businessmen are alarmed by the prospect of 
devolution and higher taxes more than they are of increased 
competition from Europe."^ Similarly, the prospect of 
autonomy"* for the Cretan political elites is an anathema 
which contrasts with their understanding of the need of the
455region for administrative devolution from Athens. The two 
moderate elites are thus apprehensive of devolutionary 
change and the effect it may have to their elite position 
and benefits in their respective regions.
A comparative examination of the results in testing working 
hypotheses WH7, WH8 and WH9 gives a profile of the elites
. Three quarters of the members of the Scottish CBI, in April of 1991, 
opposed any form of a Scottish Assembly (as reported in the Financial 
Times, 21 February 1992, p.20).
. Herzfeld (1985,pp.3-50) gives some very interesting insights on the 
hierarchy of a sense of belonging for the Cretan people and their 
'concentric loyalties' between the local, the regional, the national and 
the European level. In his study he identifies the segmentary view of 
Cretan allegiances to be based on the view that "Crete, ..., regards 
itself as an idiosyncratic and proudly independent part of the national 
entity, distinct from it, physically separated from it, but yet endowed 
with qualities that have made Crete the birthplace of many national 
leaders in politics, war, and the arts" (Hertzfeld, 1985, p.6).
. The calls for political autonomy are related by Cretan and Greek Press 
to foreign attempts to destabilise Greece. The source of such perceived 
propaganda has at different times been identified as the United States 
who hold military bases on the island (Cretan local newspaper 'Alithia', 
a number of issues in July 197 9); Israel, through its intelligence 
agency Mosad (Cretan local newspaper 'Kritiko Fos', 15 July 1979); the 
Former Yougoslav Republic of Macedonia (national Greek newspaper 'Ethnos 
tis Kyriakis', 2 February 1992) and Turkey on numerous occasions (Cretan 
local newspapers 'Chaniotika N e a ' and 'Kyrikas Chanion' on a number of 
issues in 1991). In this political climate Cretan political elites view 
the debate on devolution from Greece with a marked unease.
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investigated relevant to their attitudes on devolution and 
their perceptions of business prospects for their region 
(H IV). In particular, the fact that the two regional 
elites come from regions with a different level of 
devolution of local government appears to have an equivocal 
impact on perceptions of SMEs importance (WH7)/ those 
regional elites that aspire to more autonomous rule will be 
more negative on the prospects of SMEs in their region 
(AWH8); and positive attitudes towards devolution relate to 
a negative perception of business prospects in a region 
(AWH9). It is apparent that for the case of the particular 
elite samples and regions there is evidence to support the 
hypothesis that there exists a relationship between 
attitudes on devolution and perceptions of business 
prospects (H IV).
Finally it should be noted that the assumptions that support 
this research also limit its universality. There are a 
number of assumptions that underpin this investigation, and 
have to be borne in mind in the interpretation of results 
presented. Particularly relevant to the hypotheses 
presented here is that aspirations of higher devolution 
relate to expectations of higher prosperity and also that 
centralised national control of the local economy is 
perceived as inefficient.
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456D. Influence of Attitudes on Regional Growth
As outlined in chapter two, I have included here a 
discussion of one hypothesis I aspired to test at the 
beginning of this research effort, but for which there could 
be no conclusive measures devised for the particular sample 
and research resources. The advantage of proceeding with a 
purely exploratory investigation of this hypothesis lies in 
the existence of a wealth of information in my survey that 
could give some indication for its validity and possibly 
assist in future research efforts.
I investigate whether:
H V. The greater the similarity of attitudes among the 
political and business elite in a region the better the 
regional growth prospects.
I have used this hypothesis as an assumption in a number of 
occasions, on the logical deduction that co-operation is a 
more productive course than friction in societal
456 . I have proceeded to the investigation of these issues with the 
presentation of two papers so far, the first co-authored with Stephen 
Herbert (Christopoulos and Herbert, 1996) focused on institutional 
transformations in Strathclyde, while the second is a comparative study 
of the impact of elite concordance on growth prospects in Strathclyde 
and Crete (Christopoulos, 1996a). I have to thank reviewers and 
commentators at the 1996 Annual PSA Conference and the 1996 ECPR Annual 
Session of Workshops for very constructive comments and ideas that have 
helped me advance my argument.
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interactions. Although logical on the surface this premise 
is not necessarily true in the everyday experience of elite 
interaction. Difficulties in providing a proof for this 
hypothesis are compounded by the difficulty of inferring an 
influence on the 'macro' level (regional competitiveness) by 
the 'micro' level (elite interaction).
I have identified the similarity (or diversity) of attitudes 
between the business and political elites as the independent 
variable and the regional growth prospects as the dependent 
variable in each region. I anticipate that the region with 
a greater similarity in attitudes among two elite groups has 
better growth prospects. It can be argued that depending on 
how well a region is doing, we can infer a regional elites'
457success in promoting regional development. So, as a 
measure of comparison I include data on the performance of 
the two regional economies investigated as they compare with 
regions of similar development level and position in the 
economic cycle.
Because of a great number of antecedent and background 
variables this investigation cannot provide a quantifiable
457 . Naturally this proposition applies only to the degree that a regional 
political elite is responsible for regional development. However, it is 
safe to assume that in contemporary western Europe national politicians 
will employ discriminatory regional policy only for the benefit of their 
dissadvantaged periphery, otherwise acting for the benefit of the whole 
state. The regional impact of their policies can be therefore 
considered negligible in the long term, if this assumption is valid.
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element on the relative importance of the variable 
investigated. Furthermore I have to account for the 
possibility of spuriousness, particularly since an 
indication of similar responses between elite groups is not
458necessarily a proof of harmony in their relationship. It
could also be argued that, to the degree that there is 
interlockingness among the two elite groups in each region, 
they would be expected to hold similar opinions. I believe 
that for the samples investigated the degree of covert 
interlockingness is rather small, as uncovered in a number
. 459of previous hypotheses.
To provide a measure of discordance in the replies of the 
two regional elites, I have devised a new measure based on a 
comparison of Measures A, B, C and D. In particular I 
quantify the absolute difference in the scores of the 
regional elite groups on each of the above measures 
eventually adding them up to measure the regional elites 
'Discordance in Attitudes Score'. I subsequently convert
458 . Alternative methods of investigating actor interrelations, including 
social network analysis (Scott, 1991; Wasserman and Galaskiewicz, 1994) 
or a sociometric application to decision making networks (John and Cole, 
1996) are not considered adequate as they give limited importance to the 
sharing of values among actors in their analysis.
. Welsh (1979, p.27) has identified Greece as a country where 
interlockingness is 'periodically' prevalent due to the 'traditional 
oligarchies' of the country. A discussion on the tests and identifiable 
interlockingness of elite groups is presented earlier in this chapter in 
part B as well as comprising part of the analysis in chapter 6. It is 
my conviction that positional interlockingness is of minor significance 
in this sample.
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this absolute difference into an index to facilitate the 
interpretation of results. Since I measure absolute 
difference, a high index score signifies a high degree of 
difference and a low index score a low degree of difference 
This index can take a minimum value of zero if the two 
groups are completely concordant and a maximum value of 10 0 
if the two groups are completely discordant.
Table 7.12: Index of Discordance as revealed by the 
difference in attitudes scores between the business and 















Strathclyde Politicians 39.1 35.4 35 .3 -48. 4
122.6 15.3
Strathclyde Businessmen -11.4 -19 . 7 27.1 -39.6
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
STRATHCLYDE ELITES 50.5 55.1 8.2 8.8
Cretan Politicians -17.9 8.3 0.0 -35.7
87.0 10.9
Cretan Businessmen -3.6 28 .6 26 .2 -61.9
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
CRETAN ELITES 14.3 20.3 26.2 26.2
Notes: a. The algebraic equation used to produce the 
absolute difference score a, when one of the Measure scores 
is negative and one is positive, has the following form:
[a] = [b] + [c] . When both Measure scores are either positive 
or negative it becomes: [a] = [b]- [c] . b. The discordance
index D is calculated as the sum of the absolute difference 
values divided by eight d= (a^^+aB+ac+a^) /8 .
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By examining table 7.12 it becomes immediately apparent that 
Strathclyde and Cretan elite groups are quite disparate.
This is apparent in both the level and the variance of their 
discordance. Cretan political and business elites appear to 
have a constant and consistent discordance across the 
spectrum of the measures employed. Strathclyde elites 
portray a very different picture however. In measures A 
(grievance towards their national government) and B 
(positive attitudes towards regional autonomy) they show a 
high level of discordance. Reasons for this discordance can 
be sought in the high degree of grievance by Strathclyde
460politicians compared with a negative one by businessmen, 
while at the same time a positive attitude towards regional 
autonomy by politicians compares with a negative one by 
businessmen. This discordance can be related to the high 
priority the particular issues hold on the political agenda 
and their highly 'emotive' content in the political debate. 
By comparison, there is a comparatively small discordance in 
measures C (difference of local people) and D (preparedness 
towards 1992).
Two alternative and rival explanations can be offered in 
interpretation of Strathclyde discordance. The first one is 
that Strathclyde region will be doing better (than a
. Businessmen showing 'negative grievance' towards their national 
government are in effect supportive of national policies.
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comparable region) because regional elite discordance 
centres along politically sensitive issues. In that respect 
it will not be able to affect the interaction between the 
political and business elites who can have an active 
collaboration, evident from their concordance on non- 
politically sensitive issues. The alternative explanation 
would point to the politically sensitive nature of the 
measures of high discordance and suggest that elite 
interaction will depend on the existence of non-divisive 
issues among elites and that therefore Strathclyde is bound 
to do worse (than a comparable region).
In the Cretan case again two alternative rival explanations 
can be offered. In the first instance it can be 
hypothesised that the relative concordance influences elite 
interaction positively, and that by reflection it has a 
decisive influence on regional development. In that case 
Crete would be expected to be doing better than a comparable 
region. The alternative explanation would be that political 
elites will not interact successfully with business elites 
because they have consistently different perspectives as
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evident from a small but constant difference in their
. . _ 461attitudinal measures.
A  comparison of the discordance index scores between 
Strathclyde and Crete points to a higher discordance score 
for the Strathclyde than the Chania elite. If the two 
regions could be directly compared I would expect Chania 
influenced by a comparatively concordant regional elite, to 
show a better relative performance than Strathclyde. Such a 
comparison would assume however that agreement in all 
measures is of incrementally equal importance to elite co­
operation .
A final word of caution in the interpretation of the 
attitudinal results. In the case of the Strathclyde elites' 
relative discordance, it can be partly ascribed to presumed 
different political affiliations. On the other hand, the
461 It should always be born in mind that particularly in the era 
discussed, regional elites in Crete had a limited input on regional 
development and planning, being rather dependent on national elites. 
Andrikopoulou (1992) refers to the failure of 'regionalising' the Greek 
budget and giving power to local political elites in Greece. 
Furthermore, in attaining a truly comparative measure the region of 
comparison should be of similar size to the one from which attitudinal 
data were examined, in this case for instance the West of Crete (Nomos 
Chanion) with one of the eastern prefectures (Nomos Irakliou). 
Statistical data limitations preclude that possibility.
. Small variance of attitudes can be linked to differences in an elites' 
perception or view-point (Rickets, 1990; Brittan, 1990).
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degree to which the measure constructed identifies value 
orientations, political affiliations can be considered less 
relevant. The criticism can also be levied that Cretan 
elites are relatively concordant because there is a limited 
impact local political elites' power has on business
. . ^  463elites.
I believe that in spite of all such intervening or 
antecedent variables, the examination of the evidence will 
give a good indication of the input of regional elites to 
regional performance.
I proceed to examine data on the growth rate of the two 
regions between 1990 and 1992 expecting to find how well the
. I have argued in this thesis that Cretan political elites are relevant 
to the political process (even though they belong to a less devolved 
region than Strathclyde) because they are tied to the national political 
elites. Their role could be linked to what Kouvertaris and Dobratz 
(1984) identified as the 'vertical clientelistic relationships' on the 
pyramid of political patronage and favouritism. Of course this raises 
the possibility of the particular local elites holding only 'positional' 
and not 'functional' eliteness in their exercise of power (as discussed 
by Welsh, pp.166-167). I have empirically perceived their 'functional' 
elite power, in their locality, to be significant however. Finally, 
local political elites are definitely relevant to local business 
interests by their controls on planning permissions and licensing of 
business. Research on Spanish regional elites (Vazquez-Barquero, 1990) 
has pointed to the close ties between business and political elites that 
are fostered under a local development strategy.
. Valid attitudinal comparisons should entail regions of similar size, 
endowments, economic development and stage in the economic cycle.
Regions like Strathclyde and Merseyside can be considered of roughly 
similar socio-economic background and offer better grounds for 
comparison.
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two regions performed compared to the regions of Merseyside 
and Notio/Vorio Aigaio.*" I assume that elite membership in 
regions investigated (Crete, Strathclyde) were the same (or 
if different displayed similar attitudes and behaviour), for 
the period investigated.*" Regional elites in the 'null 
hypothesis' regions of comparison (Aigaio, Merseyside) are 
presumed not to have the characteristics that make 
Strathclyde and Crete unique.
It is, of course, the case that I cannot provide an exact 
measure of how significant the regional elites' input is to 
the respective regional performance. It could also be the 
case that over the period examined, external events, 
irrelevant to the input of the respective regional elites, 
had influenced the performance of the respective regions. I 
could also identify a number of structural constraints on 
the influence of elite interaction on regional growth.
These would stem from previous rounds of capitalist 
accumulation and the 'uneven' character of capitalist 
development between Strathclyde and Crete. Comparing the 
performance of Strathclyde vis a vis Merseyside and Crete
465 . Crete has a similar economic profile with different sectors of Vorio 
and Notio Aigaio, so combining the two appears to provide the best mode 
of comparison. See table 7.13 for the comparison of the regional 
economies by sector.
. Regional elites 'personnel circulation' and 'social circulation' data 
(as defined by Welsh 1979, pp.25-26), are not available for the Cretan 
regional elites.
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vis a vis Vorio and Notio Aigaio is an attempt to alleviate 
that condition.
I believe that in spite of all such intervening or 
antecedent variables, the examination of the evidence will 
give a good indication of the input of the regional elites 
to the regional performance. Finally, results from the 
regional rate of performance can provide a broad measure of 
comparison between the two regional elites.
Table 7.13: GVA by sector for Strathclyde/Dumfries/Galloway 
with Merseyside; Crete with Vorio and Notio Aigaio.
Agriculture Industry Services
Strathclyde+ 1% 30% 69%
Merseyside 0% 27% 70%
Notio Aigaio 9% 27% 64%
Vorio Aigaio 25% 17% 57%
Crete 25% 26% 49%
Source: Portrait of the Regions, Vol. 2 and Vol. 3, Commission of the 
EC, Luxembourg 1993.
Both regions under investigation appear to be doing better 
than their regions of comparison (graph 7.1). Strathclyde 
appears to be doing remarkably better than Merseyside, while
. Ideally this test would be performed on regions of similar size, 
endowments, economic development and stage in the economic cycle.
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Crete appears to be doing marginally better than Notio and
468Vorio Aigaio.
Graph 7.1: Regional GDP at market prices for
Strathclyde/Merseyside and Crete/Notio & Vorio Aigaio 
measured in PPS, for 1990=100





Note: The weighted PPS value of 100 for the two regions is
provided from the formula a=100/b, where b equals the respective 
PPS value of the base year for each region. In the case of Crete 
aQ=2.22 and in the case of Strathclyde a^=l.l62. PPS data are 
available in the Eurostat: Basic Statistics of the EC/EU,
Luxembourg, 1992-1995.
As apparent from table 7.13 Strathclyde and Crete do not 
have an economic profile that can allow a direct comparison, 
Merseyside and Vorio and Notio Aigaio respectively, seem to 
provide a fair match however.
. It should be noted that statistics published in relation to regional 
growth denote a fall in the average growth of GNP for the 12 European 
Community Member States commencing from 1988 . This trend was consistent 
until 1993 (Commission, 1994).
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Coming back to the possible explanations of their 
discordance I have to conclude that the Strathclyde elites 
have 'performed better', as is evident from the favourable 
disparity in regional growth with Merseyside. It is 
reasonable to assume that the comparative discordance among 
elites in Strathclyde was focused on political issues with a 
marginal effect on their co-operation. The evidence here 
suggests that their co-operation was not hampered by their 
discordance on politically 'sensitive' issues.
In the case of Crete, it can similarly be argued that 
although attitudinal discordance is evident in all measures 
constructed, this discordance does not appear to hamper the 
growth prospects of the region. It is also the case, 
however, that the combined regions of comparison appear to 
be doing just as well. It can be deduced that a small level 
of discordance influences elite interaction if it is assumed 
that it points to a varying but not necessarily divisive 
perspective of the relevant elite groups. Results for the 
Greek regions are made more tenuous by the limited level of 
decentralisation of the Greek state at the time of this 
investigation. This would suggest that regional political 
elites are less significant to regional development as
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regional elite interaction cannot be seen to be instrumental 
to development.
An exercise of the possible reasons behind attitudinal 
concordance or discordance can be offered however, based on 
the two regions for which data exist/ Strathclyde 
politicians assessing that they are in the periphery of 
Europe and suffering from a declining industrial base were 
preoccupied with supporting entrepreneurship and regional
469development (Keating, 1988; Jensen-Butler, 1996). Their
approach was pro-active as they strived to develop links 
with the local business community and establish a 'policy 
network', that would allow them to tap into European
470financial resources (Bomberg, 1994).
In the case of Crete, the region was suffering under strict 
centralisation of all regional development schemes, and the 
regional political elite lacked the impetus to produce
469 . It has been recently pointed-out that the effect of the Single Market 
on Scotland has not been particularly significant (Raines et al, 1995). 
On the other hand the Strathclyde Regional Council using data compiled 
by Cambridge Econometrics suggest that the region has greatly benefited 
by European Structural Funds, predicting an impact of an additional 
34.500 thousand jobs by the year 2 0 00 (Strathclyde Economic Trends,
1995) .
. The actions of Scottish elites have been well documented (Keating and 
Midwinter, 1981; Stoker, 1991; Kellas, 1989).
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solutions for the business of the region. The networks 
existing in Crete were clientelistic with the national 
bureaucratic and political elite at the nexus of those 
networks. This lack of independence for the political elites 
does not eliminate their significance however. Local 
enterprise councils and communal entrepreneurial 
initiatives, in which the local political elites were highly
471active created a local 'entrepreneurial milieu'.
According to table 7.12, regional elites appear more 
concordant in Crete than they do in Strathclyde, at the same 
time regional elites in Strathclyde were comparatively 
successful while there is no strong evidence to suggest the 
same for Crete. Except from noting the limited 
compatibility of the two regions, in terms of the policy 
making freedom of the relevant political elites, I can offer 
an explanation that refers to their respective political 
culture. It is possible that in regions where civil society 
can only accept a 'meritocratic' dissemination of political 
patronage, elite concordance is vital to regional 
development. On the other part of the spectrum where
471 . Or what Bailly and Lever (1996) call 'regional milieux'.
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clientelistic networks are prevalent elite concordance, 
although important, is not essential. Regional elites in 
the latter case, although not openly interlocking are likely
472to be part of a single network. Evidence for these 
relationships should lie with elite interaction in each 
region.
In an attempt to determine which are the factors that play 
the determining role in the interaction between business and 
political elites in Strathclyde and Crete I analysed their 
qualitative replies on a number of questions inquiring on 
the level and intensity of this interaction (QB6-QB13 and 
QC4-QC13).
The qualitative data analysis on their value orientations 
can be summarised in that, Strathclyde business and 
political elites do not show the singularity of purpose
473exhibited by elite groups in Chania. At the same time
472 . Piatonni (1996) in her model of 'virtuous clientelism' suggests that 
there are certain conditions under which clientelism can induce 
development, which implies an efficient allocation of resources within a 
clientelistic network.
. This does not imply that there have not been notable success in the 
interaction between the public and private sector in Strathclyde. An 
obvious example is Glasgow Action that successfully dealt with the '1990 
European City of Culture' celebrations.
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political elites in Strathclyde seem keen to co-operate with 
business and facilitate business expansion. This evidence 
would support the premise that regional elites in Crete 
although not always co-operating appear to share the same 
vision for their region. Regional elites in Strathclyde 
although relatively discordant on politically 'sensitive' 
issues make a conscious effort at co-operation, even when 
they do not share the same vision for their region's future.
It is apparent that there are significant differences in the 
political culture of interviewees in the two regions 
investigated. It is however beyond the scope of this 
paper to investigate that conjecture and determine to what 
degree it is the differences in the civic and political 
culture that can be responsible for the different way elite 
attitudes appear to affect regional elite interaction.
A factor of spuriousness in this analysis could be that 
higher growth rates for Crete are relevant to its higher 
potential for growth. Crete starting from a lower level of 
productivity and an economy based on agricultural production
474 . Differences in political culture are examined in chapter 3 section E
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has a higher potential for development. Data for that 
period however show that the expected trend to 
industrialisation cannot account for Crete's higher growth.
As is apparent from Table 7.14, in the Cretan economy an 
increasing amount of value added is produced in agriculture 
in a remarkable nine percentage points change between 1986 
and 1991.^^^ Scotland is moving in the predictable trend of 
most post-industrial economies by transferring resources
477away from industry and into services. So, 
industrialisation cannot be relevant to the difference in 
the growth performance of the two regions.
Table 7.14: Gross Value Added in market prices by sector for 
Scotland and Crete
CRETE SCOTLAND
Agriculture Industry Services Agric. Indust. Serv.
1986 36 . 0% 19 . 9% 44 .1% 2 .1% 38 . 6% 59.2%
1991 45 . 0% 15 . 9% 39 .1% 3 .1% 30.4% 66 . 5%
Note: Source here is the Eurostat publication Basic Statistics of the 
Community, Luxembourg, 1987 and 1994.
. This potential for development has failed to materialise within the 
last fifteen years as it can be demonstrated from the data of average 
GDP growth in table 7.12. This I believe relates more to the economic 
performance of Greece as a whole rather than to a failing of the region. 
Certain reasons for the deteriorating competitiveness of the Greek 
industry are analysed in the relevant report of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 1993).
. The Cretan economy's shift to agricultural production and tourism is 
attributed to the specialisation of the local economy away from an 
'integrated and self-sufficient economic unit' (Manolikakis, 1963) to a 
peripheral unit, geared towards European production needs. A complete 
account of the trends for the regional economy is given in chapter three 
477 Pa^t D.
. A more complete discussion of economic trends for the two regions is 
presented in chapter three.
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So does attitudinal concordance among elite actors affect 
regional performance? Or even more topically, do regional 
elites agree? And what is the significance of this 
agreement or disagreement?
In the evidence I have uncovered regional elites' 
concordance appears to be related to the performance of a 
region. This happens despite of a presumed negative 
attitude of a Labour dominated local authority to business 
(Strathclyde) or of a state 'controlled' local political 
elite (Chania/Crete). In both regions investigated there 
appears to be a modus vivendi between the local and national 
political elites under which although the locality may be on 
the receiving end of state caprice, co-operation over 
'practical' development issues prevails. Such an 
'understanding' certainly suits local business elites as it 
typically serves their interests. It could be argued 
therefore, that regional political elites are significant 
for business, even in comparatively centralised states, by 
the degree to which they subjugate their own interests to 
those of business in their area.^ * It would be interesting
. This argument assumes that local politicians associate more closely 
with issues of 'equity' and 'resource use externalities' than 'efficient 
use of resources' arguments. For a comprehensive debate of the trade­
offs of urban economic policy Jensen-Butler (1996) gives an excellent 
account, while Pickvance (1996) deals with its political dimensions.
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to determine the degree to which political elite actions are 
guided by a sharing of 'values' with the business elite.
It is also topical at this stage to note that the debate on 
the relevance of the interaction between regional business 
and political elites acquires significance only in the
480context of contemporary local elite interaction. Within 
the context of contemporary modern (or post-modern for some) 
political interaction and under the effects of market 
globalisation local business and political elites roles 
change. The emergence of the welfare state to a degree 
emancipates local political elites from dependence on 
business or land-owning interests. At the same time 
integration of international markets creates a new 
production and consumption space. Difficulty with the 
onomatopoeia for this new topography of what Swyngedouw 
(1992) calls the 'glocal' while Coffey and Bailey (1996) 
call 'micro-global' points to problems with its definition. 
With the growth in importance of 'place productivity' 
(Jensen-Butler, 1996) at the expense of the principle of 
absolute advantage for an area, urban or economic regions
479 . It is indeed relevant to the examination of elite interaction within 
'policy networks' of whether those elites share the same values. In 
this respect, value concordance is an essential determinant of what can 
be termed the 'quality' of elite interaction and could provide a better 
understanding (instead of a simple investigation of elite interaction) 
of how closely policy networks coincide with networks of power.
, Slaven and Kim (1994) among others have noted the extensive 
interlockingness among business and political elites in Scotland between 
1860 and 1960.
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become increasingly more important as the new production 
engines in Europe and the world (ERECO, 1993) .
In conclusion, initial examination of the data would support 
the premise of HV as higher attitude concordance among elite 
groups in Crete is matched by their higher growth than 
Strathclyde. When the two regions are compared with the 
'equivalent' regions of Vorio/Notio Aigaio and Merseyside, 
Strathclyde's performance is more remarkable, however. Lack 
of evidence on elite concordance on the regions of 
comparison precludes any conclusive evaluation of the 
premise. There is some degree of confidence in saying that 
higher concordance of attitudes in Crete correlates with a 
higher likelihood of agreement and a sharing of values among 
elite groups than is the case in Strathclyde. However, as 
unravelled through the examination of data in this section, 
agreement among regional elites does not necessarily lead to 
'productive' co-operation. Evidence analysed here offers 
support to the alternative hypothesis that only concordance 
on certain attitudes is significant for elite interaction 
(that is relevant to regional competitiveness). Strathclyde 
elites appear more concordant than Cretan one's on Measure D 
(preparedness towards 1992). If this measure is indicative 
of other similar attitudes that could be grouped under an 
elites' concern with a market's efficiency^^ it would lend
481 Efficiency considerations can be linked to policy efforts to 
supplement the workings of the market when it fails to attain a 'Pareto
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support to the premise that only certain values are 
important for regional elite co-operation.
I can juxtapose that the sharing of values among elites 
facilitates what economists call the 'entrepreneurial 
milieu' although I cannot test the null hypothesis for this 
argument. The existence however of elite concordance would 
be in accord with arguments presuming the emergence of 
governance in the European regions along neo-corporatist 
lines. If it can be proven that regional elite co-operation 
depends only on sharing of values relevant to regional 
development and happens in spite of or regardless of their 
sharing of values on issues in the political or social 
agenda, this would provide support to one of the basic 
tenets of neo-corporatism.
My initial hypothesis (HV) could be thus refined to examine 
whether regional elite attitudinal concordance on issues of 
economic efficiency (as opposed to issues of social equity 
or political governance) promotes regional growth
482prospects. The academic discourse surrounding such an 
investigation is examined in the next chapter.
optimum' efficiency as well as attempts to introduce 'structural 
efficiency' by the support of 'urban entrepreneurialism' within the 
^2 context of interregional competition (Jensen-Butler, 1996, pp.262-279) 
. Efficiency and equity as defined by Jensen-Butler (1996).
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So, with conditional support for the hypothesis that 
attitudinal concordance among elites affects regional 
development in different ways in both regions investigated, 
I now turn to a re-evaluation of the whole research 
exercise, examining the relevance of my conclusions to the 
current academic debate.
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C h a p t e r . 8
Conclusions and Inferences
A. Evaluation of Research: Measure of Attainment
I have argued here that regional elite interaction may be 
one of the causes behind differentials in regional 
performance. It should be apparent however, that precise 
measurements of elite interaction and their exact 
influence on regional development are problematic 
relationships to gauge. Hence a number of important 
limitations to this hypothesis arise.
In setting out to investigate the interaction of European 
regional elites, my attempt has been to study the 
relevance of their attitudes and interaction with their 
respective regional polity. I have also attempted to 
'question' the relevance of those attitudes to a number 
of pre-conceived notions on what regional elites do and 
what they believe while also revealing possible 
inconsistencies between their professed attitudes and 
their actual behaviour. In this work I have conducted a 
study of attitudes with the intention of understanding 
behaviour.
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Consequently, the two main themes investigated dealt with 
'regional autonomy' and 'European integration'. A number 
of secondary or supportive issues examined included 
'grievances towards their national government', perceived 
regional 'difference from the national body' and 
'preparedness of their economy towards 1992'. These 
issues were examined in the interview questions and led 
to the construction of attitudinal indexes that were 
subsequently employed in a control function of the main 
themes investigated.
It has been evident throughout this thesis that on most 
issues investigated conclusions cannot be final but 
rather indicative. It is the case as well that a number 
of very significant issues raised were addressed, leading 
to a number of novel hypotheses that are expounded in the 
last section of this thesis.
Validity considerations,^^ as they arise out of the nature 
of an elite survey, together with restrictions arising 
from the implementation of a limited scale questionnaire^* 
should be taken into account while interpreting results. 
These limitations however, are endemic to privately 
funded research and do not necessarily deduct from the 
originality of the research approach or the relevance of 
the conclusions.
. Extensively discussed in chapter two, part E.
. A discussion of the sample versus the population size is 
analysed in chapter four, part D.
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The variety of individual answers to questions raised in 
the interviews were effectively processed by a combined 
use of quantitative (in codified statistical analysis) 
and qualitative (recorded responses to open-ended 
questions) techniques of analysis. The use of both 
methods in tandem provides potential gains in the 
reliability of the data, particularly in small size, case 
intensive and cross sectional elite surveys. The 
profile of the four elite sub-groups (extensively 
explored in chapter five) emerges from their replies to 
the diverse questions posed. Their rather diverse 
attitudes became apparent early-on and serve to identify 
each of the four groups in their idiosyncracies. In the 
course of testing the hypotheses, within and between 
regional differences become apparent.
It comes as no surprise, for instance, that devolution 
and business prospects are correlated, the direction and 
strength of the correlation however, were not as self-
. The use in this research of both techniques could be improved by 
devising a model in the future for case intensive quantitative 
elite surveys (discussed in part E of this chapter). I have used 
a quasi-experimental design by employing both qualitative and 
quantitative techniques. This design led to the introduction of a 
number of substantive differences in the interpretation of 
results. A more thorough exposition of the research design is 
presented in appendix I on the formation of the questionnaire.
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evident and required careful interpretation.*®^ The 
eventual use of this correlation in conjunction with a 
number of other working hypotheses leads to the support 
of the premise that a relationship exists between 
attitudes on devolution and business prospects in a 
region. In this as in all other hypotheses, the analysis 
is based on a number of assumptions. These assumptions 
limit the universality of findings and point to inherent 
difficulties in interpretations of attitude surveys.*®^ To 
counteract these hindrances in interpretation I will 
proceed with an exposition of findings and a parallel 
analysis of relevant sources of research and theory, 
particularly as it relates to my own conclusions.
I will attempt to relate my analysis to other surveys of 
similar context, as a partial test of criterion validity. 
The limitations here arise out of the dissimilarity of
*®® . Note should also be made that the survey took place in 1991 
before the proposals for the reorganisation of the Scottish local 
authorities were finalised (Scottish Office, 1992) or there was 
any prospect of the legislation on Greek devolution to be enacted 
(law 2218/94).
*®^  . In this respect I would mention here the effect of personnel and 
social circulation among political elites that point to the 
'transient' character of any elite survey. As explored in chapter 
four, these factors can be particularly significant in times of 
institutional change, which could influence the composition of 
emergent local elites.
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all relevant available research. Furthermore, I have 
chosen not to engage in any secondary analysis of other 
surveys. Instead, I will attempt an evaluation of 
certain of my conclusions by comparing them with 
assumptions or conclusions of other relevant academic 
work. In this respect I address possible criticism by 
interpreting differences in other academic work.
Finally, I will attempt an investigation of whether my 
analysis supports the premise of the emergence of 
regional behaviour as a facet of an increasingly 
interdependent and integrating European political 
environment. I aim to determine a degree of content 
validity, although I am aware that not all aspects of the 
relevant research questions have been covered in this 
exercise.
The ultimate section of this chapter suggests possible 
related aspects and fields to my research and that may be 
beneficial to the understanding of the questions I 
raised, if researched further.
B. An Evaluation of Findings: Tested Propositions
Attitudes investigated in tested hypotheses address a 
number of issues for which references in the 
international bibliography are rather limited. In
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particular, issues addressed pertain to the difference 
between business and political elites' attitudes 
(hypothesis H I); the degree of accord between sub­
national elite attitudes as it relates with their 
development level (H II); the existence of a 
differentiation in attitudes related to a regional 
elites' origins (H III); the relationship between 
attitudes on devolution and the perceptions of business 
prospects for a region (H IV); and the relationship 
between concordance of attitudes between elite groups and 
regional growth prospects (H V ) .
To investigate these hypotheses I employed a number of 
working hypotheses. These tests have led to a number of 
interesting conclusions that relate to the samples 
investigated.
From the analysis of replies pertaining to the first 
working hypothesis (WHl) I concluded that businessmen and 
politicians hold different positions on the attitudes 
surveyed in each region. Furthermore, it seems that 
their occupational position, as businessmen or 
politicians, affects the attitude they take (WH2). The 
distinctiveness of each elite groups' attitudes and 
perspectives, as it transpires through their quantitative 
and qualitative replies, is essential for restricting the 
possibility of interlockingness between elite groups.
Its main significance, however, arises from pointing to a 
difference in elite attitudes among the key elite groups
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in a region. It is therefore relevant to an 
investigation of behaviour at a regional level.
Assuming that the difference in the regional development 
level is responsible for a difference in their attitudes, 
I have been able to establish that Cretan and Strathclyde 
elites have indeed different attitudes(WH3). I have also 
detected weak support for the premise that stronger 
concordance of attitudes is apparent in the less 
developed region (AWH4). So, I have been able to 
determine variance both 'between' and 'within' regions 
in terms of attitudes among the regional elites 
investigated.
Next, I found businessmen to perceive regional political 
elites as more receptive than national ones'(WH5), 
although I could identify a number of different causes 
for this divergence in the two regions investigated. It 
becomes evident as well that regional politicians are 
perceived to favour long term economic policies more than 
national politicians (WH6), although there are 
significant variations in their perceptions regarding 
this premise which are relevant to the occupational 
category of each elite group. From this section of the 
analysis a possible relationship between aspirations to 
autonomy and perceptions of regional Councillors 
performance indicate that there may be a relationship 
between the two. If such a relationship exists, it could 
be assumed that 'autonomy' would precede 'Councillors
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performance' in the regional elites' value system. It is 
hypothesised therefore that aspirations to autonomy have 
a positive effect on Councillors perceived performance. 
Overall, I was able to detect that regional elites region 
of origin is relevant to their perception of their 
respective regional political elites.
The different level of devolution among the two regions 
investigated seems to have no significant impact on their 
attitudes towards SMEs importance (WH7). By comparison 
those regional elites with a higher aspiration to 
autonomous rule will be more negative on the prospects of 
SMEs in their region (AWH8). In conjunction, positive 
attitudes towards autonomy/devolution relate to a 
negative perception of business prospects in a region 
(AWH9). This indicates that even if the measures used 
are inadequate there is strong evidence to support the 
proposition that there is a relationship between 
attitudes on devolution and perceptions of business 
prospects in a region among local elites.
Finally, I investigated the possible link between the 
concordance of attitudes between political and business 
elites in a region and regional performance. On the 
level of investigation permitted with the data available 
(and by the use of a cross-sectional study), it appears 
that there is a relationship between high concordance of 
attitudes between elite groups and growth performance for 
a region. For the two elite groups investigated, there
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are a number of intuitive comments that can be made 
regarding their differences in attitude. Strathclyde 
business and political elites seem to have a high 
discordance among each other for issues relating to 
grievance towards their national government and their 
attitudes towards regional autonomy, while they appear 
comparatively concordant on both other issues indexed.
By comparison, Cretan elites appear equally divergent 
across the spectrum of measures investigated, but without 
any acute (or divisive) differences. I initially offered 
the alternative hypothesis that Cretan elite groups, 
although holding consistently different attitudes, do not 
have divisive differences on issues investigated and can 
thus be constructive in their co-operation. By 
comparison, Strathclyde sub-groups, although highly 
appreciative of each other, appear to be discordant on 
issues of political significance.^"^
My final test consisted of comparing the performance of 
Strathclyde with Merseyside and Crete with Vorio/Notio
*®® . From the measures constructed in chapter five (section F) and 
compared in the index of Table 7.12 in chapter seven, it becomes 
apparent that difference in attitudes among Strathclyde elites 
receive high scores on issues of 'grievance towards their national 
government' and 'attitudes towards regional autonomy' (ranging 
from 50.5 to 55.1 index points) and low scores on all other 
measures (from 8.2 to 8.8 index points). At the same time Cretan 
elites show a consistent discordance but with much lower 
divergence on all measures investigated (ranging from 14.3 to 26.2 
index points).
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Aigaio. This comparison points to a remarkably better 
performance by Strathclyde compared to Crete. By a 
closer examination of the data it becomes apparent that 
Strathclyde elites are concordant on issues of 
'structural efficiency' but are relatively discordant on 
issues of 'social equity'. To put it differently, they 
appear concordant on attitudes that can determine their 
effective collaboration on regional development, but 
discordant on 'purely' political or social equality 
attitudes. Furthermore there are limitations on 
inferences that can be made on the effectiveness of local 
elite interaction in Crete since it is positioned on the 
receiving end of a vertical clientelistic relationship 
with the national executive. In the case of Strathclyde 
it appears evident that discordance based on politically 
contentious issues has not hampered elite interaction, 
while strong concordance on the condition of the regional 
economy seems to be in tandem with a high willingness 
among elites to co-operate. It can be deduced therefore 
that regional elites need to share the same views on 
issues of economic efficiency for a region to perform 
wel l.
It is difficult to compare other research for an element 
of criterion validity without engaging in secondary 
analysis of their data. From current published research 
however it appears that a number of studies in Europe 
touch upon issues I have investigated. Particularly 
issues relating to the emergence of regional elites and
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their relevance to regional growth have started receiving 
attention.
Research by Dupoirier (19 94) focuses on the development 
of political elites in France and not on their 
relationship with business elites.*®® In that respect it 
shows some insights into the relationship between the 
local/regional elites and the national political elites. 
She concludes her analysis claiming that "the first 
regional elites have indeed been bearers of regional 
autonomy" (Dupoirier, 1994, p.32). In this respect her 
account points to a process of regional socialisation 
that according to her, follows institutional 
decentralisation. Or to put it differently, she accounts 
for the emergence of a regional elite as a result of 
institutional change. These regional elites in turn 
generate 'regional autonomy'. Such a view can be 
limited, for not taking account of generic or external 
factors to the 'creation' of regional elites as well as 
the importance of pre-existing power structures surviving 
the process of institutional change.
*®® . A relevant analysis of regional elite roles by Lucas (1994) 
makes a number of relevant conclusions that cannot however be 
validly considered as his analysis focuses on Kenya. He found a 
link between the diminishing of state capacity and an increase in 
elite leverage while "factions of the [regional] elite are 
interested in establishing and elaborating their own identity and 
bases of power, distinct from the state" (Lucas, 1994, p.38). 
Closer to home Lecomte testifies of the emergence of a 
'politically defined regional identity' (1994, p.143) in the 
region of Rhone-Alps.
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Leonard! and Garmise drawing from primary research on a 
number of European Union states (Italy, Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, and Ireland), point to the "possible connection 
between regional government and economic growth" (1992, 
p.24 7). They base their arguments on an "analysis of the 
economic data [which] suggests that centralised nation­
states have been less successful in mobilising resources 
... than their more decentralised counterparts in Europe" 
(1992, p.265-6). And although it seems that the argument 
they put forward is primarily one of decentralisation, as 
this relates to further efficiency, they recognise the 
significance of regional elites by pointing to "the fact 
that regional elites do not see the single market as a 
zero sum game" (1992, p.252) and therefore are optimistic 
about regional prospects. Their sub-national elite 
survey points to significant differences among regional 
politicians on among others the 'state of the regional 
economy', 'impact of the single market', and 'functions 
of the EC'. These taken in conjunction demonstrate, 
according to the authors, that "the ongoing European 
integration process has established deep roots in the 
local body politic" (1992, p.257-8). Regional political 
elite attitudes are implicitly assumed to account for 
regional prospects and development. The relationship of 
the political with the regional business elites is not 
specifically considered, however.
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Vazquez-Barquero (1990 and 1992a) gives an account of the 
interaction of local political and business elites in 
Spain when faced with the challenge of local development 
strategies.*®® He attests that local political leaders 
"show themselves ready to co-operate and collaborate with 
other local groups" (1990, p.371). He finds that local 
development programs depend, among others on a "tacit or 
express acceptance of the local development strategy by 
the local entrepreneurs" (1990, p.372), signifying the 
importance of the interaction between political and 
business elites in the regions. He concludes his 
analysis by claiming that "we are witnessing in Spain for 
the first time the definition of local development 
strategies which condition the behaviour of the public 
and private, local and external actors" (1990, p.372).*®^ 
So, in conditions of 'incipient autonomy' local 
development projects with their importance for autonomous 
regional development produce regional co-operation and
*®° . In a comparative analysis of four Spanish regions' political and 
socio-economic elites Morata points to "the existence of a 
regional elite which is highly professionalised and with a 
tendentiously pragmatic and rather anti-centralist behaviour"
(1992, p.215). It is easy to infer that a professionalised 
regional elite would facilitate interaction between the business 
and political elites. Evident in an identifiable "general 
agreement in favour of increasing regional powers at the expense 
of the central government" (Morata, 1992, p.215).
*®^  . Vazquez-Barquero also attests to the significance of the 
"mobilisation of the endogenous development potential" (1992b, 
p.32) that would imply the active co-operation between regional 
political and business elites.
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consensus. This consensus is viewed by Vazquez-Barquero 
as quintessential for an autonomous development. The 
question, posed therefore is whether it is the prospect 
of regional development that produces co-operation, or 
consensus that produces regional development.
In an analysis of research on regional elites conducted 
over two decades Putnam reports that there are changes in 
the political culture in Italian regions. This has 
resulted in 'open partisanship' and the 'building' of new 
regional institutions.
"The first two decades of the regional experiment 
witnessed a dramatic change in political climate and 
culture, a trend away from ideological conflict 
toward collaboration, from extremism toward 
moderation,...,from abstract doctrine toward 
practical management..." (Putnam, 1993, p.36). 
Accounting for these changes, three hypotheses are 
proposed, these include: 'electoral replacement',
'national politics' and 'institutional socialisation'. 
With the use of a series of panel surveys he supports the 
conclusion that electoral replacement played no 
contribution to the change; national political trends 
played a modest role; while institutional socialisation 
has the highest effect on the moderation of political 
views. The significance of this study is that it points 
to the "fostering of a tolerant, collaborative 
pragmatism" (1993, p.38) among members of the new
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political elites.*®^ This pragmatism could affect their 
attitudes and interaction with the local business elites. 
Putnam concludes by claiming that "social context and 
history profoundly condition the effectiveness of 
institutions" (1993, p.182) assuming that different civic 
traditions are the basis of regional success. Civic 
community or civic virtue could be relevant to the 
development and interaction of modern regional society 
but they are not necessarily the driving forces behind 
elite interaction.*®®
Overall, I have found a number of examples in recent 
regional elite research to lend support to some of the 
conclusions I reached. In this respect I have provided 
some validation to my results, even though other regional 
elite surveys are not always directly addressing the same 
issues that I do and cannot provide a direct test of 
criterion validity.
*®^  . I note here reservations on some of the assumptions made by 
Putnam in 'Making Democracy Work' as expressed by Tarrow (1996) and 
some appraisal by Katz (1993).
*®® . The seminal work by Almond and Verba (1963) The Civic Culture: 
Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations is the starting 
point, in empirical political science, for the debate on liberal 
versus civic citizen values. A recent survey by Miller et al.
(19 95) points to the relevance of 'the moral community' in modern 
Britain in questions posed to local politicians and a sample of 
the public.
395
C. An Evaluation of Findings: Major Inferences
A number of inferences can be made from testing the 
hypotheses. It has been demonstrated that the 
interaction between business and political elites in the 
two regions is marked by qualitative differences.
It is the case that a number of secondary tests 
constructed point to issue involvement for the different 
elite groups, in accordance with their perceived regional 
interests. So it appears that Strathclyde political and 
Cretan business elites are more concordant with one 
another on issues of autonomy than with their respective 
regional counterparts. Put differently, there is at times 
a greater difference in attitudes within a region's elite 
groups than there is between the two regions. Moreover, 
it appears to be the case that this similarity in 
attitudes does not follow from their respective 
occupational categories. I have explained this 
discrepancy as 'issue involvement' together with a 
presumed division between 'moderate' and 'radical' 
elites. This latter classification refers to the degree 
that elite groups investigated welcome or fear change, as 
it pertains to European integration and regional 
autonomy.
It seems as well, that aspirations of an increase in 
devolution are linked with expectations of higher 
prosperity (and possibly social justice in the case of
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Strathclyde). Furthermore, it has been suggested that 
some members of regional elites are objecting to the 
centralisation of the nation state in its present form, 
which will signify that their support of regional 
autonomy may be based upon a principled objection to 
centralisation.
I have hypothesised that the difference between the 
attitudinal patterns of the elite groups I have 
investigated will point to a difference in the 'endowment 
base' of a region. This will be the case if the 
assumption is accepted that regional elites are of 
paramount importance to regional development. The 
investigation of this premise in the last section of my 
analysis points to a relationship between concordance of 
attitudes on certain key issues and regional performance. 
This is linked to evidence in support of the premise that 
a higher degree of concordance, between a region's elite 
groups, indicates better development prospects for a 
region.
The importance of European regional elites and their 
emergence in the European political arena is portrayed by 
Harvie (1994). Keating (1992), on the other hand, notes 
that the emergence of a 'variable geometry state order' 
directly affects European regional interaction. Taken 
one step further, this notion could imply that regions 
could be 'empowered' or even 'emancipated' within a 
European space of regional units. In this way regions
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will become significant political actors in the formation 
of European policy.^*
The roots of 'régionalisation' of European Union members 
can be traced beyond the current preoccupation with 
regional w e l f a r e . I t  is suggested that European funding 
institutions favour a 'régionalisation' of member states 
that would enhance efficiency, by-passing national 
governments and dealing directly with the regions. On 
the other hand it is suggested that "the EU does not 
intend to play the role of 'universal liberator' of 
subnational government" (Van der Knaap, 19 94, p. 96) 
while at the same time "the Commission seeks to increase 
communication and contact with subnational groups and
. The role of local political elites as instigators of 
institutionalised co-operation across-regions is explored in an 
article by Perulli (1992) on the Alpe Adria Community.
. European regional funding through the ERDF, but also through the 
EIB, the EAGF and the ESF are increasingly directed at the 
regional level (Armstrong, 1993) . It is also assumed that 
Community Support Frameworks (CSF) are geared towards the co­
ordination of the existing EU funds in peripheral and less 
developed regions (Hitiris, 1994). More importantly it has been 
suggested that the co-ordination of regional funding has in some 
cases (i.e. Greece) introduced "...the role of regional 
authorities as effective administrators of development policies" 
(Bianchi, 1992, p.66). Using the Integrated Mediterranean 
Programmes as a paradigm it is suggested that "the IMPs have 
actively contributed to launching (Greece) or relaunching (France, 
Italy) the idea of regional planning" (Bianchi, 1992, p.65), This 
view suggests that national governments devolve and decentralise 
of their own accord seeking efficiency gains and increased 
European funding.
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regional bodies on the periphery" (Bomberg, 1994, p.58). 
It can be therefore suggested that the policies and 
motives towards the EU regions by European Commission 
policy makers are not necessarily clear. Do EU policies 
really empower European regions? Is that the result of a 
conscious effort by the European Commission?
In the case of the Scottish regional elites it can be 
argued that at the time of the survey the Labour- 
controlled Strathclyde Regional and Glasgow City Councils 
had a positive and constructive relationship with the 
local business community. It was further the case that 
most businessmen had a very positive image of the local 
political e l i t e . M a j o r  differences between the two 
groups centred around attitudes towards regional 
autonomy, grievance towards their national government and 
attitudes towards European integration.
In the case of the Cretan regional elites it can be 
assumed that they exhibit a sharing of purpose that takes 
them beyond perceived differences in their views on 
autonomy and European integration. Both elite sub-groups 
seem to share a sense of what comprises common goods, 
while at the same time appear divided along party 
political lines, in a much more categorical way than is
. In this instance I refer to their positive replies to questions 
QBll (78%), QB12 (71%) and QB13 (74%) inquiring whether 
businessmen found local politicians more or equally fervent, 
effective and receptive than local M P s .
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the case in Strathclyde.**^ The Cretans seem to differ 
consistently in all attitudes measured and indexes 
constructed. Their views on regional autonomy, being 
overall negative, seem to be undermined by their very 
strong sense of regional identity on all issues raised. 
They seem unwilling (or it could be argued unable) 
therefore to construct a mature case for autonomy as they 
lack an autonomy inspired 'cultural elite'.
So the two regional elites although living in regions 
with a strong regional (if not national ethnic) identity, 
do not share similar aspirations to autonomous rule.^®® In
. The difference in values among peoples in the two regions 
investigated can be credibly linked to the character of the 
respective societies and the level of their industrialisation and 
development. It is possible that Cretan people are not aware of 
the class dimension of political action in a 'mobilised' sense. 
Attitudes of elites however are not necessarily directly 
representative of those of the greater populace. So, the 
connection with class political perceptions, although relevant, is 
not necessarily a determining factor.
. There appears to be no significant academic, cultural or 
artistic discourse in support of a Cretan identity separate from 
the Greek one. I assume thus that although there exists an 
identifiable and separate Cretan identity within the concentric 
identities of the greater Greek ethnos (Hertzfeld, 1985, p.xii) 
there is a lack of willingness (and possibly as well, a local 
elite incentive) to build-up a consciousness of 'autonomy'. This 
does not mean that the product of a local cultural elite can not 
be co-opted at a future date on an autonomy inspired build-up of a 
cultural identity as discussed by Anderson (1991) .
. Kellas defines ethnic groups as being 'essentially exclusive' 
compared with nations which "...are more inclusive and are 
culturally or politically defined" (1991, p.4).
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particular the Scottish ethnie^°° seems comparatively 
emancipated, compared with the Cretan ethnie that appears 
subjugated to a greater Hellenic national identity.
It is unfortunate that I cannot determine the degree to 
which local elite attitudes reflect public opinion. It
. Smith gives a concise definition of ethnies which are "...'named 
units of population with common ancestry myths and historical 
memories, elements of shared culture, some link with a historic 
territory and some measure of solidarity, at least among their 
elites'" (1995, p.57). Smith distinguishes between "'lateral' or 
aristocratic and the 'vertical' or demotic types of ethnies"
(1995, 58-9), he further suggests that some ethnies are 
'peripheral' in that they are determined by a core-periphery 
relation of alienation and subordination to dominant ethnic 
communities, as were the Scots to the English. A discussion of 
nation-building as part of 'an invented tradition' (Hobsbawm ,
1983) and an 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1991) takes account 
of the needs imposed on nation-states by capitalism and modernity. 
A critical account of 'post-modern' views of nationalism is given 
by Billig (1995).
. Diamandouros points to the importance of the 'fragmentation' and 
'geographical isolation' of Greek society under Ottoman rule 
"...which gave rise to an ethos of pronounced localism and 
parochialism that was effectively to impede national integration 
by placing a premium on primordial sentiments, and by producing 
fierce and lasting local and regional attachments" (1983, p.46). 
Greek nationalism during the formation of the Greek state was all 
pervasive, while religion was used as an 'ethnic tool' that 
infused "...distinctive life-styles, customs, language and 
ancestry myths with the capacity for self-renewal and re­
interpretation under changed conditions" (Smith, 1986, p.260, 
n.51). In this context all divergent local identities were 
subsumed to the dominant Byzantine-Hellenistic tradition. An 
excellent anthropological account of a 'recessive' local ethnic 
identity in modern Greece can be found in Campbell (1964) .
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appears that elite perceptions coincide more with 
politically over-participating groups and the middle- 
class than they do with the disenfranchised (Nie and 
Verba, 1975). It could thus be assumed that political 
elites have a close concordance with the middle-classes 
(most of my sample could be considered as middle class). 
If that is the case, views held by politicians on 
European integration for instance, could be considered 
relevant to a wider audience.
From the exposition of findings it becomes apparent that 
sub-national elites in the two regions have indeed 
different attitudinal patterns and perceptions. It is 
not apparent however, whether sub-national elite groups 
have separate behavioural patterns from national ones. 
Since the samples investigated did not contain 
specifically national elites or other elite 'control 
groups' no inferences can be made on this topic.
Evidence from all research quoted in this chapter provide 
relevant support to both my conclusions and my 
inferences. Theoretical assumptions of other researchers 
are broadly in accord with the results I present here.
In this respect an element of construct validity is 
successful, as attitude measurements complied with the 
theoretical predictions of hypotheses constructed.
Furthermore, it is assumed that cultural and ethnic 
characteristics indeed separate the Cretan and Scottish
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regional elites from their respective nation-state 
elites. I can make no direct assumptions however on the 
degree to which the national political and business 
culture subjugates the respective regional cultures.
There is some evidence to suggest that regional culture, 
if not predominant, is at least significant in attitude 
formation in the two regions investigated.^^
The question finally arises of whether I have 
demonstrated the existence of regional behaviour, that is 
distinct from national behaviour, for the relevant 
regional elites investigated. As this is a comparative 
inquiry, I can attest that the empirical findings 
separate the elites investigated according to their 
attitudes between the two regions. I have come to no 
conclusions as to what extent these regional elites have 
distinctively separate attitudes from their respective 
national elites not having a national sample to compare 
each region. I will proceed with a purely exploratory 
inquiry of this topic in the following section.
. In their verbatim replies to questions pertaining to how 
'separate' people are in their region and the rest of their 
nation-state (QD9,QD10) respondents invariably expounded on 
cultural differences.
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D. Regional Elite Behaviour?
In the analysis of data and tests of the working 
hypotheses a number of questions were raised that could 
have been dealt with if regional elites examined were 
chosen from within one nation-state. Furthermore, my 
analysis at times appeared to make the implicit 
assumption that regional elites in two of the most remote 
and most disparate areas of Europe could be considered 
analogous.
Generalisations made here focused on purpose on two 
regions with different cultural and socio-economic 
character that share however, certain identifiable common 
political attributes (as extensively expounded on in 
chapters three and four). The use of two regions not 
within the confines of a single nation-state was based on 
my assumption that in the emerging European polity, even 
the most disparate of regional units will be likely to 
share a number of common features. One of these could be 
the behaviour of their regional elites, particularly if 
we accept that in the context of globalisation elites 
will exhibit similar value systems and consequently 
behaviour (Lasch, 1995). I will argue here that 
'regional behaviour', (beyond the culturally defined 
expected difference in behaviour among regions with 
different ethnic backgrounds), will be one of the by ­
products of European integration. It could be further
404
implied that it is one of the major intangible assets of 
a region.
The basic arguments on globalisation^” and the emergence 
of an identifiable political class at the regional level 
I have assumed would be related to the existence of an 
identifiable regional behaviour. Post-modernity may be 
relevant to the vision of Anthony Giddens who predicts 
that it "...would not be a world that 'collapses outward' 
into decentralised organisations but would no doubt 
interlace the local and global in complex fashion."(1991, 
p. 178) To the degree that this signifies the emergence
of new forms of polity, the political space within local 
and regional units will become the arena where most 
political decisions (those most affecting everyday life) 
will be taken. This perspective transcends the view of 
the emergence of regional democracy, as a response to the 
need of the contemporary overburdened nation-states, for 
increased legitimacy as I will be arguing further on.
In this context, regionalism within post or radicalised 
modernity (as defined by Giddens, 1991, p.150) and the
. I note here that globalisation is not an inevitable condition of 
contemporary capitalism but is seen by some as "no more than an 
argument deployed by the right to cow the left... [as it] denudes 
the few existing international institutions of the political and 
financial support necessary to upgrade their capacity to shape and 
manage current trends" (Hutton, 1995).
. For a critical account of the 'neoconservativeness' of 
postmodernity see Habermas (1987).
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focus on a Europe of the Regions among European elites 
are not necessarily related. The latter has more to do 
with the democratic deficit of European Union 
institutions and a nation-based regionalism.
The institutional antagonisms within the EU are also 
relevant to the emergent importance of r e g i o n s . T h e  
European Commission "in order to increase its political 
autonomy,...is looking for 'new partners' against the 
omnipotent Council" (Van der Knaap, 1994, p. 9 0 ) . On 
the other hand, local elites as part of 'territorial 
communities' that affect decisions taken at the EU 
institutions are not necessarily 'agents of change' or
The idea of a 'Europe of the Regions' received attention during 
the negotiations and the signing of the Treaty of the European 
Union which instituted a Committee of the Regions. A critical 
account of the notion is given by Borras-Alomar et al. who attest 
that "...the utopian discourse of a harmonious, peaceful 'Europe 
of the Regions' has practically no resemblance with current 
practices, nor even with probable future developments" (1994, 
p.21). Keating suggests that "the Europe of the regions scenario 
stumbles on the awkward fact that there are no natural regions or 
nations in Europe..." (1992, p.52). It can also be assumed that 
the EU needs to operate at a scale intermediate between the state 
and the locality for its policy initiatives to be effective.
. A thorough account on the institutional dynamics of the EU can 
be found in Lodge (1993,1995), who makes a very concise case for 
redressing the democratic deficit, as does Martin (1991) in a 
federalist inspired diatribe.
. In this respect "one by-product of the subsidiarity debate has 
been the opening up of a related discussion about expanding the 
role of subnational governments in EC policy making" (Peterson, 
1994, p.129).
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'champions of oppositional interests' (Bomberg, 1994, 
p.56). In the French case Dupoirier (1994) asserts that 
the emergence of regional elites has fostered an 
increased awareness on the role of new regions, which in 
turn has led to an increase in regional autonomy. A 
similar case is made for Germany where "the success of 
'co-operative federalism' was partly due to the emergence 
of regional political elites" (Harvie, 1994, p. 59) . It 
is the same case in Spain where 'incipient regional 
autonomy' has "brought about both awareness that local 
community work is a necessary condition for solving local 
problems and the willingness of local actors to co­
operate" (Vazquez-Barquero, 1990, p.371). In Italy 
Putnam suggests that "regional leaders exercised more 
independent influence" in the 1990's than they did in the 
1970's while "over the last two decades the region has 
become an authentic, autonomous, and increasingly 
distinctive arena in Italian politics" (1993, p.47).
These accounts take the perspective that regional elites 
developed as a result of legislation establishing 
autonomous government in the regional level, this in turn
is assumed to lead to elite formation by a process of
incorporation to this new regime that leads to
institutionalisation.
. Although it can also be claimed that the emergence of regional 
elites in Germany is the product of a unique political moment in 
the historical development of th^ German state. A number of 
relevant arguments on German regional elites are analysed in Kuhne 
and Ruck (1993).
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I have argued earlier (chapter 7 section D) that the 
régionalisation process is a partly a 'response' to 
globalisation. The 'glocal' (Swygendouw, 1992) signifies 
both the importance of 'place productivity' as well as 
the increased relevance of 'information networks'
(Jensen-Butler, 1996). So, the increased relevance of 
local economic actors for regional competitiveness and 
the effect of the welfare state in increasing the power 
and relative independence of local political actors is 
another factor influencing European régionalisation 
(Lever, 1996).
A rather idealised and glorifying perspective views the 
regional unit as "...an institution whose origins are 
lost in the mists of time, which serves today as a 
bulwark against totalitarianism. The region is seen to 
be rooted in a natural law or derived from the theory of 
intermediate authorities..." (Kukawaka and Tournon, 1987, 
p.40) In the same vein there have been calls for a
. A narrowly defined economic argument is also put forward for the 
importance of emergent "region-states [which] are the natural 
economic zones in a borderless world because, by definition, the 
demands of the global economy shape their contours" (Ohmae, 1995, 
p. 134) . It is further suggested that now "economic activity is 
what defines the landscape on which all other institutions, 
including political institutions, must operate" (Ohmae, 1995, 
p.129), while "nation states are eroding as economic actors.
Region states are taking shape" (Ohmae, 1995, p.13 7). This view 
completely ignores the role of international politics by assuming 
that 'all politics is local', by inferring that all human
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"constitutional guarantee for local and regional autonomy 
within the Community" (Council of Europe, 1990, p. 12) . 
According to this view localities, as the focus of the 
first level of allegiance among citizens and the founding 
block of democracy, are only important in promoting 
democratic efficiency. This can only imply, however, 
that their historical 'fulfilment' will come with an 
institutionalised decentralisation.
Identifying the EU as the first 'post-modern political 
unit' it is suggested that integration leads to an 
'unbundling of territoriality' which "is not located some 
place else: but it is becoming another place" (Ruggie, 
1993, p.176). The European Union "may constitute the 
first 'multiperspectival polity' to emerge since the 
advent of the modern era"(Ruggie, 1993, p.171-2) while as
a part of a 'nonterritorial global economic region' it is
significant in that it embodies "novel behavioural and 
institutional forms and...novel space-time constructs 
that these forms embody" (Ruggie, 1993, p.173). In other
words the EU is perceived not only as a product but also
as an inevitable by-product of post-modernity since "the 
emergence of multiperspectival institutional forms was
motivation is economic and by supposing that local, national and 
international elites always aim (or should aim) at the highest 
economic returns.
. A call for "strengthening the regional structures in Europe" 
(Robert, 1985, p.4) is also related to the need for efficient 
regional development.
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identified as a key dimension in understanding the 
possibility of postmodernity" (Ruggie, 1993, p.176).
In this respect, regional behaviour, in the European 
context, is determined by the need to redefine identity 
in a local sphere and a by-product of modernity and 
globalisation.*^^ It is also the product of elite 
interaction as part of territorially based networks that 
increasingly by-pass or even ignore the supremacy of 
nation-state policy n e t w o r k s . A n d  although, as Smith 
points out, the emergence of a "distinctive value and 
belief - system shared exclusively by the peoples of 
Europe" (1995, p.128) may be a chimera, the realities of 
globalisation are creating the conditions for re­
asserting regional identities.
This condition is not one that directly threatens the 
nation state or national identity.*^* The nation state
. The redefinition of regional identity in the political sphere is 
not necessarily identical with notions of regional culture or 
local ethnic identity. The two spheres may be related but should 
not be confused. According to Keating "there is a danger of 
culture becoming a residual category to explain everything which 
can not be explained in terms of structures or political choice" 
(1991, p.3).
. In his study of 'civic traditions in modern Italy' Putnam 
suggests that the civic community is far from disappearing and 
that globalisation and modernity do not necessarily mean that 
"modernity is the enemy of civility" (Putnam, 1993, p.114).
. Indeed it has been suggested that "The growth of initiatives and 
competencies on regional and European levels is accompanied, in 
many instances, by a reassertion of national governments and
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can co-exist within the concentric circles of citizens 
allegiances and patterns of identification.^* It is the 
behaviour of citizens at their locality that can act as a 
point of convergence for their self-identification and 
serve as a focus of their identity.*^* The academic 
interest on regional behaviour will increase in tandem 
with the emergence of a "variable geometry state order" 
(Keating, 1992, p.60).
In my analysis most of the difference of regional elite 
attitudes within the regions investigated can be 
explained away by party political and socio-economic 
considerations (H I ) . Differences between the two 
regions however cannot as readily be explained away by 
the same political or socio-economic factors (H II) . I 
have found some evidence that it is their occupational 
position as businessmen or politicians that accounts for 
most of the variation in attitudes within regions (WH2). 
While, on most attitudes investigated, Cretan and 
Strathclyde elites show a variation in attitude (WH3).
bureaucracies...", while at the same time "...the place of regions 
in Europe is alongside that of national and non-state actors" 
(Borras-Alomar et al., 1994, p.24).
. See Smith (1996) for an account of how 'concentric identities' 
coincide with 'concentric models of territorialised governance' in 
France.
. In this context Keating also asserts that "...territorial 
autonomy will depend less on the acquisition by regions and 
stateless nations of state like attributes and
competencies,...than on the constitution of their civil societies" 
(1992, p.59).
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At the same time there appears to be a higher concordance 
of attitudes in Crete, which is the less developed region 
examined, than in Strathclyde, which is the more 
developed region(AWH4).
My perspective being 'agent-based' it may be inherently 
restricted, as I try to examine how regional elites 
influence their regional environment. In that respect, 
it could also be suggested that my account of the 
importance of 'regional behaviour', as it is related to 
globalisation and European integration, may be limited in 
the same way that neorealist and neofunctionalist 
accounts are in their analysis of European integration 
(Hix, 1994) . My 'alternative' interpretation of one of 
the forces of European integration can be related to what 
Wallace calls 'informal integration', which consist of 
'intense interaction patterns' that are a result of the 
"dynamics of markets, technology, communications networks 
and social change" (1990, p.9).”®
Inferences that can be made on the general population in 
the regions examined are naturally limited. This is 
particularly the case since not all aspects of the 
relevant hypotheses could be examined in this work, a
. It would be further interesting to note a shift in the emphasis 
of the debate on globalisation to local and regional 
'subnationalisms' (Featherstone, 1990) as well as the emergence of 
an agenda on the Self-determination of Minorities in International 
Politics (Heraclides, 1991).
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result of limited content validity. It is also 
impossible to deduce 'laws' of conduct for regional 
elites or infer the emergence of 'regional behaviour' 
throughout the EU from the comparative examination of two 
non-typical regions.
So, although I cannot pretend to have 're-evaluated' the 
role of regional elites, I have found some evidence to 
suggest that their role may indeed be vital for the 
development of regional units. The process of European 
integration could be leading to the reasserting of 
regional identities and the re-enforcement of those codes 
of conduct that will lead to a re-assertion of 'regional 
behaviour'. In this respect I am in agreement with 
Rosamond in his claim that "there may indeed be 
identifiable sets of global dynamics, but their impact is 
entirely dependent upon the mediation provided by 
localities and regions" (1995, p.401).
I can not give evidence of a transformation of regional 
civil society as I do not engage in a longitudinal 
analysis, I can detect causes of strain and discontent 
with institutional arrangements regarding the respective 
nation-states that could be eventually related to the 
emergence of a 'regional awareness'. This, as I have 
tried to portray from my analysis of the current academic
. It has further been argued that "national and subnational 
identities are reimagined as awareness of external, globalizing 
'threats' takes place"(Rosamond, 1995, p.401).
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discourse, is not necessarily envisaged as an 
antagonistic 'sub-state nationalism'.
The emergence of a politically significant and 
identifiable 'regional behaviour' can be partly related 
to the opportunities presented by the emergence of the 
new European polity. It can be in that sense the 
product of European integration under the influence of 
globalisation and radicalised modernity.
E. Suggestions for Further Research
In the course of this research effort one of the main 
difficulties has been data collection. Existing survey 
formats are too loose and are based on an intuitive 
understanding from the researcher of the strengths and 
pitfalls of particular questionnaire designs. More 
significantly however, the two basic questionnaire 
designs are not often linked and there are rare instances 
of a combined use of quantitative and qualitative survey 
approaches.
. Wallace claims that the EU is better understood as "a semi­
developed political system than as a highly interdependent 
regional international system" (1994, p.272). The EU is still in 
the formative phase of its institutional and maybe as well of its 
social development.
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In comparative local elite surveys, which can encompass a 
large number of informed subjects, it is desirable to 
conduct surveys that both tap into the need for efficient 
quantitative analysis and to the possibility of 
knowledgeable insights from the subjects. In this 
research I have used a variant of both methods by 
employing questions that can provide quantifiable 
measurements (i.e. Likert scale) as open ended questions 
as well. The quantitative data provided the orientation, 
while the qualifications to replies provided the insights 
that can be reasonably expected from an in depth elite 
survey.
Furthermore, although in the name of efficiency 
quantitative surveys are considered a more precise and 
accurate solution, they are embedded in validity 
considerations exactly because it is impossible to 
evaluate all relevant parameters while constructing a 
questionnaire. It is not possible, in other words, to 
know beforehand the preoccupations of a regional 
Councillor towards European integration and by asking any 
number of pre-arranged questions it is not certain that 
the most relevant issues will be explored or that their 
strength will be correctly gauged. This condition makes 
the use in tandem of both quantitative and qualitative 
tools desirable, if not imperative.
Given the resource limitations there are very few 
elements that could have been improved on the research
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design.^* In retrospect I would have eliminated some 
questions that did not belong to the indexes I 
constructed in chapter five Furthermore, I would not
have separated and distinguished parts B and C of the 
questionnaire to be exclusively asked to the business and 
political sub-samples. Although the issues pertaining to 
each elite group are different this solution diminishes 
the comparability of a number of their replies.
There are a number of issues that I have considered 
relevant to this investigation and which I have not been 
able to test with the measures employed. My inquiry has 
touched upon a number of these issues and I have 
consequently decided to give a number of ex post facto 
explanations that can be used in developing relevant 
research designs and hypotheses in the future.
The first of these fields is the perceived role of 
multinational enterprises and therefore international
. I would have liked to consider the possibility of a panel study 
or of a longitudinal survey in the regions and for the topics I 
have researched, but I know this to be unfeasible.
. I also note here the changes that have occurred since I have 
conducted my survey which include the introduction of a single 
tier in Scottish local government planned for April 1996 
(discussed by Paddison, 1995 and McAteer, 1996) and the 
introduction of elections of regional prefects in Greece in 
October 1994 (a discussion of pre-decentralisation attitudes of 
regional elites by Verney and Papageorgiou 1992). These 
developments could have an effect on both attitudes and 
composition of the new regional political elites.
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capital in a regional economy. Attitudes towards 
multinationals could be linked with attitudes to regional 
autonomy.
Secondly, attitudes on European integration may also be 
linked with regional elite alienation from the state 
centre. This may be due to the increase in grievance 
towards the nation-state in tandem with an increase in 
expectations from the supra-national EU.^^^
Further research is also needed on the effect of elites' 
'locally biased' mental maps of opportunity. These may 
be affecting regional competitiveness by being markedly 
different between regional political and business elites.
This last sphere of 'distorted maps of opportunity' could 
be relevant to the current preoccupation with 
globalisation and the consequences of modernity (or 
post/radicalised modernity). What I have termed 
'regional behaviour' could be relevant to the emergence 
of a new regional affinity in defiance of, or as a
. For instance the question arose, while I was examining working 
hypotheses six and seven (WH6, WH7), of whether a higher level of 
devolution is correlated with higher aspirations to autonomy. 
Evidence from measure B (chapter five section F) suggest that 
Strathclyde politicians have a high positive attitude towards 
regional autonomy while the only other group with a high positive 
attitude are Cretan businessmen. The two sub-groups would 
reasonably be expected to give answers on opposing sides of that 
scale. Since there is no corroboration and the data appear 
inconclusive this question has to remain open in this thesis.
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consequence of, the so called laws of globalisation and 
capitalist accumulation. We may be witnessing the 
beginning of an era in which there will be a re-focusing 
of national allegiance to more narrowly defined 
territorial localities/regions. Such a development will 
find us ill equipped in making interpretations or 
understanding change, if current dividing lines between 
fields of social science research are maintained. New 
challenges require new tools which can be provided by 
taking a multidisciplinary perspective .
Finally, the examination of policy networks within the 
context of multi-perspectival polities (and multi-level 
governance) can improve our understanding of how regional 
elites interlink with national and supra-national ones. 
The use of socio-metrics may not be adequate however in 
determining how closely policy communities and policy 
networks coincide with power networks.^* In that respect
. I have borrowed concepts and dealt with both theoretic and 
empirical material beyond those of purely political science or 
European integration studies from among others, political 
geography, political sociology, social anthropology, regional 
economics and political economy. I note here the results of a 
round table organised under the aegis of the Journal of Common 
Market Studies, where it was stressed that studies of European 
integration need to be interdisciplinary, while there was also a 
call for an integration of empirical and theoretical work (Bulmer 
and Scott, 1994).
. Noting the limitations expressed earlier on employing policy 
networks as more than an investigative tool.
. Social network analysis is explained by Scott (1991) while 
political networks are analysed by Knoke (1990) .
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actor 'centrality' or 'betweenness' may be inadequate 
measures of interaction/"^ Elite value sharing should be 
considered at least as important in determining the 
effectiveness of network connections. In the same vein, 
the possibility that collaboration between elites is 
determined by their sharing of certain values warrants 
further investigation. Elite actor concordance may 
enhance our understanding of the workings within policy 
networks as well as provide us with a better insight of 
prospects for effective co-operation among elite actors.
. For an excellent empirical investigation with the use of 
sociometrics see John and Cole (1996).
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NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS
(Selected Issues)
CRETAN and GREEK
Alithia (Cretan local newspaper)
Chaniotica Nea (Cretan local newspaper)
Chaniotiki Eleftherotypia (Cretan local newspaper)
Ekonomikos Tachydromos (weekly economic journal)
Epilogi (monthly economic journal)
Ethnos tis Kyriakis (national Sunday newspaper)
Kritiko Fos (Cretan local newspaper)
Kyrikas Chanion (Cretan local newspaper)
To Vima tis Kyriakis (national Sunday newspaper)
Tourismos ke Ekonomia (monthly journal), special issue "Crete 
and Tourism" June 1991 (No.155)
SCOTTISH and UK
The Economist (weekly economic journal)
The European (European affairs weekly)
The Financial Times (economic newspaper)
The Glasgow Herald (Scottish newspaper)
Scottish Economic Bulletin (HMSO Statistics on Scotland)
The Scotsman (Scottish newspaper)
Stathclyde Economic Trends (published by the Strathclyde 
Regional Council)
EUROPEAN
(European Commission, European Union)
Eurobarometer (public opinion statistics of EC & EU)
Eurostat (statistics of the EC & EU)
Regio (regional statistics of the EC & EU)
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I LIST OF ABREVIATIONS
If Community Support Frameworks 
;^G F European Agricultural Guarantee Fund 
European Economic Community 
FC European Community
European Investment Bank
ÙERDF European Regional Development Fund 
European Social Fund 
EU European Union 
FT Financial Times 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GRP Gross Regional Product 
IMPs Integrated Mediterranean Programmes 
LOG Less Developed Country 
Lie Low Income Country 
MNLs Multinatrional Enterprises 
TNLs Trans-National Enterprises 
SMEs Small-Medium Sized Enterprises 
SRC Strathclyde Regional Council
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Appendix I: Questionnaire Formation and Implementation
A. Overview
It has been my judgment that the most appropriate way to collect 
data relevant to the hypotheses I want to investigate was through 
a questionnaire in a survey. Elite interviewing was chosen as 
the most efficient method given the limited resources and 
particular focus of the hypotheses. The prevalent effort has 
been to introduce a surveying approach to entail the largest 
possible sample, which as some researchers content is a method 
'superior to elite interviews of informants' (Hoffman-Lange,
1987). Hoffman-Lange further testifies that "the use of a highly 
structured questionnaire presents no obstacles and does not lead 
to insufficient response rates" (1987, p.44). This view I 
combined with the view that interviews are "surely superior to 
any alternative way of discovering what they (elites) believe and 
do" (Crewe, 1974, p.43). Effectively the use of both a 
quantitative measure by providing for graded responses and a 
qualitative one by creating questions that can be further 
qualified and expanded upon, has been deemed necessary.
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The view that elite attitudes cannot be comprehensively mapped- 
out by the extensive study of a few individuals is shared in this 
research while at the same time, it seems apparent, thinning-out 
of resources to attempt interviews with a larger section of the 
local elite could create a series of data that could lack on 
insight.
In this survey I combine a number of surveying techniques on the 
structure and formation of questions. Heed is taken of the 
warning on validity by William Belson (1986) of combining the 
response distributions from open and closed question systems by 
separating and identifying the two groups (i.e. quantitative and 
qualitative) when analysing results.
Yes and No questions where combined with questions in which 
employment of Likert and Semantic Differential scaling is deemed 
appropriate, to facilitate the more diverse input of data 
possible in order to test the research h y p o t h e s i s . I n  this 
way the use of aggregated data from answers to construct a 
statistical distribution can be employed, while at the same time
.Again note is given on validity considerations as expressed by Belson 
(1986, p.2 54) in that Semantic Differential Scaling tends to provide 
comparisons which are prone to bias. His conclusion is that errors although 
apparent balance out in the net aggregation of results. The small size of the 
sample in this survey make the use of this investigative tool more prone to 
bias.
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cross reference those distributions with the content of answers 
from key individuals. Being aware of the limitations in this 
sample size and maybe even of the sampling method (as referred to 
in chapter four) any distribution is of limited statistical 
significance as a descriptive element of the respective 
populations Further than resource and other limitations as
explained, in previous chapters, note should be made that sample 
populations in many cases were not numerous enough to make a 
statistical distribution meaningful. Explanations and 
qualifications of responses to questions become thus essential 
for claiming relative insight into the elites observed. Most 
research on elites avoids mixing the two perspectives. I have 
found the present approach to be a complementary one to those 
already existing. By taking aggregate data of a small sample and 
comparing them with responses of key individuals to particular 
questions, the degree to which an opinion is within or outside 
"mainline" responses, of the elite sub-group respondents belong 
to, can be tested. Interviewees were encouraged to give 
extensive replies qualifying their scaled answers which have been 
essential for explaining their attitudes.
A statistical distribution of replies is bound to be affected by a bias 
to middle responses. As research conducted by G. F. Bishop asserts "offering 
respondents a middle alternative in a survey question will generally make a 
significant difference in the conclusions that would be drawn about the 
distribution of public opinion on an issue, because such alternatives usually 
attract a substantial number of people who may be ambivalent about the other 
alternatives presented to them" (Bishop, 1987, p.229).
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An effort was made for the basic questions to remain the same in 
both languages, changes of questions have only been allowed to 
facilitate differences in local norms. For example Greek local 
authorities have far less power than Scottish local authorities, 
a fact that is facilitated by milder references to regional power 
in Greece. Such modifications are 'inherent to cross-national 
surveys' (Nevitte,1990) as long as the comparative logic remains 
intact. Nevitte and Gibbins further suggest that for cross 
country research one should try to minimize within group variance 
so as to sharpen focus in between group variance. To the effect 
that this was possible in ray analysis I have tried to attain a 
similar perspective.
Respondents where assured of confidentiality in their 
r e s p o n s e s . 2^8 The social position of interviewees and the 
particular problems of elite interviewing were prominent in the 
approach used while conducting the survey.
528. Relevant research on the problems of confidentiality was conducted under 
the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences in the U.S. (Shaw, 1979). 
Dissenting voices of the particular research conclude however that, 
"...concern over the issue of confidentiality may have been exaggerated, and 
they tell against the claim that a promise of perpetual confidentiality or of 
long delayed access to identifiable data is essential to obtaining 
information." (Shaw,1979,p.119). In the present research however the elite 
status of the individuals interviewed makes confidentiality considerations 
particularly relevant.
529. Further than Manheim and Rich's book (Manheim, 1991) on elite 
interviewing, standards of conduct are covered in McCrossan (1991).
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An introductory presentation of the questionnaire at the 
beginning of each interview referred to definitions of 'local', 
'regional', 'national', 'autonomy' and 'devolution' employed. 
Interviewees were encouraged to interrupt the interviewer and ask 
for clarifications of any questions whose meaning they perceived 
as dubious. So, although every effort was made at keeping the 
meaning of questions simple and unequivocal, attention was also 
paid at possible misconceptions that wording could create to 
respondents.
B. Survey Instrumentation
The construction of the actual questions was done in relation to 
the hypotheses I wanted to test (as discussed in chapter two) .
The structure was redrawn a number of times in order to 
facilitate the best possible reception from interviewees, while 
certain questions had to be positioned, so that they could act as 
stimuli, for issues this thesis has set out to c o v e r . T h i s  was
530. Relevant to 'desirable' directions of research is the volume by Thomas 
(1985) .
531. Considerations of validity in the construction of questions in 
questionnaire use are given by Belson who raises serious doubts as to the 
effectiveness of questions he used in his research claiming that "For all the 
questions tested, the proportion falling within permissible limits was, on 
average, only 29 per cent." (Belson, 1981,p.350). Basic texts in 
questionnaire formation also include Manheim (1991), Yates (1953) and Miller 
(1983) .
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attained, for instance, by placing questions on issues with a 
general consensus before controversial ones. ^32
The questionnaire itself was divided into four parts. Part A is 
designed to be answered from all interviewees and contains two 
sections. The first section provides background information 
about the interviewee. Particularly the rank within their 
organisation, the age group as well as information on date and 
place of the interview. The second section contains one factual 
question on national identity and three questions on attitudes of 
interviewees toward European integration and nationalist 
political movements. The way the questions are asked is 
intentionally non argumentative, in an effort to establish that 
the questionnaire pertains to European and nationalist issues.
As with most questions in this questionnaire a two stages 
approach is taken; I try to establish first to what degree the 
respondent's attitude was internationalist (question Q 1 .) and 
then asked whether they were consciously pro-federalist (question 
Q 2) . Positive or negative sentiment towards the local 
nationalist movements which was asked next was followed by a 
question on family roots, the possible correlation being obvious.
532. The possibility that low involvement or awareness of an issue affects 
respondent likelihood to take an extreme position has to be taken into 
consideration. Research by Bishop suggests that some "response effects in 
public opinion surveys may well be a function of issue involvement"(Bishop 
1990, p.216), although this might not always be the case.
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Nationalism being an issue on which people have strong views, I 
superseded with a more factual question on national origin. If I 
had asked these questions in reversed order I was preoccupied 
interviewees could be induced by their national identification to 
show bias towards a nationalist affiliation.
Part B was aimed at businessmen exclusively. In part B.I. 
factual information about the size of their company by turnover 
and employees; the ownership of the company whether public or 
private, local, national or foreign ; and the operations whether 
local, regional, national or export oriented were asked. The 
reason for this being obvious. In the same way that an 
individual can be representing demographic groups I felt 
executives could be biased depending on their companies export 
orientation, ownership and size. I do not propose to investigate 
this further by extensively testing such hypotheses. I expected 
however that ownership and size of business to be related to 
businessmen perspectives.
In part B.II. questions were asked within a framework that builds 
up to questions QB11,QB12 and QB13 and ends with rather non- 
controversial questions to prepare the ground for part D.
Question one asks about regional government, two about the 
development of small medium enterprises and three asks on the
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contested issue of whether they think small-medium enterprises 
are relevant to economic integration. This group of questions 
has two points of interest, the first is a straight-forward one 
and asks them of whether they think the region (and in part b. 
the company) will benefit from an increase in the powers of 
regional government. Answers here can be compared to answers Q1 
and Q 2 , QDl and QD13 which refer respectively to federalism and 
business perspective about a united Europe. The second 
interesting point is eased on the interviewees with question two 
which is rather general, while question three is introducing an 
issue that many of them admitted not to have seen under this 
light before. Responses to this question I consider quite 
significant for the hypothesis testing.
The next group of questions has question four introducing people 
to the subject of elected representatives and how well the sample 
group was acquainted with them. I could have accepted and 
substituted this question by the frequent relevant polls 
conducted on degree of awareness of the electorate but I felt 
since I could not (as explained above) attain completely 
representative samples I had to get this information for the 
particular sample. Furthermore, the elite nature of the sample 
meant that their involvement and political awareness could 
significantly diverge from that of the general population.
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Questions five and six are most interesting since they register 
opinion (on a Likert scale) of businessmen on Councillors and 
MPs, being asked to compare them while sub-issues touched upon 
questions of whether they perceive the local political community 
as pro or against business interests.
Answers to the next group of questions should be compared with 
the degree to which respondents consider themselves pro or anti- 
European as well as whether they have an ethnocentric 
perspective.
Tied to this issue is question eight which investigates 
confidence in local e n t r e p r e n e u r s , ^33 qbi8 extrapolates this by 
asking whether multinationals will be good for local business.
In effect I am trying to determine if they consider 
multinationals good for the local economy.
Part C was addressed to political personalities exclusively. In 
part C.I the general information of political party affiliation 
and body or area of representation were dealt with. This 
information is important as all relevant information in part A. I
533- A minor adjustment between the Greek and the Scottish version of the 
questionnaire is that the Greek version does not ask question B.II.8.A, in 
parts a .& b . as the British version does but rather asks if they 'would 
function effectively in a region different than their own'. The degree of 
attachment to the region is answered by both versions, the British also 
examining, attitudes to European employment.
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and B.I. for classifying responses according to social position 
and status.
The questions in part C.II. comprise all those questions I felt 
were not relevant to businessmen, but were particularly relevant 
to political personalities. Questions QC9, QCIO and QC12 could 
however be compared with relevant questions QBll, QB12 and QB13. 
Differences between the two groups centre around the importance 
these have in relation to the structure of the q u e s t i o n n a i r e . ^ 34 
The first two questions on part C comprise one entity. Lobbying 
and accountability are the issues raised. This is done 
connecting lobbying with the region while accountability is 
connected with regional authorities and regional development. 
Because both questions ask about MPs relationships with the 
region, question one is designed to reflect regional authorities 
preoccupation with MPs involvement and accountability to regional 
issues, while question two asks the same in a more straight 
forward manner.
534 . Businessmen were asked about the fervour, effectiveness and 
receptiveness of their local authority representatives after they had been 
asked to what degree they were acquainted with their local, national or 
European representatives. Such a question would have been comparatively 
redundant with the political elite. On the other hand politician's position 
within the elite I felt warranted questions on the comparative importance of 
the local vs. the national and European executive.
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Question QC4 prefaces QC5 and QC7 in asking which are more 
important for the development of the region, local or 
multinational companies. QC5 and QC7 are to an extent 
situational questions asking whether the respondents believe that 
if the economy was hit by a recession a surviving firm would tend 
to migrate, depending on size (small-medium vs. multinational). 
Omitted are large local concerns. What I try to measure though 
is confidence in multinationals compared with a distinctly local 
concern, making this comparison rather pronounced. Questions 
from part B that can be juxtaposed to this section are QB3 and 
QB4. In questions QC9, QCIO and QC12 I ask respondents to 
compare regional councillors with local MPs as they did in the 
first part of this section (questions QBl and QB2), but keep the 
two sets apart because the perspective of the two groups can be 
seen as different. I try to determine the degree to which 
regional councillors are considered, better acquainted with their 
constituency, more willing and more able to be involved in policy 
decisions. In other words the degree to which they can play a 
decisive part in the democratic process. QC12 is constructed so 
as to induce the expression of attitude rather than fact.
Finally I asked two questions that could have been included in 
part C.I. but I felt their inclusion at the end was more likely 
to provide an honest reply. The first of the additional
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questions (QC13) asks if these political personalities have in 
effect themselves been lobbied. The second (QC14) asks whether
they have a personal interest in business in their area. If they 
are on the focus of lobbying themselves, that could qualify some 
of their answers. Similarly if they have a personal business 
interest in their area it could prove important in dealing with 
their replies to business interests as in questions QC4, QC5,
QC7, QDl, QD2, QD3 and QD5.
Part D was applied to both samples of interviewees. In the first
question of whether autonomy is well thought of by business, 
answers given can be compared with Q1 and Q2 , QBl and QB5. while 
it is a preamble to questions QD2 and QD3 following. The second 
and third questions ask of whether the economic future depends on 
local or out of region resources in capital and entrepreneurial 
skill. My interest in the juxtaposition is set in the hypotheses 
about the perceived importance of the local vs. the out of region 
and foreign resources. In that respect this group of questions 
is relevant to most of my research. The possible qualifications 
in responses to them I consider most important. Question QC4 has 
obvious similarities, but is asked on a different context. 
Question four gives a set of options categorising the local 
regional council (City Council in Greece) with two favourable and 
two unfavourable options. The purpose is to compare answers here
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with relevant answers in the previous parts, identifying a 
possible bias from extreme like or dislike of the work of the 
regional authority. Q2, QBl, QB6, QB7, QB8, QCl, QC2, QC9, QCIO 
and QC12 are questions that a positive or negative image of the 
local council can have an effect on. Questions QD5, QD6 and QD7 
comprise a group, giving (in Likert scale) the degree of 
confidence of the respondents to the relevant national and 
regional economies; then proceeding to ask whether the region is 
in a worse position than the nation (emphasising in some way 
perceived differences in development) concluding with a question 
on whether the region has not been receiving adequate support by 
the nation. Measuring possible disaffection with the national 
administration was the target of this group of questions.
Question QD9 which follows asks whether there are differences 
between 'us' and 'them'. The region vs. the nation. In the 
Greek version Europe was added as an option to measure 
'alienation' of the locals with the outside world.
The last two questions ask whether Europe represents a challenge 
(which was the only question with a unanimous-but one- 
affirmative answer) ; I finish with an assessment question of 
risks and opportunities in a united Europe.
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One of the basic considerations while constructing this survey 
was to limit the number of questions to the absolute minimum so 
that if need be it could be implemented in approximately half an 
hour. Average time of interviews was about forty five minutes 
although most successful ones I consider those that lasted for 
about an hour. The most extreme case was an interview that was 
conducted in two parts the first session running for 115 minutes 
and the second for over forty five minutes.
I refer to the way sampling was done in each country on chapter 
four, as for piloting and pre-testing I tested the interview on 
fellow research students on three different occasions in order to 
identify and clarify obscure points as well as to facilitate the 
best possible flow when administering the actual survey.
As I conducted all interviews myself there was no need for 
monitoring or verifying the execution of the survey. However I 
found necessary to cross reference replies in order to eliminate 
those of the respondents that might give extreme and out of 
context replies. This I considered a possibility of making an 
error in either understanding a question or recording an answer. 
Such errors not being apparent beyond statistical normality, no 
answers were eliminated. A full record of dates and places of
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interviews as well as the actual questionnaires are available in 
these appendices for any further verification.
Data collected are processed and analysed in chapters five, six 
and seven. Coding of replies posed certain difficulties stemming 
from the small sample size that made any one reply significant 
for the outlook of the research. Furthermore most of the replies 
having a qualitative element as their most significant part loose 
a great deal of their intended meaning by codification. It is 
apparent that the numerical codification of replies can not be 
separated from their qualifications when interpreting results.
In some cases I aggregate results for reasons of simplicity, 
possible inaccuracies that this entails should always be born in 
mind.
C. The British Version: Strathclyde
The elite groups I had to approach in Strathclyde were quite 
diverse. The political personalities are representing a number 
of bodies: The City Council of Glasgow, The Regional Council in 
Strathclyde, Members of Parliament and Members of the European 
Parliament. An effort was made to interview personalities from
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across the political spectrum, but Strathclyde being a Labour 
dominated region, most of the interviewees were from the Labour 
party.
I did not equate percentage of seats held by Labour with 
interviewees from this party because in that case all above 
mentioned bodies are over 85% Labour for Strathclyde. I could 
alternatively take percentage of party vote in the last elections 
irrespective of seats won. I felt however that this would bias 
this sample again since, non elected candidates would not 
necessarily be part of the interactive process between the 
business and the political community, to the degree that elected 
politicians are. Instead I used a gross measure of 70% Labour 
interviewees and the rest roughly equally divided between the 
Scottish National Party, the Liberal Democrats and the 
Conservatives.
Since the important factor in this survey was representation of 
prevailing views and since I could not achieve statistical 
significance with such a small sample I felt that the rough guide 
I used was adequate for my purposes.
The business community was more diverse than the political 
community. I considered that an advantage and tried to avoid
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over-representation of bigger interests who had a higher rate of 
response to the mailing than smaller enterprises.
Approximately 46% of companies in this survey had exports to more 
than two countries (see graph 5.1), while seven out of ten 
interviewees where in the most dynamic age group of 3 6 to 55
years old. More than 75% have the title of director or control a
big part of their companies stock. Ownership was predominantly 
Scottish with over 62% of the companies privately owned. Of 
public companies 23% of the total are British held while 15% are 
owned by foreign interests.
The size of the companies was bigger than the average for 
Scotland. By turnover 26% make up to £5 million and have no more 
than one hundred employees. Medium sized companies (100-500 
employees) were approximately 44% of this sample. While large 
companies (over 500 employees) were approximately 32% of the 
sample. Comparatively, gross UK data show that large companies 
account for 30.03% of employment (Commission, 1990).
The small enterprises I talked to (10-99 employees) comprised 26%
of the sample while nationally they are responsible for 24% of
employment. Over represented with 44% of the sample are medium 
size enterprises (100-500 employees which account for 23% of
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employment nationally including data for micro enterprises). For 
the same reasons mentioned above, regarding large enterprises, it 
was felt that I need not weigh the responses.
I consider the employment indicator a good measure of the social 
welfare significance of firms in the Community. Larger 
corporations are able to hold more lobbying muscle by the fact 
that they have more resources, faster decision making and the 
ability to approach political personalities directly. Micro and 
Small enterprises on the other hand are usually unable to master 
the resources to effectively lobby local political personalities 
other than collectively. Medium sized enterprises I often found, 
directly lobby authorities and political personalities in their 
region. This stems from the fact that most are still owned by 
those people that created them who are actively involved in local 
community life and politics.
Overall, it seems that big corporate management keeps a distance 
from local politics unless they have a particular policy 
affecting them to lobby for while medium sized business tried to 
have a more hands-on approach even on issues not directly 
relevant to them.
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In this sample I did not target Micro enterprises (1-9 employees) 
primarily because I wanted to target those business people that 
actively interact with the political community but also because 
on the pilot survey I found them unwilling to take the time to 
answer a survey. This is understandable since their resources 
are very limited.
D. The Greek Version: Crete
Problems of researching in Chania become apparent in the 
exposition of chapter three. From the local body politic I 
talked with a more representative sample than was the case in 
Strathclyde. On the other hand there is a deficiency in the 
sample since I do not have any elected members to the Greek or 
European Parliament. There are many reasons for this, the most 
important of which is the unwillingness of Greek national 
politicians to take part in a survey. Many times over I found 
that they were too preoccupied with an answer of theirs being 
quoted, irrespective of my guaranties of scientific integrity. 
Another disadvantage was, not being myself a member of a 
political party I could not utilise any party connections to that 
effect. Of the local politicians that have answered my 
questionnaire however two have been elected to parliament in the
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past and many have been candidates. European Parliament seats on 
the other hand are not fought locally but nationally, while only 
one MEP has a directly Cretan political background. Furthermore 
MEPs in Greece are not necessarily directly linked with the local 
political 'game' and patronage networks since they are proposed 
by parties on a national scale and would not have to make a 
political stand or contest the election themselves.
Two of the interviewees declared being with or supported by the 
Left (Communists-KKE and Left Coalition-SYN or jointly with 
Socialists) eight were elected with the Socialists (PASOK or a 
Centre-PASOK coalition), two declared belonging to the political 
centre and two being elected with the Conservatives (Nea 
Dimocratia). Of them five were councillors in one of the major 
city councils three were mayors and four presidents of local 
communities. I also interviewed two key individuals in the local 
community. The first was the local 'comatarhis' (party 
representative) for the Socialists. The second was an editor of 
one of the local political papers. Both were directly involved 
in the political interaction and I felt their views in many cases
. A  list of candidates, to be elected according to seniority on that list 
is produced for a national ballot by each party. This system makes the 
inducement of MEPs for campaigning minimal, other than maintaining good 
relations with the national party elite. Their involvement in national 
politics tends to be marginal.
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to be very informed. There was only one female interviewed as 
there are extremely few elected women locally. The age 
composition shows most of the interviewees being comparatively 
young with 46% being younger than 45 years. I trust this 
sample to be overall closely representative of the local 
political community.
Interviews were conducted with twenty two businessmen as well.
Of those interviewed 54% were 45 years of age or younger showing 
a comparative dynamism in the business society, to the degree 
that this sample is representative.
Average size of companies in Greece and Crete in particular, 
being much smaller than the European average I interviewed a 
certain number of companies in the Micro category. Although no 
director interviewed represented a company with less than five 
employees. Most of the companies interviewed were in the small 
category which should be expected as Services and Handicraft are 
the most dynamic sectors in the local economy, while medium sized 
companies were few in keeping with the national averages (see 
table 5.3).
Only 23% of the directors interviewed belonged to companies that 
operated or traded on a national scale and only 14% had exports
500
outside Greece (see table 5.5). One was a subsidiary company to 
a European concern, operating in textiles and using local labour 
to add value to its products. All the rest of the companies were 
privately owned, predominantly from local concerns. Overall, I 
have considered this sample as a close approximation to the local 
business and political elite in Crete.
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Appendix Ma; Greek Version of the Questionnaire
NEPÜI A




4. a.AAAH IÛIGTHTA 
B.EniXEIPHMATIAI 
Y .nOAITlKGI
5. 0EIH ITHN EniXEIPHlH/KüMMA/ÛIÜlKHEH
6. HAIKIA
a.<35 e.36-45 
Y .46-55o . 56 >
II. EPniHIEII
1. nICTTEusra I or I n uaKoo-oi k o v o u ik h  noAiriKn ea noenei va
EÀEYXETai QE TOniKO, E0 VI K O F) SlEBVES sninEÔo: 
ran I k g / Eevi k o / 5 ie b v e s
2. riiCTTEUETai or I u I a ouoanovôia ( oevTEoaÀ i ctt i kou runou) yia
ra Kparn rns E v c j u e v p s Euownns E i va : EcoiKrn;
N/0/ÛE
3. riicrrEUETai or i ra EsviKicrriKa k i vnuara naizouv sEriKO ooAo
arnv noAiriKn zcon rns h e d  i coeds i as ;
N/□/û£
4. 0 I o iz E s  rns o i K o v E v E i a s  eras SoiCTKovrai arnv Konrn;
N/Ü/ÛE
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M EP Q I  "B
ZYMnAHPQITE AN H AHANTHZH ZTÜ MEPOZ A EPOTHZh 1.2. EINAI B
I. NA ZYMHAHPOGEI HPOAIPETIKA
1. a. MEYE80S rns Eraioias - k u k A q EDvacricjv (e k .ô d x .)
6. Neyseos rns sraipias - ap leuos eoyazouEvcov
2. 16 IOKrnaia
3. Eninsoo ûpaans a. Ton IKO 
B . riED I cpepe I CKO
Y . E s V I KO
o. E q a Y U Y E S  OTE UIQ O 6uO XWPES
E . E ^ O Y W Y E S  CTE n EP I QCTOr EDES (Zno 5uO XW PES
II. EPQTHIEIZ
1. riiareuerai or i as y e v i k e s  y p q u u e s :
A. o vouos Xaviwv ea snwcoEAneE i ano uia auçnan rwv Eqouaiwv 
rns Nouapxias; (cpopo i/avr inpoawnsuan/EKna i 6euan/5nMOCT i a epya
kAh )
N/0/A6
0. n EnixE.'Pncrn eras ea EnwoeAneei ano uia reroja usraBoAn 
aro EH Insôo nou nepvovrai anooacEis;
N/Q/Û6
2. A. ripoBAenErai rnv avanruqti nEpiaaorEpwv u i K pouscra i wv 
EnixEipnaswv crrov vopo eras; (noaoariaia nEPiaaor Epes m i k p o — 
UEoaiEs enixEipnCTEis ere axecrn us qeyocAes)
N/0/ÛE
B. Mia rsroia e c e A i c p sa ônuiouoynaei eeriKO k A iuc via rnv 
EH I XEIpnan a a s ;
N /0 / Ô E
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3. n IareueraI ori uia avooos aro noaoaro rwv m iKpwv-ueaaiwv 
enixeipnaEwv ea Bonsnaei arnv gnwioupyia :
a. uI as nio anoKEvrpwuevns (aurovouns) oiKovouias
B. pias nio E^aprnuevns oiKovopias (arnv nepicpepsia aas)
Y. ÛE
4.A&FvwpizErai noios Eivai o e k A e y u e v o s  aas EKnpoawnos arov 
Ûnuio/Ko I vornra nou Bp taxerai o ronos epyaaias aas;
N/Ü/AE
B. rvwpizerai no ids sivai o BouAsurns rns nspipEPEias aas; 
N/Ü/ÛE
r. rvwpizerai xanoiov EuowBouAeurn ano rnv Kpnrn;
N/0/ÛE
Û. Mnopeirai va ovouaaerai evav ano rous avwrepw
avacpEpes vres ; ( ûnuapxo / BouAeur es / EupoBouAeur es )
E. Exerai ra reAeuraia 5uo xpovia npoaevYicrei xanoiov ano 
rous e k A e y m e v o u s  aas avrinpoawnous n rnv ônuoaia Sioixnan me 
Kano Io a Irnua rns enixeipnans aas;
a . û n M o / K o Ivornra 
B .NouapxI a
Y . YnouPYE I a/K.uBepvnr i kous Ooyocv i auous 
o.EupwnaiKn E n irponn/KoivoBouAio
E . a A A o ..........
z . KQuu I c enacon
5. Bp I axera I ori oi û n u o r ixoi/ K o ivorixoi luuBouAoi npoweouv 
ra oixovoMixa auucoeoovra rns neo i coepe i as ;
A . H e p  Iaaorepo eveepua ano rous ronixous BouAeures
1 2 3 4 5
nepiaaoTEOo ue rnv lôia ue ^ iYoreoo
eveepua eeoun ev5 i acoepov/eEoun
B.Me ueyaAureon anoreAeauarixornra ano rous ronixous BouAeures.
1 2 3 4 5
UE ueyaAuTEon ue rnv i5ia ue uiKporeon
anoTeAeauarIKornra anoreA. anoTE^eauarixornra
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6. niareuerai ori oi ûnuorik o i/Koivorik o i luuSouAoi Eivai nio 
npoairoi orav sxerai xanoio airnua/yvuun auy k p ivouevoi ue 
rous roniKOus BouAeures;
1 2 3 4 5
nepIaaorepo i5ia AiyoreooAEKTiKoi aexriKornra Sexrik g i
7, 0a Eiaaarav npoeuuos va xavera i rnv 16 1a 5ouAeia nou 
xaveraI eow ae uia aAAn nepioxn av aas napexovrav napouotos u I aeos/avrauo I Bn ue aurov nou xEpoizerai eoco;
а. Meaa arnv EAAaoa N/G/ÛE
б. Iris EupwnaiKES K o ivornres N/0/ÛE
Enixeipnuarlas/IreAexos
S. riiareuerai or i o i enixeipnuaries rns nepioxns aas;
A.0a unopouaav va anoôoaouv ro i5io xaAa ae uia nepioxn 
oiapoperixn ano rnv ôixn rous;
N/Q/ÛE
B.0a unopouaav va anoôoaouv xaAurepa eav nepiaaorepes 
noAueeviKES eraipies Aeiroupyouaav arnv nepioxn;
N/Ü/ÙE
nPGXGPHITE ITHN lYMHAHPOIH TOY MEPOYI Û
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MEPüi r
NA lYMnAHPOGEI MONON EAN H AHANTHIH ITHN EPOTHIH 1.2. TOY 
MEPOYI A EINAI y.
I. nPÜAIPETiKA ITOIXEIA
1. (iOAITIKH AnüKAHlH/KÜMMA





1. niCTTEuerai o t i oi ronik o i BouAeures ( ave^aprnra ano ro av 
eI va I arnv xuBeovnan n rnv avrinoAireuan):
a.ôExovrai ro ueycAurepü u e d o s  ruv n i eaecov (lobbying) yia 
sépara pe ronixo evoiapepov:
N/O/ÛE
B . eecjpou vra I uneueuvo i y i a anocoaae i s nou naiovovrai ano ris 
roniKEs apxEs (Ûnuous/Koivornres/Nouaoxie s );
M/Ü/ÛE
2. n I areuera 1 or i o i BouAeures eecooouvra i uneueuvo i y i a rnv 
roniKn avanru^n (nep i cpepe i axn ) nspiaaorepo (axopa xa i orav âev Exouv ausan avapoiSn) ano ris ronixes apxes;
N/ü/ûE
3. riiareuerai or i n eunueo i a rou vouou aas e^aprara i nepiaaorepo ano:
a.Tous ronixous enixeipnuaries (auroxeovo en i xe i pnpcxr i xoôuvauI K O )
B.Eraipies pe eôpa e c^o ano rnv Kpnrn. 
y.ÛEv %epw. .
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4.1. A. Is nso I nrcocrn ucoeans. niorsueTai or i oi p i xpo-uscra i es enixeipnaeis nou ea eniSicoaouv eivai nio nieavo va 
ôiarnoncrouv opaarno i ornra arnv nepioxn aas n va peraoepeouv 
ae xanoia aAAn neoioxn;
a.ûiarncouv aaparnpiornra 
B . Meracpeoo vra i 
y . û£
B.Eav ueracoepouv ris opaarnp i ornres rous ni areuera i or i ea nporipnaouv va eyxaraaraeouv;
a.exros rou vouou Xavicov, aAAa ueaa arnv Kpnrn 
B.arnv unoAoinn EAAaoa 
y .arnv Eupwnaixn k o ivornra
o .aA Aou...........
4.2.A.Ie nepinruan ucoeans. niareuerai or i oi noAuefeviKss 
eraipies eivai nio nieavo va ôiarnpnaouv rnv ôpaarnpiornra rous arov vouo n va uercoeoeouv ae aAAn neoioxn:
a.oiarnoouv oocarnoiornraS . peracoeoovra i y .ÛE
B.Eav uerapeoBouv ae nia nepioxn vouizerai ori ea nporipouaav va opaarnpIonoIneouv:
a.ae Kcnoiov aAAo vopo rns Kpnrns
B.ae Kano I a aAAn nepioxn rns EAAaôas exros Konrns y.Evros rns Eupconaixns Koivornras5.aA Aou.  .......e . ÛÔ
5. riiareuerai or i oi ünuor i ko i luuSouAo i exouv nio axpiBn 
eiKOv a rcjv en i xe i pnuar i kwv ôuvarornrwv (menral map ) rns 
neo I coepe I as rous ano rous BouAeures rns lôias nep i coepe i as ; (FIATI:)
M / 0 / c^ “
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6 . A . n I areuETa I or i oi oduotikoi ctuuBouaoi Eivai neo i crcroreDO 
equneoeriKOi ae nieaeis en i xe i pnuar i cov rns nepioxns, ae axean 
UE rous ronixous BouAeures;
N/Ü/ÛE
B.nIareueraI ori oi ônuorixoi auuSouApi eiv a i anooexres 
nep I aaoreocov nieaewv ano enixeipnuaries rns nepioxns as axean 
ue rous ronixous BouAeures:
N/Ü/ÛZ
7.do I os ex rwv xarwreow niareuerai ori exei nio uaxpoxpovn 
npoonrixn orav nporeivei oixovopixn noAirixn:
a.ûnuorixos luuBouAos 
B.BouAeurns Y .EupoBouAeurnso.ûev Eepw
nEPAITEPG EPQTHIEII 
Elite Interviewino Method
1. Exerai ueaa ara reAeuraia ouo xpovia ôexrsi nieaeis ano enixeipnuaries nou npoaBAenav arnv aAAay n n rponoAoyia vouoeeaias; LOBBYING
txerai xanoio nooawnixo snay YsAuar i xo evoiacoepwv ae xanoia 
ano ris ronixes en i xeipnaeis: le xanoia eevixn enixeipnan: 
(le axean epyaaias n xaroxos nepiaaorepo ano 1 % eraipias)
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MEPÜI û
NA ZYMnAHPGGEI FIA ÜAÜYI TÜYZ EPOTOYMENOYI
1. niareuerai or i ai enixeipnaeis rns enapxeias aas ea
eBÀenav eerixa rnv nieavornra va anoKrouae n Kpnrn axerixn
aurovoMI a ano rnv unoAoinn EÀAaôa;
N/Ü/ÛE
2. Hiareurai or i ro oik o v o u iko usAAo v rns nepioxns aas
Bp I axerai ae ronixa xepaAaia n xecpaAaia ue npoeAeuan e^w
ano rnv Kpn^n;(eaurepixes n e^urepixes enevouaeis)
EI/EEÜT/ûE
3. Hiareuera I or i n ueAAovrixn oixovouiKn avanru^n rns nepioxns ea eSaornen xupiws ano ronixous n enixeipnuaries nou npoepxovra I eçu ano rnv Kpnrn;
TOn/EEOr/ûE
4. Ga xapaxrnpIzare rnv ronixn ûnuorixn/Koivorixn aoxn aav:
ûuvauI KO Hapayovra aris ûnuoKparix es 
ûIaôIK aaies
6.Inuavriko Itoua r.Mixpns Inuaaias û. E va AvaxpoVIauo
5. A.Hiareurai ori n EAAnvixn Oixovouia eivai eroiun yia rov 
avrayuviauo nou ea cpepe i n Euownaixn OAoxAnpcoan xa i ro 1992;






B.Hiareurai or i n nep i cpepe i ax n oixovouia rns Kpnrns eivai ero I un y i a ro v avraycoviauo nou ea cpeoe i ro 1992:
1 2 HoAu xaAa 
npoeroiuaauevn
3 4
riDoero I uaauevn 5 ÛEKaeoAou
EroI un
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6. n IareueraI ori o vouos aas eivai ae xeiporeon eean ano rnv 









7. riiareurai or i n eevixn noAirixn oev exei ônuioupynaei arnv 
Kpnrn ris euxaioies nou exouv onuioupyneei ae aAAes 
nepioxes rns EAAaôas;
N/ü/û£







9. riiareuerai or i n Eupwnn avr i npwawneue i uia npoxAnan y i a 
rnv nepioxn aas; (ue noio roono av v a i)
N/0/ÛE
10. riiareuerai or i unapxouv nepiaorepes euxaipies ae uia evwuevn Eupwnn: n X IVÔUVO
riep I aaorepes EuxaIP I es
3 4
IÔ Io En Ineôo EuxaIpIwv/KIVÔUVWV
5 û :DepIaaorepoVÔUVOI
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Appendix lia: British version of the Questionnaire 
variable naunes are in bold.
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PART A: ID
I. FILLED IN BY INTERVIEWER BEFORE THE ATTITUDE QUESTIONS
1. DATE AND PLACE.......................
ID 2. A. OTHER.........  B. BUSINESSMAN C
RANK 3. RANK/POSITION WITHIN ORGANISATION
POLITICIAN






Q1 1. Do you believe that macro-economic policies should be 
controlled at the regional, national or international 
level?
Regional National International Do Not Know
1 2 3 4
Q2 2. Do you believe a federal structure for Europe can be 
viable?
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
Q3 3. Are Nationalist Political movements (like the SNP) 
constructive in regional politics?
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
533 . At the beginning of each interview the use of terms such as 'autonomy', 
'national' or 'regional' is explained and put in the context within which 
they are used here (see appendix I).
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Q4 4. Are your family/ethnic roots in Scotland?
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
PART B.
COMPLETE IF ANSWER TO QUESTION A.I.2. = b .BUSINESSMAN
I. TO BE COMPLETED PROVISIONALLY 
If respondents do not object.
PI l.a. SIZE OF COMPANY BY TURNOVER




d.EXPORTS TO ONE OR TWO COUNTRIES
e.EXPORTS TO MORE THAN TWO COUNTRIES
II. QUESTIONS
1. Do you believe that overall:
QBl A.Strathclyde region will benefit from an increase in 
the powers of the regional government?
{taxes/representation/education/public works etc)
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
QB2 B.Your business will benefit from such a shift in power 
to the region?
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
QB3 Do you foresee the development of more small-medium 
enterprises in your region?
(Change of ratio of small-medium to big corporations!
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
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QB4 Will such a development create a positive environment for 
your firm?
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
QB5 Do you think that a shift in the economy towards small- 
medium enterprises will aid in the creation of:
A. a more devolved (autonomous) economy?
B. a rather dependent (integrated) economy?
C. DN
QB6 Do you know who is your constituency local/regional
political representative? (Regional/District Councillors





Do you know who is your constituency national 
representative?
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
you know your constituency European
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
Could you identify by name any of your above mentioned 
representatives?
QBIO Have you in the last two years approached any
administrative officials with some request from your 
company in the :
A. Strathclyde regional council
B . regional governmental authority (Scottish Office)
C. national government
D. European Commission/Parliament
E . Other ...............................
QBIO F. Do you consider yourself to be an entrepreneur or an
executive?
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QBll Do you find that council representatives promote the 
economic interests of the region:




















QB13 How receptive do you think regional councillors are to your 









QB14 Would you be prepared to do the same job you are performing 
here in another region, if you were given a similar 
salary/compensation to the one you receive already?
In Great Britain
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
QB15 In the European Communities
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
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QB16 Do you believe that local entrepreneurs:
Would be able to function effectively in a different region 
than their own?
In Great Britain
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
the European Communities
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
QB18 Are Capable of performing better if more multinational 
enterprises operate in their region?
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
COMPLETE PART D NEXT
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PART C
TO BE COMPLETED IF ANSWER TO QUESTION 1.2 OF PART A IS C 
I. TO BE COMPLETED PROVISIONALLY BY INTERVIEWER 
PPl POLITICAL AFFILIATION/PARTY 
PP2 LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION:
a.CITY COUNCIL b. REGION c. NATION d. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
e.QUESTIONS
QCl Do you feel that local MP's in Westminster (irrespective of 
being Government or opposition) are:
Receiving most of the lobbying for issues with regional 
impact?
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
QC2 Considered accountable for decisions taken by regional 
authorities?
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
QC3 Do you believe that MP's are held more accountable, for 
regional development (even when not responsible) than 
regional councillors?
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
QC4 Do you believe your region's prosperity depends more on:
A. Local Entrepreneurs B. Companies with Headquarters
outside the region
C . Don't Know
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QC5 In the case of a recession, do you believe small-medium 
sized business that will survive the recession are more 
likely to maintain operations in your region, or shift to 
another region?
a. maintain operations
b. shift to another region
c . DN
QC6 If they shift where do you think they will prefer to 
operate?
a. in another Scottish region
b. in another British region outside Scotland
c. within the EC
d. other
QC7 In the case of a recession, do you believe multinational 
business are more likely to maintain operations, in your 
region, or shift to another region?
a. maintain operations
b. shift to another region
C . DN
QC8 If they shift where do you think they will prefer to 
operate?
a. in another Scottish region
b. in another British region outside Scotland
c . within the EC
d. other
QC9 Do you find that local councillors possess a more accurate 
'mental map' of their constituency than MP's?
(get explanation of reply if possible)
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
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QCIO Do you believe that regional councillors
a. Are more (attentive) receptive than Westminster MP's 
to pressure from businessmen in their area?
QCll b. Receive more pressure than MPs?
QC12 Which of the following do you believe have a longer term 
perspective when proposing economic policy: regional, 
national or European representatives? (Councillors, MP's, 
or MEP's)




QC13 Have you been approached by businessmen with requests that 
would require current legislation amendments or the 
introduction of new legislation.
QC14 Do you have a business interest in any of the Strathclyde 
business?
(Directly employed or holding more than 1% of a company)
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PART D
TO BE COMPLETED FOR ALL INTERVIEWEES
QDl Do you believe that if your region were to become more 
autonomous, business would perceive this as a generally 
positive development?
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
QD2 Do you think that the economic future of your region lies 
in local or out of regional capital? (depends on 
indigenous or exogenous investment)
IND EXOG Do Not Know
1 2 3
QD3 Do you believe that future economic growth will depend 
mainly on local or out of region entrepreneurial skill?




QD4 Do you regard the Strathclyde regional council as:
A. A Dynamic B. An Active C. Of Minor D. An Anachronism 
Element in Body Importance
Modern 
Democracy
QD5 A.Do you believe that the British economy is ready for the 


















QD7 Do you find that your region is in a worse position than 










QD8 Do you believe that national policies have failed to create 
the opportunities in your region that have been created in 
other regions of Britain?
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
QD9 Overall do you find there are great differences between 
people in your region and those in the rest of : 
a. Scotland?
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
QDIO b. Britain?
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
Rest of Europe?
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3
QD12 Do you think that Europe represents a challenge for your 
region?
(expand: in what way if yes)
Yes No Do Not Know
1 2 3













APPENDIX Ile. Questionnaire Codebook (Standard Codes)
NO. VALUE VARIABLE DESCRIPTION VAR.NAME
1. 1 Strathclyde Political Elite ID
1. 2 Strathclyde Business Elite ID
1. 3 Cretan Political Elite ID
1. 4 Cretan Business Elite ID
2. 11 Small Business Owner RANK
2. 12 Business Manager RANK
2. 13 Business Director RANK
2. 20 Political Activist RANK
2. 21 Senior Administrator RANK
2. 22 Glasgow City Councillor RANK
2. 23 Strathclyde Regional Councillor RANK
2. 24 Scottish MP RANK
2. 25 Scottish MEP RANK
2. 26 Cretan President o f Local Community RANK
2. 27 Cretan City Councillor RANK
2. 28 Cretan Mayor RANK
2. 30 Political Administrator RANK
2. 40 Other RANK
3. 1 Age Group of 35 or Less AGE
3. 2 Age Group o f 36-45 AGE
3. 3 Age Group of 46-55 AGE
3. 4 Age Group of 56 or More AGE
4. 1 Control of Macro-economics by the Region Ql
4. 2 Control of Macro-economics by the Nation Q1
4. 3 Control of Macro-economics Internationally Ql
4. 4 Do Not Know Ql
4. 5 Other Ql
5. 1 Yes-Federalism in Europe Viable Q2
5. 2 No-Federalism in Europe Not Viable Q2
5. 3 Do Not Know Q2
5. 4 Other Q2
6. 1 Yes-Nationalist Movements Constructive Q3
6. 2 No-Nationalist Movem. Non- Constructive Q3
6. 3 Do Not Know Q3
6. 4 Other Q3
7. 1 Yes-My Family Roots Are In the Region Q4
7. 2 No-My Family Roots Are Not In the Region Q4
7. 3 Do Not Know Q4
7. 4 Other Q4
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NO. VALUE VARIABLE DESCRIPTION VAR. NAME
8. 1 Scottish Company Turnover £5m.< PI
8. 2 Scottish Company Turnover £5-20m. PI
8. 3 Scottish Company Turnover >£20m PI
8. 4 Cretan Company Turnover DRCH 10m< PI
8. 5 Cretan Company Turnover DRCH 10-100m PI
8. 6 Cretan Company Turnover DRCH 100m.> PI
8. 7 No Information on Company Turnover PI
9. 1 Scottish Company No. o f Employees 10-20 P2
9. 2 Scottish Company No. o f Employees 21-100 P2
9. 3 Scottish Company No. of Employees 100> P2
9. 4 Cretan Company No. of Employees 5-10 P2
9. 5 Cretan Company No. o f Employees 11 -50 P2
9. 6 Cretan Company No. o f Employees 51> P2
9. 7 No Information on Number o f Employees P2
10. 1 Scottish Company Privately Owned P3
10. 2 Scottish Company Publicly Owned P3
10. 3 UK Company Privately Owned P3
10. 4 UK Company Publicly Owned P3
10. 5 Intemationaly Owned Company P3
10. 6 Cretan Company Privately Owned P3
10. 7 Cretan Company Publicly Owned P3
10. 8 Greek Company Privately Owned P3
10. 9 Greek Company Publicly Owned P3
11. 1 Firm Maintains Local Operations Only P4
11. 2 Firm has Region Wide Operations P4
11. 3 Firm has Nation Wide Operations P4
11. 4 Firm Exports/Operates in One or Two Other Countries P4
11. 5 Firm Exports/Operates In More than Two Other Countries P4
12. 1 YES-Region will benefit from increase in Regional Power QBl
12. 2 NO QBl
12. 3 DO NOT KNOW QBl
12. 4 OTHER QBl
13. 1 YES-My business benefits from a power shift to the region QB2
13. 2 NO QB2
13. 3 DO NOT KNOW QB2
13. 4 OTHER QB2
14. 1 YES-I forsee the Development o f more SMEs QB3
14. 2 NO QB3
14. 3 DO NOT KNOW QB3
14. 4 OTHER QB3
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NO. VALUE VARIABLE DESCRIPTION VAR. NAME
15. 1 YES- More SMEs will be beneficial to my firm QB4
15. 2 NO QB4
15. 3 DO NOT KNOW QB4
15. 4 OTHER QB4
16. 1 YES-More SMEs create more autonomy QB5
16. 2 NO QB5
16. 3 DO NOT KNOW QB5
16. 4 OTHER QB5
17. 1 YES-I know my constituency regional representative QB6
17. 2 NO QB6
17. 3 DO NOT KNOW QB6
17. 4 OTHER QB6
18. 1 YES-I know my constituency MP QB7
18. 2 NO QB7
18. 3 DO NOT KNOW QB7
18. 4 OTHER QB7
19. 1 YES-I know my constituency MEP QB8
19. 2 NO QB8
19. 3 DO NOT KNOW QB8
19. 4 OTHER QB8
20. 1 YES-I can identify by name an elected representative QB9
20. 2 NO QB9
21. 1 YES-I have approached the region with a company request QBIOA
21. 2 NO QBIOA
22. 1 YES-I have approached the goverments' regional office QBl OB
22. 2 NO QBIOB
23. 1 YES-I have approached the national goverment QBIOC
23. 2 NO QBIOC
24. 1 YES-I have approached the European Commission QBl CD
24. 2 NO QBl CD
25. 1 YES-I have approached an other govermental institution QBIOE
25. 2 NO QBIOE
26. 5 1-Council representatives are much more fervent than 
MPs'
Q B ll
26. 4 2-more fervent Q B ll
26. 3 3-equally fervent Q B ll
26. 2 4-slightly less fervent Q B ll
26. 1 5-less fervent Q B ll
26. 8 OTHER Q B ll
26. 9 DO NOT KNOW Q B ll
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NO. VALUE VARIABLE DESCRIPTION VAR. NAME
27. 5 1-Councillors more effective than MP's QB12
27. 4 2-slightly more effective QB12
27. 3 3-equally effective QB12
27. 2 4-slightly less effective QB12
27. 1 5-less effective QB12
27. 8 OTHER QB12
27. 9 DO NOT KNOW QB12
28. 5 1-Councillors are more receptive than MP's QB13
28. 4 2-slightly more receptive QB13
28. 3 3-equally receptive QB13
28. 2 4-slightly less receptive QB13
28. 1 5-less receptive QB13
28. 8 OTHER QB13
28. 9 DO NOT KNOW QB13
29. 1 YES-I would work in another region within nation QB14
29. 2 NO QB14
29. 3 DO NOT KNOW QB14
29. 4 OTHER QB14
30. 1 YES-I would work in another region within Europe QB15
30. 2 NO QB15
30. 3 DO NOT KNOW QB15
30. 4 OTHER QB15
31. 1 ENTREPRENEUR QBl OF
31. 2 EXECUTIVE QBl OF
31. 3 OTHER QBl OF
32. 1 YES-Local entrepreneurs can be effective elsewhere in UK QB16
32. 2 NO QB16
32. 3 DO NOT KNOW QB16
32. 4 OTHER QB16
33. 1 YES-Local entrepreneurs can be effective in Europe QB17
33. 2 NO QB17
33. 3 DO NOT KNOW QB17
33. 4 OTHER QB17
34. 1 YES- Entrepreneurs performance is affected by MNLs QB18
34. 2 NO QB18
34. 3 DO NOT KNOW QB18
34. 4 OTHER QB18
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NO. VALUE VARIABLE DESCRIPTION VAR. NAME
35. 1 POLITICAL AFFILIATION-GR Left (SIN-ARISTERA) PPl
35. 2 GR Socialists Left (Left-PASOK) PPl
35. 3 GR Socialists (PASOK) PPl
35. 4 GR Socialists Centre (Centre-PASOK) PPl
35. 5 GR Conservatives Centre(NEA DEMOKRATIA-Kentro) PPl
35. 6 GR Conservatives (NEA DEMOKRATIA) PPl
35. 7 GR Communists (KKE) PPl
35. 8 GR Centre Party (ENOSIS KENTROU) PPl
35. 10 OTHER PPl
35. 11 SNP PPl
35. 12 LABOUR PPl
35. 13 LIBERAL DEMOCRATS PPl
35. 14 CONSERVATIVES PPl
36. 1 YES-MP's receive most o f lobbying on regional issues QCl
36. 2 NO QCl
36. 3 DO NOT KNOW QCl
36. 4 OTHER QCl
37. 1 YES-MPs are held accountable for regional decisions QC2
37. 2 NO QC2
37. 3 DO NOT KNOW QC2
37. 4 OTHER QC2
38. 1 YES-MPs are held accountable for regional development QC3
38. 2 NO QC3
38. 3 DO NOTKNOW QC3
38. 4 OTHER QC3
39. 1 LOCAL ENTREPRENEURS-Are important for region QC4
39. 2 MNLs-Are more important for regional prosperity QC4
39. 3 DO NOT KNOW QC4
39. 4 OTHER QC4
40. 1 YES- SMEs will stay in the region after a recession QC5
40. 2 NO QC5
40. 3 DO NOT KNOW QC5
40. 4 OTHER QC5
41. 1 SMEs SHIFT-Another Scottish Region QC6
41. 2 Another British Region excluding Scotland QC6
41. 3 Elsewhere in the EC QC6
41. 4 OTHER QC6
41. 5 DO NOT KNOW QC6
42. 1 YES-MNLs will stay in region after a recession QC7
42. 2 NO QC7
42. 3 DO NOT KNOW QC7
42. 4 OTHER QC7
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43. 1 MNLs SHIFT-Another Scottish region QC8
43. 2 Another British Region excluding Scotland QC8
43. 3 Elsewhere in the EC QC8
43. 4 OTHER QC8
43. 5 DO NOT KNOW QC8
44. 1 YES-Councillors have accurate 'mental map' QC9
44. 2 NO QC9
44. 3 DO NOT KNOW QC9
44. 4 OTHER QC9
45. 1 YES-Councillors receptive to business pressure QCIO
45. 2 NO QCIO
45. 3 DO NOT KNOW QCIO
45. 4 OTHER QCIO
46. 1 YES-Councillors receive more pressure than MPs Q C ll
46. 2 NO Q C ll
46. 3 DO NOT KNOW Q C ll
46. 4 OTHER Q C ll
47. 1 REGIONAL-Representatives have longer term perspective QC12
47. 2 NATIONAL QC12
47. 3 EUROPEAN QC12
47. 4 DO NOT KNOW QC12
48. 1 YES-I have been lobbyied by businessmen QC13
48. 2 NO QCl 3
49. 1 YES-I have business interests in my region QC14
49. 2 NO QC14
50. 1 YES-Business would perceive autonomy positively QDl
50. 2 NO QDl
50. 3 DO NOT KNOW QDl
50. 4 OTHER QDl
51. 1 INDIGENOUS-Capital sources more important for region QD2
51. 2 EXOGENOUS QD2
51. 3 BALANCED QD2
51. 4 DO NOT KNOW QD2
52. 1 LOCAL-Entrepreneurial skill more important QD3
52. 2 OUT OF REGION QD3
52. 3 BALANCED QD3
52. 4 DO NOT KNOW QD3
53. 1 DYNAMIC-Opinion of Regional Council QD4
53. 2 ACTIVE QD4
53. 3 OF MINOR IMPORTANCE QD4
53. 4 ANACHRONISM QD4
53. 5 OTHER QD4
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54. 5 1-British economy well prepared for 1992 QD5
54. 4 2-almost well prepared QD5
54. 3 3-prepared QD5
54. 2 4-slightly unprepared QD5
54. 1 5-not prepared at all QD5
54. 8 OTHER QD5
54. 9 DO NOT KNOW QD5
55. 5 1-Scottish economy well prepared for 1992 QD6
55. 4 2-almost well prepared QD6
55. 3 3-prepared QD6
55. 2 4-slightly unprepared QD6
55. 1 5-not prepared at all QD6
55. 8 OTHER QD6
55. 9 DO NOT KNOW QD6
56. 5 1-Region much better than nation regarding 1992 QD7
56. 4 2-slightly better QD7
56. 3 3-same QD7
56. 2 4-slightly worse QD7
56. 1 5-much worse QD7
56. 8 OTHER QD7
56. 9 DO NOT KNOW QD7
57. 1 YES-National policies have failed to create opportunities QD8
57. 2 NO QD8
57. 3 DO NOT KNOW QD8
57. 4 OTHER QD8
58. 1 YES-People different here than in rest of Scotland/Crete QD9
58. 2 NO QD9
58. 3 DO NOT KNOW QD9
58. 4 OTHER QD9
59. 1 YES-People different here than in the rest o f UK/GR QDIO
59. 2 NO QDIO
59. 3 DO NOT KNOW QDIO
59. 4 OTHER QDIO
60. 1 YES-People different here than in the rest of Europe Q D ll
60. 2 NO Q D ll
60. 3 DO NOT KNOW Q D ll
60. 4 OTHER Q D ll
61. 1 YES-Europe represents a challenge for our region QD12
61. 2 NO QD12
61. 3 DO NOT KNOW QD12
61. 4 OTHER QD12
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62. 5 1-More opportunities exist in a united Europe QD13
62. 4 2-slightly more opportunities QD13
62. 3 3-same level o f opportunities and risks QD13
62. 2 4-slightly more risks QDl 3
62. 1 5-more risks QD13
62. 8 OTHER QDl 3
62. 9 DO NOTKNOW QDl 3
NOTES
1. Values assigned here are those used in the primary analysis. 
In further analysis certain variable values where collapsed, 
filtered or order reversed to facilitate more sophisticated 
tests.
2. In variable RANK (Variable No.2) it was deemed appropriate to 
assign different values to the political elites of the two 
regions because of the two different regional political systems.
3. In the variables PI (Variable No.8) and P2 (Variable No.9) 
different values where assigned for establishing firm size by 
turnover and employees. This was done arbitrarily but in a 
fashion that would reflect the different level of economic 
development of the two regions. This is a practice routinely 
followed by the European Commission when publishing reports 
(Commission,1990,1991b)and I believe best reflects the relative 
weight of local elite individuals.
4. In variable PPl (Variable No.35) assignment of a number of 
variants in the standard political parties of Greece was deemed 
necessary after a repeated insistence of interviewees to assign 
themselves political hues when giving out their party 
affiliation.
5. Variables QCll (Variable No. 46) and QDll (Variable No. 60) 
where exclusively included in the Greek questionnaire. Their 
inclusion could assist in the analysis of more intricate 
questions in the region.
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Appendix Il.d; Sample Letter of Approach
Date [alone, with month spelled out in full]
Dear Sir,
I am currently engaged at the University of Glasgow on a research project which seeks to analyse the impact of the forthcoming European single market on business perspectives and performance. The project is a comparative one, and aims to look at developments in Scotland, Spain and Greece.
A central part of the research involves an assessment of the attitudes of key figures in the Strathclyde business community towards the single market and how its arrival will affect their own plans. To this end, I would beimmensely grateful if you would be prepared to spare a short amount of time (no more than three quarters of an hour, at most) to see me and answer a brief questionnaire.
I appreciate that your schedule must be very busy, but if you could possibly oblige I am sure that the results of the research project would be of interest, and - indeed - may help to improve Scotland's competitive edge in respect to other European regions.
Thus, I do hope that you are able to respond positively to this request. Iwould be happy to arrange an appointment at any convenient time.




Appendix Ilia: List of Interviewees (Names of interviewees withheld to maintain confidentiality)
NO/ID DATE NAME/FUNCTION

































































































































PRESIDENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITY
65GR/POL 26/9/91
PRESIDENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITY
66GR/POL 25/9/91
PRESID OF LOCAL COMMUNITY
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67GR/POL 26/9/91
PRESIDENT OF CITY COUNCIL
68GR/POL 9/10/91




PRESIDENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITY/ & DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION
71GR/POL 11/9/91










MAYOR OF SMALL TOWN
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